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Glossary of Key Mining Terms
Abandoned Mine: A site where advanced exploration (diggings, pits, 
trenches), or mineral extraction has ceased, without effective remedi-
ation or reclamation. This term is often used to refer to orphaned mines 
(see below).
Acid Mine Drainage: A pollution issue where mine wastes (tailings, 
waste rock, etc.) from sulphide rock formations react with air and water 
to produce sulphuric acid. The resulting acidic water has the potential 
to oxidize heavy metals (lead, cadmium, copper, etc.), exacerbating the 
water pollution problem.
Base Metals: Metals that are not considered precious (iron, copper, lead, 
etc.).
Cyanide: A chemical used to dissolve gold or silver in order to facilitate 
separation from ore. 
Open Pit (or Open Cast) Mining: A mining method that removes ore 
deposits through the mechanized digging of large holes directly from the 
surface (usually after the removal of overburden such as vegetation and 
soils). 
Ore Body: The entire body of rock and other material that is extracted to 
process and produce one or more valuable minerals.
M I N I NG A N D C OM M U N I T I E S I N NORT H E R N C A NA DAxii
Ore Concentrates: Produced through a milling process (often crushing 
and chemical separation) that results in a fine powder with a high per-
centage of the target metal. Ore concentrates are not a finished product, 
but are often produced in situ for more efficient transport to a smelter. 
Ore Reserves: An assessment of the total amount of ore that can be ex-
tracted to produce minerals, usually categorized as possible, probable, or 
proven. 
Orphaned Mine: An abandoned mine for which no private owner can 
be identified in order to establish liability. Such sites typically revert to 
public ownership and responsibility. 
Placer Mining: Recovery of surface or stream-bed deposits of a target 
mineral (often gold), typically by washing, dredging, or hydraulic mining.
Prospecting: The earliest stage of the development process involving the 
active search for possible mineral claims.
Reclamation: A process of converting abandoned (or soon to be aban-
doned) mining lands to a usable state, as opposed to allowing them to 
become derelict.
Rehabilitation: In mining landscapes where full restoration (see below) 
is impossible, a partial repair of the structure and function of the previ-
ous ecosystem. 
Remediation: Environmental cleanup at operating or abandoned mines, 
usually focused on lands and waters contaminated with heavy metals, 
radiation, and other toxic substances.
Restoration: An attempt to address the ecological impacts of mining 
through a return (as nearly as possible) to the ecological conditions that 
existed prior to mining.
xiiiGlossary of Key Mining Terms
Strip Mining: Mining near the surface through the removal of overbur-
den and scraping of the ore over large areas. Strip mining is common 
with coal and sometimes bitumen deposits.
Tailings: Waste material (often a fine dust or slurry) emitted from an 
ore-processing mill after separating valuable minerals from the sur-
rounding ore. 
Tailings Pond: An artificially constructed body of water meant to con-
fine tailings and prevent associated toxic material from spreading to local 
bodies of water or escaping as airborne dust. Leakage from tailings ponds 
has historically proved a major problem at mining operations. 
Underground Mining: Removal of valuable minerals through the dig-
ging of mining shafts, tunnels, and chambers. 
Waste Rock: Larger chunks of rock (and sometimes coarse gravel) pro-
duced through the mining process but containing no valuable minerals. 
Waste rock is often left in large piles at abandoned mines, but can also 
be used as construction material for roads or as fill during reclamation 
activities. 
A Note on Terminology
Throughout this volume, we generally use the terms indigenous to con-
note first peoples in a global context, Aboriginal and Native to indicate 
first peoples in a Canadian context, and First Nations or Inuit to describe 
distinct cultural/linguistic groups or legally recognized bands in Canada. 
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ę
K
e
n
o
 H
ill
3
19
13
-1
7
 
19
19
-8
9
S
ilv
e
r-
le
a
d
-
z
in
c
U
n
d
e
rg
ro
u
n
d
Y
u
k
o
n
K
e
n
o
 C
it
y,
 E
ls
a
, 
M
a
y
o
N
a
-c
h
o
 N
y
ä
k
 D
u
n
C
a
ro
l 
L
a
k
e
 
M
in
e
4
19
6
2
-p
re
se
n
t
Ir
o
n
O
p
e
n
 p
it
N
e
w
fo
u
n
d
la
n
d
 
a
n
d
 L
a
b
ra
d
o
r
L
a
b
ra
d
o
r 
C
it
y,
 
W
a
b
u
sh
In
n
u
P
in
e
 P
o
in
t
5
19
6
4
-1
9
8
9
L
e
a
d
-z
in
c
O
p
e
n
 p
it
 a
n
d
 
u
n
d
e
rg
ro
u
n
d
N
o
rt
h
w
e
st
  
Te
rr
it
o
ri
e
s
P
in
e
 P
o
in
t,
  
F
o
rt
 R
e
so
lu
ti
o
n
, 
H
a
y
 R
iv
e
r
D
e
n
in
u
 K
u
e
 (
D
e
n
e
) 
F
ir
st
 N
a
ti
o
n
, 
K
’a
t’
o
d
e
e
c
h
e
 (
D
e
n
e
) 
F
ir
st
 N
a
ti
o
n
S
c
h
e
ff
e
rv
ill
e
 
M
in
in
g
 D
is
tr
ic
t
6
19
5
4
-1
9
8
2
Ir
o
n
 o
re
O
p
e
n
 p
it
N
o
rt
h
e
rn
  
Q
u
e
b
e
c
S
c
h
e
ff
e
rv
ill
e
N
a
sk
a
p
i 
N
a
ti
o
n
 o
f 
K
a
w
a
w
a
c
h
ic
h
a
m
a
k
; 
In
n
u
 N
a
ti
o
n
 o
f 
 
M
a
ti
m
e
k
u
sh
-L
a
c
 J
o
h
n
A
th
a
b
a
sc
a
 o
il 
sa
n
d
s 
(s
e
v
e
ra
l 
p
ro
je
c
ts
)
7
19
6
7
-p
re
se
n
t
B
it
u
m
e
n
S
u
rf
a
c
e
 m
in
in
g
N
o
rt
h
e
rn
  
A
lb
e
rt
a
F
o
rt
 M
c
M
u
rr
a
y,
 
F
o
rt
 M
c
K
a
y
F
ir
st
 N
a
ti
o
n
s 
o
f 
 
A
th
a
b
a
sc
a
 T
ri
b
a
l 
 
C
o
u
n
c
il 
(C
re
e
, 
D
e
n
e
)
N
a
n
is
iv
ik
10
19
74
-2
0
0
2
L
e
a
d
-z
in
c
U
n
d
e
rg
ro
u
n
d
N
u
n
a
v
u
t
A
rc
ti
c
 B
a
y
  
(I
k
p
ia
rj
u
k
)
In
u
it
P
o
la
ri
s
11
19
8
2
-2
0
0
2
L
e
a
d
-z
in
c
U
n
d
e
rg
ro
u
n
d
N
u
n
a
v
u
t
R
e
so
lu
te
  
(Q
a
u
su
it
tu
q
)
In
u
it
G
ia
n
t 
M
in
e
12
19
4
8
-2
0
0
4
G
o
ld
U
n
d
e
rg
ro
u
n
d
 
a
n
d
 o
p
e
n
 p
it
N
o
rt
h
w
e
st
  
Te
rr
it
o
ri
e
s
Y
e
llo
w
k
n
if
e
Y
e
llo
w
k
n
iv
e
s 
D
e
n
e
  
F
ir
st
 N
a
ti
o
n
Ta
bl
e 1
: S
um
m
ar
y o
f k
ey
 lo
ca
tio
ns
 an
d 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s o
f c
as
e s
tu
dy
 m
in
e s
ite
s
1Introduction: The Complex Legacy  
of Mining in Northern Canada
Arn Keeling and John Sandlos
In the midst of his annual northern tour in August 2011, Prime Minister Stephen 
Harper visited the Meadowbank Gold Mine, one hundred kilometres or so 
north of Baker Lake, Nunavut. Speaking in front of assembled workers and mas-
sive ore-hauling trucks, Harper hailed the mine—Nunavut’s only producing site 
at the time—as a beacon of future prosperity for the people of the Arctic, and 
promised his government would help industry “unlock development possibilities 
in the North.”1 The PM reiterated these grand pronouncements to party sup-
porters in Yukon the following year, when, echoing former Conservative Prime 
Minister John Diefenbaker, he declared that “the North’s time has come” and 
that mineral development would help fulfill a “great national dream.”2
Fast-forward to early 2013: as gold prices continued their long slide 
in the wake of the global recession, Agnico-Eagle, the company that owns 
Meadowbank, announced that it would close the mine three years earlier than 
planned (in 2017) and shift operations to another northern site. Mineral ex-
ploration funds began drying up, and new development proposals were scaled 
back across the North. Most dramatically, the massive Baffinland Mary River 
iron mine project in Nunavut radically curtailed its investment and develop-
ment plans, cancelling a proposed railway and port development on Baffin 
Island and scaling back its project investment to $740 million from an initial 
projection of $4 billion.3
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These events illustrated, in a very short time frame, the extreme vola-
tility of the mining sector and the uncertainties that stalk mining-de-
pendent communities and regions. Since the early 2000s, this industry 
has seen strong growth, as global demand and concerns over mineral 
scarcity began driving a “commodity supercycle” that spurred strong in-
vestment.4 High mineral prices meant companies began to seek oppor-
tunities in regions previously considered too remote or expensive to oper-
ate profitably, including Northern Canada. Exploration and development 
expenditures skyrocketed, attracting renewed interest in historic mining 
areas—whether former mines or previously explored but unexploited 
deposits—that had been idled by the industry’s prolonged slump in the 
1980s and 1990s. After the “bust” that closed mines and destroyed com-
munities in the 1980s, mining seemed ready to “boom” again in the heady 
days of the pre-recession 2000s. Most observers remain cautiously opti-
mistic about the medium to long-term trends in commodity prices, and 
the prospects for northern development, but there’s little doubt recent 
bumps in the road to northern riches have caused some to reflect on the 
industry’s risks, as well as benefits.5
As a historian and a historical geographer, our perspective on these 
developments is informed by the long view of mining’s place in Canada’s 
northern and national history. Hardrock mining was the most important 
activity that brought industrial development to Northern Canada in the 
twentieth century. Large-scale industrial mining projects in the Canadian 
North began to appear even as placer gold mining in the Klondike began 
to decline in the early part of the century. Before 1945, industrial min-
ing was concentrated at three main sites across the North: the Keno Hill 
silver camp near Mayo in the Yukon, the radium/uranium mines around 
Port Radium, NWT, and the gold mines at Yellowknife, NWT (Map 1). 
Surging postwar demand for industrial and strategic minerals, fuelled 
by both Cold War military needs and an expanding consumer society in 
North America, stimulated widespread exploration and development in 
the Canadian North. The postwar boom saw several major new develop-
ments, including the lead-zinc deposits at Pine Point, NWT, lead deposits 
at Faro in the Yukon (the Cyprus-Anvil Mine), and nickel at Rankin Inlet, 
NWT (now Nunavut), as well as the expansion of gold mining in the 
Yellowknife district.
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Despite the relatively small number and wide geographic dispersal of 
these mines, industrial mining had a transformative impact on the North. 
By the 1950s, metal mining and fuel production (the latter almost en-
tirely for local consumption in industrial developments and settlements) 
accounted for over 80 per cent of territorial economic output.6 Mining 
in the provincial norths also expanded, including major iron mines in 
Quebec and Labrador (Schefferville, Labrador City), uranium develop-
ments in Saskatchewan and Ontario, and several base metal mines in 
northern Manitoba. Mineral development in this period stimulated 
non-Native exploration and settlement, investment in infrastructure 
from roads to railways to power developments, and the increasing inte-
gration of these once-remote territories into the national economy. Yet 
the costs of such development have become increasingly evident in recent 
decades. Former mine sites have left in their wake not only a toxic legacy 
of tailings ponds and waste rock dumps, but also a history of social and 
economic dislocation that continues to disproportionately impact north-
ern Native communities. The promise of development and prosperity for 
northern regions—the “northern dream” of prime ministers since John 
Diefenbaker—has frequently delivered only ephemeral benefits, while 
leaving behind lingering social and environmental problems.
Mining and Communities in Northern Canada traces the history and 
legacies of the region’s encounter with industrial mining in the twenti-
eth century. With chapters spanning Canada’s territorial north (and two 
provincial norths), this book aims to place the contemporary mineral 
boom (and accompanying hyperbolic rhetoric) into a critical historical 
context, as well as documenting the tremendous environmental, eco-
nomic, and socio-cultural changes wrought by this transformative indus-
try. Certainly the northern mining industry imported many significant 
historical tensions and contradictions worthy of their own book-length 
analyses, not least the ongoing conflict between capital and a labour 
force composed largely of outsiders. However, the studies in this volume 
focus largely on the often-neglected historical experiences of northern 
Native communities and their encounters with mineral development. 
Addressing the paucity of detailed historical studies on mining in the 
region, this volume represents an important collective contribution to 
our understanding of northern history, industrial development, and 
5Introduction
environmental change in the North, even as the region stands on the 
brink of another transformative period.
Most of the chapters emerged from a research project based at 
Memorial University called “Abandoned Mines in Northern Canada,” 
which sought to illuminate the complex historical geography of min-
eral development, as well as its impacts on local communities and en-
vironments in the North. Generous funding from the Social Sciences 
and Humanities Research Council, ArcticNet, the Northern Scientific 
Training Program and other sources enabled the recruitment of talent-
ed students who, along with the project leaders and other collaborators, 
undertook extensive archival and field-based research in northern com-
munities. Using a series of abandoned mines—sites of mineral explora-
tion, development, and production that had ceased operation—as case 
studies, project researchers explored the impacts of industrial modern-
ization on northern communities and environments, as well as the con-
temporary problems related to closure, abandonment, and remediation 
of these sites. In addition to producing a series of fine theses related to 
their case studies, many of the students involved in the project contribut-
ed chapters to this book. In addition, project partners from the commun-
ities themselves feature not only as informants or research partners in 
the field, but also in some instances as chapter authors.7 The result (sum-
marized at the end of this introduction) is a unique collaborative volume 
documenting the complex and contentious historical engagement with 
mining in the twentieth-century North.
FR AMI NG CANADA’S NORTHER N  
MI NI NG HISTORY
If our encounters with northern mining people and landscapes provided 
the most immediate and powerful influence on the chapters contained 
herein, our collective attempts to contend with the vast and complex his-
torical literature on Canadian and international mining have also shaped 
our work in profound ways. From the outset of the project, Harold Innis’s 
foundational work on the rise and fall of hinterland staples economies 
provided a key pathway into our study. Although certainly not a new 
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perspective, Innis’s analysis of economic vulnerability among commun-
ities dependent on single resources provided a template for understanding 
the patterns of boom and bust in northern mining developments whose 
fate was often determined by distant economic forces. Ironically, Innis’s 
most important work on mining, Settlement and the Mining Frontier, was 
quite positive about the economic impact of the Klondike gold rush and 
optimistic about the potential for mining to spread modern energy and 
transportation infrastructure throughout Northern Canada.8
Innis’s boosterism reflected a broader optimism about northern de-
velopment in the 1920s, but his staples thesis nevertheless influenced a 
newer generation of scholars who analyzed more critically the cyclical 
nature of northern mining development. In a series of articles, geograph-
er John Bradbury examined the massive post–World War II develop-
ment of the Quebec–Labrador iron ore range, highlighting the rise and 
near-collapse of communities such as Schefferville.9 In a more theor-
etical vein, Trevor Barnes and others have elaborated on Innis’s concept 
of cyclonics, the idea the hinterland resource developments proceed in 
storm-like fashion, with a sudden flood of capital, labour, materials, and 
knowledge into remote areas that dissipates just as suddenly when con-
ditions change.10 Even the few American environmental historians who 
have turned their gaze northward to Alaska or the Yukon emphasize the 
deep connection of mining to distant metropolitan centres where ma-
terials, animals, people, and capital are mobilized for the single-mind-
ed exploitation of a single resource, and where overdependence on these 
“paths out of town” can lead to economic shock and collapse in min-
ing’s instant towns.11 Mining is a risky business in remote regions such 
as the Canadian North: high transportation and operating costs com-
bined with vulnerability to volatile markets have often made community 
breakdown and economic collapse the inevitable endgame for northern 
mining towns. 
But what of the Native communities that predate the development 
of mining in the Canadian North? Too often the staples-inflected liter-
ature has focused only on the rise and fall of largely non-Native mining 
towns, stories that ignored First Nations and Inuit communities who ex-
perienced sudden and rapid social, economic, and environmental change 
due to mining, and who persisted in spite of the abandonment of adjacent 
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mining activities. As we began our research, we found surprisingly little 
scholarly work on this theme, particularly from a longer-term historical 
perspective. Much of what has been done stems from the work of NGOs 
such as MiningWatch and the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, 
or emanates from the formal assessment processes and reporting re-
quirements of mines with significant environmental liabilities.12 Aware 
of the burgeoning literature on mining and indigenous conflicts in the 
US Southwest, Australia, Africa, and Latin America, we immediately 
sought to frame mining in Northern Canada within the global literature 
on environment and justice.13 We ultimately adopted historical polit-
ical ecology as a major theoretical frame for our work, a geographical 
subdiscipline that highlights the unequal distribution of environmental 
harms and benefits due to colonial environmental management and re-
source production schemes in Third World regions. We argued that the 
territorial north in the twentieth century, much like these other resource 
extraction zones in the developing world, was a thinly populated but still 
largely indigenous space where the long reach of mining severely impact-
ed pre-existing subsistence economies, provided few local employment 
or investment opportunities, and often left severe environmental prob-
lems with which Aboriginal communities have to contend.14
The historical political ecology framework thus helps connect min-
eral development’s local impacts and conflicts to larger questions sur-
rounding the links between political economy, state-led or promoted de-
velopment projects, and the settler colonial dispossession of indigenous 
people.15 In Canada, past northern development visions and policies have 
been strongly linked to the exploitation of the region’s natural resour-
ces; particularly after the Second World War, politicians and bureau-
crats promoted resource development, especially mining, as the key to 
assimilating northern people and territories into the national economy.16 
Throughout much of Arctic and Subarctic Canada, this agenda advocat-
ed the transition of Aboriginal economies away from land-based subsist-
ence and trade economies, and toward wage economies and settlement 
life—often with dire consequences for Aboriginal people themselves.17 
Our research has found, similar to cases in the developing world, that 
the southern Canadian perception of the North as both an underdevel-
oped territory and as a potentially rich resource frontier underwrote 
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industry-friendly government policies and subsidies for industrial infra-
structure, including dams, townsites, roads, and railways, all of which 
further affected Native communities and territories. 
These impacts were most stark at major mines where Native com-
munities faced acute toxic threats or other environmental clean-up issues 
over the long term: sites such as the Port Radium mine, the Cyprus-Anvil 
lead-zinc mine, the Pine Point Mine, or the Giant Mine. Indeed, many 
chapters in this volume reveal that Native people maintain strong feel-
ings of historical injustice about the social and environmental legacies 
of mining in their regions. Some regard mining as a key agent of col-
onialism in their region, bringing sudden influxes of outside workers, 
instant communities, state agencies, and environmental degradation, 
all of which combined to compromise subsistence economies based on 
hunting and trapping.18 For instance, particularly in early to midcen-
tury developments, mines drove significant local deforestation through 
their voracious demand for wood for fuel and construction.19 Many large 
northern mineral developments were accompanied by hydroelectric 
dams (including at Faro, Pine Point, Yellowknife, Uranium City, Lynn 
Lake, and Schefferville) in order to power towns and industrial facilities, 
dams that altered local rivers and displaced land users.20 In places such 
as Port Radium or Yellowknife, Native people were exposed to acute and 
low-level toxic contaminants (radiation at the former site, arsenic at the 
latter) that caused death and illness in some cases. The precise health and 
ecological impacts of past mine pollution is difficult to assess due to the 
inherent limits of historical epidemiology (and poor contemporary mon-
itoring practices), but the persistence of pollutants long after the closure 
of these mines has contributed to a sense that the land is sick and danger-
ous rather than a source of sustenance.21
 Very often the impacts of mining and its related developments oc-
curred alongside the other profound environmental, social, and health 
challenges that northern Native people faced throughout the twentieth 
century. New diseases, acute hunger, poor nutrition associated with 
store-bought food, declining fur trade economies, community reloca-
tions, military activities, and poor housing often coincided with min-
ing development or arose as a direct result of conditions within mining 
communities, as many of the case studies make clear.22 In spite of these 
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wide-ranging changes, for northern Native communities on the front 
lines of toxic or radiological exposure due to mining, the use of their 
traditional lands as repositories for pollution and waste is often remem-
bered as the most significant of the changes that outsiders brought with 
them. 
As with other historical works highlighting the dire ecological im-
pacts of mining, it was difficult to conclude that the environmental issues 
associated with northern mining could lead anywhere but to stories of 
decline and dislocation.23 However, a major challenge to this negative 
perspective has come from what might loosely be described as the “re-
silience school” of mining history. Inspired by the pioneering work of 
geographer Richard Francaviglia (and perhaps influenced by the general 
revolt against “declensionist” narratives among environmental histor-
ians and historical geographers), several scholars and popular writers 
have argued against a “mining imaginary” in which the death of mining 
communities and environmental catastrophe inevitably follow the clos-
ure of a mine. Mining communities, these writers suggest, often survive 
after the end of mining, through any combination of economic diversifi-
cation, mining-related tourism, redevelopment (as sites of mineral pro-
duction or as brownfield redevelopments for other industries), or large-
scale ecological restoration projects. Central to these studies is the idea 
that mining communities identify very strongly with their own history; 
meaningful commemoration of mine work, community life, and mining 
landscapes remains a key concern in many mining towns facing closure 
and remediation.24 
In Northern Canada, factors such as distance and limited infra-
structure present very real challenges to the survival of mining commun-
ities, but we did find ample evidence of resilience and a strong mining 
identity among former mining communities in the region. Since the final 
closure of the Giant and Con gold mines adjacent to Yellowknife in the 
early 2000s, the city has thrived as a government town (it is the terri-
torial capital) and as a supply and labour centre for the major diamond 
mines that commenced operation on the tundra to the northeast in the 
late 1990s. The city still retains a strong identification with its origins as a 
mining town: local history societies have published several oral histories 
of life in the early gold mining years, while the NWT Mining Heritage 
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Society hopes to develop a museum preserving some of the industrial 
heritage (including at least one headframe) at the Giant Mine site.25 
Former Inuit miners in Rankin Inlet also maintain a strong identification 
with the community’s mining history, while the community has survived 
as a relatively large (by northern standards) government and service cen-
tre, and regional transportation hub.26 Other sites such as Port Radium, 
the Keno Hill silver mines, and the Quebec-Labrador iron region have 
received almost hagiographic treatment in popular histories produced by 
former mine officials or in histories commissioned by mining compan-
ies.27 Some of our other case study towns, such as Schefferville, Quebec; 
Uranium City, Saskatchewan; and Keno City, Yukon, clung to life despite 
being depopulated when the mines closed due to plunging mineral prices 
in the 1980s, and now anticipate a rebirth if commodity prices remain 
high and redevelopment of abandoned mineral deposits moves forward. 
Even in cases where the physical community did not survive, former 
town residents keep the memory of their community alive. One example 
is Pine Point’s very active web-based memorial, a grassroots commem-
oration that was recently highlighted in a brilliant online interactive 
documentary by the National Film Board.28 Mining towns in Northern 
Canada sometimes do survive the collapse of their main raison d’etre, 
whether they are sustained by new economic activity or kept alive in the 
memories and virtual worlds of former residents. 
How to reconcile the theme of resilience with the historical political 
ecology framework we had adopted became a key question for our col-
lective work on abandoned mines. Ultimately we found that many Native 
communities exhibited their own forms of resilience both during and 
after mining boom periods, taking advantage of wage labour opportun-
ities when presented but also returning to hunting and trapping activities 
when prices were favourable. From very early in our research, we realized 
it was too simple to suggest that Native northerners were simply the pas-
sive victims of mining. Native people took advantage of opportunities in 
the mining industry when they could, adapting to mineral development 
through strategies that ranged from engaging in ad hoc labour to even-
tually applying political pressure for the establishment of Inuit and Dene 
mineral rights and/or royalty regimes through impact and benefit agree-
ments and the comprehensive land claims process.29 
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And yet, abandoned mines in Northern Canada remain places that 
are too deeply contested to fit neatly within the resilience framework. 
Indeed, the resilience school too often ignores the multiple ways in which 
mines impact communities, particularly in light of the colonial and pol-
itical ecology context that we highlight above. For many researchers on 
this project, one of the most remarkable findings was the extent to which 
many Native northerners embraced the complexity of their mining hist-
ories, critiquing the colonialism and environmental degradation that 
were invariably tied to mining on the one hand, but minutes later ex-
pressing the same pride in their work and nostalgia for the good old min-
ing days as their non-Native former co-workers. As so many of the people 
we spoke with stated in many different ways, mining often brought with 
it a complicated and mixed legacy.
Nowhere are these deep contradictions surrounding mining history 
more acute than the contemporary debates surrounding the remediation 
and redevelopment of many of our case study mines. Again, contrary to 
the arguments of the resilience school, the “afterlife” of mines can have 
extremely negative implications for northern Native communities. Many 
northern mines live on as sources of local controversy because of severe 
long-term environmental degradation, where legacies including massive 
landscape changes, waste rock piles, abandoned industrial facilities, and 
toxic contaminants such as heavy metals, acid mine drainage, or radio-
activity have forced the federal government to establish expensive re-
mediation programs. In addition, prompted by recent spikes in mineral 
prices, many abandoned northern mines are being resurrected through 
redevelopment of remaining ore deposits—in some cases simultaneous-
ly with remediation of the original mining development. We have come 
to think of these examples as “zombie” mines, because in their afterlife 
they continue to haunt communities with many of the same issues—en-
vironmental risks, unequal wealth distribution, decision making by out-
siders—that emerged with the original development.30
Even where projects are undergoing only remediation—often as-
sumed to be a form of healing the land—the mobilization and contain-
ment of toxic material and the perpetual care and monitoring required at 
some sites raise profoundly complex issues associated with community 
risks and intergenerational equity. In 2002 a federal Auditor General’s 
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report prioritized thirty abandoned mines in the territorial north as re-
quiring remediation, with an estimated cost of $555 million (a very low 
figure given the fact that remediation for the Giant Mine alone is fore-
casted to cost over $1 billion).31 As of this writing, Aboriginal Affairs 
and Northern Development Canada is conducting remediation activity, 
planning, and/or monitoring programs at seventeen of these sites, with 
four simultaneously undergoing redevelopment.32 During the course 
of our research, we have been able to document community memories 
and contemporary reactions to six mines in the territorial or provincial 
norths that exhibit zombie-like characteristics—Giant, Keno Hill, Pine 
Point, Nanisivik, Rankin Inlet, and Port Radium—as well as the proposed 
redevelopment of iron deposits near Schefferville. These examples repre-
sent only a small fraction of abandoned mines in the Canadian North or 
the thousands of sites globally, but they reveal the complex and multi-
faceted ways that the fractious histories and community memories of cy-
clonic development projects in Northern Canada have profoundly shaped 
local responses to contemporary mine remediation efforts. 
 
Figure 2: Yellowknife, NWT’s abandoned Giant Mine in 2008, before remediation 
activities began. Remediation costs at Giant are expected to exceed $1 billion. Photo 
by Arn Keeling. 
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U NDER STANDI NG MI NES  
THROUGH OR AL HISTORY
Local memories of abandoned mines have persisted in much the same 
way as the after-effects of the sites themselves. In most of our case study 
communities, we found that undertaking oral history research was es-
sential to capture the varied local memories of mining and to document 
the complex and layered community stories that rarely emerged in ar-
chival documents or government reports. A lively scholarly and popu-
lar literature on mining and communities makes extensive use of oral 
history in order to document the experiences of workers and families in 
these uniquely hardscrabble settings.33 Oral histories have also explored 
the environmental degradation associated with mining, while highlight-
ing the various ways these “wasted” landscapes are perceived by area 
residents themselves, who may identify positively with industrial ruins or 
mine waste sites.34 In this way, oral history permits researchers to explore 
the multiple meanings and experiences of mining places.35 Ranging from 
collections of edited transcripts to the use of oral interviews in conjunc-
tion with ethnographic, archaeological, and archival sources, oral history 
is regarded as a potent source for the documentation of otherwise “hid-
den voices” of mining history. 
Typically absent from this body of oral history work is the experi-
ence of Native people in many mining regions. Few studies in Canada 
have used oral history to capture indigenous people’s parallel historical 
development of mining identities and their experience of mine closure, 
either as workers or as broader participants in local economic and settle-
ment life.36 As people with lifeways and knowledge systems intimately 
tied to local environments, northern Native communities often have 
borne the brunt of the environmental changes associated with mining, 
whether deforestation, local resource depletion caused by habitat change 
and harvesting by newcomers, or pollution and toxicity stemming from 
mining and mineral processing wastes. Indigenous oral histories can also 
provide important insight into these processes and experiences of min-
ing-driven environmental change.
Our initial motivation, then, for using oral history was one common 
to many practitioners: to address the gaps in the archival record and to 
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explore the hidden histories and untold experiences of industrial develop-
ment in the North. Most of the chapters in this volume include detailed 
archival research in federal and territorial archives, which document 
government policy and, to a lesser extent, corporate and individual min-
ing-related activities in the North.37 But Native voices are conspicuously 
absent from the vast government archival record on northern mining, 
despite the fact that responsibility for Aboriginal affairs and northern 
development rested within a single federal department—the Department 
of Northern Affairs and National Resources, in its various incarnations—
after the Second World War. Where Native people are present, they ap-
pear as objects of state policies around employment, settlement, or inter-
actions with non-Native newcomers; rarely, before the 1970s at least, 
were Native people’s opinions, reactions, or experiences of development 
recorded or sought. Our interest in “recovering” Native experiences with 
industrial development resonates with one of the core motivations of oral 
historians: to record (literally and figuratively) these ignored stories and 
thereby to challenge dominant historical narratives.38 
In the process of engaging with communities and individuals over 
the course of this project, however, some of the paradoxes of this ap-
proach became apparent, prompting a deeper reflection on questions of 
positionality and knowledge of the sort urged by advocates of indigenous 
methodologies.39 Although the communities and individuals we worked 
with expressed enthusiasm for documenting their stories, the notion of 
“restoring hidden voices” to the public transcript in many ways reflected 
our own outsider status and interests (as southern, non-Native academ-
ics and students).40 It quickly became apparent that stories of industrial 
development and environmental damage are far from “hidden” in the 
communities themselves; rather, they continually circulate and are mo-
bilized from time to time in communities’ ongoing engagements with 
land-use planning, land claims, and new development proposals. This 
question also arose when we returned to communities to report on the 
results of the oral history studies, which sometimes placed us in the awk-
ward position of repeating to community members their own stories. It 
has become important for us to recognize that the absences in the ar-
chival record and ignorance of southern Canadians (including scholars) 
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regarding Native experiences do not necessarily extend to the commun-
ities themselves. 
Similar questions arose surrounding cross-cultural communication, 
translation, and representation in this project. As outsider researchers, 
we typically worked with community researchers, who participated in 
the research process by connecting us with informants, asking questions 
themselves, or translating interviews with elders who preferred to speak 
their language. These community researchers represented a vital bridge 
between ourselves as non-Native visitors (and, to informants, unknown 
quantities) and these knowledge-holders. Nevertheless, questions of 
translation—both linguistic and epistemological—remain. With respect 
to language, the two-way communication of an interview became medi-
ated through a third party and the back-and-forth translation of ideas 
and terms, raising ample potential for misunderstanding and miscom-
munication. Where possible, we have sought full translations of inter-
views after the fact, but the potential gulf in meaning and understanding 
remains, however tentatively bridged by our able translators. As outsiders 
and non-Native people, we do not expect to share or completely under-
stand Native knowledge and experience; we also recognize that, because 
they were speaking to outsiders, interviewees may have chosen to share 
certain versions of stories with us, based on the questions we asked. In 
that sense, we follow Linda Shopes and others in regarding oral histor-
ies as products of this interaction, rather than as objectively collected 
“knowledge.”41
In this dynamic of the co-production of knowledge, the outcomes of 
oral history research are best regarded in terms of shared authority and 
negotiated meanings. Shopes suggests this shared authority is a check 
on all participants in the oral history process: “Scholars do not get to 
exercise critical judgment quite so forcefully or conform to current his-
toriographic thinking quite so deftly; laypeople do not get to romanticize 
the past quite so easily.”42 Nevertheless, our ongoing interpretation and 
re-presentation of these interviews becomes a further layer of mediation 
between the informant and various audiences (including the readers of 
this volume). As we began to undertake transcription (itself a problem-
atic textual rendering of oral expression) and analysis of our interviews, 
we confronted questions of respectful yet critical representation of this 
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knowledge in both public and scholarly contexts. Concerns about reli-
ability and validity stalk oral history: in analyzing stories about industrial 
development and environmental change, we remain alert for the effects 
of nostalgia or “social memory” in shaping individual recollections of 
particular events and issues.43 Nevertheless, we have approached the oral 
history component of the project not with the desire to document con-
crete events or specific environmental impacts (i.e., to answer questions 
of causality or proof), but rather with the goal of capturing personal and 
collective experiences and perceptions of mining-induced social and en-
vironmental change. As archaeologist Karen Metheny asserts, “Oral his-
tory, then, is as much an exercise in verification as it is learning how peo-
ple create their own versions of the past and determining the meaning of 
those constructions.”44 Thus, we regard oral stories not as hard “evidence” 
about environmental and social change (although respondents have often 
suggested environmental impacts and problems not well documented in 
the archival record), but rather as personal insights enriching and deep-
ening narratives of industrial development with grounded, individual ex-
periences and observations. 
In seeking these stories, it was critical to acknowledge community 
motivations (collectively represented by First Nation, Métis, and Inuit 
governments or other organizations) and the interests of individual par-
ticipants themselves in sharing their experiences, and to undertake the 
research through processes and agreements approved by them. Each of 
the case study communities brought varying motivations and levels of 
participation and oversight to the research. In some cases, our propos-
als to study the mining past were greeted with more or less instant en-
thusiasm. In other cases, relationship building took repeated visits and 
discussions over years. In all cases, the communities’ engagement with 
the research (quite properly) reflected their interest in documenting the 
past, whether for the purposes of land claims, resource management, and 
regulatory processes, or simply recording for posterity elders’ experien-
ces with mining and the coming of non-Native settlement. Rather than 
limiting or biasing the research, these interests validated our presence 
in the community and the goals of our study, while allowing us more 
or less free rein to conduct the interviews as we saw fit. Guided by the 
Tri-Council Policy on Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans 
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(TCPS2),45 project researchers also followed the relevant community, ter-
ritorial, and institutional protocols for gaining informed consent from 
participants. While particular individuals and organizations are acknow-
ledged in each of the chapters, it is appropriate here to acknowledge and 
thank the many northerners who worked with us to help make this re-
search possible.
Rather than undertaking “life history” or traditional knowledge stud-
ies, we employed a semi-structured, “directed interview” technique that 
sought to highlight individual experiences and knowledge of mining and 
the local environment. Because we aimed to document lived experience 
of events that were (mostly) within living memory of the subjects, we did 
not seek folkloric or other stories of a “traditional” nature (though iron-
ically, most of the research agreements we established with First Nations 
are governed by traditional knowledge protocols). This approach had 
benefits and costs. While it enabled a focused and purposeful interview 
(allowing respondents to direct the discussion as they saw fit), it perhaps 
divorced the topic somewhat from the wider contexts of interviewees’ 
lives: family, community, land, and culture.46 Whether or not inter-
viewees worked there or had strong opinions about it, the mine was likely 
not the central feature of their lives—except perhaps during the hour or 
so spent in conversation with researchers. These contexts nevertheless 
occasionally forced their way into the transcript, through references to 
family origins, histories of movement, or important personal milestones, 
and provided important glimpses of interviewees’ lives.
The result is a rich tapestry of personal and community memories 
and stories from small mining towns ranging from the High Arctic to the 
provincial northlands; from Nunatsiavut, Labrador, in the East to Mayo, 
Yukon, in the West. The vastness of the subject matter and the geograph-
ic territory, not to mention the usual constraints of time and budgets, 
prevented us from covering all major mining developments in Northern 
Canada. Indeed, some major historical mines such as Con Mine near 
Yellowknife, the Cyprus-Anvil Mine in the Yukon, and the uranium 
mines of northern Saskatchewan receive only brief mention in this book. 
Innumerable smaller mineral developments are ignored. We chose our 
existing case studies in part because of their size, longevity, and severity 
of local impacts, but also based on the extent to which individual mines 
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represented the leading edge of mineral-led colonialism in particular re-
gions of Northern Canada. Keno Hill silver mine, for instance, was the 
first industrial mine in the territorial north; other sites were the first to 
push mining into remote regions such as the Eastern Arctic (Rankin 
Inlet), the Arctic Islands (Polaris and Nanisivik), isolated areas along 
the Quebec–Labrador border (Schefferville and Labrador City), and the 
south side of Great Slave Lake (Pine Point). Certainly we wanted a col-
lection that represented diverse regions of Northern Canada (including 
examples from the provincial norths) and a variety of time periods, but 
individual research interests and life experiences (some authors live close 
to their case studies) also shaped the choices of cases and subject matter 
in this book. 
The first section of the book focuses most intensely on our oral his-
tory research projects and the complex community memories of mining 
in Northern Canada. Arn Keeling and Patricia Boulter’s chapter high-
lights Inuit memories of the North Rankin Nickel Mine, the first large-
scale Arctic mining project, opened in 1957, and the first to employ 
Inuit labour as a deliberate social and economic development strategy. 
The chapter traces the challenges faced by the Inuit, but also their stra-
tegic adaptation, during the rapid transition “from igloo to mine shaft,” 
arguing that Inuit developed a strong identity as miners even as they cri-
tiqued shortcomings of the project such as poor housing and the short 
five-year life of the mine. In the second chapter, Sarah Gordon analyz-
es one of Northern Canada’s most controversial mining sites, the Port 
Radium mines that produced radium and then uranium from the east-
ern shores of Sahtú (Great Bear Lake) from 1931 to 1960 (and intermit-
tently produced silver until 1982). The mine is notorious, not only for 
its contribution of uranium to the Manhattan Project, but also due to 
the controversy surrounding radiological exposure among Dene workers 
from Délįnę. Gordon highlights how community memory surrounding 
the discovery of pitchblende (which they contend was passed on by elder 
Old Beyonnie rather than “discovered” by legendary prospector Gilbert 
Labine) intersects with more recent attempts to reconcile the colonial 
past of the mine with community healing in the present. In Chapter 3, 
Alexandra Winton and Joella Hogan trace the long history of interaction 
between the United Keno Hill Mine and the Na-Cho Nyäk Dun First 
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Nation in the central Yukon. Through a close reading of the experience 
of one elder, Henry Melancon, the authors argue (similar to Keeling and 
Boulter) that the mines brought a mixed legacy of opportunities and nega-
tive impacts, historical experiences that inform contemporary reactions 
to Alexco Resource Corporation’s ongoing simultaneous remediation and 
redevelopment of the old mining area. Jane Hammond’s work in Chapter 
4 moves away from northern Native communities, instead providing an 
oral history that accounts for gender relations in the iron-mining town 
of Labrador City. Hammond’s work reveals that, despite women’s advan-
ces in the workforce elsewhere in Canada in the 1970s, social pressure, 
company policies, and masculine workplace culture meant that women 
entered mine work only very slowly in Labrador City, often finding them-
selves caught uneasily between the twin pressures of the domestic and 
wage labour realms. John Sandlos’s final chapter in this section surveys 
the intensive oral history research conducted in Fort Resolution, NWT, 
near the massive Pine Point lead-zinc mining complex that operated on 
the south shores of Great Slave Lake between 1964 and 1988. The many 
collected memories of individuals suggest a mixed historical legacy for 
mining in the region, with interviewees recalling their great fondness for 
mine work and town life, while at the same time lamenting the nega-
tive social, economic, and environmental changes that accompanied the 
introduction of mining to their region. As with the previous studies, oral 
history research throws into bold relief the manner in which northern 
Native communities remember mining, in the words of one interviewee, 
as a mix of the good and the bad. 
However remote they may be geographically, northern communities 
are never isolated from the political and policy frameworks that simultan-
eously promote and regulate mining development in Canada. The second 
section of the book thus examines the many ways that northern com-
munities have attempted to insert their voices into provincial, territorial, 
and federal regulatory processes or to directly engage mining companies. 
In Chapter 6, Jean-Sébastien Boutet evaluates the Quebec government’s 
Plan Nord, a comprehensive northern development program centred 
on major hydro and mineral projects, in light of the mixed legacy of the 
abandoned iron mines near Schefferville. Boutet suggests that previous 
mine closures and the sudden loss of a wage economy at Schefferville 
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continue to haunt contemporary discussions of development among the 
Innu communities of Matimekush–Lac John (Schefferville) and Uashat 
mak Mani-utenam (Sept-Îles), despite current promises of long-term jobs 
and prosperity. Hereward Longley, in Chapter 7, turns toward the initial 
period of oil sands growth in the 1970s, tracing the attempts of the Fort 
McKay First Nation to assert some control over the economic and en-
vironmental impacts of development through the courts and regulatory 
hearings. Andrea Procter’s chapter examines the growth of an Inuit rights 
discourse in response to uranium exploration in northern Labrador, an 
assertion of resource claims that was expressed formally through the 
emergence of the Labrador Inuit Association in the 1970s and the land 
claims process that produced Nunatsiavut in 2005. And yet, even though 
resource rights and land claims may represent a step forward from total 
exclusion of Inuit from development, Procter questions whether granting 
Inuit a share of the dominant development paradigm may also represent 
an entrenchment of neoliberal ideas of self-sufficiency and economic au-
tonomy from state “handouts.” In a similar vein, the final chapter of this 
section, by Tyler Levitan and Emilie Cameron, provides a pointed cri-
tique of the recent move toward impact and benefit agreements (IBAs), 
the private deals that are now typically struck between mining compan-
ies and northern Native communities in order to delineate jobs, econom-
ic benefits, and environmental liabilities associated with nearby mining 
developments. As with Procter’s work, Levitan and Cameron suggest that 
the seemingly inclusionary step of inviting northern Native communities 
into negotiations with companies may actually represent the affirmation 
of a neoliberal regime whereby northern social development programs 
become at least partially privatized within the (disturbingly) boom and 
bust capital flows associated with the mining industry. While mining 
companies and governments point to new industry–Native community 
partnerships as a marker of major change, the chapters in this section 
suggest that unequal power relations and colonial legacies still play a ma-
jor role in shaping northern development projects. 
The final section presents three chapters that examine the zom-
bie-like afterlife of many mines, and the manner in which the history of 
these places is reflected in the contemporary reality of nearby commun-
ities. The first of these is Scott Midgley’s discussion of the abandoned 
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Nanisivik lead-zinc mine on Baffin Island, which operated from 1976 to 
2002. Midgley considers the post-closure debates over mine remediation 
at Nanisivik, arguing that, far from being valueless, the abandoned mine 
became a site of contested valuation (of land and environment), as the 
government and company insisted on scientific and cost-effective ap-
proaches to mine remediation while the Inuit of Arctic Bay expressed 
deep skepticism about the long-term efficacy of the proposed remedi-
ation plan. By contrast, Heather Green suggests in Chapter 11 that the 
fly-in, fly-out Polaris lead-zinc mine that operated on Little Cornwallis 
Island figures hardly at all in the historical memory of the service town 
of Resolute, located about ninety kilometres to the south on Cornwallis 
Island. Through oral history interviews, however, Green discovered that 
the relative amnesia surrounding Polaris is in part a product of Resolute’s 
own experience of marginalization from the social and economic bene-
fits of the development, and the mine persists mainly as a symbol of rela-
tive Inuit exclusion from previous development projects. The book’s final 
chapter belongs to Yellowknife-based social and environmental activist 
Kevin O’Reilly, who provides a detailed yet passionate account of at-
tempts to insert local voices into the remediation of the abandoned Giant 
Mine. Here, the federal department of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern 
Development Canada (AANDC) is proposing to contain through freez-
ing 237,000 tons of arsenic trioxide stored underground at the mine, a 
staggering amount of highly toxic material that will require care and 
maintenance in perpetuity. O’Reilly tells a deeply disturbing story of how 
AANDC has resisted public involvement, environmental assessment, 
and independent oversight over the remediation project, reducing the 
deeply conflicted issues surrounding the historical mine site to a mere 
technical engineering problem. Perhaps more than any other site, the 
immense scale and complexity of remediating Giant illustrate the costly 
legacies associated with northern mining, and the deep conflicts these 
sites continue to provoke in the present. 
It has been more than one hundred years since mining began in the 
Keno Hill Silver District, the site of the territorial north’s first indus-
trial-scale hardrock mines. What has a century of mining brought the 
Canadian North? Did the mines bring civilization or advance the agen-
da of settler colonialism? Did they bring untold riches or siphon wealth 
M I N I NG A N D C OM M U N I T I E S I N NORT H E R N C A NA DA22
from the region for other people living in other places? Did the mines 
bring economic development or dislocation, all the while bequeathing 
long-term and costly environmental problems that may not be solved for 
generations? The chapters in this book suggest that mining in Northern 
Canada brought all of these things. There is no doubt, for instance, that 
mining was one of the major stimulants of northward expansion in 
Canada, a colonial incursion into Native territory that has only recently 
been redressed, however inadequately, through land claims and IBA pro-
cesses. The materials and much of the wealth from these mines did indeed 
follow many pathways out of town—gold to the vaults of central banks, 
lead and zinc to massive smelting facilities in Southern Canada or over-
seas, and uranium to the research laboratories of the Los Alamos atomic 
bomb project—but often provided only marginal employment benefits to 
the Native communities adjacent to the mines. At the same time, Native 
communities did often embrace mining development and mining labour 
as a hedge against tough times in the fur trade and hunting economies. 
Mining brought new communities and settlers to Northern Canada, but 
the collapse of many major developments left a legacy of nearly aban-
doned communities or ghost towns that stand as testaments to the 
ephemeral nature of the mineral economy. In some cases, the abandoned 
mines of Northern Canada have also produced environmental problems 
that afflicted the past and the present, and potentially could persist far 
into the future.
Almost all of our case studies illustrate the deeply conflicted historic-
al experience of northern mining development that inevitably hangs over 
current debates about mine remediation, redevelopment, or new mining 
projects close to Native communities. If the history of northern mining 
is indeed a tangled legacy, the chapters in this book allow us a close-up 
view of these contradictory stories, and the ongoing attempts to recon-
cile the complex past with the opportunities and challenges that mining 
may present northern communities in the future. The renewed northern 
mining boom of the past decade has brought territorial governments, 
Native leaders (particularly the newly empowered land-claims organiz-
ations), and mining companies into new relationships, under circum-
stances very different than those surrounding twentieth-century mining. 
Yet as Virginia Gibson suggested in her study of diamond mining in the 
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Northwest Territories, while modern miners “may seek to enter the polit-
ical geography of the north without acknowledging the past, [a] relational 
view of history reveals they will arrive with the shadows of ghost-mines 
behind them.”47 Our research into abandoned mines confirms that reck-
oning with the history, geography, and ongoing legacies of past rounds of 
extractive development is critical if large-scale mining has any chance of 
generating enduring prosperity and opportunities for sustainable econ-
omies in Northern Canada.
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From Igloo to Mine Shaft:  
Inuit Labour and Memory at  
the Rankin Inlet Nickel Mine 
Arn Keeling and Patricia Boulter
The North Rankin Nickel Mine in Kangiqiniq (Rankin Inlet)1 has been 
closed now for over fifty years, and its iconic headframe lost to fire in the 
late 1970s. Yet the sense of connection and identification with the mine 
remains strong in the town. At a workshop held in 2011, nearly seventy 
people gathered to share stories, examine historical photographs, and 
watch a screening of the National Film Board documentary “People of 
the Rock.”2 The film, made in 1961 and depicting a somewhat sanitized 
version of the Rankin Inlet mine story, nevertheless elicited poignant 
memories from elders in the room, who shared stories of lost loved ones 
and memories of the mining days and their youth. Community members 
gathered around archival photos of Inuit miners at work, pointing out 
friends and relations, and helping in some cases with identification (Figs. 
1, 2). The mood of the gathering, while reflective, was also celebratory, a 
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chance for the community to once again honour its founding members 
and partake in stories and images of the mining days.
In many ways, a commemorative gathering such as this workshop 
might seem unremarkable. Indeed, a wide-ranging literature on mining 
history and heritage explores the persistence of local identities as “min-
ing communities” long after the end of mining. Historically, mining 
communities have been known for the strong sense of worker solidar-
ity forged in the often-extreme “workscapes” of mining, a solidarity that 
may extend to community responses to the crisis of deindustrialization.3 
Through rituals, commemorative activities, and a typically strong iden-
tification with the mining landscape, many mining communities dem-
onstrate their resilience in the face of the often-devastating economic 
and social changes associated with mine closure. Describing this ten-
acious sense of place within marginal communities and landscapes, Ben 
Marsh notes that, for many people, “land retains its meaning long after 
the means are exhausted.”4 While perhaps easily dismissed as exercises 
in nostalgia, or critiqued for their masking of the social inequities and 
environmental degradation associated with mineral development and 
deindustrialization, these perspectives nevertheless capture something 
of the intense identity formation connected with the experience of min-
ing labour and the role of these identities in fostering community spirit 
and resilience in the face of economic decline.5
 
Figure 1: 
Workers joking 
with a supervisor 
at the nickel mine 
[Harry Liberal, 
Titi Kudlu, Noah 
Kumakjuaq and 
Andy Easton]. 
Photo by Kryn 
Taconis. Library 
and Archives 
Canada photo 
PA-175565.
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But the Kangiqiniq workshop also highlights the absence from these 
accounts of the experience of indigenous people in many mining re-
gions. Although indigenous people have long worked in and for mines 
in various capacities, their mining history is usually explored in terms of 
their dispossession, exclusion, marginalization, and experience of land-
scape degradation associated with (neo)colonial mineral development. 
As Bridge and Frederiksen note (with reference to Nigeria), mining was 
“part and parcel of the process of socio-ecological modernization” of in-
digenous territories globally, and “the principal means by which [these 
 
Figure 2: Two men stand and talk in front of Rankin Inlet Nickel Mines Ltd.,  
July 1961. Douglas Wilkinson fonds/Nunavut Archives/N-1979-051: 2316 
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territories] became incorporated into a world economy under conditions 
of colonial rule.”6 Yet indigenous people did not merely suffer through 
or resist mineral development; they also participated (willingly or other-
wise) and, in so doing, became miners. For instance, classic anthropo-
logical studies in Bolivia explored the development of an indigenous 
mining identity there, associated with the long history of colonial and 
modern mining in the Andean region.7 Nevertheless, few studies (beyond 
those in this volume) have sought to capture indigenous people’s parallel 
historical development of mining identities and their experience of mine 
closure, either as workers or as broader participants in local economic 
and settlement life.8 
The history of the North Rankin Nickel Mine provides insights into 
the complex indigenous experience of mining as an agent of socio-eco-
nomic change. Founded on a rich nickel deposit located on the western 
shore of Hudson Bay in present-day Nunavut, the mine formed the basis 
for the settlement at Kangiqiniq in the late 1950s. Regarded as an experi-
ment in Inuit modernization and a solution to a perceived crisis affecting 
traditional resources, the mine’s short operational life (1957–1962) belied 
its importance as Canada’s first Arctic mine and the first to actively pro-
mote the employment of indigenous workers. At its peak, Inuit employ-
ees, virtually all of whom moved to Rankin Inlet with no experience of 
wage work, comprised about 70 per cent of the mine’s workforce, as both 
underground and surface workers. The mine’s sudden closure in 1962 
devastated the local economy, threatening the community’s very survival 
and forcing many Inuit to leave the community to seek alternate employ-
ment or to return to traditional harvesting activities.
While the story of the Rankin Inlet mine has been explored by vari-
ous authors, few have incorporated first-hand perspectives of Inuit min-
ers themselves.9 Based on oral histories conducted in Kangiqiniq in 2011 
with the assistance of Inuit researchers, this essay explores the history 
of mining at Kangiqiniq and the emergence of a mining identity among 
Inuit miners.10 These perspectives are supplemented by archival research 
on the history of the mine and its relation to government and company 
policy in the region. In spite of its short, tumultuous life and sudden col-
lapse, the mine remains central to the identity of the community and its 
Inuit and non-Inuit residents alike. The memories shared by Inuit miners 
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about Kangiqiniq provide important insights into the experience of in-
digenous workers with mineral development, the transition to industrial 
modernity, and the impacts of mine closure. The continued close iden-
tification with the mine by these elders, and by the broader Kangiqiniq 
community, reveals the unique and persistent sense of heritage and place 
connected to the mining experience.
****
The North Rankin Nickel Mine, which commenced construction in the 
early 1950s and produced its first ore in 1957, operated in the context of 
rapid socio-economic change in the postwar Eastern Arctic. Before the 
1950s, northern agencies, including the RCMP and federal government 
officials, strove to prohibit Inuit from congregating around permanent 
settlements by enforcing a strict “policy of dispersal.” This policy aimed 
to protect traditional Inuit land-based culture, but more importantly, 
to ensure Inuit would not become a financial burden to the nation. At 
the same time, contradictory educational and settlement policies sought 
both to elevate Inuit from their “primitive” position through moderniz-
ing their social and cultural practices while at the same time preserv-
ing their “independent” and “traditional” lifeways.11 Early in the 1950s, 
with the collapse of Arctic fox fur prices and a perceived crisis in caribou 
populations, the Department of Northern Affairs adopted an increasing-
ly interventionist policy in the Eastern Arctic.12 These developments, and 
the negative publicity surrounding desperate Inuit living conditions (in-
cluding episodes of starvation among inland Inuit groups) largely ended 
the laissez faire attitude of the government, which shifted to the promo-
tion of wage labour as a solution to the “Eskimo problem.”
Along with work in construction at Distant Early Warning (DEW) 
Line stations, the mine at Rankin Inlet appeared to offer an opportunity 
to shift Inuit away from their seemingly precarious land-based economy 
and toward industrial wage labour and settlement life. As a Canadian 
Press reporter noted in 1958, “[Government] officials here call the Rankin 
experiment a ‘bright shining light’ against the general background of the 
Eskimo Problem. Sustained success would mean a lot in the program 
to integrate the Eskimo from his stone-age past into the ‘time clock’ 
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world.”13 Writing to the mine company’s secretary for information about 
the operation, Deputy Minister of Northern Affairs R. Gordon Robertson 
suggested that “because of the steadily increasing inroads on the wildlife 
resources of the North, it is going to be necessary to have more Eskimos 
adapted to wage employment as their means of livelihood.”14 To this end, 
the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources and other 
government agencies in the region, such as the RCMP, assisted the North 
Rankin Nickel Mine in identifying suitable Inuit candidates for employ-
ment.15 As the mine’s first general manager Ken Whatmough recalled, 
the company also drew on the connections of Singiituq, a boat pilot from 
Chesterfield Inlet, to locate local labour when needed.16
For its part, the company initially embraced Inuit labour as a season-
al workforce, and Inuit were engaged in construction and stevedore work 
(as well as trade) at Rankin Inlet as early as 1953. By 1956–57, as the mine 
shifted to production, Inuit were recruited to Rankin Inlet in increasing 
numbers. North Rankin Nickel Mine (NRNM) president W. W. Weber 
told Northern Affairs officials he was “strongly in favor of employing as 
 
Figure 3: 
One of the 
supervisors at 
the nickel mine 
[Singiituq]. Photo 
by Kryn Taconis/
Library and 
Archives Canada 
photo PA-175593.
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many Eskimos as possible” and integrating them permanently into the 
life of the mining camp.17 That year, Inuit employment increased from 
fourteen to eighty workers and, under mine manager J. Andrew Easton, 
Inuit workers became integrated into nearly all aspects of the operation, 
including (eventually) underground work. For NRNM, in spite of lan-
guage and cultural barriers, Inuit workers provided a ready and “cheer-
ful” labour force that helped the company deal with the challenge and ex-
pense of attracting and retaining southern mine workers in this remote 
location. With the mine’s financial viability in question from the outset, 
Inuit labour presented an important means of reducing costs.18 
Though the bulk of the recruits were from the Chesterfield Inlet 
area of northwestern Hudson Bay, Inuit migrated to the new settlement 
from across the Kivalliq (then known as Keewatin) region. Interviewees 
recalled travelling by dog sled, airplane, and Peterhead boat to Rankin 
Inlet in the mid- to late 1950s. Ollie Ittinuar, who was an RCMP special 
constable at Chesterfield Inlet in the early 1950s, recalled a community 
meeting at which people were asked if they would like to work at the 
mine. Seeking better wages, Ittinuar travelled by dog team to Rankin 
Inlet with another family. “As soon as we got over there the mine people 
came over and asked us to work for them right away, so we got to work 
right away upon arrival. So that’s how the job started with the mine.”19 
Others, like Joachim Kavik and Francis Kapuk, lived with their families 
in the area (Kavik at Meliadine Lake, Kapuk at Baker Foreland), so they 
were well aware of the developments at Rankin Inlet. Kapuk recalled:
 When we came here from caribou hunting we would come 
back here and stay with people here .  .  . They were living in ig-
loos at that time when we would come here . . . There was white 
people who came in at that time as well who came to tell us there 
were employment opportunities at the mine, who said if you hear 
of anyone who wants to work for the mine, pass it around. 
Others, like Thomas Tudlik (from north of Chesterfield Inlet) and John 
Towtoongie (from Coral Harbour), had previously left their communities 
to seek opportunities elsewhere before coming to Rankin Inlet. Veronica 
Manilak flew to Rankin Inlet from Repulse Bay with her husband in 1961, 
where they joined her father, who was already working at the mine.
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In the Keewatin Journal (a recollection of life in the region from the 
1950s–70s published in 1979), several people recounted how between 
1958 and 1959 they were no longer able to make a living or survive off 
the land due to the shortage in caribou, and therefore had no alternative 
other than to work in the mine.20 Similarly, several miners we interviewed 
recalled how their moves brought a dramatic, almost immediate change 
from a predominantly land-based lifestyle of hunting and trapping to in-
dustrial work and settlement life. “We lived as a true natured Inuit when 
I was growing up,” noted Thomas Tudlik. “For example, we had no family 
allowances. In those days we had no governments, no established gov-
ernments during the time I was growing up. We had the Hudson Bay 
Company, where we traded furs and things like that.” Joachim Kavik said 
that his father, while happy living on the land, was encouraged to come 
work at the mine and eventually did so. “My father was a very traditional 
Inuk he did not speak one word of English when he started working for 
the mine.” His family wanted to keep their dogs for hunting, so they lived 
about a mile from the Rankin settlement. 
The transition to settlement life posed challenges for Inuit workers 
and their families. Both settlement and work life for Rankin Inuit was 
highly structured by the paternalistic yet often contradictory policies of 
the company and Northern Affairs officials. Initially, Inuit workers lived 
in sod houses and tents at the fringes of the nascent settlement (see Fig. 
4), while southern workers occupied bunkhouses near the mine. Francis 
Kapuk recalled difficult living conditions: “In the early stages when we 
came here we were living in a tent, we didn’t really stay in an igloo but we 
stayed in a tent. We fixed it up by putting together whatever cardboard 
we could find as insulation inside the tent.” Veronica Manilak remembers 
the challenges of starting over in a new community: “I found it rather 
boring, extremely lonely [and] strange, because when we left we left every-
thing at home including our husky dogs including our belongings. We left 
home with nothing, we left our tent, we left everything in there, the only 
thing we took were our children and our rifle and that’s pretty much it.” 
Migration to Rankin Inlet brought Inuit from different regional dia-
lect and kinship groups together with white southerners in the “cosmo-
politan” setting of Rankin Inlet, and the settlement was initially segre-
gated by race and kinship. As it developed, the townsite was divided into 
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three distinct sections: two containing Inuit residents (the New and Old 
Eskimo Settlements) and the other meant for non-Inuit, Euro-Canadian 
personnel of the mine, government, or other institutions.21 The “White 
Settlement” comprised two neat rows of buildings: houses for the fed-
eral northern service officer, the HBC store, the school, and the Roman 
Catholic and Anglican missions. In this section, houses were supplied 
with heat, water, and sewage lines from the mine. “The New Eskimo 
Settlement” was separated from the white settlement and located further 
from the mine buildings. It was closely monitored by the NRNM and con-
sidered off limits to non-Inuit mine workers. The houses here were pre-
fabricated, three-room structures. Although these houses all had electric-
al lighting and regular garbage collection provided for by the mine, they 
did not have centralized heating or running water. Instead, Inuit heated 
their houses with cooking stoves and had to walk to get water. Makeshift 
outhouses were often shared by several families. Located a quarter mile 
north of the mine’s headframe, the “Old Eskimo Settlement” consisted 
 
Figure 4: Reinforced tent house in Rankin Inlet, early 1950s. Photo by Kenneth 
Whatmough, Consulting Engineer and General Manager, North Rankin Nickel 
Mines Limited/Nunavut Archives.
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of several clusters of shacks and tents, many built by Inuit themselves. 
In this section, the mine provided no essential services and “debris [was] 
.  .  . scattered everywhere.”22 This area was typically occupied by those 
who had lower-paying positions within the mine. However, many Inuit 
families preferred living in the Old Settlement, for they could live near 
kin and practise their traditional pursuits easily in the less monitored 
environment. The settlement’s segregated nature in this period was re-
inforced by government officials when interior Padlirmiut suffering from 
starvation in the winter of 1957–58 were relocated and settled in a nearby 
Keewatin Rehabilitation Project camp called Itivia.23
Work for wages was, of course, the principal attraction of Rankin 
Inlet. Initially, Inuit workers, particularly those doing construction work, 
were paid less than non-Inuit (as little as 60 cents per hour).24 The com-
pany and federal officials reacted strongly to accusations from the local 
Oblate missionary, Father Fafard, and others that they perpetuated sec-
ond-class status and wages among Inuit, noting that Inuit workers also 
received meals in the mine’s mess hall and, by the end of the 1950s, free 
housing and stove oil.25 By the time Inuit workers began working under-
ground, wages were on par with those paid non-Inuit workers for similar 
jobs. Although the hours were long and the underground environment 
unfamiliar, Inuit miners appreciated the security of regular wages and, 
as one miner’s wife recalled, the opportunity to purchase goods at the 
mine commissary and Hudson Bay store.26 Nevertheless, Inuit miners’ 
pay packets were controlled at first by the northern service officer, “in 
order to ensure that at the outset at least their earnings are used to pur-
chase only essential goods and not frittered away on non-essentials” like 
luxury goods.27
As in most aspects of settlement life, workplace segregation (Inuit 
and non-Inuit initially ate separately, for instance) gave way to gradu-
al, if partial, integration of Inuit and non-Inuit. Although few spoke any 
English at all (and no white miners spoke Inuktitut), several Inuit miners 
recalled how they learned by example how to drill, blast, and operate 
underground: according to Peter Ipkarnerk, “The white people that we 
worked [with], they were there to show us how to do things, so we learned 
by example, by looking, by observing.” In this way, Inuit workers learned 
to operate machinery above and below ground, trained as mechanics 
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(such as plumbers), and joined non-Inuit workers on the mine’s emer-
gency rescue team. Others, like Jack Kabvitok, worked in construction 
and performed other services around the settlement before working in 
the mine itself. The former miners suggested work relations with qallu-
naat (non-Inuit) workers were good, overall, even jokingly remembering 
learning how to swear in English from them. Although some tensions 
and conflicts with supervisors were recalled, the “big boss,” mine manag-
er Andy Easton, was fondly remembered as a fair man who cared for the 
Inuit workers. 
For the mine and Northern Affairs officials, one of the main chal-
lenges in employing Inuit was the inculcation of the norms and values of 
wage work, including time discipline. Southern employees, working on 
seasonal rotation and living in bunkhouses away from families, worked 
seven days a week, but Inuit workers balked at this schedule (although 
they worked these hours during construction). As early as 1956, a north-
ern service officer reported that “the Eskimos stated that they were sat-
isfied with the pay and working conditions but that they would like to 
have time off for hunting meat for their wives and children.”28 From time 
to time, Inuit employees would fail to show up for shifts in order to go 
hunting, a source of friction with the mine. Working with Northern 
Affairs officials, mine management devised a system whereby Inuit could 
request leave to hunt, so long as they helped to find a shift replacement 
in advance. As former miner Peter Ipkarnerk recounted, “We . .  . made 
a request to our supervisors, to the authorities, to go out and hunt . . . as 
long as they agreed then we could go out in the middle of the week.” This 
option was important to the miners, not only materially in helping feed 
their families, but also culturally. According to Thomas Tudlik: “the work 
was very important, the fact that we had to work all the time. But, at the 
same time we are meat eaters, so we used to go out hunting.” In 1959, 
when the mine reinstituted seven-day weeks, Inuit miners complained 
and the northern service officer wrote to manager Andrew Easton, not-
ing that Inuit needed time off to practise “their traditional occupations,” 
with a view to a “return to life on the land” after mining.29
Invoking ideas of acculturation and citizenship, many federal officials 
regarded employment at Rankin Inlet as furthering the Inuit “adjustment 
and integration into our industrial society” with “the same opportunities 
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to develop their talents as other Canadians.”30 Inuit from the coastal re-
gions north of Rankin Inlet (Chesterfield Inlet and Repulse Bay) were 
considered more acculturated to living in settled communities and par-
ticipating in wage labour ventures, due to their interaction with whalers 
and history of Distant Early Warning Line construction employment. 
For its part, the mining company (which dominated community life) re-
mained mainly concerned with the performance of Inuit as workers, not 
their status as citizens.31 As the anthropologist Robert Dailey and his wife 
Lois noted in their 1958 report on the community, “Those Eskimo [sic] 
that are frugal, hard working, punctual, and cooperative, are in the eyes 
of the mine ‘desirable.’ Those who do not readily adjust or who do not 
pay close enough attention to orders, or who malinger, are rejected and 
forced to leave the community.”32 Similarly, the anthropologist, social 
worker, and long-time Rankin Inlet resident Bob Williamson concluded 
that in spite of the ready adaptation by many to mine work, “the Eskimo 
did not completely identify with the mine and management objectives.” 
Indeed, some Inuit who worked at the mine chose to leave, returning to 
former communities or moving to more “traditional” communities like 
Whale Cove.33 Clearly some, like John Towtoongie, who told us of split-
ting his time between living in Whale Cove and working in Rankin Inlet, 
preferred to retain their connections to hunting life over a full-time com-
mitment to mining.
The emerging social life of the community reflected a similar pattern 
of segregation, then partial integration. Early efforts to limit and monitor 
contact between the Inuit and non-Inuit of the community extended to 
social functions.34 In spite of a desire to acculturate and “modernize” Inuit, 
the many entertainments organized within the community were initially 
racially segregated, and a separate movie night and dance were held each 
week for Inuit and non-Inuit. Non-Inuit men were strictly prohibited 
from entering the “Eskimo Village,” or they would be fired.35 Similarly, 
Inuit women were not allowed access to the male bunkhouses and could 
not enter the commissary except on Saturdays and only in the company 
of their husbands. Although later relaxed, these policies aimed to prevent 
drinking, gambling, and, most of all, liaisons between non-Inuit men and 
Inuit women, to avoid sexually transmitted diseases, adultery, prostitu-
tion, and unwanted pregnancies. In spite of these restrictions, as Ollie 
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Ittinuar’s son Peter, who grew up in Rankin Inlet, commented, “in a way 
it was more integration than had ever existed before, even though it was 
segregated. People took part in the same activities, there was community 
dances, movies . . . white people and Inuit people went to these things at 
the same time, went to church at the same time.” Elders fondly recalled 
fiddle dances and cowboy films attended by both Inuit and qallunaat. 
They noted that beer drinking, too, became a feature of community life, a 
source of bonding between Inuit and non-Inuit workers, but also a source 
of problems for some workers. 
By the early 1960s, Rankin Inlet was a thriving community of about 
600 Inuit and non-Inuit, with government offices (housed by the mine), 
an RCMP detachment, three religious missions, and a Hudson’s Bay 
store. But the North Rankin Nickel Mine, from the outset a financially 
precarious operation, began to seriously founder in 1960 and on April 3, 
1962, the Globe and Mail reported that the mine had closed, throwing 
seventy “Eskimos” out of work and threatening the future of the town. 
Deputy Minister of Northern Affairs R. G. Robertson ruefully reflected, 
“The problem with mines is that they run out,” while expressing hopes 
that displaced Inuit workers might eventually find work elsewhere and 
promising government support in the interim.36 In another story, busi-
ness reporter Stanley Twardy, playing on the popular image in the south-
ern press of the modernized Inuit miner, was less sanguine: “Hoping to 
bring civilization to the Rankin Eskimos the Government sold them on 
installment-plan-buying of wooden huts and the Hudson’s Bay store ac-
cepted their credit on other long-term purchases. Some Eskimos learn-
ed to live in style and purchased refrigerators, which are operated from 
the mine’s electric supply.”37 A month later, newspapers were reporting 
the government’s emergency response to the emerging “Keewatin crisis” 
and forecasting “an end to the unique inland caribou people” occasioned 
by declining caribou herds, relocation to the coast and, now, economic 
displacement.38
Northern Affairs officials, who had so eagerly encouraged Inuit to 
migrate to Rankin Inlet for work, veered between paralysis and panic 
at the prospect of the mine’s closure and mass unemployment in the re-
gion. As early as 1959, the area administrator for Rankin Inlet had urged 
government planning for closure, noting “wage employment is the basic 
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need of the people here” but concluding, grimly, that “some of the people 
might have been better off in the long run had they never entered the field 
of wage employment.”39 Through a series of reports, correspondence, and 
conferences on the future of the region in the wake of mine closure, sug-
gestions for the community ranged from the creation of alternative in-
dustries to a return to traditional semi-subsistence activities to the com-
plete depopulation of Rankin Inlet and relocation of its residents (either 
to other Arctic communities, or to Southern Canada).40 In the end, the 
unofficial “plan” for Rankin Inlet’s post-mining future consisted of a cha-
otic series of initiatives that involved elements of voluntary relocation, 
migration (back to previous settlements), economic diversification, and 
(eventually) the move of Northern Affairs’ Keewatin regional headquar-
ters from Churchill, Manitoba, to Rankin Inlet as an economic stimulus. 
For its part, the mining company and its non-Native employees simply 
walked away from the settlement, after selling much of the town’s infra-
structure to the federal government.41
Inuit workers and their families recalled closure as a time of hardship 
and adjustment. As two workers interviewed by filmmaker Peter Ittinuar 
in the early 1970s recalled, with few work opportunities in Rankin Inlet, 
many Inuit returned to their former communities at their own expense. “I 
thought there was going to be permanent mining activity, and I thought 
there was going to be a lot of employment,” David Iglukak told Ittinuar.42 
While Northern Affairs officials encouraged Inuit to leave the communi-
ty and to return to land-based activities for survival, many who had left 
this life struggled to re-adjust. Veronica Manilak recalled:
We became extremely poor after the mine closed. We were 
as a matter of fact very hungry at times.  .  .  . There was a man 
named Batiste who had dogs, and with his dogs my husband went 
out caribou hunting one day and he got lots of caribou and we 
got lots of meat at that point. We had no more snowmobiles and 
things like that because the mine had closed and we became ex-
tremely poor.
As Shingituk [Singiituq], the Inuk foreman, pointed out in a meeting with 
Rankin Inlet’s Eskimo Affairs Council in February 1962, many people 
who had moved to Rankin Inlet “no longer had the type of equipment 
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they would need to return to the land”—especially dogs.43 Belying their 
supposed status as working Canadian citizens, Inuit workers were ex-
cluded from unemployment insurance benefits, and welfare payments in 
the community skyrocketed in 1963. Reflecting the efforts to push Inuit 
back onto the land, welfare rates were adjusted to account for an individ-
ual’s ability (though not necessarily success) to obtain “country food.”44 
For its part, the mining company, Veronica Manilak suggested, “just left 
us behind,” and the interviewees in Peter Ittinuar’s film lamented the 
hardship and reliance on government assistance that resulted.
Contemporary interviews illustrate the diverse strategies for survival 
pursued by the unemployed miners. Many families (indeed the majority 
in Rankin Inlet) did not want to leave; as Jack Kabvitok noted, “Rankin 
Inlet had become my home.” He sold carvings to stake hunting activities 
(“it was a bit of a struggle at that point because we had practically noth-
ing, even though at that time I had five dogs”), and eventually found work 
with the town government. John Towtoongie recalled that people who 
returned to Arviat and Whale Cove also found it difficult to hunt for a 
living. “I was actually about the only one with a team of dogs, along with 
[another] man. When we would go out caribou hunting for example, there 
were a few caribou around at that time, when we would catch caribou we 
would distribute the meat among the other people.” Francis Kapuk briefly 
returned to Chesterfield Inlet to hunt seal, then was recruited to return 
to Rankin Inlet to work in the government-established fish canning en-
terprise. This and other government-sponsored arts and crafts initiatives, 
including a sewing centre and ceramics studio, provided some income for 
the families of displaced miners, and opened up wage-earning opportun-
ities for women.45 
As many noted at the time, however, Rankin Inuit no longer desired 
to live fully off the land, but instead wished to be given the choice of 
practising their traditional lifeways, participating in wage labour oppor-
tunities, or balancing the two. Many of the miners, in fact, wanted to 
continue mine work, and Northern Affairs officials sought to match 
Inuit mine workers with other industrial opportunities elsewhere in 
the North, with some success. With government assistance, Inuit from 
Rankin Inlet relocated to work in mines in Quebec (at the request of 
former NRNM manager Andy Easton), Manitoba, the Yukon, and the 
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Northwest Territories; as well, they went to work on the construction of 
the Great Slave Lake Railway line from Alberta to the Pine Point Mine 
in the NWT.46 Peter Ipkarnerk and Francis Kapuk, along with two other 
miners, were flown to Yellowknife in late 1963 to work at Con Mine. Ollie 
Ittinuar, after a short stint at the Asbestos Hill Mine in Quebec, joined 
several other Rankin families at the Sherritt Gordon mine in Lynn Lake, 
Manitoba, where he worked for nine years, eventually becoming a shift 
boss. Some relocated miners brought their families (like the Ittinuars); 
others, like Joachim Kavik, lived in bunkhouses or in rented accommo-
dations with other miners.
These moves (as with the relocations to Rankin Inlet) were treated by 
Northern Affairs officials as an “experiment,” so they were closely mon-
itored and reported on, including in the press.47 As with Rankin Inlet, 
the redeployment of Inuit miners at other northern sites was intended to 
reduce labour turnover costs at northern mines and to continue the pro-
cess of Inuit social development. Government reports and correspond-
ence document the miners’ struggle to adjust to new surroundings and 
their separation from families, but also the successful transplant of many 
workers.48 Several workers moved repeatedly between Rankin Inlet and 
different locations or jobs as they sought personal stability and oppor-
tunity. Separation from family was, oftentimes, an obstacle to long-term 
employment at mines and communities far from Rankin Inlet. Others, 
particularly those like the Ittinuars whose family remained together, 
thrived in their new locations. Many miners gained reputations as val-
ued employees and went on to work at mines across the North, including 
Cullaton Lake, Nanisivik, and others. 
Nevertheless, for many miners, Rankin Inlet continued to draw them 
back, in spite of the community’s challenges. Upon returning from a few 
years working in Yellowknife, Peter Ipkarnerk found that “it was lonely 
when we came back here to Rankin Inlet. Looking at the mine . . . seeing 
the mine closed it was very lonely because that was the only place where 
we were making money, where we were able to work and make money.” 
He continued working on long rotations away from the settlement before 
retiring as a miner in 1969. After a long period as a miner in Lynn Lake, 
eventually Ollie Ittinuar also brought his family back to Rankin Inlet, 
where he opened a coffee shop. As Williamson and Foster noted in their 
51Arn Keeling and Patricia Boulter
1975 report on the relocations, most non-Inuit observers regarded the 
return of the miners to Rankin Inlet as a failure of the relocation and 
re-establishment program.49 But it appears many workers simply seized 
the opportunity to return to the community they and their families now 
called home, particularly once the establishment of regional administra-
tion in Rankin Inlet somewhat stabilized the community in the 1970s. 
Many of the original Rankin mining families became leading families 
in the town; their names adorn the lists of past town councillors and 
mayors posted on the wall of the hamlet chamber, and they are regularly 
honoured as the founding generation of the community. As several min-
ers we interviewed told us, mining is still regarded as the community’s 
reason for being and as a shaper of its character.50
****
Asked about the hard work performed by the miners of Rankin Inlet, 
Peter Ipkarnerk offered this analogy:
Inuit are no strangers to hard work . . . many years ago Inuit 
lived a very difficult life with the contact with the white man, you 
know. We would receive matches for example, in order to save 
one stick of match, for example, we used to split in half so that 
we’d have another match, another a bit more match . . . to light 
the Inuit oil lamp. My parents, for example, had maybe two bags 
of tea and those bags of tea would last for a very long time. So we 
were always aware of the hard work that we did, that we used to 
do years and years ago.
Ipkarnerk’s story, like those of some others we interviewed, reflects the 
connection of his Inuit values of industriousness and adaptability with 
his life experience of mine work. Although wage employment, as Pamela 
Stern points out, is often contrasted with subsistence work,51 Ipkarnerk’s 
comment suggests a kind of continuity or connection between these ac-
tivities and the struggles associated with them.
In the interviews we conducted, the miners’ articulation of a strong 
sense of identity as miners does not supplant, but is folded into their sense 
of Inuitness and seen as contiguous with it. While clearly influenced and 
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perhaps to some degree controlled by federal officials and mine managers 
in the settlement, Inuit miners also pursued goals and practices com-
mensurate with their own “life projects,” whether hunting for country 
food or leaving jobs altogether to return to their families and homes.52 In 
some cases (perhaps among the miners we were unable to interview), for-
mer workers might not have identified so closely or positively with their 
mining experience. Nevertheless, the miners we interviewed talked not 
only with evident pride about their achievements working underground 
in the Rankin Inlet mine and elsewhere, but also about the importance of 
hunting and language, their work ethic, and their sense of connection to 
Kangiqiniq as an Arctic place. In the crucible of their struggles to adapt 
and survive in difficult circumstances, whether environmental or eco-
nomic, identities were forged and transformed: the miners’ and that of 
the Kangiqiniq community.53
The Rankin Inlet story, as told in the archives, in film, and in the 
oral histories of miners and their spouses, adds a significant indigenous 
dimension to the stories of work, community life, and survival in min-
ing and post-mining communities. As Katharine Rollwagen observed in 
relation to the Britannia Beach mine in British Columbia, “employees’ 
experiences during these crises .  .  . remind us that resource-town clo-
sures cannot be characterized as inevitable or tragic; these are dynamic 
periods of intense change, shaped by both material realities, such as in-
come and commodity prices, and discursive factors, such as loyalty and 
community”—to which we would add, identity.54 In some cases, elders’ 
memories of the mining experience at Rankin Inlet seem to have been fil-
tered, to some extent, through the lens of personal and collective nostal-
gia, and the sharp edges of social struggle and economic hardship dulled 
somewhat by the passage of time. But as Piita Irniq, former commissioner 
of Nunavut and Kangiqiniq resident in the 1980s and 1990s, noted in an 
interview, the experience of moving “from igloo to mine shaft” in a single 
generation also resonates with the larger story of Inuit resilience in the 
face of colonialism and rapid socio-economic and cultural change. While 
federal officials at the time promoted mineral development as an instru-
ment of Inuit acculturation and assimilation into modern Canadian so-
ciety, what the mine’s history and its aftermath show is that while Inuit 
successfully, in many cases, became miners, they definitively remained 
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Inuit. Similar to the “entanglements of industry and indigeneity” doc-
umented by Jean-Sébastien Boutet in his account of Naskapi and Innu 
communities near Schefferville, Quebec, Inuit in Rankin Inlet embraced 
a variety of strategies as they pursued their life projects in the context of 
rapidly changing historical-geographical circumstances, including envi-
ronmental change, the growing influence of colonial forces in their lives, 
and the opportunities and challenges presented by industrial develop-
ment and decline.55
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|  chapter 2
Narratives Unearthed, or,  
How an Abandoned Mine  
Doesn’t Really Abandon You
Sarah M. Gordon
In Denendeh, the traditional territory of the Dene Nation, there are two 
places called Sǫbak’e, “the money place.” One is Yellowknife, capital of 
the Northwest Territories and administrative hub for most industry of 
the region, which centred on gold mining beginning in 1935 and dia-
mond mining beginning in 1998.1 The other is on the eastern shore of 
Great Bear Lake, where the Port Radium mine, and its associated village, 
used to stand. Arguably the most striking cultural collision between the 
Dene of the Sahtú (Great Bear Lake) and the forces of urban Canada took 
place at Port Radium. For sixty years, the only settlements on the lake 
were the Dene town of Délįnę (formerly Fort Franklin) on the western 
shore, the Port Radium mining town on the eastern shore, and a small 
Dene settlement at Sawmill Bay near Port Radium. Délįnę is the only 
one remaining. In the 1940s and 1950s, companies associated with the 
Port Radium mine hired Dene workers to load and transport uranium ore 
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across the lake and downriver and to supply wood for fuel and construc-
tion at the mine site. The long-term impacts of the mine have been dev-
astating and controversial to the Sahtúot’ı̨nę, or Great Bear Lake Dene. 
The story of Port Radium has become, in Délįnę, a cautionary tale about 
what happens when trust is given to the wrong people, local interests are 
not given equal weight to outside interests, and when outside influence is 
allowed to progress unchecked by local knowledge on Dene land.
Port Radium has been the subject of numerous histories that have 
foregrounded different perspectives on its impacts and importance: the 
community of Délı̨nę itself has published a book of personal histories;2 
historians and academics have produced texts that have sought to give 
the mine broader historical context;3 it has been the subject of at least 
two documentary films;4 and countless pages in magazines, newspapers, 
and other periodicals have been devoted to its story.5 Collectively, these 
texts tell conflicting stories about the origin of the mine and its relation-
ship with the Aboriginal people who lived and worked there. This chapter 
does not seek to evaluate any of those narratives, nor does it seek to add 
yet another voice to the cacophony. Rather, its goal is to assess some of 
these conflicting narratives as narratives. These are stories that people 
tell and that they believe, and as such they reflect larger epistemic para-
digms at work in the context of their circulation. In the words of Julie 
Cruikshank: “More interesting than the question of which versions more 
accurately account for ‘what really happened’ is what differing versions 
tell us about the values they commemorate.”6 A story never exists in iso-
lation. In all cases, there are people who tell the story, people who listen, 
and people who remember; all of these people do the work of contextual-
izing that story within the framework of the relationships surrounding it, 
the history that precedes it, and the future that flows forward from it. J. 
L. Austin introduced to linguistic circles the idea that not all statements 
can be said to be true or false, but rather, some utterances exist to do 
something;7 Searle pushed this a step further by arguing that, truly, all 
utterances do something.8 Kiowa writer N. Scott Momaday argues that 
questions of truth and fiction are subsumed beneath the life and actions 
of the story itself:
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Stories are true to our common experience; they are state-
ments which concern the human condition. To the extent that 
the human condition involves moral considerations, stories have 
moral implications. Beyond that, stories are true in that they are 
established squarely upon belief. In the oral tradition stories are 
told not merely to entertain or to instruct; they are told to be 
believed. Stories are not subject to the imposition of such ques-
tions as true or false, fact or fiction. Stories are realities lived and 
believed. They are true.9 
The mainstream and Dene narratives about the discovery of the Port 
Radium mine reflect sharply contrasting attitudes about the relationship 
between people (both Dene and non-Dene) and the landscape; these are 
the attitudes that have shaped, and continue to shape, northern coloni-
alism. At the same time, the metonymic relationship between the mine 
and the broader experience of colonialism imbues Port Radium with a 
homeopathic power: to heal Port Radium properly, with due attention 
given to the values and personhood of the Sahtúot’ı̨nę and the Sahtú 
landscape, is to take a great leap toward healing the damage of colonial-
ism more broadly.
Intimate and multifaceted relationships between mining, colonial-
ism, and indigenous cultures exist throughout the Americas. Délı̨nę’s 
story finds its closest cognate in the story of the Navajo, whose ances-
tral land became home to a thousand uranium mines in the early twen-
tieth century, and who lost countless elders to the effects of radiation 
exposure. Among the Navajo, uranium is a monster, Leetso, born from 
the ground and delivered by the Navajo miners.10 Similarly, tin mines in 
Bolivia, which began to appear almost immediately following coloniza-
tion of the region, are homes to a syncretic Devil whose growth in power 
corresponds to growth in labour alienation.11 June Nash has discussed 
how Bolivian tin miners’ insistence on foregrounding local cosmology 
as a framework within which to understand both the mines’ internal 
functions and their ongoing social impacts has empowered miners to 
resist imposed models of modernization.12 In Délı̨nę, neither the mine 
nor its ore has the agency attributed to monsters or devils, as they do in 
the Navajo homeland and in Bolivia. Rather, the land itself has a kind of 
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personhood; the natural, social, and cultural worlds often disaggregated 
in urban societies and in analyses of indigenous societies13 remain uni-
fied here, so the relationship between people and the land is governed 
by guidelines of interpersonal ethical conduct. Julie Cruikshank has dis-
cussed how Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal narratives about the Klondike 
gold rush construct the categories of “individual” and “society” in starkly 
contrasting ways that index radically different understandings of what 
qualifies as good, valued, or justified behaviour.14 Like Cruikshank, I seek 
to describe how different narratives about Port Radium reflect values of 
the teller that relate to conceptions of personhood and the relationship 
between people and the environment. Like Nash and Taussig, I seek to 
uncover the ways in which these narrative differences create opportun-
ities for local Aboriginal empowerment in the face of colonial pressure to 
continue to assimilate to mainstream Canadian norms.
I spent a total of thirteen months in Délı̨nę between June 2009 and 
August 2011, researching the way the community negotiates the pres-
sure to assimilate to Euro-Canadian norms while retaining a sense of 
local Sahtúot’ı̨nę identity. To that end, I interviewed various community 
members of different ages; I travelled on the land around the lake on trips 
geared toward trapping, hunting, fishing, and community education; 
and I participated in diverse community gatherings and activities. When 
I discussed culture change and community adaptation with friends in 
Délı̨nę, Port Radium came up as a recurrent theme in conversation. The 
ongoing impact of the mine comes not only from its material footprint 
on the landscape of the Sahtú: it comes also from the knowledge spread 
about the mine and its history through the narratives that circulate about 
it in different spheres. The varied stories about the mine—with its decep-
tive beginning, controversial existence, and devastating outcome—stand 
as both icons of and cautionary tales about the broader experience of 
colonialism.
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PORT R ADIUM: A BR IEF HISTORY
The Port Radium mine was built to excavate a vein of pitchblende ore that 
was staked by Gilbert Labine in 1930. Various conflicting narratives ac-
count for how he came to discover the ore; those will be discussed below. 
Following the discovery, Labine’s Eldorado Gold Mines Ltd. built a camp 
in a protected cove called Cameron Bay. Other companies set up small 
ventures nearby, at Contact Lake and on the Camsell River. The goal of 
most of these ventures was to unearth and sell silver, copper, iron, and 
especially radium, which was being used in everything from phosphores-
cent wristwatches to newly developed cancer treatments. Uranium, which 
was considered virtually worthless at the time, was dumped with other 
tailings into the lake water. Prior to Labine’s discovery, Belgium had held 
a monopoly over the global radium supply, extracting the element—which 
was valued at $75,000 per gram in 1930—from its colony in the Belgian 
Congo.15 In the mid-1930s, the Canadian government established a post 
office and RCMP outpost at the Cameron Bay site to serve all the workers 
in the area. By the late 1930s, the global radium market had become sat-
urated, and Eldorado found itself in a pricing war with the Belgian Union 
Minière; facing expensive extraction processes, the northern Canadian 
companies found themselves priced out of the market. To avoid shutting 
down, Eldorado negotiated with the Union Minière to delineate the geo-
graphical boundaries of their respective markets. But when World War 
II broke out in 1939, all participating countries imposed powerful trade 
restrictions; when Canada joined the Allies in September of that year, 
Eldorado lost its market in Germany. In 1940, the mine closed tempor-
arily.16 The government closed its offices there, and all non-Aboriginal 
residents returned to their homes farther south. In 1941, the American 
atomic bomb project began seeking sources of uranium oxide, a mineral 
found in high concentrations in pitchblende. The Nazi naval military and 
its U-boats held the North Atlantic in a stranglehold. The transportation 
of uranium across the Atlantic from Belgian-controlled mines in Africa 
became prohibitively dangerous. In 1942, the American government 
asked to purchase sixty tons of Canadian uranium oxide for use in the 
Manhattan Project, its secret task force working to develop a new, ex-
tremely powerful bomb.17 The order was enough to inspire the Canadian 
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government to purchase a controlling share of Labine’s Eldorado Gold 
Mines Ltd., rechristening it Eldorado Mining and Refining Ltd. and re-
opening the Port Radium site as a Crown corporation.18 Most of the ur-
anium used in the Manhattan Project came from previously purchased 
stock imported from Belgian-controlled Congo and stored in Staten 
Island, New York; demands beyond that were met with uranium from 
Port Radium. The Eldorado Mine at Port Radium continued to produce 
uranium ore until 1960, when it closed down again. In 1964, it reopened 
as a silver mine. The mine shut down for the final time in 1982, and most 
of its associated buildings and structures were dismantled.
While Eldorado’s archival records are largely closed to the public, 
all available evidence suggests that before 1977, the Aboriginal people 
were not hired to work underground in the mine.19 Aboriginal people 
were hired informally to provide other services around the Port Radium 
site: many Délı̨nę residents describe gathering wood for use as fuel and 
building material. Aboriginal people were also directly employed by the 
Northern Transportation Company Ltd. (NTCL) to work as ore carriers 
and barge pilots along the uranium transport route that moved the ore 
from its extraction site to refineries farther south. But even those work-
ers with jobs that did not involve handling ore report noticing the effects 
of the radioactive dust that coated everything, and the fuel and oil that 
would find its way into the water from the boats and machinery. To get 
water, people would have to break the oily sheen that clung to the lake’s 
surface. Ducks and fish, cut open, smelled like fuel, and sometimes they 
grew tumors.20 
The rise in cancer cases among Sahtúot’ı̨nę became noticeable after 
the mine closed in the 1980s. The community pressured the Canadian 
government to undertake studies of the history, epidemiology, and en-
vironmental impact of Port Radium. Délı̨nę secured an agreement after 
initial resistance to conduct joint research with the federal government 
in these areas. In 2000, the two governments formed the Canada-Délįnę 
Uranium Table (CDUT), a committee that aimed “to address concerns 
about the human health and environmental impacts of Port Radium.”21 
The CDUT’s final report, issued in 2005, stated that “according to risk 
modelling based on the [radiation] dose reconstruction, 1.6 excess can-
cers (more than baseline) are theoretically predicted in a group of 35 
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individuals with ages and radioactive doses the same as the ore transport 
workers,”22 but they found no conclusive evidence that uranium transport 
workers experienced any direct health impacts from radiation exposure. 
Many community members and some independent researchers dispute 
this claim.23 The CDUT’s research did, however, identify long-lasting 
tears in the community’s political, cultural, and psychological fabric that 
are directly traceable to the community’s connection with Port Radium. 
Their final report outlined twenty-six recommendations for action to-
ward remediating the mine’s lingering impacts. The recommendations 
included mandates for traditional knowledge research and the estab-
lishment of a traditional knowledge centre in the community, local job 
training and capacity building, the protection of Sahtúot’ı̨nę interests in 
all future research in the community, staffing the community health cen-
tre with health-care workers sensitive to Sahtúot’ı̨nę culture and to the 
mine’s health impacts, and remediating the environment and landscape 
as quickly as possible.24 
The CDUT process was controversial throughout its execution. Most 
people, in my experience, were pleased with the list of twenty-six rec-
ommendations that emerged from the process, but have been displeased 
with what they perceive to be insufficient follow-through on the part 
of the federal government. The remediation of the landscape has been 
underway for several years, but the components of cultural and psycho-
logical healing have received comparatively little attention. Local efforts 
to do this work have proven difficult to fund; traditional knowledge re-
search has largely come about on the impetus of independent researchers 
visiting from universities and non-governmental organizations who can 
draw on scholarly and arts-based funding. Furthermore, the environ-
mental cleanup, upon which great progress has been made in recent 
years, is fraught with tension: many community elders dislike that bar-
rels of waste are being buried on-site, rather than transported elsewhere 
for disposal. Many people still desire compensation for the cancer deaths 
that they attribute to radiation exposure on the land. The mine may have 
been closed for more than three decades, its openings sealed over and 
most of its buildings dismantled, but its story, in Délı̨nę, is far from over.
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CONFLICTI NG DISCOV ERY NAR R ATI V ES: 
GILBERT LABI NE 
The Port Radium mine has two distinct and radically different origin 
stories: one told in Délı̨nę, and another told in publications and formal 
documents throughout the rest of Canada. These narratives are mutually 
exclusive: if one is wholly true, the other cannot be. That said, even if 
one narrative is true and the other is false, the secret of the discovery of 
the pitchblende vein at Port Radium remains with the people who were 
present at the time, none of whom are alive anymore. For people today, 
these discovery narratives reflect strongly contrasting perspectives on 
Aboriginal disenfranchisement and the fair use of northern land. 
The commonly known narrative about the origin of the Port Radium 
mine originates with Gilbert Labine, the prospector who identified the 
site and whose company, Eldorado Gold Mines Ltd., established the mine 
there. This “mainstream” story has been reproduced in several major 
Canadian publications.25 According to that story, Gilbert Labine took 
a prospecting trip to the Northwest Territories, possibly inspired by a 
1900 report by J. Macintosh Bell, a geologist for the Geological Survey 
of Canada, which referred to a sighting of cobalt bloom at the site where 
Port Radium was later established.26 In a 1934 speech on the history of the 
subject, Labine describes having used maps of the Northwest Territories 
secured from the Department of the Interior and having received guid-
ance from the 1900 Bell report.27 In 1960, however, Labine published a 
contradictory history of his expedition. In an early publication about the 
history of the mine, Labine denied having seen the Bell report:
There is one fact I would like to point out: I had no geological 
maps and any of my early mapping of the structures was made by 
my own reconnaissance and not by the Geological Survey. It has 
been stated that the Bell Report of 1900 [. . .] was responsible for 
my going to Great Bear Lake. I would like to state here that this 
is absolutely false, as I did not read the Bell Report until the fol-
lowing year when I obtained a copy from the archives in Ottawa, 
after I had already been in that country. Further, I had travelled 
with Bell. As a matter-of-fact I was his first assistant in Canada 
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when he returned from New Zealand and in all of our discus-
sions never once did he mention to me that he had seen anything 
of interest in the Great Bear Lake field.28 
At least one rendition of the narrative indicates that Labine made a first 
prospecting trip to the Northwest Territories in 1929 without having 
read the Bell report and spotted the cobalt bloom during his return 
flight south. This inspired him to seek out the Bell report on his return 
home and then to head back to the region the following year, for further 
prospecting.29
Labine travelled with a partner, Charles St. Paul, and for a long time 
found nothing. One morning, shortly before they were about to give up, 
St. Paul was struck with snow blindness—a temporary, painful affliction 
of the eyes caused by overexposure to ultraviolet light without the use 
of eye protection, commonly triggered by sunlight reflecting off vast 
expanses of snow—and had to spend a few days recovering in the dark. 
Labine went for a walk on his own, where he stumbled across an ore vein 
that may have been pitchblende or may have been silver showing indica-
tions of pitchblende, depending on the version of the narrative. Labine 
found a plum-sized sample of the black rock, which he brought back to 
St. Paul in their tent. He nursed St. Paul’s eyes back to health until St. 
Paul could confirm Labine’s suspicions: the surface of the rock—which 
appeared black, shiny, and bubbly, like it had solidified while boiling—
looked like pitchblende.
The two men returned to the south, where their hunch was validated 
at a lab. Armed with this new knowledge, Labine staked his claim at the 
site of the vein, and then set about the arduous task of securing venture 
capital to fund his goal of building a mine a thousand miles from the 
nearest railroad, which was in Edmonton. Through perseverance, backed 
by the extremely high price of radium at the time, he succeeded, and the 
mine was built on the site of that vein of pitchblende.
While my purpose in this analysis is not to evaluate the validity 
of this narrative, it contains inconsistencies that bear mentioning. As 
others have pointed out,30 it is extremely unlikely that a prospector as 
experienced as St. Paul would have made the kinds of basic errors that 
would have led to snow blindness. Labine and St. Paul spent an entire 
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season prospecting together, and yet Labine’s discovery happened almost 
immediately following the onset of St. Paul’s affliction (snow blindness 
typically heals in less than seventy-two hours). As well, pitchblende is 
not a common ore in Canada, making it questionable that the two men 
would have been able to identify the rock so readily. Different sources 
have told different stories about how Labine had previously been able to 
see a sample of the ore.31
Perhaps Labine intentionally lied in one version of this narrative. 
More likely, the narrative evolved over the twenty-five years between 
these tellings, curated according to the demands of different audiences 
and how Labine wished to understand his own story. A reader can hard-
ly help but notice how Labine’s personal narrative has Horatio Alger 
qualities, embracing every trope of the American myth of the self-made 
man, who typically comes from poverty and, through hard work, perse-
verance, and strategic risk taking, achieves great financial success.32 Lest 
this individualistic formula seem too American to have been the uncon-
scious result of a narrator’s interaction with more collectively minded 
Canadian audiences, it bears noting that shortly after the pitchblende 
strike, the Eldorado mining company enlisted the support of a New York 
City–based PR firm in shaping its corporate image,33 and that the trope 
of the self-made man has also been pervasive in Canada, particularly in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,34 and especially with 
reference to prospectors. Julie Cruikshank has referred to Horatio Alger 
as the Yukon prospector’s “prototype.”35 By actively excluding the Bell 
report from later versions of the narrative, Labine frees himself of any 
obligation to share credit for the mine’s discovery. Even the assistant he 
paid to accompany him plays only a supporting role in the narrative: St. 
Paul’s snow-blindness not only sets up the conditions for Labine’s dis-
covery, but also illustrates his weakness and lesser competence as con-
trasted with Labine’s robust success (after all, the two men were travel-
ling together in the same conditions, but only one went snow-blind). Key 
tropes of Canadian literature find their way into the story, as well. Sherrill 
Grace describes a “northern narrative,” in which a white, male hero is 
thrown into a northern landscape and must struggle to survive until he 
finds salvation “through endurance in this harsh yet potentially trans-
forming landscape.”36 In lieu of the wolves and bears that most frequently 
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symbolize northern danger, Labine’s narrative has snow blindness; in lieu 
of explicit spiritual salvation, Labine finds financial salvation. Labine has 
ventured into that wilderness and not only survived but vanquished it 
(which, in turn, calls to mind Margaret Atwood’s rhetoric of “survival” as 
connected to Canada’s fascination with, and terror of, the north).37 
At the same time that Labine’s narrative positions him as a survivor 
of the North’s many challenges, it also feeds into the rhetoric of oppor-
tunism surrounding northern expansion that was popular in Canada in 
the first half of the twentieth century.38 The turn of the century saw ex-
panding foreign and domestic markets for Canadian natural resources 
and a federal government, under Sir Wilfrid Laurier, that was keen to en-
able national industry to capitalize on these opportunities.39 This attitude 
grew even more powerful in the 1940s, when Lester B. Pearson—then 
ambassador to the United States—published an article in Foreign Affairs 
celebrating the opportunity offered by the “great wealth in the Land of 
the Midnight Sun,” saying that “a whole new region has been brought out 
of the blurred and shadowy realm of northern folklore and shown to be 
an important and accessible part of our modern world.”40 Labine’s story 
combines the thrill of risk with the promise of opportunity, elevating his 
own stature while promoting broader Canadian motives to further col-
onize the North.
DISCOV ERY NAR R ATI V ES: ɁƎHTSÉO 
BEYON NIE
Unsurprisingly, the origin of the Port Radium mine is understood very 
differently in Délı̨nę than in the rest of Canada, and the Délı̨nę version 
includes Aboriginal people as prominent players in the mine’s discovery 
and establishment. Like Labine’s version, the Sahtúot’ı̨nę narrative comes 
in several versions that waver, slightly, around a common narrative cen-
tre. I quote it here from the version published in “If Only We Had Known”: 
The History of Port Radium as Told by The Sahtúot’ı̨nę: 
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Prior to 1930, a Dene man, Victor Beyonnie’s dad was travel-
ling to Caribou Point and camped at Port Radium. He noticed an 
unusual looking rock, which he showed a non-Dene prospector.
The prospector took the rock to Edmonton and showed it to 
a prospector named Gilbert Labine. Being a geologist, Mr. Labine 
noticed that the rock possibly contained pitchblende. In 1930, 
Gilbert Labine began staking claims at Echo Bay on the eastern 
shore of Great Bear Lake. During 1931 he and his crew shipped 
ten tons of handpicked ore to Ottawa for further analysis.41 
When the story is told in Délįnę, sometimes people say that Old Beyonnie 
met a prospector who gave the rock to Gilbert Labine, and sometimes 
people say that Old Beyonnie met Labine himself during his expedition 
to the Arctic. Everyone agrees that the prospector gave Old Beyonnie 
something tokenistic in exchange for the rock—coffee, rifle shells, a bag 
of flour—saying that the rock probably had no value. The ore proved to be 
pitchblende, of course, and its discovery not only saved Labine’s company 
from the brink of bankruptcy, but made Labine himself very wealthy. As 
in stories of ox-hide purchases common in colonial North America, an 
agreement is made to exchange small items, but the colonizing party, 
with duplicitous intent, claimed far more than the spirit of the agreement 
allowed.42 
The Délı̨nę narrative is widely known and commonly told in the com-
munity. It comes up as a metaphor or analogy in the context of other 
political conversations: an implicit cautionary tale. On the occasion that 
this narrative came up in one of my interviews, its structure and content 
were fragmented across three speakers (elder Andrew John “AJ” Kenny, 
his son Dennis who worked with me as an interpreter, and myself) and 
two languages (the Sahtúot’ı̨nę language and English):
Sarah Gordon (SG): What do you think is the most import-
ant lesson for young people and future generations to learn from 
the Port Radium story?
Andrew John “AJ” Kenny (AJK): [responds in Sahtúot’ı̨nę 
language].
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Dennis Kenny (DK), interpreting: He said the government 
treated our elders really badly. Really badly. The way they treated 
them, there was no compensation, nothing. He said, look at my 
mom’s grandfather. He’s the one who found the . . . that stuff at 
Port Radium.
SG: The pitchblende?
DK: Yeah. He was the one who found it. And he never, her 
dad never even got compensated. He got a 25 pound flour. And 
they’re talking about this guy who discovered it. Now he’s rich, 
he’s a millionaire, and there’s a book about him. And no noth-
ing about my mom’s dad. My grandfather. He’s the one who 
discovered. . .
AJK (in English): Victor. Victor Beyonnie’s dad. Victor’s 
brother is my wife’s father.
DK: Yeah. Their dad. He’s the one who found that.
SG: What was his name? It was Beyonnie, but. . .
DK: Ɂǝhtséo Beyonnie.43 
AJK: Beyonnie.
DK: They just call him Beyonnie. He [AJ] said that story is, 
you know, it’s important for people to learn it, how the govern-
ment treated us. So badly. Not just that, but the explorers too. 
Like that guy who discovered that stuff.
SG: Labine?
DK: Labine, yeah. Some people said all the older people . . . 
should, you know, gather young people together and tell them 
exactly what happened and what they did for them and what 
happened to them. Now my Dad’s talking about all this, how his 
brother’s gone by cancer, my grandpa died by cancer, my grandpa 
was a really hard-working man .  .  . he was good hard-working 
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man and he helped a lot of people just with, you know, giving 
them advice and stuff like that.44 
Virtually any time Port Radium is discussed in Délı̨nę, the narrative is 
tied to some concept of death. The Kennys’ version of the origin narrative 
closes with a discussion of the cancer: the mine began with the unjust 
treatment of a Dene man, and it continues, now, with the unjust suffering 
of Dene people who lived or worked at or near the mine or the uranium 
transport route. But another narrative—less commonly told, but just as 
widely known in Délı̨nę—speaks to prior Dene knowledge of the mine 
site and of the lives it would take. Its focus, however, is not on the Dene 
lives lost, but the Japanese. The narrative, paraphrased based on my field 
notes, goes like this:
The place where Port Radium is now, long ago, people knew 
it was a bad place. They said they should never sleep there or 
go near it. But long ago, some hunters were travelling and they 
stayed there one night. One of them was a prophet, and that 
night, he had a dream. He saw a large hole in the ground with 
white men walking into it. Then, he saw a large flying bird car-
rying a black stick. The bird carried the stick to a land far away 
and then dropped it; it made a giant, burning hole in the ground. 
Out of the hole, the spirits of thousands of people escaped, rising 
to the sky. The spirits looked like Dene people, but they were not 
Dene.
The versions of this narrative that I heard attributed the vision to an un-
named prophet who lived long, long ago, though they often cite Prophet 
Ayah (or Ayha)45—an extremely important Dene prophet who passed 
away in Délı̨nę in 1920—as a teller of the tale. Most notable of these is the 
version recorded by Sahtúot’ı̨nę elder George Blondin in his book When 
the World Was New.46 Other versions of the story, recorded by journalists 
and previous ethnographers, attribute the vision itself to Ayha, when he 
was a young man, before he had been instructed to share his visions with 
the world. One version, published in News/North—a regional newspaper 
that circulates throughout the Canadian territories—cites Leroy Andre 
and Joe Blondin, both Sahtúot’ı̨nę, as its sources:
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Long before the Europeans came or any mines opened on the 
shores of Great Bear Lake, the Dene people learned Port Radium 
was deadly and many of them stayed away.
Délı̨nę didn’t exist yet and the people still lived on the land, 
often travelling in groups of families to hunt and fish.
One day a group of Dene was passing through the area and 
they decided to camp near what would eventually become known 
as Port Radium. Among them was a powerful medicine man, the 
Prophet Ayha.
During the night, the others awoke to the prophet singing. 
He did not wake himself, but sang for most of the night in his 
sleep.
In the morning the people asked him why he was singing in 
his sleep, so he told them of his vision. He said he saw boats and 
many houses with smoke coming out of them. There were people 
with white skin going into a great hole in the ground and coming 
back out with rocks.
These people were carrying the rocks away and he decided 
to see where they were going. So in his dream state he followed 
them across Great Bear Lake and down along the river network 
to Fort McMurray and beyond there into the U.S. There the peo-
ple made a long stick and put the rocks in it. They then loaded the 
big stick into a giant bird, which then took flight so he followed it 
as it flew over wide-open water.
When it came back over the land, the bird dropped the stick 
and it burst into a giant ball of fire and many people who lived 
there were burnt.
“Those people looked a lot like us,” said Prophet Ayha. “I was 
singing for them.”
He then told the people that all of this would happen after 
they died.
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Many years later, in September of 1940, the Prophet Ayha 
passed away.
On Aug. 6, 1945, the U.S. dropped the first atomic bomb on 
Hiroshima. Three days later another fell on Nagasaki.47 
Another print version of this story adds that long before colonization, 
the Dene knew that this place was dangerous; loud noises came from the 
rocks there, and it was “bad medicine” to pass nearby.48
CONTR ASTI NG NAR R ATI V ES 
The mainstream Canadian narrative of the origin of Port Radium con-
trasts sharply with the Délı̨nę narrative with respect to where they situ-
ate power and agency. The mainstream story situates power with Labine: 
plucky, resourceful, down-on-his-luck prospector who challenges the 
frigid Canadian Arctic and survives, rewarded for his rigour and per-
sistence by the discovery of an ore containing a wildly valuable element, 
radium. The Aboriginal residents of the area are, at best, background 
characters, part of the landscape; more often they are invisible. The Dene 
narrative, however, complicates these power dynamics. Because the rock 
is discovered by Ɂǝhtséo Beyonnie, a Dene man, the glory of its discovery 
(and associated power) should, according to the Sahtúot’ı̨nę, reside with 
him, but the prospector purchases the rock for a token sum so that he 
may assume its power for himself, accruing great wealth and prestige in 
the process. The Aboriginal version of the story focuses on the good faith 
with which the First Nations people generally greeted and supported the 
arriving Europeans, and on the unjust and inhumane treatment they re-
ceived in response.
The differences in the roles played by Aboriginal people in the mine’s 
discovery mirror the roles they play in narratives of northern colonial-
ism more broadly: the mainstream narratives of Arctic colonialism erase 
Aboriginal sovereignty and personhood, especially in the face of indus-
trial and governmental desires for land and resources on Aboriginal 
land.49 The Crown recognized Aboriginal title to any land that had not 
been ceded through treaty, but as the land held value to the government 
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and the Aboriginal people did not, the latter were conceptualized mostly 
as obstacles to overcome in order to secure the former.50
One constant remains through the different versions of Labine’s 
story, in keeping with the colonial mentality: Aboriginal people do not 
appear. This noticeable absence is in keeping with subsequent descrip-
tions of Port Radium. At Library and Archives Canada, I searched doz-
ens of boxes of material related to the Eldorado, scanning for references 
to Aboriginal people at the mine sites. Boxes contained correspondence 
between the company’s management staff, employment records, and file 
after file of media clippings—but little if any mention of Dene, as employ-
ees, traders, or even merely local residents. Julie Cruikshank has argued 
that “facts get established by enacting silences . . . there are things to be 
said and ways of saying them.”51 Whenever a narrative is shared, be it 
orally or in print, decisions of inclusion and exclusion are made based 
on culturally ingrained assumptions of what is or is not considered rel-
evant. When southern, urban Canada hears stories of the founding of 
a new and successful mine, it expects Horatio Alger: independence and 
plucky self-reliance. When it hears of the country’s movement to further 
colonize the North, it expects stories of challenge meeting opportunity. 
It does not expect stories about the local people of the area whose lives 
are integral to and affected (sometimes negatively) by the success of the 
story’s lead character.
The picture of Aboriginal life at Port Radium emerged in the nega-
tive spaces of my archival scavenging. The archival material about 
Port Radium and the Eldorado corporation made no reference to the 
Aboriginal employees who lived at the mine and worked there casually, 
or who worked along the uranium transport route.52 An unpublished es-
say called “Radium in Canada,” by radiation expert Marcel Pochon, who 
was a high-level director at Eldorado for many years, says that “Great 
Bear Lake had had, in the past, very few visitors,” going on to enumerate 
prospectors and missionaries who had travelled in the region, but giving 
no mention to the Dene and Tłįcho ̨ people who had travelled there for 
centuries; it goes on to describe the land as “uninhabited.”53
A 1937 article in Collier’s Weekly includes limited references to 
Aboriginal residents of the Port Radium area, but its inclusions and ex-
clusions are telling. “Radium City,” the topic of the article, has, in the 
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author’s description, only a single female resident—the wife of the mine 
manager—but nonetheless manages to have a “little gang of half-breed 
kids.”54 The author goes on to describe the warming effect of the smiles of 
young women he sees from afar, who, implicitly, are not the lone woman 
resident of Radium City.55 Aboriginal people are present in the gaps of the 
story, in the spaces between and around its actual characters, who are, of 
course, white.
The background appearances of Aboriginal people in so many Port 
Radium stories raise the question that they may have appeared in the 
background of Labine’s mine discovery narrative, as well, even if he never 
mentioned them or implied that they were there. Fred J. “Tiny” Peet, an 
electrician and miner who had worked at Port Radium, stated in an oral 
history interview that Labine mentioned having hired an “Indian” guide 
in his early expeditions to the area.56 “Punch” Dickins, renowned bush 
pilot who flew in and out of Port Radium, said that Peet’s story certainly 
would have made sense, because many Aboriginal people hunted in the 
area and would have been of great help with equipment and dog teams.57 
He also offered that, according to his understanding, prospectors’ inter-
est in the region had originally stemmed from the fact that the Dene and 
Dogrib people who lived there had copper arrowheads—a perspective that 
contrasts sharply with Pochon’s assertion that the landscape of the Sahtú 
was devoid of human life. Just as northern colonization cannot escape 
the presence of Aboriginal people, no matter its attempts to work around 
them, neither can any discovery narrative about Port Radium completely 
and convincingly erase the presence and influence of Aboriginal people.
Differing perspectives on northern colonization, as illustrated by 
these contrasting narratives about the origin of the Port Radium mine, 
also reflect different attitudes about the nature of fair exchange and reci-
procity. In both narratives, a piece of ore found its way from the earth 
on the shore of Great Bear Lake into the hands of a prospector. In the 
Sahtúot’ı̨nę narrative, that exchange was mediated by a Dene man; in 
Labine’s narrative, he found the rock himself. In both cases, however, 
Labine profited enormously from his discovery, in terms of both finance 
and fame. In an urban Canadian narrative context, there is no problem 
with this arrangement. Labine gambled carefully and invested well in 
his trip, he made a discovery, and succeeded—any successful business, 
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after all, is, at its core, about selling something for more than it cost to 
acquire or produce. Even if Ɂǝhtséo Beyonnie did find the rock and sell 
it to Labine for a token price, this may not inherently be unfair: when he 
bought it, he presumably was unaware of its value. But the nature of this 
exchange, and the resulting process of profiting from the gifts given free-
ly by the land, violates fundamental moral codes in Délı̨nę.
During my time in Délı̨nę, I had two separate conversations, one in 
an interview and one informally, with individuals who drew parallels be-
tween the cultural prohibition against selling wild meat for money and 
the ethical problem with the mine. When a hunter or fisherman in Délįnę 
brings home meat, it is expected that he will share that meat with friends 
and relatives who ask, and that he will not request money in exchange. 
Morris Neyelle, a respected community leader, outlined in an interview 
the ethic of exchange that he inherited from his elders:
You know, in my culture, like hunting, fishing, all those kind 
of things that my elders, even my parents always said, what’s giv-
en to you free should be given back free. Don’t take anything for 
it, especially money. So to this day, if somebody asks for meat—
caribou meat, or fish—first thing they do is, especially outsiders, 
they go, “Well, I’ll give you money.” I say, “No!” I say, “It’s given to 
me free, why should I take money for it? I didn’t make it. It’s given 
to me free, I should give it back free to whoever asks for it.”
But if you misuse it, the elders always said, if you misuse it by 
gaining from it, by accepting money for it, that way, everything 
will go, they always said. And I notice a lot of that happening in 
the other regions. I know there are a lot of stores where they were 
selling meat. I’ve seen that too. And it’s not right. If they made it, 
sure. But they didn’t make it, so that’s why they’re losing all the 
caribou.58 
Neyelle and I often discussed the politics of selling meat, and how no 
person should ask for money for something like meat, which was given 
to them for free. In similar conversation, another elder told me, laughing, 
that if people were keen to give him something in exchange for meat, they 
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could bring him five gallons of gas for his snowmobile when they knew he 
was heading out on a trip—not that anybody ever did!
On one occasion, while we were discussing these politics of exchange, 
Neyelle drew a poignant comparison between this ethic and the ethics of 
mining: the problem with mining, he said, was that humans extracted 
from the ground a rock that they did not make, and then sold it for profit. 
The land did not ask payment for the ore that they extracted. And thus, 
just as the caribou would retreat from the hunting grounds of people who 
disrespected them by selling their meat, so too was the land pulling away 
from the people. This idea of the land withdrawing could be interpreted 
in many ways: the growing sense, among elders, that younger generations 
are disconnected from the local landscape is one possibility; the idea that 
the resources of the land are becoming slimmer and harder to use, and its 
environment changing and becoming less hospitable, is another.
Implicit in Neyelle’s story is an analysis of the nature of reciproc-
ity and exchange in Délı̨nę, and the importance of not taking personal 
gain at the expense of another human or non-human being. The land, a 
living thing, creates all of its parts: the caribou, the fish, the minerals in 
the earth. When we, as humans, take any of those, we are receiving the 
gifts given by the land. Any travelling that a person may do to find the 
caribou herd, or any labouring the person may do to cut a hole in the 
lake ice, is simply the work that must be done in order to receive those 
gifts: it doesn’t make anything. And if the land did not want people to 
receive those gifts, it would keep those gifts away from the people who 
seek them. So, to charge money for something given by the land is to take 
something for nothing, to profit without having done anything to deserve 
it.59 That kind of empty profit is exemplified by money. Money is an ab-
straction that circulates between people without any obvious empirical 
roots in the world. Neyelle often told me that the elders said not to worry 
too much about money—it was, after all, only a thing of this world, of no 
real value.
When an elder says that he will accept five gallons of gasoline from 
anyone grateful to receive his meat, he is recognizing the difference be-
tween receiving money as interest and receiving gas as both a gift and an 
investment. Gas is a practical thing: without it, the skidoos, trucks, and 
boat motors will not run, and without those tools, the elder can neither 
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travel to get more meat nor drive around town to deliver it to those who 
need it. He does not profit, per se, from a gift of gasoline: he cannot pock-
et five gallons of gas and use it to buy frivolous things for himself. Instead, 
he will use the gasoline—either that five-gallon can, or an equivalent 
five-gallon can that he buys for himself before his next trip—to do the 
work he must do in order to continue to provide meat to the community. 
And a person who gives him the gift of five gallons of gas also gives him 
the gift of time, saving him from having to drive to the gas station to buy 
those five gallons himself. All of this enables this elder to treat the land 
with the respect it deserves: by harvesting only the meat that the com-
munity needs at any given time, he does not have to overharvest on any 
given trip and risk harming the caribou herds or wasting meat. 
R EMEMBER I NG AN ABANDONED MI NE
The buildings of the original Port Radium community have long since 
been dismantled, but the remnants of the mine itself still remain. As a 
part of the CDUT agreement, the land must be remediated as much as 
possible.60 What constitutes a thoroughly remediated site remains a topic 
of contention. According to the federal government, and to the local of-
ficials in charge of liaising between local and federal authorities on the 
topic, the remediation work on the area of the Port Radium mine itself is 
complete; at the time of my visit to Délı̨nę in the summers of 2009 and 
2010, remediation work had moved on to Sawmill Bay, with temporary 
workers being hired on three-week rotations to clean up that contamin-
ated site. But the elders, in particular, continue to insist that the remedi-
ation work at Port Radium is incomplete. Morris Neyelle, for example, 
is dissatisfied with any remediation plan that involves disposing of any 
waste on-site—especially any toxic waste. That waste was made by people 
from the South, he says, so they should take it back south with them. The 
final agreement of the Canada-Délı̨nę Uranium Table stipulates that while 
tailings, abandoned machinery, and scrap may be disposed of on-site, 
any hazardous material should be removed for safe disposal elsewhere.61 
Sahtúot’ı̨nę employees of the clean-up process told me that they were re-
sponsible for burying material on-site. Nobody was able to say with any 
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confidence whether that material was hazardous or not. Happiness that 
the remediation plans are moving forward, and that Sahtúot’ı̨nę workers 
are being employed as part of the process, is tempered by distrust in the 
overall process. Port Radium was built on deception and misinformation: 
why should any Dene believe that its deconstruction should be any more 
honest? 
The parallel of the colonial experience and the Port Radium experi-
ence extends into the future. While the Sahtúot’ı̨nę work on remediat-
ing the mine site, they are also working on remediating themselves, not 
only from the damaging impacts of their experiences living and working 
on the uranium transport route, but also from the impacts of abusive 
residential schools62 and tuberculosis hospitals,63 of Indian agents, of liv-
ing as wards of the state, of manipulative treaty processes.64 The mine is 
both a part of this process and powerful metonymy for it: like many of 
those other colonial events, its development brought with it the promise 
of some good things (jobs for Dene people and new opportunities for 
trade, for example), but those good things have been outweighed by their 
negative consequences, which never could have been predicted by the 
Sahtúot’ı̨nę people. This metonymy certainly emphasizes the mine’s cog-
nitively destructive power, but it also imbues the mine, and its associated 
narratives and effects, with a kind of homeopathic power: to address, and 
heal from, the impacts of the mine is to address and heal from the im-
pacts of colonialism more broadly. And planning to keep the problems of 
the mine from repeating themselves means also planning to assert con-
trol over the ongoing colonial relationship between Délı̨nę and Canada.
This is not to say that the presence of Port Radium within living 
memory of many Sahtúot’ı̨nę somehow simplifies the decolonization 
process. If anything, it highlights the tensions that exist between differ-
ent generations and personalities within the community regarding how 
the community should assert its independence and negotiate its relation-
ship between the First Nation government and economy, and the federal 
government and economy. For example, many community leaders, es-
pecially of older generations, express significant reservations about the 
prospect of any future natural resource development on their land, citing 
Port Radium as an example of how projects that may seem beneficial at 
first can have unanticipated long-term consequences, particularly when 
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outsiders are the primary stakeholders. But other community leaders, 
particularly younger ones, recognize Port Radium as a cautionary tale for 
what can happen if the community is denied a seat at the decision-mak-
ing table, but also argue that opening parts of the Sahtú to natural re-
source exploration, and potential extraction, can provide the community 
with much-needed cash inflow and employment opportunities. The com-
munity is concurrently working to implement self-government, geared 
toward asserting Sahtúot’ı̨nę sovereignty over local governance, land 
management, and education. Just as resource development must proceed 
cautiously, taking into account the perspectives and needs of various 
community members, so too must the self-government process.
In her work on narratives of colonial encounter in Alaska, Cruikshank 
reminds us that “ideas have material consequences.”65 The narratives 
surrounding the origin, life, and afterlife of Port Radium do things: they 
situate power; they illustrate Dene and non-Dene understandings of per-
sonhood, agency, responsibility, and modernity; they assign meaning to 
Port Radium relative to a larger colonial context and use Port Radium as 
an icon for the deception inherent in colonial processes more broadly. 
The mainstream Canadian narrative of the mine’s origin, with its erasure 
of any Aboriginal presence and its foregrounding of the mine’s discovery 
as the achievement of a lone ambitious and resourceful person, reflects 
the values and interests of its largely white, urban audiences and tellers. 
The Dene narrative indexes concerns regarding the community’s broader 
colonial context and concurrently shapes the community’s recovery from 
the mine’s impacts and the broader impacts of colonialism. 
Cruikshank has argued that “viewing encounters of ideas historically 
shows how indigenous peoples continue to face a double exclusion, in-
itially by colonial processes that displace them from land and ultimately 
by a neocolonial discourse that hastens the transformation of sentient 
and social spaces to measurable commodities called ‘lands and resour-
ces.’”66 In the words of Dennis Kenny, speaking on behalf of his father 
Andrew John Kenny: “He [Andrew John] said that [the Port Radium] 
story is . . . important for people to learn . . . How the government treated 
us. Not just [the government], but the explorers, too.”67 “The explorers” 
are the prospectors and any other adventurers who travelled through the 
North desiring and seeking out means for personal gain. The story of Port 
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Radium is, for the people of Délı̨nę, a cautionary tale that contains mor-
al and political implications that influence the community’s strategies 
for self-governance and cultural preservation. Beyond its impact on the 
environment, Port Radium has given an accessible face to the overarch-
ing ethos of colonial mistreatment, and in that respect, it gives Délı̨nę 
the strength of a visible adversary against which it may chart its course, 
demarcated by local traditions and values, into a self-determined future. 
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that “no Délįne [sic] Dene were ever directly employed by Eldorado at the Port 
Radium mine or mill,” though they did trade wood and meat at the village and 
85Sarah M. Gordon
worked along the uranium transport route as ore carriers, deckhands, and 
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“It’s Just Natural”:  
First Nation Family History  
and the Keno Hill Silver Mine 
Alexandra Winton and Joella Hogan
For Yukon First Nation people, family history is intertwined with the his-
tory of the land. As the late Yukon First Nation elder Kitty Smith once 
told anthropologist Julie Cruikshank, “I belong to Yukon. I’m born here. 
I branch here. My grandpa’s country, here. My grandma’s. That’s why I 
stay here . . . My roots grow in jackpine roots.”1 This sentiment holds true 
for the Na-Cho Nyäk Dun, or Big River People,2 of the central Yukon, 
even though their relationships to the land and to each other have been 
transformed by over one hundred years of silver mining within their tra-
ditional territory. 
In this chapter, we share the story of Herman Melancon, a member of 
the First Nation of Na-Cho Nyäk Dun and an underground miner. Using 
indigenous methodologies, historical research, and oral history gener-
ously shared by Herman, we parallel Herman’s personal and family his-
tory with that of the Keno Hill mine, offering an intimate view into the 
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complexity of relationships between northern First Nation peoples and 
industrial development.
Herman’s family connection with the mine dates back to before he 
was born, to the mine’s origins in the early twentieth century. At the 
heart of the Na-Cho Nyäk Dun traditional territory is the McQuesten 
River watershed, a region rich in fish and wildlife that sustained the 
Northern Tutchone-speaking people on their seasonal round throughout 
this rugged landscape.3 It was near the headwaters of the McQuesten that 
high-grade galena, or silver ore, was discovered by Jacob A. Davidson in 
1903. Hoping for gold, Davidson abandoned the find, unaware that he had 
stumbled upon one of the largest and richest silver deposits in the world, 
soon to be known as the Keno Hill mining district. Two years later and 
approximately one hundred kilometres downstream from Davidson’s dis-
covery, Dave Hager was born in McQuesten Village, a seasonal Na-Cho 
Nyäk Dun settlement at the mouth of the McQuesten River. Although it 
was not immediately apparent, Davidson’s discovery would bring great 
changes for Hager, his family, and for the Na-Cho Nyäk Dun.
By virtue of their location, the Na-Cho Nyäk Dun had managed to 
escape some of the most severe impacts of the Klondike gold rush of 
1898—the onslaught of thousands of gold seekers, the devastation of lo-
cal wildlife populations, and the destruction of traditional hunting and 
fishing lands (to name a few). As the Klondike gold rush began to wane, 
however, increasing numbers of prospectors flooded into Na-Cho Nyäk 
Dun territory in search of the next bonanza.4 There was gold in the area, 
but as more silver discoveries were made, many with ore averaging 300 
ounces of silver to the ton, most prospectors abandoned their placer 
gold claims in search of silver. The first major staking rush did not occur 
until the 1920s, but when it did, development came quickly to the area. 
Mining techniques rapidly progressed from individual miners collecting 
float, or surface chunks of galena, to mechanized underground mining 
with corporate financing from the likes of the Guggenheim brothers. 
As the mines proliferated below ground, so too did the new commun-
ities above: the wild boom town of Keno City sprang up at the foot of 
silver-rich Sourdough, Galena, and Keno hills; while mining camps like 
Calumet, Wernecke, Elsa, and Bellekeno clung to the tops of these wind-
swept peaks. Down in the valley, the more sedate community of Mayo 
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developed into a regional centre on the banks of the Stewart River, where 
the silver-lead-zinc ore could be shipped out on sternwheelers (Fig. 1).5
Traditionally, Na-Cho Nyäk Dun people had travelled throughout 
this area in order to take advantage of seasonal harvests and lessen their 
impact on the land. In the summer months, Na-Cho Nyäk Dun families 
gathered on the banks of the Stewart and McQuesten Rivers to fish for 
chinook and chum salmon; in the fall, they moved into the mountains to 
hunt gophers and caribou, pick berries, and gather medicinal plants; and 
in winter, they returned to the lowlands to hunt for moose and ice-fish 
in the region’s many lakes.6 As the Keno Hill mining district developed, 
the expanding network of mines, roads, and communities bisected these 
traditional hunting and gathering grounds, contaminating water sources 
and ruining delicate plant and animal habitats. The Na-Cho Nyäk Dun 
were exposed to new diseases, religions, and societal pressures trans-
ported by newcomers. In keeping with the colonial policies of the day, 
the Na-Cho Nyäk Dun were forcibly settled into a sedentary community 
two miles downriver from Mayo, now known as the Old Village, where, 
despite being subject to curfews and segregation, they managed to live 
a semi-traditional lifestyle for many years.7 As Na-Cho Nyäk Dun elder 
Dave Moses described it, his people adapted their seasonal round and 
subsistence patterns in order to accommodate the newcomers and their 
needs:
After the boom, lots of people comin’ to this place . . . Indian 
go get rifle to shoot moose and sell meat to Whiteman and make 
his living that way. When they find some rock in Keno, [First Na-
tion] people move to Mayo and work on steamboat, cut wood, 
pile wood and sold wood on the barge . . . Pretty soon they use 
machine to grind the ore so it comes to a flour and put it in a sack 
. . . I been around Keno Hill when they first start. When I was a 
little boy people worked around Keno, Elsa, and hauled ore with 
horse team and caterpillar in the wintertime . . . Later they put 
in the highway and we haul ore back from Keno, back and forth 
with truck.8
As Moses explained, many First Nation people joined in the new econ-
omy, cutting wood for the steamships, selling meat, fish, and berries to 
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the miners, and eventually, working in the mines themselves. For the Na-
Cho Nyäk Dun, the way that they related to their environment began to 
change, as they adapted their hunting and harvesting patterns to help 
feed and shelter these newcomers and as they became involved in the 
extraction industry that quickly transformed their land.
By the late 1940s, most of the silver claims in the area had been con-
solidated by United Keno Hill Mines Ltd. (UKHM) and large-scale in-
dustrial mining had taken hold in the Keno region. UKHM operated up 
to nine different mines in the Keno Hill district, most of which consisted 
of a series of deep underground shafts, where miners worked in tandem, 
blasting out veins of ore to be hauled away by narrow-gauge railways. 
All ore was then transported by truck or aerial tramway to the company 
town of Elsa, the hub of the district, where a 250-ton capacity mill would 
separate out silver, lead, and zinc concentrates to be shipped to a smelter 
in Trail, British Columbia. 
The expanding UKHM operations required massive amounts of 
electricity, which was provided by the Mayo hydro dam, built by the 
Yukon government in 1952 at the urging of UKHM. This dam drastically 
changed the hydrology of the Mayo River and raised the level of Mayo 
Lake by six metres. Transmission lines and roads were completed be-
tween Keno, Mayo, and Whitehorse, shifting the mode of transportation 
away from the rivers and damaging moose and caribou habitats.9 Also in 
the 1950s, the Na-Cho Nyäk Dun were asked to relocate once again, this 
time back into the town of Mayo, where they were subject to discrimin-
ation, and many of their children were taken away to residential schools. 
After the boom years of the 1950s and 1960s, the Keno Hill district 
went into a slow decline. Aging technology and low silver prices prompt-
ed cutbacks, strikes, and eventually, the indefinite closure of the mines in 
1989. Most UKHM employees left the Yukon, Elsa was abandoned, and 
there was virtually no reclamation of the mine sites. As life in the region 
slowed, many Na-Cho Nyäk Dun people returned to traditional pursuits, 
such as hunting and trapping, and the environmental destruction left by 
the mining industry became more apparent.
Throughout this cycle of boom and bust, Na-Cho Nyäk Dun citi-
zens became adept at operating in two new worlds: both the dark, cav-
ernous world of the underground mines and the capital-based world of 
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the newcomers who built them. The Na-Cho Nyäk Dun weathered envi-
ronmental, economic, and social changes, while struggling to maintain 
their traditions, language, and culture. Perhaps the most severe impact 
was the newcomers themselves—an influx of hundreds of single Euro-
Canadian men, who streamed into the region to work at the mines. Many 
of the newcomers entered into relationships with local Na-Cho Nyäk 
Dun women, and, whether they were considered legitimate or not, these 
relationships forever altered the cultural makeup of the region. 
This complex reality is embodied by Dave Hager’s grandson, Herman 
Melancon—the son of Dave’s daughter Irene and Maurice Melancon, a 
non–First Nation miner from Quebec. At age fifty, Herman Melancon 
has spent more than half his life underground working as a miner. When 
asked to introduce himself, Herman quickly acknowledges his mining 
background: 
I’m Herman Melancon, from Mayo. I lived here most of my 
life, but I also lived in Tungsten, Northwest Territories for a couple 
 
Figure 2: Herman Melancon. Photo by Evan Rensch.
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years, it’s another mining town. It’s running right now, that mine, 
and I been mining for 26 years. I first started in the Keno Hill 
Mine .  .  . I learned just from, probably from, coming from my 
Dad being a miner, see? It’s just natural. I grew up around it, eh?
Just as Kitty Smith likened herself to the Jack pine—“I branch here,” she 
said, her family and her history growing and diverging like the southern 
Yukon tree10—Herman Melancon’s family grew and expanded with the 
development of the Keno Hill silver mine. Like the roots of a tree seeking 
water, the shafts, caverns, and tunnels of the mines have spread under-
ground, following the silver-rich mineral veins. So too have Herman’s 
family and the Na-Cho Nyäk Dun culture grown, so that both are now 
irrevocably intertwined with the history of the mine. Knit together in a 
complex pattern of mutual involvement and unequal impacts, the story 
of the Na-Cho Nyäk Dun and the Keno Hill mine is illustrative of how 
Aboriginal people across Northern Canada have been both affected by 
and involved in one of the most destructive forms of industrial develop-
ment in their traditional lands. Our goal as researchers, authors, and 
community members is to share Herman’s version of this story, which 
may help us to understand this complex relationship. 
In order to help tell this story, we employ anthropological, oral his-
tory, and indigenous methodologies. The work of anthropologist Julie 
Cruikshank has influenced our approach to oral history and ethnogra-
phy. Cruikshank’s early work with Yukon First Nation women helped to 
set a new standard for oral history. By using long, uninterrupted inter-
view excerpts, Cruikshank allowed, as much as possible, for stories to be 
told by the tellers themselves.11 We make use of this style of storytelling 
here. 
Indigenous academics such as Shawn Wilson, Lianne Leddy, and 
Margaret Kovach have also informed our approach to research.12 As 
Wilson suggests, “We cannot remove ourselves from the world in order 
to examine it.”13 Indeed, this would be difficult for us, as we both live in 
or very near to the communities in which we have conducted research. 
Indigenous methodology also stresses the need for researchers to locate 
themselves during and within their research;14 therefore, we will take a 
moment to do so now. Alexandra met Herman while conducting research 
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for her master’s degree. In the summer of 2011, Alexandra and a young 
Na-Cho Nyäk Dun citizen, Kaylie-Ann Hummel, interviewed Herman 
about his experiences with the Keno Hill mine. Joella (herself a Na-Cho 
Nyäk Dun citizen) met Herman through his wife Bobbie-Lee. Joella can-
not remember exactly when she met him, as Herman has always been 
there, in the background, working in his garage or as the main character 
in Bobbie-Lee’s stories. In the winter of 2013, Joella and Bobbie-Lee con-
ducted another interview with Herman for this book chapter.
We have also been influenced by our own life experiences, storytell-
ing cultures, and family histories, which counsel us to listen well, give 
credit to storytellers, and ask for permission before sharing their stories. 
Therefore, we have attempted to work as collaboratively as possible with 
Herman as we conducted research for and wrote this contribution. We 
are very much aware that our personalities and backgrounds have had an 
impact on our relationship with Herman and the way in which we por-
tray his story; as such, we have included our own questions and responses 
in Herman’s interview excerpts. We have used initials (HM, AW, JH, KH) 
to indicate who is speaking in these excerpts. As much as possible, we 
hope to allow Herman to tell his own story, fostering a relationship with 
the reader, who may then see the connections between Herman’s com-
munity and his or her own. 
According to Cruikshank, such narrative connections are vital to 
understanding change in modern First Nation communities:
Yukon storytellers of First Nation ancestry frequently demon-
strate ability to build connections where rifts might otherwise 
appear. They use narratives to dismantle boundaries rather than 
erect them .  .  . narrative storytelling can construct meaningful 
bridges in disruptive situations.15
In a complex era of mineral redevelopment, coupled with new Aboriginal 
self-government, we believe that Herman’s story can serve as one such 
bridge. By sharing his narrative, we hope to create a broader under-
standing of the modern relationship between the Na-Cho Nyäk Dun, 
their land, and the processes that have affected it. Na-Cho Nyäk Dun 
are not alone in this situation; indeed many northern Aboriginal people 
are now faced with the difficulties of engaging in a modern economy, 
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while balancing new self-government responsibilities and struggling to 
preserve traditional ways of being. We hope that by sharing this story, 
we will shed light on the complexities of this modern era for northern 
Aboriginal people.
DOCUMENTI NG CHANGE
On September 27, 1905, Dave Hager was born to Jenny Jimmy at 
McQuesten Village. Known his entire life as “Big Dave,” Hager was an 
amateur photographer, who both took part in and recorded a time of 
great change for the Na-Cho Nyäk Dun. His photographs can be found 
in the homes of his children as well as in the Yukon Archives. Dave doc-
umented his life and those around him through the lens of his camera; 
photographs of him show a young man in the early days of mining, when 
he was working on the steamboats (Fig. 6). These wooden paddlewheelers 
 
Figure 3: Dave Hager standing on the sternwheeler “Keno” ca. 1930s. Yukon 
Archives/Dave Hager fonds/#8875.
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pushed barges loaded with ore from the Keno mines down the Stewart 
River toward Whitehorse. Ore would then be shipped on the White 
Pass Railway to the port of Skagway, Alaska, and then out to a smelt-
er in Southern Canada. The Stewart and Yukon Rivers were lined with 
wood camps, where many First Nation men worked, providing the thou-
sands of cords of wood needed to fuel the boats. Big Dave worked as a 
deckhand, loading the wood from shore onto the boats. Later, when the 
highways replaced the steamships, Hager worked for the Yukon territor-
ial government, conducting highway maintenance between Mayo and 
Whitehorse.16
Dave, like many Na-Cho Nyäk Dun men, engaged in the new econ-
omy but did not catch gold—or in this case, silver—fever. He managed to 
keep a foot in both worlds by maintaining traditional pursuits, such as 
hunting, trapping, and raising his family on the land as much as possible. 
An anecdotal account, which appears in Hills of Silver, the only book 
dedicated to the Keno Hill silver mine, reveals Dave’s attitude toward 
mining. After watching a crew of miners struggle for three days to move 
a large piece of mining equipment just one thousand feet, Dave, who was 
repairing a nearby bridge, is purported to have remarked, “those white 
men will do anything for money.”17
In 1929, Big Dave married Alice Louise, a First Nation woman from 
Fort Good Hope, Northwest Territories. Together, Dave and Alice had 
six daughters: Martha, Rosie, Jenny, Irene, Laura, and Mary, all of whom 
were raised in the Mayo area. The Hager girls would all marry non–First 
Nation miners, or men involved with Keno Hill in some way. As Herman’s 
wife Bobbie-Lee said, “they were all attracted to miners.” One of these 
daughters, Irene, met and married Maurice Melancon, originally from 
Quebec. From a mining family himself, Maurice came north to work as 
an underground miner for UKHM. While Maurice was transplanted to 
the Mayo area, like many others, he gained acceptance in the community 
and knowledge of the land from his First Nation wife and her family. The 
skills to operate in both worlds were then passed on to their son Herman, 
who learned to hunt and trap from his grandfather and learned about the 
mining industry from his father.18 
For a brief time, Maurice worked at another mine, called Tungsten, 
located in the southern Yukon. Tragically, Maurice was killed in a car 
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accident while driving to work on the Tungsten road. Herman recalled 
the accident:
He was driving to work in Tungsten, after he got called back 
there to go to work. And he was driving back there and there was 
only about, I don’t know, bad pass there and he went over the 
bank. He drove right from Mayo too, that day, it was too far . . . I 
was nineteen. I went mining after he died, right after.
Born to a miner, Herman became a miner himself at the age of twenty. 
While Herman is definitely the miner in the family, his brothers have all 
been involved with mining either directly or in the support industries. 
When asked why he continues to mine, despite the dangers of under-
ground work, Herman replied: “Well, it’s part of me, it’s in my blood. My 
Dad, probably to, in some way, make him proud a’ me. And then, plus for 
the money, I like the money.”
Herman is just one of the many Na-Cho Nyäk Dun citizens in the 
modern community of Mayo who are of mixed ancestry, due to the influx 
of young, Euro-Canadian men who came to work in the mines. These 
men came alone, and many of them married local Na-Cho Nyäk Dun 
women. According to the enfranchisement policies of the 1876 Indian 
Act, these women and their children then lost their status as Indian peo-
ple and the few privileges it provided. Years later, they fought to regain 
their status and take part in the land claim agreements that were oc-
curring across the territory.19 The women were also isolated from their 
families, as many of them went to live in Elsa with their new husbands. 
Of course, these struggles did not change who they were, or their ability 
to connect with their culture or the land. Debbie Buyck, a Na-Cho Nyäk 
Dun woman whose husband worked in Elsa, has said that even while 
living in a predominantly non–First Nation company town, built on the 
standards of southern Canadians, Na-Cho Nyäk Dun women managed 
to practise many of their traditional activities:
We did continue in our traditional ways outside of work, we 
went berry picking, hunting and fishing. We would go out on the 
weekend for drives or day hikes and would scout out old places 
our parents had taken us when we were kids .  .  . the mothers 
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and kids would go berry picking and fishing while our husbands 
worked in the mines, we took lots of picnics and some of the old 
First Nation ladies in camp taught us our traditional ways.20
Many of the Na-Cho Nyäk Dun women who lived up at Elsa talk of pick-
ing berries, hunting, and snaring small animals in the region, all attempts 
to maintain aspects of the seasonal harvest. The increased mining activ-
ity in the area and a more sedentary lifestyle affected the Na-Cho Nyäk 
Dun’s ability to hunt, fish, and pursue traditional activities; however, 
these pursuits did not disappear entirely. Men and women both found 
ways to balance this new life with traditional ways of living, which were 
passed down to the generation currently in Mayo. 
“ IT ’S HAR D TO IMAGI NE THESE HILLS 
W ITHOUT MI NI NG ”
For Herman’s grandparents and parents, the mine was a new develop-
ment, an oddity, which altered their environment, brought newcomers 
into the area, and drastically reshaped their relationship to the land and 
to others. For Herman, however, the mine has always been there, and 
his involvement with it began early. As Herman’s father was a non–First 
Nation man who worked for UKHM, his family was able to live in the 
company town of Elsa, where UKHM provided housing, recreation fa-
cilities, free steam heat, and discounted groceries. While Herman has 
fond memories of a busy youth in the community, not everyone was able 
to live there. Most First Nation men who worked for the mine lived a few 
kilometres down the road, in a small cluster of houses called Millerville. 
It is unclear whether they were forced to live there rather than in Elsa, 
or whether they received the same benefits as residents of Elsa.21 For a 
young man of mixed ancestry, like Herman, life in such a racially divided 
mining camp must have been somewhat difficult, but, like many people 
now living in Mayo, he is reluctant to speak about the segregated past. 
When Herman’s father got better-paying work at the Tungsten 
mine, the Melancon family moved back to Mayo. After his father’s sud-
den death, Herman began working for UKHM himself. His first job was 
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digging trenches, but, being a tall, strong man, Herman quickly moved 
up to the position of trammer. As he explained, there was a natural pro-
gression in the training of an underground miner and a gradual increase 
in pay:
HM: Trammer . . . that’s where you drive around little trains 
for the miners, go outside and dump it [the ore], then you come 
back and help them, have to help them . .  . And then you go to 
miner helper, later, from that. And then eventually you can do 
your own minin’. But now, it’s all trained differently, they’re 
all trained on heavy equipments, eh? Right off the bat, usually. 
AW: So they didn’t have those sorts of training programs when 
you were young?
HM: No, you learn different . . . I went underground, they get 
you diggin’ ditch, eh? And they start you off from the bottom.
Herman has worked as a miner ever since, and now, as he said, “I run 
everything underground. Yeah, anything that moves, I run it, eh? I have 
to.” While he is known throughout the community as a good miner, his 
career has not been without its dangers. When Herman was twenty-sev-
en, he was in a horrific accident that occurred when a co-worker, drill-
ing into the rock face beside him, accidentally hit a hole pre-loaded with 
dynamite. Joella asked Herman about the incident:
JH: Do you want to tell me the story about how your arm got 
blew up?
HM: . . . Well, we were drillin’, I was in Bellekeno . . . I was 
workin’ three weeks by myself . . . And then they hired young guy, 
[name omitted], used to live in Elsa. And the night shift crew, 
they bootlegged the face, so bootleg is like a socket of holes that 
they built, you know, couple feet deep, or a foot deep, whatev-
er and then the shift boss spray paint them all blue, fluorescent 
blue, so you could see them, eh? . . . it’s the law to drill away from 
them, six inches minimum, away from all those holes. Because 
if there’s power still to light it, you can’t see inside, it’s frozen eh, 
the holes, all crushed. . . . So I was just pulling that drill down off 
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the backhoe on the left side, I only had three holes left to go and 
then it went off . . . just when my arm was in the air, I guess. And 
it blew me back or wherever, by the time I woke up I was proba-
bly about thirty feet from the face, landed about thirty feet away. 
Banged my arm. I could see something happened, ’cause I was 
laying on the ground and it was all quiet, you couldn’t hear noth-
ing. And then I could hear [Herman’s co-worker] moaning away, 
way up at the face there. But I was lookin’ around for my arm, 
’cause I couldn’t see it on my side. And something was hurting 
on my right side. And I was looking around, bending over, look 
around on the ground for my arm, ’cause I thought it was blown 
off, like that bending over and then all of a sudden, my arm . . . 
come flying, fell off the back of my neck and come, was hanging 
there. Then I was happy, ’cause it was still there. But I couldn’t do 
nothing, I had to hold it up, it was broken, broken right off, eh? 
The bone was busted right off.
Fortunately, both men survived the explosion, and, after just two months 
off work, receiving workers compensation, Herman went back under-
ground. “I had to,” he said, “‘cause workers comp bother me. . . . I still got 
pins in here, pins there and screws. . . I was scared for a while, to work 
underground, but it actually was a good therapy. . . . It helped me become 
stronger, after a year or two it didn’t bother me no more.” 
This accident and others have left physical imprints on Herman’s 
body. After so many years of working with loud, heavy machinery in a 
poorly ventilated, underground environment, his hearing is diminished, 
his lungs are damaged, and he bears the scars from potentially dead-
ly accidents. These corporeal impacts are easy for Herman to discuss. 
Intangible impacts on his community and his culture are more difficult 
to express. While Herman is quick to acknowledge the history of the 
mine, he struggles to articulate how it may have affected his ancestors:
KH: How do you feel about the mining history in the area? 
 
 HM: I uh, there’s a lot of history there. I think it goes back 
right to 1900’s, so there’s still silver up there. There’s still silver 
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there for a while. And there is a lot of history there, you can just 
tell by that old museum in Keno, eh? Just by going through there . . . 
AW: And how do you think that mining history has affected 
the Na-Cho Nyäk Dun First Nation?
HM: I’m not sure how it affected.  .  . I know they’re getting 
more um, native people involved in mining, with their training, eh?
Instead of discussing the past impacts of the mine, Herman speaks about 
the future, pointing out that there are more First Nation people working 
within the mining industry. Perhaps this is because Herman has never 
known the area without mining—as Joella says, “for this current genera-
tion [of which she and Herman are a part] . . . it is hard to imagine these 
hills without mining.” The history of the mine and Herman’s family story 
are so intertwined, it is impossible to separate one from the other in order 
to examine it. 
Although Herman’s family history has revolved around the mine, 
mining is just his work, and there is much more to his life. Herman also 
learned how to hunt and trap from his grandfather, Dave Hager, and he 
still employs these skills, as he hunts for moose each fall and maintains 
a trapline near Mayo. Herman was happy to speak with us about this 
aspect of his life:
AW: . . . And what about trapping, what sort of animals do 
you trap?
HM: Usually marten and wolverine, link [lynx] usually. Usu-
ally the one that pay, eh? ‘Cause now it’s pretty well . . . pretty low 
right now.
AW: And where do you trap?
HM: I got a little line ten miles out of Mayo, it starts on the, 
it’s called the Kurtz River and the Ridge Trail. I have a little, I got 
a little trapping shack on it too.
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Hunting and trapping are important activities that, along with mining, 
tie Herman to his traditional territory and keep him connected to the 
land. Hunting and trapping are also important skills that Herman was 
able to rely on to keep him afloat when the mining industry went into an 
inevitable decline. 
MI NE CLOSUR E AND SELF-GOV ER N MENT
In January 1989, as many employees were returning from Christmas 
holidays, UKHM suddenly announced that, due to low mineral prices, 
the company was closing the mine indefinitely. All residents of Elsa were 
given two weeks to vacate the town, which was quickly abandoned. Most 
UKHM workers left Elsa immediately, finding work at other mines in 
Southern Canada, but about half of them remained in the Yukon, some 
moving to Mayo and a few others settling in Keno or the surrounding 
rural areas.22 The mines were shuttered, with just a small crew of loyal 
employees left to treat run-off water from the mines and guard the build-
ings from vandals. Herman was not immediately affected by the mine 
closure, as he had already moved on to contract mining work and was 
able to support his young family, while supplementing his wages with 
trapping. Kaylie-Ann asked him about this time:
HM: 1989? When it shut down? I quit before it shut down. I 
worked there for six years and then I went to work for contrac-
tors, so I was already gone outta there. Like I say, I guess it shut 
down, everybody moved out, all to B.C., all the families moved 
right outta there. And they just had a skeleton crew there, eh? 
That’s what I remember from the closure, how it shut down there.
Eventually, Herman also had to leave his home community to seek work 
in mines in the southern Yukon and British Columbia. Herman hinted 
at the difficulties of this lifestyle: “. . . you’re always gone, eh?” When the 
mine shut, most Na-Cho Nyäk Dun citizens moved into Mayo to be with 
their extended families, but this was a quiet time for the Mayo region. 
While there was some employment to be found with the territorial gov-
ernment and the Local Improvement District,23 there was little other 
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work to sustain the population. However, long-awaited land claims and 
self-government processes were finally beginning to take shape. 
When the mine was in its final years, Na-Cho Nyäk Dun elders and 
a team of land use technicians and negotiators were working on a mon-
umental self-government and land claims agreement. Historically there 
were no treaties negotiated with Yukon First Nations. In order to ad-
dress this, in 1973 the Yukon Native Brotherhood delivered a landmark 
document to Prime Minister Trudeau, Together Today for Our Children 
Tomorrow, which was Canada’s first comprehensive land claim.24 This 
claim eventually developed into the Yukon Umbrella Final Agreement, 
a modern-day treaty under which the majority of Yukon First Nations 
negotiated individual land-claim and self-government agreements.25 In 
1993, after decades of negotiations, the Na-Cho Nyäk Dun became the 
first Yukon First Nation to sign its land-claim and self-government agree-
ments with the federal and territorial governments.26
During the land claims process, blocks of land were selected in a large 
range of sizes throughout the Na-Cho Nyäk Dun traditional territory. 
These lands were selected for traditional pursuits, harvesting, protecting 
heritage sites, and future housing and development, as well as for eco-
nomic development. Much of this land was selected with future genera-
tions in mind. Many young Na-Cho Nyäk Dun men were charged with 
surveying the lands, interviewing elders, and documenting these sites for 
land claims. Those who were involved with self-government had hope for 
a brighter future, while others were able to maintain a subsistence life-
style by cutting wood, trapping, or working as hunting guides.
As Na-Cho Nyäk Dun people began the long process of reclaiming 
the land, both on paper and in person, they became more aware of the 
environmental degradation caused by years of mining. There had been 
very little reclamation or remediation work done at the mine sites; as a re-
sult the relics left from mining activity were a danger to wildlife, such as 
moose, which were found tangled in wire left over from the mine. People 
became cautious about hunting and fishing near the shuttered mines, 
and concerns were raised about the quality of water and the impacts on 
fish and wildlife. 
Na-Cho Nyäk Dun began the slow process of self-government, 
taking over services formerly operated by the federal government, 
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such as administration of housing and health and social benefits. Self-
government ushered in a new era for the Na-Cho Nyäk Dun, who again 
have a measure of control over their traditional lands. The First Nation 
now owns approximately 4,700 square kilometres of settlement land, 
within a traditional territory spanning 162,465 square kilometres.27 The 
First Nation of Na-Cho Nyäk Dun now must be consulted regarding 
development within that region. In order to ensure that their citizens 
benefit from future development, the First Nation created the Na-Cho 
Nyäk Dun Development Corporation, a business arm of the government, 
which can enter into agreements with mining and exploration compan-
ies.28 Now, the First Nation of Na-Cho Nyäk Dun must act as stewards 
of the environment and the economy, keeping an eye on the activities 
of new mining companies, while at the same time supporting work and 
training opportunities for its citizens.
A NEW ER A OF MI NI NG
Throughout these years, Elsa remained abandoned, Keno City shrank 
to approximately twenty residents, and Mayo experienced an economic 
downturn: with the need for services greatly diminished, the town fell to 
800 residents, or half of its former population.29 Tourism was regarded 
as an important economic alternative to mining, so the Yukon govern-
ment and local tourism organizations marketed the Mayo area with a 
mining theme. The name “Silver Trail” was given to the Yukon Highway 
11, which links Mayo, Elsa, and Keno with the Klondike Highway, and 
wilderness tourism was suggested as a complementary attraction to the 
region’s mining history.30
But in 2006, after sitting abandoned for nearly two decades, the Keno 
Hill mine site was purchased by Alexco Resource Corporation, a junior 
mining and reclamation company based in Vancouver. The Yukon gov-
ernment awarded Alexco a contract to remediate the mines and the Elsa 
townsite, while simultaneously allowing the company to conduct its own 
exploration work and assess the possibility of redeveloping the mine. In 
2010, the Bellekeno Mine, one of United Keno Hill’s top producers, was 
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reopened by Alexco, and the first trucks of silver, lead, and zinc ore in 
over twenty years began to run through the Keno Hill region.
With a settled land claim and the implementation of self-govern-
ment, the Na-Cho Nyäk Dun Development Corporation was eager to 
create economic opportunities for its citizens and the region of Mayo 
and has done so by supporting the redevelopment of the Keno Hill mine. 
For Herman, this new relationship was inevitable for his First Nation, but 
it also creates a new form of responsibility:
AW: What do you think about Na-Cho Nyäk Dun being in-
volved in the mine up there?
HM: Well, I guess they probably have to keep an eye on them, 
what they do up there. I dunno, make sure they keep the area 
clean and everything, and treat the water. I guess they gotta keep 
treating the water steady there, eh?
AW: So how do you feel about the First Nation being involved 
in the mining industry as a whole?
HM: Well, if they’re, eventually they will have to, eh?
AW: Yeah?
HM: They’ll have to uh, know about mining and have more 
people trained.
The mine redevelopment was not of immediate concern for Herman; 
however, he soon returned to work at Keno Hill:
KH: How did you feel when you heard that the mine was 
reopening?
HM: At the time I didn’t mind, ‘cause it was close to home. 
But I wasn’t worried about it, ‘cause I had a job somewhere else 
anyway, but then I got on with . . . I went to work for Alexco for a 
while . . . then I got on with the contractor, soon as they started 
mining, eh? Right away.
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Even though twenty years had gone by, Herman found little difference 
between his work for UKHM and his work for Alexco; however, he easily 
draws contrasts between the communities, the old Elsa and that of the 
new Alexco operation. UKHM Elsa was a real town, with families and an 
air of permanency, whereas the new incarnation of Elsa is simply a work 
camp:
HM: Elsa, when it was a town site, when people, families 
lived there, it was more busy. Now it’s more like a work-camp, eh, 
basically. It’s pretty quiet up there now. Like, this is just a working 
camp, eh?
AW: And what’s it like for you to be working around Elsa, 
now, a town that you sorta grew up in, that you spent some time 
in? When you see the old school and buildings like that, how does 
it feel?
HM: Well there’s probably lots ‘a memories in there, yeah, 
when you’re a kid. I remember playing hockey there all the time 
and that. And it was a pretty busy little town, eh?
AW: Yeah. Do you miss it? Like, do you miss living there, or 
having that town around?
HM: I dunno, yeah, a little, in a way, but I just like quiet plac-
es, eh? Quiet towns, I don’t like very big places. I could stay in a 
big place, but not very long. ‘Cause see here, some days you still, 
you don’t even have to lock your door.
For Herman, there was an emotional connection to the town of Elsa, but 
with eight young daughters to care for, Herman is less concerned with 
the changes in Elsa, an abandoned mining town, than with the possible 
changes in Mayo, where his family now lives: 
AW: So how do you think the mine reopening there, how do 
you think it’s affected the community of Mayo?
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HM: It probably bring a little more money into the commu-
nity, more than anything, and some jobs. Yeah. But the majority 
jobs always go to outside, eh?
AW: Why do you think that is?
HM: Um, they’re more qualified.
Herman is one of the few experienced Na-Cho Nyäk Dun miners work-
ing at Keno Hill. As in the previous era of mining, most of the well-
paid management and technical trades positions are awarded to people 
from outside the Yukon, who work on a fly-in, fly-out basis. Much like 
the UKHM era, the influx of young, predominantly male workers at the 
mine has created concerns about alcohol, drugs, and social changes in 
the community. However, it was just such an influx of young men that 
brought Herman’s father to the Yukon and created a comparable situation 
for Herman’s grandfather, Dave Hager. Both Herman and his grandfather 
Dave managed to balance traditional subsistence work while engaging in 
a modern economy, and both were living in a time of cultural and social 
change—for Dave it was an influx of newcomers and industrial develop-
ment, while Herman has witnessed the revival of such development in 
a new era of Aboriginal self-government. Like his grandfather, Herman 
also has a large, primarily female family to look after—Herman has eight 
daughters, and Dave had six. Herman continues to drill away at the same 
mineral veins his father worked on, expanding the underground maze 
of tunnels and shafts, some of which are supported by timbers cut by 
his grandfather. But while his family history may be intrinsically linked 
to that of the mines, Herman appreciates the world above ground much 
more than the dark, damp mines below:
AW: . . . So what’s it like working underground, like what are 
your days like there?
HM: If you keep busy, it go by fast. Yeah, I like that. Some-
times you get tired of the dark, I like to come out in the daytime 
when it’s nice outside, I’ll come all the way outside to eat lunch, 
yeah, like if it’s real nice.
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AW: Just to get some sunlight?
HM: Yeah, to come see some daylight, eh?
[Laughter]
HM: ‘Cause you know, I don’t wanna spend all day down 
there, like to come out at least once, eh? .  .  . So, you see a lot ‘a 
dark, eh? Feel like a mushroom.
Herman also sees an important distinction between his work life and his 
home life. Mining may pay the bills, but most important for Herman is 
the rural, northern lifestyle, which he is able to maintain despite physic-
ally demanding shift work:
AW: . . . Well, when you’re not working up there, what oth-
er sorts of activities do you do out on the land and in the area 
around here?
HM: Well, I like hunting. I used to trap and all that before, 
but prices are way too low, I don’t bother anymore, in the winter.
AW: Where do you go hunting?
HM: Usually up towards Elsa, up that way. Up in that area, 
or up river.
AW: Is it for moose, mostly?
HM: Yeah. Sometime I go hunting for sheep too. 
AW: Have you noticed any changes with the moose habitat or 
behavior, or anything around the mine sites?
HM: Yeah, there’s less moose around. There’s more activity, 
eh, with this mining going on.
AW: Right. So how does that affect your hunting?
HM: Well, usually people have to go further out, eh, for their 
moose.
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Herman, a man who has spent more than half his life mining—who sus-
tains his family and his traditional pursuits through mining—is still crit-
ical of such development. While he is not given to public speaking, his 
wife, Bobbie-Lee, has represented him at community meetings, speaking 
out about certain mineral development projects to which Herman is op-
posed, such as a proposed hardrock mine near Mayo:
HM: . . . But see they’re gonna open that Victoria Gold too, and 
that’s in huntin’ country there, boy. Yeah, that’s out McQuesten 
Flats there, and all that, that area.
AW: How do people feel about that one?
HM: I’m not sure. Me, myself, I don’t care much for open pit 
mining, ‘cause it makes a big hole, eh? And too, when they start 
using heap leach, eh?
AW: Right. So do you think that kind of mining, up at Keno 
Hill is better for the environment?
HM: In a way, eh? Yeah, because it’s one hole in the side of the 
mountain, not compared to a open pit. Open pits are huge. When 
they, they can affect the area way more, yeah, so but they still, it 
still goes on all over, eh?
AW: Do you feel like you have a say? Like as a First Nation 
person in the area, like your First Nation has sort of a say in that 
kind of mining?
HM: Uh, yeah, yeah, they must have some kinda say, ‘cause 
that’s all Band land [First Nation settlement land] over there, on 
this side of it. But they usually go ahead anyway, eh?
Both dependent on the mining industry and critical of it, Herman per-
sonifies the complexity of the mining and development debate in the 
Yukon. In spite of the sometimes fierce rhetoric surrounding contempor-
ary mineral development in the territory, few Yukoners are completely 
against or completely in favour of mining. Instead, there is a spectrum 
of what people view as acceptable. Herman, like all of us, is mired in the 
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modern, industrial world, which is still dependent on non-renewable re-
sources, such as metals and fossil fuels. While Herman toils underground 
to uncover these metals—silver, lead, and zinc—many of us benefit from 
his work and in turn, partake in the industry. 
“LONG AS IT DOESN ’ T CHANGE  
THE Y UKON TOO MUCH ”
The United Keno Hill Mine has left its mark on the Na-Cho Nyäk Dun 
traditional territory. The largest environmental scars are hidden deep 
within the Wernecke Mountains, where there are hundreds of kilometres 
of hollowed-out mining shafts and, as people say, more timber below 
ground than above. The social and cultural effects of the mine, however, 
can still be seen, heard, and felt in the community of Mayo and among 
the Na-Cho Nyäk Dun. For Herman Melancon, who has worked at the 
mine nearly his entire adult life, this work has not only shaped his family 
history, it will also leave a permanent, physical impact on his life. Indeed, 
with each scar and injury, the story of decades of underground mining is 
slowly being inscribed on Herman’s body. Near the end of our interview, 
Herman did confess that he was concerned about his health and would 
eventually like to stop working underground:
AW: Well, I think that’s pretty much all of our questions, do 
you have anything else you wanna add, or . . .?
HM: I’d probably like to quit, uh, stop from it, you know, stop 
mining eventually, try something else, maybe placer, maybe plac-
er mining. ‘Cause sometimes all the diesel smoke underground, I 
get tired of it, coughing that black stuff up.
AW: Right. You’re worried about your health?
HM: Yeah, I’m starting to get worried about my lungs, ac-
tually. I start trying to wear mask more, you know? I wear mask 
more now, ‘cause some equipment, you know, you got lots a’ 
equipment moving underground and the ventilation is not good 
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enough then you, you get too smoky and breathe too much of 
that diesel fumes in, eh?
AW: Right, right. Do you notice any effects, any like physical 
effects yet, from working down there, or . . .?
HM: .  .  . my hearing is less, eh? Percentage. It’s still pretty 
good, but it’s, as years go by it’s gonna get less, eh?
Herman is critical of the environmental degradation caused by mining 
and of the physical impacts on his own body, but for him, mining is a part 
of his life. A career change would mean shifting from one form of min-
ing (underground) to another (placer). Herman has been a miner since 
he was twenty years old, and while he is realistic about the boom and 
bust life cycle of the industry, he is confident there will always be another 
mine where he can find work:
AW: . . . So who do you think should regulate that [the min-
ing industry]?
HM: Probably government, eh? Don’t open it up too much. 
There’s a lot a’ nice country, eh, up in the Yukon. But I dunno how 
long the mining boom will last, eh? Maybe it’ll last ten years.
AW: Do you think about that, like, what you’ll do if the mine 
shuts down again?
HM: Keno Hill? I’d probably just go out, more out in B.C. 
again, eh? But there’s another mine open, there’s another one at 
Minto anyway, Minto too. There’s how many mines going in the 
Yukon—one, two, three, eh? I think. 
There may always be another mine at which Herman can work, but with 
each new mine, or redevelopment, there are social and environmental 
consequences to bear. One of the most significant social impacts of the 
Keno Hill redevelopment has been a polarization of opinions between 
people in the surrounding communities. For the Na-Cho Nyäk Dun, 
differences in opinion about the mine have served to widen the gap be-
tween elders and the younger generation who, like Herman, grew up 
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with mining. For many elders, protection of the land is of the utmost 
importance, while for a younger generation, who are now running the 
First Nation government, economic development is also a high priority. 
Herman spoke about this gap:
AW: .  .  . Do you think there’s a difference between the way 
elders in Mayo feel about the mining and the way younger people 
feel about mining?
HM: Yeah, there’s probably a difference. Elders never like it 
very much, eh? . . . in the old days, elders didn’t bother with min-
ing very much. That’s ’cause long time ago, Indian people, they 
used to find gold in the river and they just threw it back in there, 
didn’t they?
AW: Yeah.
[Laughter]
HM: Didn’t bother, but now, I’m not sure how elders feel 
about it now. But you see more younger people working at mines, 
now, eh? . . . Long as it doesn’t change the Yukon too much, eh? 
The Yukon should be left the way it is, see. You uh, shouldn’t 
overpopulate too much, here, shouldn’t change very much, ‘cause 
they’ll just ruin it.
Herman demonstrates an important similarity between the opinions of 
elders and those of younger Na-Cho Nyäk Dun citizens. While they may 
strive for economic development and recognize their historical connec-
tion and economic dependence on the Keno Hill mine, Na-Cho Nyäk 
Dun citizens, old and young, value the land and feel that they belong to 
it. As Na-Cho Nyäk Dun elder Helen Buyck has asserted, “The land was 
their teacher, and the knowledge they have of it is far greater than most 
people can appreciate.”31 This land and the Na-Cho Nyäk Dun culture 
have been shaped by over one hundred years of underground mining, but 
those hundred years represent just a fraction of their story. While some of 
that history will remain hidden deep within the silver-laden mountains, 
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much of it will be told both through the stories and the bodies of the Na-
Cho Nyäk Dun themselves.
We have shared elements of Herman’s story, in an attempt to bridge 
the burgeoning gaps between generations of Na-Cho Nyäk Dun citizens 
and between First Nation and non–First Nation Yukoners. However, as 
Julie Cruikshank points out, “that a culture is shared does not mean that 
all individual interpretations will be the same.”32 Indeed, this is not a de-
finitive representation of contemporary Na-Cho Nyäk Dun opinions or 
culture, it is simply our interpretation of Herman’s story, which is one 
we find particularly poignant and illuminating. The very act of sharing 
stories such as Herman’s may serve to create understanding between 
generations and, we hope, demonstrate the ability of narrative to unravel 
the complexity of modern relationships between northern indigenous 
peoples, industrial development, and the land that they share.
Authors’ note: At the time of editing in 2013, Alexco Resource 
Corporation announced that, due to decreasing silver prices, the company 
would be laying off up to 25 per cent  of its employees at the Keno Hill 
silver mine, with tentative plans to reopen in the early 2015.33 Herman 
was laid off and has been exploring other work opportunities at mines 
down south. Unfortunately, fur prices have been too low for Herman to 
profitably work his traplines. 
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Gender, Labour, and Community  
in a Remote Mining Town
Jane Hammond
The quickest way to travel from the island of Newfoundland to Labrador 
City is by airplane. A small Provincial Airline plane does a twice-daily 
milk run from St. John’s to Labrador City, stopping in Deer Lake and 
Goose Bay before reaching its final destination. In early May 2011, as the 
plane approached western Labrador, I was struck by the scale and extent 
of over five decades of open-pit iron mining on the landscape. Mountains 
of red earth sat next to large craters sculpted by years of mass-mining 
for iron ore. Labrador City, originally built by the Iron Ore Company of 
Canada (IOC), made up the majority of the western Labrador’s popula-
tion and continually underwent construction to keep up with expand-
ing iron production, as contractors cut large sections of the surrounding 
wooded area to make room for more temporary housing. Less visible than 
these environmental changes, however, is the history of unequal gender 
relations that have accompanied the extraction of iron ore in western 
Labrador, as women struggled to enter the mining workforce and gain 
independence and opportunity in this male-dominated company town. 
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The study of women’s place in industrial towns, and more specifically 
mining communities, has blossomed since the 1980s as scholars moved 
from focused studies of gender in industry to a more all-encompassing 
approach to place, community, and industry. This shift in focus reflects 
changing historiographical understandings of gender and labour history. 
By the 1980s, scholars such as Angela John recognized that past histor-
ical accounts reflected inaccurate, stereotyped gender roles and ideolo-
gies.1 Several studies examined traditional gender divisions and explored 
the significance of women’s positions as housewives to the success of the 
town and industry. For example, Luxton and Fox used a Marxist approach 
to reinterpret the work of housewives, arguing that “women’s work in the 
home is one of the most important and necessary labour processes of 
industrial capitalist society.”2 Similarly, Vicky Seddon’s public history of 
the British coal miners’ strikes of the 1980s determined that most women 
became involved in the strike because they viewed it as an extension of 
their duties as housewives.3 By the late 1990s to 2000s, scholars transi-
tioned in their approach from women’s studies to gender studies, and the 
focus moved to understanding relationships between men and women. 
Recognizing the complexity of gender and labour history, these studies 
used interdisciplinary, mixed-methods approaches.4 
Drawing from these models, this study of Labrador City women’s his-
tory also used an interdisciplinary framework and multi-method tech-
niques. The primary research for this chapter consists of twenty-five oral 
history interviews and group workshops conducted in May 2011.5 Oral 
history is used to reveal the hidden voices and complex divisions among 
working-class residents in the town, since these might not be readily ap-
parent using other research methods. To obtain multiple points of view, 
interviewees included current or retired employees of the mine and res-
idents of the community ranging in age from twenty-four to eighty-two. 
Following the interview process, interviews were carefully analyzed since 
“only slowly do underlying strands of a community’s culture reveal them-
selves, as interview after interview sounds the same themes.”6 From oral 
histories, historians can learn not just the facts, but also the experiences, 
feelings, and insights of the people being interviewed. The study was fur-
ther supported with research into archival sources and published docu-
ments by IOC and the provincial government.
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This research reveals that women’s entry into the mining workforce 
was halting in Labrador City. From the early 1970s to the 2000s, top-
down forces, such as the influence of the company, along with bottom-up 
social pressure from other working-class residents made it difficult for 
women to enter wage labour comfortably or in large numbers. According 
to Karen Beckwith, change in traditional gender roles in an industrial 
community requires three major preconditions: women must have the 
desire to act, the opportunity to change their position, and the strength 
of group support.7 Certainly, in broad terms the advent of the 1970s pro-
vided a potential opportunity for women in Labrador City to make em-
ployment gains, as the second wave of feminism took hold, and women 
throughout North America began to enter wage employment. This was 
no less true in Newfoundland, where feminist groups throughout the 
province encouraged women to take a more active role in society, form-
ing women’s unions with a common goal of “lobbying the governments 
to influence policies that regulate women’s lives.”8 One result was em-
ployment gains: the number of women working in the province’s paid 
labour force increased by 56.9 per cent between 1970 and 1980.9 In fact, 
according to interviewees in Rick Rennie’s studies, women of other min-
ing towns in the province, notably Buchans and St. Lawrence, were active 
participants in the workforce.10 Despite these gains in the workplace and 
toward gender equality in the province and in North America at large, 
at Labrador City, IOC policies continued to structure and maintain an 
unequal division of labour at the Carol Lake Mine. Women struggled 
to obtain positions at the mine and, once they entered the mine work-
force, faced social and occupational discrimination. Through a study of 
Labrador City from the 1970s to 2000s, this discussion will reveal that 
despite women’s ability to obtain positions in the mine, the social life and 
work culture of the company and town maintained gendered inequality 
until the 2000s. Labrador City’s gender history can be divided into three 
periods. After an initial period between the town’s founding in 1958 and 
1975, when the company worked to build not only a stable town but also 
to create an ideal image of the community by encouraging traditional 
gender roles, women began to resist actively the imposition of unequal 
gender relations. From 1975 to 1989, women grew increasingly discon-
tented, even as they tentatively entered the mine workforce, mainly in 
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supporting positions. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, women’s activ-
ism, changing attitudes, and strong demands for labour led to greater 
gender equality. While this chapter focuses on the latter two stages, it is 
important to first give a brief history of the mine and town’s conception. 
After the early success of the Iron Ore Company of Canada’s (IOC) 
mining project in Schefferville, Quebec, in 1958 the company began de-
veloping the Carol Lake Mine and accompanying mining town, Labrador 
City. As in many mining towns developed in the 1960s, the founding 
company invested a great deal of time and money into community de-
velopment and transformed the region from a land shared with moose, 
bears, and other wild animals into a modern, suburban-style Canadian 
town.11 To maintain this atmosphere, the company controlled the type of 
people who could live in the community. By hiring only male employees 
and hand-picking “satisfactory” residents, IOC wielded power not only 
over the economy of the town, but also influenced the people’s way of life 
and their connection to place.12 As a result, the town was an environment 
where women often felt trapped and forced to depend upon their hus-
bands for survival. It was this feeling of inequality that shaped women’s 
level of engagement in community life and their labour opportunities.13 
In its hiring policies, the company sought to emulate the ideal-
ized social structure of the 1950s. Through the 1960s and even as late 
as the 1970s, IOC’s unofficial policy was to hire women only for office 
work because the mining industry was seen as a man’s world. As Nichole 
Churchill noted, “For a very long period of time, Labrador West was a 
male-dominated community .  .  . and you know breaking into the male 
workforce itself was a problem.”14 In giving priority to married men, it 
was clear that IOC was still enforcing the nuclear family lifestyle.15 
By the 1970s, however, some changes made it possible for women to 
enter non-traditional occupations. The federal Royal Commission on the 
Status of Women in 1969 recommended that more women be employed 
in Canadian companies. In response to this report and its correspond-
ing need for employees, IOC began hiring a limited number of women 
in low-paying, untrained positions in the company. These positions were 
previously seen as masculine, and included labourers, janitors, office 
workers, and heavy equipment operators.16 Despite this initial action, it 
was not easy for women to enter these jobs. Elizabeth Andrews was one 
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of those women who struggled to get an entry-level position: “I wrote all 
the tests, passed them and just waited to be hired. And you’re hearing 
all these people getting hired and you’re still. . . . Well what it was is you 
had to keep going back all the time.” Andrews finally broke into the min-
ing industry workforce in August 1974 and was among the first group of 
women to get hired. 
While the industry’s high salary was important, women did not en-
dure the hardships associated with entering the mining industry simply 
to get extra money. There was more behind this action. A woman’s en-
trance into the mining industry in the 1970s was a political statement, 
whether or not this was her primary intention.17 The desire for equal 
rights and women’s independence was, quite possibly, stronger in the 
mining districts throughout Newfoundland and Labrador since, as ex-
pressed in histories of other towns, the women of the province were used 
to greater opportunities:18
I just didn’t get what the problem was. Back home [Stephen-
ville], if there was fifteen women in the field, there was probably 
fifteen men. Nobody thought nothing less of it. It was just the 
normal thing to do.19
After many years of being trapped in their homes with nothing to do, or 
stuck in abusive relationships, some women in Labrador City saw work at 
the mine as an opportunity to achieve financial independence. However, 
they still lacked strength in numbers and the support of the town and 
company.
The economic downturn in the early 1980s highlighted women’s ten-
uous place in the mine’s workforce. Between 1978 and 1982, the mine 
went through a bust cycle, resulting in mass layoffs. Since the majority 
of IOC women workers held entry-level jobs, they were the first to go. 
The very few women who successfully avoided the layoffs were harshly 
criticized by some IOC men and their wives. Many in the community felt 
that it was unfair for women to take the few remaining positions when 
men needed the money to support their families.20 Clearly, some people 
in the town did not believe women were or should become breadwinners. 
As well, many still believed—as they had when women had first entered 
the mine—that this was not a serious long-term venture but simply an 
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attempt by women to prove their ability to make extra money. At the end 
of the recession, IOC was quick to hire back many of the male workers 
who had been laid off during the bust cycle. However, women were less 
likely to be rehired by the company. Suddenly women found themselves 
in the same battles they had struggled through in the 1970s.21 
WOR K I NG WOMEN AND GENDER ROLES  
I N THE COMMU NITY
It wasn’t long before the mine and town again saw prosperity. With this 
boom cycle came mass hiring, and despite IOC’s primary loyalty to men, 
the company once again needed women. Thus, by the mid-1980s a larg-
er number of women began working in the mining industry. Women’s 
changing place in the workforce had implications for gender relations and 
social life in the town. Social divisions emerged between IOC-employed 
and non–IOC-employed women. Even when IOC women were accepted 
into housewives’ social groups or clubs in town, shift work made it prac-
tically impossible to become a member as they missed too many meet-
ings. People developed very strong opinions of wives and mothers work-
ing in the mine. One IOC woman remarked:
I didn’t go to the hair dressers. I went a couple of times but 
you don’t go back. Oh, no. You get in there and you’re listening 
to all these women talking about the women working in IOC: 
“Nothing but a bunch of whores in there screwing everything 
that’s in there.” One day I turned over and I said: “Listen, you 
know who we’re screwing? Your husbands, cause it’s all your hus-
bands we’re working with.”22
Unable to socialize with the women of the town, some IOC women tried 
socializing with other IOC employees, but this came with its own prob-
lems. Just as IOC men had been accustomed to their male-only work en-
vironment, they also enjoyed a male-only social life. When IOC women 
entered the bars where IOC employees commonly gathered after a shift, 
the men ignored them:
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They didn’t want you in there because they figured you didn’t 
belong. You go in here at happy hour at the clubs in the evening 
after work, even though it was a union centre and the women 
should have been allowed just as much as the men, but if I walked 
in with my husband everything just went dead . . . it was obscene 
for you to walk into the club because that was where the men 
went after work, not the women.23
Women were not given the cold shoulder just at the clubs. While the men 
would talk to women at the plant, once in town they refused to even ac-
knowledge women’s presence. The small group of IOC women suddenly 
felt like outcasts in their own community. As some interviewees noted, 
it took a “different breed of women” to last in the mining workforce be-
cause they had to endure hardships both on and off the project.24 The few 
IOC women who were willing to endure the work and town harassment 
built strong and lasting friendships with each other. As Elizabeth said, “I 
knows some of them more than I knows my family, right because I was 
nineteen when I started. I mean, I knew them for thirty years.”25 These 
friendships were essential in preventing depression and social isolation 
among the women.
In spite of the gains made by women in the 1980s, in many ways 
Labrador City retained many of the gendered social roles of the previous 
generation. At this time, 73 per cent of the adult residents were mar-
ried. Of these, 87 per cent lived in a nuclear family setting where women 
remained responsible for domestic labour. Most often, there were four 
to five members per household.26 This lifestyle was strongly encouraged 
by company housing policies. Mining companies in the region urged 
residents to buy housing since company officials believed that home 
ownership encouraged long-term residency, a stable workforce, and low-
er costs for the company.27 IOC provided subsidies for its employees, but 
these subsidies came with a number of unwritten rules. Priority went 
to married men, preferably those with families, followed by single men. 
IOC women, married or single, could not obtain any housing subsidies.28 
While technically a home could be owned by anyone who could afford it, 
the majority of women did not qualify for a mortgage. This forced some 
women to remain in abusive relationships, and it caused others to seek 
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marriage when they had no interest in it.29 Ultimately, IOC women were 
deprived of the independence and freedom they were fighting for when 
originally entering the industry.
Even as late as the 1980s, there was a clear socially acceptable path for 
Labrador City women to follow. As single, young adults, women worked 
until they found husbands. They could take jobs as babysitters, nurses, 
schoolteachers, office workers, or service industry workers.30 They were 
then expected to take the position of housewife until their children 
reached maturity. Social pressure and particularly a lack of child-care 
facilities encouraged women to remain home with younger children. The 
town, which prided itself on all its modern amenities, did not have a day-
care centre until the 1990s.31 As one resident recalled:
Mom didn’t work for most of while we were growing up. I 
can remember her coming to us and saying she was getting a job 
and we were going to have to take care of ourselves at lunch. So 
we’d have to get our own lunch. I was probably about thirteen or 
fourteen.32
Once the children reached their teen years, women could choose to 
go back to work part-time or even full-time in positions categorized as 
women’s work. It appeared that the community embraced and in many 
cases encouraged women to work in the town’s service industry. In fact, 
some women even gained town support as they became entrepreneurs. 
When Alison Wiseman became a widow in 1987, she decided to open 
the Dollar Plus Souvenirs and Convenience store in the town mall. When 
Wiseman faced financial hardships, the community gave her monetary 
and emotional support.33 Women were also supported when opening 
home-based businesses such as Linda Cassell’s sewing venture.34 Much 
like their entrance into the mining industry, some women saw this as an 
opportunity to gain independence.
While working was acceptable for those women without young chil-
dren, some interviewees reserved harsh judgments about the effect that 
working mothers’ absences had on their children. One informant be-
lieved that staying home when her children were young had made them 
better behaved and educated. She stated: 
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I stayed home . . . when she got home from school, to give her 
a ride, to do different things with her . . . Some kids were left from 
the time they got out of school in the evening to the time their 
parents got home in the evening. God only knows what they were 
at . . . Mine were supervised and I found a difference, not only in 
their behaviour but even in their attitude and their language . . . 
I carted around a lot of kids and I picked them up and dropped 
them off and I could see a difference. Every day as time went by 
some of them got worse.35
She further argued that there was a marked difference in school grades. 
Since working mothers did not have as much time to devote to their chil-
dren and could not always find a babysitter, children were left to do their 
homework as they pleased. The parents would find out how their children 
were doing through the report cards, and by then it was too late to fix 
the problem. The housewives, on the contrary, “kept an even keel on it,” 
which yielded better grades.36
On the opposing side, women who did work often believed that 
less doting on the child created a more independent, responsible, and 
well-rounded young adult who was ready to move out and experience life. 
Elizabeth Andrews was one working woman who had strong opinions on 
the matter:
When the mother stays at home, [the children] had a harder 
job leaving the home, they had a harder job going to university; a 
lot of them don’t know how to take care of themselves . . . I must 
say mine are three quite independent go-getters. Determined 
they were .  .  . and I say: “Parents, do they think they’re doing a 
wonderful job if their kids never had to cook, never had to clean, 
never had to do for themselves?”37
The working mother believed that by taking on the added pressure of 
working while raising a family they were also able to provide more for 
their children and meet the demands of the consumer world. Keeping 
them busy in extracurricular activities and giving them things such as 
skidoos prevented boredom and created a well-rounded child.38
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Interviewees suggested that working women were sometimes blamed 
for changing marital relations and domestic breakdowns.39 Working 
alongside men at the mine led to a perceived increase in extramarital 
affairs. As men and women spent sixteen-hour shifts together, they 
were often seeing more of their work partners than they were of their 
spouses, ultimately leading to family breakups.40 From a different per-
spective, women also used mine employment as a means to secure finan-
cial independence and escape unsatisfactory or abusive relationships.41 
In households where both spouses worked in wage labour, families need-
ed to adopt a new division of domestic labour, sharing the household 
responsibilities as a result of opposing shift work and limited access to 
babysitters and cleaning services.42 But changing one’s domestic practi-
ces was not easy for some families, and in Labrador City it triggered re-
sentment from some of the men who were used to being “tended on” by 
their wives.43
In the late 1980s and 1990s, both IOC and the town’s women orga-
nized to push for gender equality in Labrador City. These efforts led to 
the establishment of the local Women’s Centre run by Marion Atkinson 
and Barbara Doran. This was designed to provide a safe place for women 
in the area and to promote equal rights.44 In response to growing rates of 
sexual and marital problems (such as abuse, infidelity, and divorce) in the 
town, the Labrador West Status of Women Council and the newly formed 
Women’s Centre created the Labrador West Status of Women Committee 
to study gender relations in the town and in the workforce.45 Finding that 
working women felt that they were not supported, the Women’s Centre 
established coffee groups, children’s play time, skills-training programs, 
and emotional support groups. The centre was also a safe house for 
victims of domestic abuse.46 The IOC publicly supported the Women’s 
Centre and the Labrador West study. The company also joined the federal 
government’s voluntary affirmative action program, which was launched 
in 1978 as a means of establishing gender equality in the workplace.47 
IOC’s actions helped regain the image they once had of being supportive 
and involved in the success of the community as well as the industry.48
By the 1990s, despite IOC’s outward enthusiasm for equality in the 
workplace and town, the company and its male employees still drew clear 
lines separating feminine and masculine work at the mine. A study on 
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women in the workforce of Newfoundland and Labrador revealed that 
while 46.8 per cent of women worked in paid labour, women represented 
less than 10 per cent of the workforce in trades, technology, and oper-
ations fields.49 Those women who worked with IOC still most often oc-
cupied roles consistent with stereotypes about women’s abilities: they 
worked as cleaners, or were funnelled into other jobs that were not as 
physically demanding. Their positions usually did not pay enough relative 
to the community’s cost of living. Therefore, the majority of women still 
depended on marriage for financial security.50
Nevertheless, in the 1990s, there was a sudden increase in female 
mine workers at IOC. At this time, the town and company noticed a 
large number of second- and third-generation children leaving the small 
town to seek education or jobs, which meant a loss of potential employ-
ees. Thus, IOC joined forces with College of the North Atlantic’s local 
campus and the local steelworkers’ union to develop the two-year mining 
technician diploma as part of the “Employee of the Future” program.51 
Students were almost guaranteed a job with the company upon success-
ful completion of the program.52 As anticipated, the program effectively 
encouraged a number of young men to stay in the community. It also 
unexpectedly raised the percentage of female employees. Since both IOC 
and the college followed the affirmative action program, their education 
program needed to be accessible to everyone, and women of all ages took 
advantage.53 Noreen Careen, the director of the Labrador West Women’s 
Centre, noticed the program resulted in a significant change in the lives 
of working women in the community. As she argued, “it’s the greatest 
move that was ever made because it gave women an opportunity for their 
independence that otherwise they would never have had in this com-
munity.” Just as IOC strongly influenced women of the 1960s and 1970s 
to embrace the role of housewife, it was now one of the main forces en-
couraging women’s paid employment. Now the majority of Labrador City 
women were working, if not at IOC then in the supporting services in the 
town.54
The growing participation of women in the Labrador City workforce 
did not make up for the labour shortfall in the booming community. In 
fact, some secondary industries and volunteer organizations began to 
suffer from a lack of available employees. IOC had an unwritten rule that 
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it would not steal employees from other businesses; however, if an em-
ployee quit a position before applying to IOC, that person was considered 
fair game. With limited choices, stores began hiring people at younger 
ages, and soon they were hiring children as young as thirteen and four-
teen. Other stores and restaurants were forced to close earlier in the even-
ing, as early as six o’clock. Many businesses that should have succeeded, 
given the average family income in the town, were forced to close perma-
nently.55 By the early 2000s, businesses began hiring temporary workers 
from developing countries.56 Tim Hortons was the first company to do 
so, and soon Walmart, McDonald’s, and other local businesses followed. 
These companies hired groups of foreign workers, most often from the 
Philippines, for two-year contracts that included one shared house for 
approximately ten to twenty employees.57
Like the secondary industries, most of the volunteer roles in the town 
were originally filled by women. As noted earlier, women used these roles 
to give them something to do throughout the day. Yet with full-time paid 
positions, women no longer needed or had time to participate in volun-
teer work. While children took on some responsibilities in the town, few 
were willing to become involved in volunteer work when they could easi-
ly find paid employment. This resulted in fewer social events in the com-
munity, and some residents felt the town spirit was fading.58
As a result of IOC’s new policy toward hiring women, the company 
achieved parity in the number of male and female employees by the ear-
ly 2000s.59 The company added women’s locker rooms, washrooms, and 
lunchrooms, and removed derogatory pictures from the walls. IOC and 
the union developed an anti-harassment policy with zero tolerance for 
bullying.60 As IOC increasingly sought female employees, men encour-
aged their wives to enter the workforce, and mothers encouraged their 
daughters to avoid depending on male breadwinners. As one mother 
recalled:
I tell my girls, you get your education, get a job, be indepen-
dent, look out for yourself, then find someone that you can stay 
with and be with. I’ve seen so many people I know my mother’s 
age, like I have a friend whose parents were in a bad relation but 
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the woman couldn’t leave because she has nothing to go to: no 
education, no job, no skills, but now it’s so different.61
Increasingly, women in Labrador City regarded paid employment as a 
means of achieving financial independence and personal empowerment. 
Still, the achievement of gender parity in the town’s main industry 
did not eliminate conflict over gender roles in the workplace. Many min-
ing-industry employees noted that the positions in the workforce have 
simply been divided along gender lines. While a few women filled trade 
positions such as mechanics and electricians, they were a very small min-
ority. Most women remained in less physically demanding positions such 
as truck driving. Some women did feel that they fit into this work en-
vironment well. One remembered: 
I worked with the guys and the guys treated me like I was 
one of the boys. And one of the guys even said that to me, “Oh 
you’re just one of the boys,” and I think that was one of the best 
compliments I ever had . . . I thought that was perfect. I got along 
great with the guys. There was none of this sexual suggestiveness 
or anything like that. Every now and then they’d tell an off-co-
lour joke, but I mean you just laugh at it. As long as it’s not geared 
towards me personally, I don’t mind an off-colour joke or dirty 
joke or whatever. No big deal to me.62
It is clear, however, that in order for women to fit in, they needed to 
present themselves as “one of the boys.” If women appeared weak, male 
employees did not appreciate working with them. In fact, some men be-
lieved that women were given “easy jobs” because they were often unable 
to do jobs requiring strength. This left all the physically demanding jobs 
for the men. If a man wanted to rotate to an easier job for a few weeks, 
there were often none available.63
****
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As the town of Labrador City celebrated its fiftieth year in 2008, the 
residents took pride in their generations of hard work in the mines and 
marvelled at the vast changes to the region’s landscape. Yet, the same 
mine that evokes such strong pride was also at the centre of the cracks 
that emerged in the town’s gender relations, a fraught history revealed 
through oral histories of this fifty-year period. Despite women making 
inroads into paid labour in the 1970s, company policy and a masculine 
workplace culture constrained the number and quality of positions that 
were available to women. Oral interviews also suggested that working 
women experienced social pressure and at times outright condemna-
tion for entering the workforce. Moreover, through the period of low 
commodity prices in the 1980s, it was female workers who were most 
vulnerable to layoffs, showing that their foothold in a male-dominated 
workforce remained tenuous. 
If the call for gender equality in the Carol Lake Mine began with the 
broader feminist call for greater access to wage employment in the 1970s, 
progress on the issue was slow. Indeed, gendered inequalities maintained 
a strong hold over Labrador City until the 2000s, when a significant in-
crease in women’s employment and more tangible social and workplace 
equity policies from the town and company (child care, anti-harassment, 
etc.) led to significant gains for working women. Other studies have sug-
gested that, as in Labrador City, a combination of policy changes in the 
workplace and fundamental cultural and social change within the local 
community is a prerequisite for the advancement of gender equity in sin-
gle-industry towns.64 In Labrador City, policy innovation and cultural 
change proceeded more slowly than was typical elsewhere in Canada. 
The memories of women who lived and worked in the town suggest, 
moreover, that the intransigence of management and cultural resistance 
among other working-class residents worked in concert to reinforce male 
dominance and gender inequity at the mine.
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“A Mix of the Good and the Bad”: 
Community Memory and  
the Pine Point Mine
John Sandlos
Mining brings massive transformation to lives and landscapes. Almost 
inevitably, the people who worked in and lived near historic mines are 
compelled to tell stories about these changes. Whether it is recollec-
tions of hardships and good times within the mining camps, memories 
of large-scale environmental change, reminiscences of social life within 
a mining town, or remembrances of work on or under the ground, the 
process of telling stories can generate multiple and sometimes contested 
interpretations of local mining heritage within a particular landscape. 
Was the mine a good place to work? Was the town a good place to raise a 
family? Did pollution arise from the mine? What kind of landscape chan-
ges (open pits, roads, tailings ponds, etc.) did the mine produce, and how 
well were these physical reminders cleaned up? How did mining change 
pre-existing forms of natural resources use? The answers to these ques-
tions provide rich source material that can help us to understand the 
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complex social, cultural, and ecological memory and meanings associat-
ed with mining activity in small communities that are typically located 
in remote regions. 
This has been particularly true for indigenous communities who 
must balance the inherently short-term benefits of mining development 
with long-term residency in particular localities and regions. And in-
deed, there is a large body of writing on the social, economic, and en-
vironmental inequities associated with large-scale mining development 
in subsistence-oriented indigenous communities throughout the globe.1 
Oral history research methods have sometimes been used as a means 
to capture these local voices and stories in places where mining has led 
to environmental injustices such as acute pollution and the exposure of 
indigenous communities to chemical and radiological toxins.2 Such com-
munity-generated stories can provide a powerful corrective to booster-
ish histories (often commissioned by companies or published by mining 
heritage societies) that celebrate mining as a historical gateway for the 
extension of capital, settlement, and development in remote regions.3 
Similar to the community-generated stories, the historical narrative 
of the Pine Point Mine, at first glance, seems to pit the environmental 
and economic impacts of development against the subsistence economies 
of First Nations communities. The Consolidated Mining and Smelting 
Company (later Cominco) operated the mine on the south shore of Great 
Slave Lake from 1964 to 1988 through a subsidiary company, Pine Point 
Mines, Ltd. As a massive lead-zinc mine, the Pine Point Mine was also 
central to the Canadian government’s post–World War II colonial agen-
da in Northern Canada. Government records are replete with references 
to the mine as a gateway development that would stimulate additional 
mines throughout the North and quickly catapult northern Aboriginal 
people from the moribund fur trade economy to more modern forms of 
industrial wage labour.4 So great was the political consensus in favour 
of northern development in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the federal 
government provided subsidies of nearly $100 million for a railroad, a 
highway extension, and hydroelectric development to support Pine Point, 
infrastructure that was meant to kick-start further mineral development 
and modernization throughout the Northwest Territories.5 
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Even at the early stages of the mine’s operating life, however, several 
critics began to argue that the economic promise of Pine Point for ad-
jacent First Nations communities, particularly for the Chipewyan and 
Métis community of Fort Resolution roughly sixty kilometres to the east, 
had gone largely unfulfilled. As early as 1968, the political economist 
Kenneth Rea invoked Harold Innis’s staples theory to criticize Pine Point 
as another in a long line of export-oriented northern development pro-
jects that contributed little to local economic development.6 Sociologist 
Paul Deprez’s 1973 report for the Winnipeg-based Centre for Settlement 
Studies adopted much the same tone, highlighting how the federal gov-
ernment’s failure to provide local skills training, a viable housing policy 
for northerners, and an extension of the Pine Point highway further 
east to Fort Resolution meant the mine workforce was mostly imported 
and the local economic benefits of the mine severely limited.7 In 1977, 
Justice Thomas Berger’s report on hearings into the proposed Mackenzie 
Valley gas pipeline quoted liberally from Fort Resolution testimony, sug-
gesting that Pine Point demonstrated the negative impact of industrial 
mega-development on local hunting and trapping activities.8 Almost 
simultaneously, the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee (CARC—an 
environmental NGO) released a report highlighting the negative social, 
economic, and environmental consequences of the mine, particularly for 
Aboriginal hunters and trappers in Fort Resolution.9 The sudden closure 
of the mine in 1988, the subsequent collapse of the town of Pine Point, 
and the abandonment of the mine’s forty-seven open pits in an unre-
mediated state further cemented the idea that Fort Resolution and other 
nearby First Nations communities had derived little from the mine other 
than the mess that was left behind. 
In recent years, a very different parallel story has begun to emerge 
about the legacy of Pine Point. In 2011 media artists Michael Simons and 
Paul Shoebridge released an interactive web documentary about the town 
of Pine Point through the National Film Board. Inspired by the efforts of 
former Pine Point resident Richard Cloutier to keep the abandoned and 
demolished ghost town alive through the web memorial titled “Pine Point 
Revisited,” the remarkable web documentary traces the overwhelmingly 
positive memories of life in the town of Pine Point. In a broader sense, the 
Pine Point website and documentary provide a powerful example of what 
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Figure 1: Abandoned waste rock pile, Pine Point Mine, NWT, 2009.  
Photo by John Sandlos.
many historians and geographers have identified as a close identification 
with local place and landscape in remote mining towns, even after the 
cessation of mining activity.10 The Simons and Shoebridge documentary 
declares (as looped video of a figure-skating performance of the Wizard 
of Oz at the Pine Point annual winter carnival plays in the background) 
that “most Pine Pointers think their home town was the best place on 
earth to have lived.”11 With a close-knit community and seemingly end-
less recreation activities, the Pine Point experience evokes for many waves 
of nostalgia for the demolished community. 
How are these competing stories—the mine as colonial disruption 
versus the mine work and the mine town as a near-paradise—inter-
preted within the First Nations communities adjacent to the Pine Point 
Mine? A complicated answer can be found in the thirty-nine oral his-
tory interviews the Memorial University–based “Abandoned Mines in 
Northern Canada” project conducted mostly in Fort Resolution, but also 
141John Sandlos
in the largely Slavey K’atl’odeeche First Nation (Hay River Reserve) and 
among members of the Hay River–based North Slave Métis Alliance.12 
The most striking and surprising feature of these interviews is that they 
feature parallel stories about Pine Point as a source of economic and en-
vironmental disruption, but also memories of Pine Point as a great place 
to live and work. Negative memories of local racism or environmental 
change are often juxtaposed within the same interview. This mix of posi-
tive and negative memories is all the more surprising because other oral 
history projects on historical large-scale northern mines have suggested 
unambiguously negative consequences for adjacent First Nations.13 The 
process of selecting interviewees—local research assistants largely chose 
individuals who had spent time living in the town or working at the mine, 
as opposed to those with no association with the town or mine, who 
might have been more critical—may have biased comments toward those 
nostalgic for a past life in Pine Point. Nonetheless, as Emilie Cameron has 
recently argued, stories about Northern Canada are not always subject to 
the binary categories—north versus south, mining versus communities, 
colonial versus indigenous, industrial activity versions traditional econ-
omies—that scholars have often chosen to highlight.14 In the more than 
two decades since Pine Point has closed, people in adjacent First Nations 
communities have retained memories that that speak both critically and 
nostalgically about the mine and the town, a reflection of their ability 
to accommodate and resist that massive changes that that the federal 
government’s development agenda and private capital brought to their 
region in the 1960s. 
SPEAK I NG OF PI NE POI NT: THE IMPACTS 
A long tradition of testimony and storytelling about the impact of Pine 
Point exists in nearby Aboriginal communities, and has circulated for 
decades in public hearings about the mine or other development projects. 
Beginning with Justice Berger’s landmark Mackenzie Valley Pipeline 
Inquiry in the 1970s, residents of Fort Resolution in particular have 
told an overwhelmingly negative story about the Pine Point Mine. The 
basic storyline resonates with the descriptions of adverse effects in the 
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previously mentioned academic literature: local First Nations were never 
consulted about the mine, they received few economic benefits (including 
jobs) from the mine, development at the mine severely impacted trapping 
activities, and the community was left with nothing but the huge mess 
of abandoned pits and the tailings pond.15 Chief Robert Sayine, speak-
ing through an interpreter at the Berger Inquiry in 1975, described Fort 
Resolution’s experience with mining development: 
He [Sayine] says you should see our own Pine Point there, he 
says for about ten miles radius around Pine Point he says you’ll 
never see no green trees around there for about ten miles radius 
around Pine Point. He says everything is just—all the dead trees, 
that’s all you could see around there.
He says look at that water around there because it never 
freezes during the winter, and you could smell it even when you 
are in a car passing through there, you can smell that water. 
Yes, he says right at the meeting wherever they’re going to 
have a stockpile for these pipes for the pipeline, he says, you told 
us there was going to be about 400 people is going to be em-
ployed there, and he says that’s the same kind of promise we got 
from Pine Point in 1960 when we sat in the meeting with them. 
There was going to be lots of jobs for natives there, but what we 
get today, he says there’s nothing for natives over at Pine Point.16
Local First Nations’ criticism only hardened after the mine closed in 1988, 
as people realized that Cominco’s abandonment and restoration plan 
did not extend beyond covering the tailings pond with gravel, removing 
the houses and buildings at Pine Point townsite, and treating remain-
ing water discharge to mitigate zinc discharge. The pits, the roads, and 
some infrastructure (the power facility) were left as long-term reminders 
of mining’s impacts on the landscape. Speaking for the Fort Resolution 
Hunters and Trappers Association, Cecil Lafferty testified to local objec-
tions to the limited reclamation plan at a Northwest Territories Water 
Board hearing on renewal of the mine’s water licence in 1990: 
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Presently the operation may be terminated, except for the 
retreatment program and minor clean-up, however, we have 
lost that whole area for future utilization, economically. With 
the long term lease on the area it would be unworthy to even 
consider the area in our land selection. This was once a pristine 
traditional harvesting area for the people of Fort Resolution. The 
Pine Point Mines Limited have yet to implement an adequate 
restoration program that will be satisfactory to the people con-
cerned. The operation over a period of twenty years, had numer-
ous open pits that were left as is to fill up with groundwater. The 
waste dumps were not covered over with soil that could at least 
enhance growth, and what little land that was not dug up flooded 
over by the pit dewatering programs, which in turn killed all the 
trees and surrounding vegetation in the area.
During its short lived operation, Pine Point Mines Limited 
had also put in hundreds of miles of haul roads that are all about 
four times as wide as our normal highways. Ironically, these 
roads impeded proper drainage of the land and therefore flooded 
. . . The tailings pond with its high level of metal, particularly zinc 
in a soluble form, is being flushed out annually into the environ-
ment .  .  . We strongly believe that our waters are polluted and 
that the fish are absorbing the metals.17
In 1993, Bernadette Unka, the chief of Fort Resolution’s Chipewyan band 
government, the Deninu K’ue First Nation, summed up the environment-
al and economic dislocation associated with the mine for a national audi-
ence at the hearings of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples:  
Pine Points [sic] Mines nor Canada have never compensated 
the Dene people that used those areas in their hunting, fishing 
and trapping. They have never been compensated for their loss 
or for the land devastation. When I say land devastation, if you 
are to fly over Pine Point Mines you would look down and you 
would think you were flying over the moon with the craters and 
open pits that are left open. The people have never been compen-
sated for the hardships and the heartaches induced by mineral 
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development. While the company creamed the crop at $53 mil-
lion during their peak years, we got very little jobs and what we 
did get were very low-paying jobs.18
Although comments such as those above were produced for public con-
sumption, the large volume of public testimony about the negative im-
pacts of the mine on First Nations represents a significant source of oral 
history recollections about the mine. Taken together, they suggest that 
feelings about the Pine Point Mine ran raw during the operational phase 
and in the years after closure, with broken promises of jobs and econom-
ic development consistently juxtaposed with the negative impacts on 
Aboriginal harvesting and fishing, and on the land more generally. 
In 2010, many people we interviewed recounted many similar stor-
ies describing the extensive impact of the mine.19 Even before the mine 
opened, respondents noted, several traplines were destroyed in the area 
as line cutting and seismic exploration proceeded in the 1950s and ear-
ly 1960s. As Angus Beaulieu described it, “People were trapping in that 
area, and they bulldozed people’s traplines, and many people lost their 
traps and everything. Every 900 feet they had a bulldozer go in there in 
the winter . . . A lot of people lost their traps. People in those days, they 
didn’t say too much.”20 Kevin Fabien remembered, “All the animals dis-
appeared; they went farther away because of all the construction going 
on and all the equipment running.” Other interviewees explained that 
pollution and habitat change also meant that game animals disappeared 
in the area. As George Balsillie put it, “The mine killed everything around 
there.”21 
As with the testimony from earlier sources, several interviewees sug-
gested that these lost opportunities associated with trapping were not re-
placed with chances to earn a living at the mine. Angus Beaulieu claimed 
that only an average of eight people from Fort Resolution were hired at 
Pine Point at any given time in the 1960s and 1970s, a number he claims 
did not increase dramatically until thirty-eight additional Fort Resolution 
residents were hired on just prior to Justice Berger arriving to conduct 
hearings and then subsequently laid off shortly afterwards.22 For those 
local Aboriginal people who did get jobs, several interviewees suggested 
they were often confined to menial low-skilled jobs, particularly cutting 
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seismic exploration lines in the forest or the repetitive work of shovelling 
ore in the dusty environment of the loading shed. As Sam Bugghins from 
K’atl’odeeche First Nation stated in regard to Aboriginal people from Hay 
River, “mostly they cut lines” when they worked at the mine.23 
In broad terms, some interviewees resented the lack of consultation 
and compensation in advance of the mine development, which is now 
standard practice and takes the form of impact and benefit agreements 
between mining companies and First Nations. Greg Villeneuve recalls 
that “they didn’t even inform Res [Fort Resolution] about anything that 
time. Like now, other mines they pay out these, you know, like Res used 
to get IBA money for everybody, to give it out. And back then, I guess I’m 
not sure how it worked, but Res never did get a cent out of Cominco. And 
that’s I think where, you know, we lost out on lots in Fort Res. We could’a 
had lots. It could’a been a rich little town.”24 Lloyd Cardinal claimed that 
the lack of consultation was possibly the most significant source of local 
 
Figure 2: Abandoned mine pit, Pine Point Mine, NWT , 2009. Photo by John Sandlos.
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resentment about the mine in Fort Resolution: “The biggest negative 
impact that Pine Point brought was that they didn’t get our consent.”25 
Whether it was a lack of employment and training opportunities or the 
absence of consultation and other financial benefits, the notion persists 
that in economic and political terms the mine bypassed nearby Native 
communities. 
Many interviewees noted—in contrast to the ephemeral economic 
benefits—the more lasting environmental impacts of the mine. Indeed, 
the abandonment of the open pits and waste rock piles with little attempt 
at remediation is still a major source of discontent in adjacent Native 
communities. Leonard Beaulieu’s concerns about the landscape chan-
ges and safety issues associated with the pits are representative of many 
interviewees: “Look at the way they left Pine Point. Goddamn place is 
full of holes, about forty big goddamn holes full of water .  .  . Yeah, you 
know, they left the mess like that.”26 In a similar comment, Henry McKay 
criticized Cominco directly for the lack of remediation at the mine site: 
The way I look at it, those people that make the mill and mine 
and make all that money and are gone, they don’t care. ’Cuz they 
made their money, and they’re gone, and they just leave every-
thing to us. Big holes, you know? We can’t look after that. They 
should make us a promise that they’ll do something about it at 
the end, you know? Like fill out that hole they’re makin’. And, you 
know, why do they leave that big stockpile there? Put it back! It’d 
be safer for animals. It’s only right. They shouldn’t be leaving it 
like that.27
In addition to the pits, people continue to have widespread concerns about 
the health and environmental impacts of water pollution. Roy Fabian, 
chief of K’atl’odeeche First Nation, claimed that when he was young-
er his father told him not to drink the water in the area of the mine.28 
K’atl’odeeche resident Harold Moore claimed that the government lied to 
miners about contaminants in the drinking water supply, and many died 
after moving to Pine Point.29 
Leonard Beaulieu summed up local concerns linking the spread of 
water-borne contaminants from the mine to deformities in fish and the 
increase of cancer among the local Native population in the 1970s:
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Until 1973, all the waste was pumped down the hill into the 
lake. Poison. All that shit that’s sitting in the pond right now. You 
know, holding back in that dyke? And then, they had two big pits; 
the X-15 pit right behind the highway, and the W-17 right next 
to . . . I know all those pits. I used to haul out of there. The waste 
from the water, from the thing you know, there’s always water 
pumping and pumping. They’d pump that across the highway. 
Every time you drove by there. In them days you’d get sixty be-
low, up until 1975 you’d get sixty below. And if it freezes . . . stink. 
Oh shit. It used to run way up into the bush and it’d run through 
to Paulette Creek, back into my lake. And then people are won-
dering why there was cancer. Now today they don’t know who to 
blame. They’re blaming it on the tar sands. It’s not the tar sands 
.  .  . Every elder that gets sick: cancer. Cancer. It’s the goddamn 
water! There’s no water treatment plant that’s going to stop that 
 
Figure 3: Water Treatment Pond, Pine Point Mine, NWT , 2009. Photo by John Sandlos.
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cancer from, you know? That’s why us here we don’t drink the 
darn water. I buy water from the store. That has really impacted 
the lives of the people in the North West Territories; their health. 
That Cominco Pine Point Mine.30
Scientific studies in the 1970s suggested that heavy metals, particularly 
copper, cadmium, lead, and zinc, were leaking from the tailings pond dur-
ing spring runoff, but spikes above safe levels were localized in nature. An 
Environment Canada report from the mid-1990s questioned the method-
ology of these earlier studies, and claimed that water and fish in the area 
were generally safe for human consumption.31 Nonetheless, in our inter-
views and informal conversations in Fort Resolution and K’atl’odeeche 
First Nation, people persistently identified water quality and human 
health issues as one of their biggest concerns associated with the mine 
and one of the most pressing research needs within the community. 
People who spoke with us also highlighted some of the negative so-
cial consequences associated with the mine. Some who moved to Pine 
Point reported difficulty adjusting to the new town, particularly when 
they experienced incidents of racism. Although only seven years old 
when she moved to Pine Point, Priscilla Lafferty recalls being “scared” 
due to the large numbers of outsiders, and remembers that “just because 
we were Native we were called down and what not.”32 Denise McKay 
remembered similar fears grounded in the fact that she did not speak 
much English.33 Other interviewees reported memories of racial violence 
and division. Melvin Mandeville recalled, “We used to .  .  . especially 
the Newfoundlanders, the Newfies, whatever, we’d fight against them 
lots, and they’d be callin’ us wagon burners and we’d be callin’ them 
Newfielanders or whatever. We fought like that, as kids. The older adults 
too, they’d be drinkin’ and fighting.” Mandeville also suggested there 
was racism in the schools, describing Native children being singled out 
to read in front of the class when the teacher knew they were not good 
readers, and being told he could not wear moccasins to school because 
the teacher did not like the smell.34 Gord Beaulieu remembered that the 
police could be rough on Native people living in Pine Point. Obviously, 
the town of Pine Point was not always the “best place on earth” for some 
of its residents.35 
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Interviewees suggested that the other major negative social impact 
was increased exposure to alcohol after a highway extension connected 
Fort Resolution with Pine Point and the rest of the world in 1972. Ronald 
McKay told us that Fort Resolution became known as “Little Vietnam” 
after the highway was extended to the town: “There was shootings, and 
fighting. Actually, it turned the whole community upside down with the 
boozing. It was kind of like the end of the road development thing, where 
boom! Everything just boomed and no rules. People just partied. There 
was a lot of money, you know.”36 Although interviewees suggested that 
the situation improved over time, some indicated that the long-term im-
pact of the road was to undermine the close-knit nature of their previ-
ously isolated community. Angus Beaulieu recalled, “And it seemed like 
people were much closer before than after . . . Before it was like one big 
family, people got along much better. It seemed like about from the time 
they got that road in, people kind of . . . you know, I don’t know how to 
explain it, but it was not the way it was before Pine Point.”37 Ron McKay 
similarly claimed that Fort Resolution was “really, really strong” before 
the road came in, but increased mobility made people more individual-
istic and less willing to help neighbours.38 Leander Beaulieu noted that 
“people used to be more together” before the road and associated changes 
such as the introduction of electricity and television, but “now they’re 
more in their own little world . . . more distant.”39 In broad terms, Tommy 
Unka stated that the introduction of the mine, the road, and associated 
southern influences “kind of dragged me away from my traditional life-
style.”40 For Fort Resolution residents, the mine was a watershed event in 
their history, a development project that ultimately fostered closer links 
with the outside world and a move away from the bush life. 
SPEAK I NG OF PI NE POI NT:  
A GR EAT PLACE TO LI V E
Stories about the past can unfold in ways that defy our attempts to uncov-
er singular meanings about social and environmental change. Certainly 
in the case of our interviews about Pine Point, people told us about ex-
periences that challenge previous assessments of the mine as a wholly 
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negative experience for nearby Native communities. As with non–Native 
Pine Pointers, there was overwhelming consensus among interviewees 
that the town of Pine Point offered an exceptional quality of life, that 
work at the mine often offered tangible monetary reward, and that rather 
than wholly displacing trapping, work at the mine offered Native people 
income that supplemented wildlife harvesting practices when fur prices 
were low. Powerful stories of Pine Point’s environmental, political, and 
social impacts were thus very often tempered with accounts of the posi-
tive aspects of the mine. This was particularly true among younger inter-
viewees, people who may be remembering the halcyon days of childhood, 
but for whom life in the community of Pine Point remained a positive and 
momentous part of their life histories. 
If there was any theme that came through loud and clear in the inter-
views, even among critics of the mine’s environmental and economic 
legacies, it was the fond memories for the town of Pine Point. Lorraine 
Mckay, the first child ever to be born at Pine Point, claimed simply that 
she “loved it there, because I was raised there and knew everybody.”41 
Linda McKay asserted that “if that place would have opened up I’d be 
the first one to move back there . . . Oh, do I ever miss that place man. 
Sometimes I’d sit there, my mom and I would just sit there and talk; talk 
about Pine Point.”42 Garvin Lizotte remembers Pine Point as “a picture 
perfect town,” where “every yard had flowers and grass, picket fence. It 
was a beautiful town.” As Lizotte’s comments hint, part of the affinity 
people feel for Pine Point stems from the fact that it resembled a modern 
suburb, with all the facilities, amenities, and activities one would expect 
in a southern small town. Citing what he felt were excellent schools and 
many opportunities for sports and recreation, Lizotte remembered that 
“it was the best of the best of everything.”43 As Dene and Métis began 
to visit or move to Pine Point, the quality of life in the more traditional 
Fort Resolution seemed diminished compared to the ultra-new and mod-
ern mining town. Eddy McKay recalled his growing perception of a stark 
contrast between the two towns: 
I guess it was totally different from Fort Res, as you know. 
It had a lot of things, you know. Stores, all kinds of stores, and 
everything was paved, and running water. You know, everything 
151John Sandlos
was right up to the times. You had the best of pretty much every-
thing for a small community . . ..Oh yeah, there was a lot of sports 
there. That is where this arena came from. They moved it over 
here after it closed. The ball field went to Hay River. They had 
a soccer field right next door to the school. And then the high 
school had another big field, so there was a lot of green space, I 
guess, recreational space.44
As did McKay, many interviewees cited sports and recreation as the focal 
point of the town’s social life, with memories of baseball tournaments, 
the Arctic Winter Games, and the Pine Days festival flowing into many 
of our conversations. Larry Dragon, a Métis from Hay River, described 
the town as “close knit” because “if you wanted something, like to get 
into recreation, they had the arena, which Cominco build 99 percent of it 
. . . You had a curling rink . . . towards the end you had a swimming pool. 
They had everything there. They had a golf course; the best golf course 
in the Territories back then.”45 Such testimony suggests that the efforts 
of federal and territorial governments to create a model northern min-
ing town—a family-oriented community with a high quality of life that 
contrasted with rough mining camps or divisive company towns—was at 
least partly successful.
Certainly many interviewees confirmed Dragon’s comments about 
the close social cohesion within the town. Many stated that everybody 
got along at Pine Point, and even some of those who cited incidents of 
racism suggested that for the most part outsiders embraced local Native 
people as friends. Ron McKay, who described racial tension between 
Aboriginal people and outsiders, also described how “the non-Native 
people were actually really nice to—like, my dad had some of the greatest 
friends there that were non-Native. They took care of him and everything, 
so they were good people.”46 Lorraine Mckay suggested that “growing up 
they used to get along, everybody from Res or Hay River who’d go to Pine 
Point, they were always welcome.”47 Several people noted that they had a 
particular affinity for Newfoundlanders, due to shared interests in hunt-
ing and fishing. And for some local people, one of the exciting aspects of 
moving to Pine Point was the opportunity to meet people from all over 
the world. As Garvin Lizotte explained, “We had at that mine guys from 
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Iran, my dad had good friends from Portugal, Argentina, you know, all 
over. I could just keep on naming them. It was just awesome to live there. 
Good culture, eh. Just because of the mine, people come in for all differ-
ent trades. I enjoyed it. Like I lived beside a real Italian family; the mom 
and dad were both from Italy.”48 Melvin Mandeville likewise recalled that 
he “found it interesting, because coming from a community where it’s all 
Chipewyan and Native and not too many white people, or Hispanics and 
coloured and stuff. So it was good in that sense, to meet different people 
and knowing that the world isn’t just here. There’s a big world, eh.”49 If the 
comments of many interviewees suggest that racism was part of the so-
cial landscape at Pine Point, other testimony suggests that residents were 
often able to create a cultural middle ground within the community.
Many people also invoked the idea of successfully accommodating 
change more broadly when discussing their embrace of southern cul-
tural and economic norms. Ronald Beaulieu described the expanded en-
tertainment and shopping opportunities in Pine Point, suggesting that 
the culture brought up from the south, “it’s different than us, so to us 
it’s exciting. Maybe to them it’s a regular thing, but we see it different.” 
Although Beaulieu repeated a common sentiment when he suggested 
that the new money that accompanied the mining jobs “screwed a lot of 
people up” with increased alcohol consumption, he and many others also 
cited the introduction of good-paying jobs as one of the best aspects of 
the new mining economy.50 Gord Beaulieu recalls that
We were working six days on, two days off. And the money 
was good. It was probably better money at that time than any-
where I’ve worked since, with the value of money back then. In 
1979, ’80, you could go to the store, and if you buy a hundred 
dollars’ worth of groceries . . . we couldn’t carry it out of the store; 
it was too much. Nowadays if you buy a hundred dollars’ worth 
of groceries, and you can just walk out carrying it in one hand. 
So, you know, for the value of the money, and even vehicles were 
cheap back then. So I made good money. I had fun in Pine Point.51 
Tommy Beaulieu recalled that many more Fort Resolution people were 
able to buy vehicles because of mine wages, suggesting in turn that in-
creased mobility opened up the opportunity to buy cheap groceries in 
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Pine Point.52 Indeed, many interviewees felt that access to cheaper food 
was one of the most significant positive impacts of the mine and the 
eventual road extension to Fort Resolution. 
It is tempting to conclude that the introduction of modern wage 
labour and outside sources of food undermined local patterns of subsist-
ence hunting and commercial trapping in the South Slave region. Many 
comments from interviewees suggest, however, that Native people in the 
area took a flexible approach to various economic opportunities, often 
moving between trapping and mine labour to take advantage of shift-
ing prices and market conditions. Darin Mckay remembered his father’s 
movement between two types of labour:
I think he did trapping on the side, yeah. He always trapped, 
all his life he’s been a trapper. Like before he moved to the mine 
here, that’s what he did . . . I guess when trapping wasn’t the great-
est, that was when fur was cheap. And that maybe, five, ten years 
after we moved there, or maybe five years after we moved to Pine 
Point, the fur price went up. Just when the mines were shutting 
down too they were laying off people. And my dad was a trapper, 
so we moved out of Pine Point because they were shutting down, 
you know, there was not money I guess in lead and things, startin’ 
to get old. Then we moved to Res and he started trapping again, 
hunting and old times. Right ’til today he still traps and hunts. 
And he does trap in that area, Pine Point, right now.53 
Leonard Beaulieu, who worked off and on at the mine and on the road 
crew from 1965 to 1974, claimed that trapping “was not worth it” when 
the mine opened in 1964, but by the mid-1970s lots of people quit their 
jobs because fur prices were very high. He recalled, “At that time, lynx 
averaged $400 apiece. Damn right, sport. In two months I made $21,000. 
Never make that working on a CAT.”54 Some interviewees indicated that 
settling in Pine Point and taking advantage of the associated wage labour 
opportunities drew them out of trapping for good. For others, however, 
movement between trapping and mining labour provided a means to 
cushion the blow from the international price swings that could cripple 
local economies associated with both these forms of primary resource 
production. 
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For still other interviewees, the transition from life in a modern town 
back to the more subsistence-oriented Fort Resolution proved difficult 
after the closure of the mine. Denise McKay said that she did not want 
to move back because there were no jobs (though she did find a job in 
the community hall), and her kids were sad to lose their friends at Pine 
Point.55 Eddy McKay remembered a period of adjustment to life at the 
older town:
I didn’t like it at first, cuz, you know, there was no running 
water, and we had honey buckets I guess, and cramped housing; 
having to go to the school and shower over there. So it was totally 
different. And then, I don’t know, I got (pauses), what would you 
say? I guess I accepted it more. And opened myself to the life in 
Fort Res, and then it wasn’t too bad after a little while.56
Catherine Boucher similarly recalled that “for them [returning Pine 
Pointers] it was a big change for the families I guess because, even for me, 
when I came back it was different. Oh there was no pool table. You know, 
the things I liked to do when I was in Pine Point.” Aside from missing 
the good life at Pine Point, Boucher suggested that one major source of 
difficulty for people moving back to Fort Resolution was the fact that 
there was no housing.57 As well, according to Melvin Mandeville, the dif-
ficulty of adjusting to his return to Fort Resolution was compounded by 
the fact that many people labelled the Pine Pointers as outsiders.58 In any 
case, memories of adjusting to the comparatively poor facilities at Fort 
Resolution point to a mixed legacy. As many attest, quality of life in Pine 
Point was quite high for some Native workers lucky enough to find work 
and housing in the town. But the juxtaposition of a modern town with 
another that (at the time) lacked basic municipal services also suggests 
the lack of lasting economic benefits that flowed to Fort Resolution dur-
ing the life of the Pine Point Mine. 
Such a mixed record is reflected in the ambivalent attitude of many 
Native people to the mine. While we did encounter some unequivocal 
Pine Point boosters and some who directed only harsh criticism at the 
mine among the many people we spoke with, most suggested in some way 
that the mine represented a mixed legacy for Native people in the sur-
rounding communities. As mentioned previously, a remarkable number 
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of people mixed stories of racism with stories of how the people in Pine 
Point were friendly, and pointed out how well they got along with many 
outsiders. Darin Mckay, for example, juxtaposed difficult memories of ra-
cism with broader recollections of the very positive social life in the town:
Yeah, [the town was] a little bit rough. They kinda didn’t like 
Natives, some of them. But lots of them were nice to us, you know, 
white people. “Come in and have cookies,” or something. We had 
neighbours—yeah there was a few, the ones that didn’t like us, I 
guess, had some kind of beef. But I didn’t know; I was a kid, eh? 
I remember that. It was a good town, to tell you the truth. It was 
a nice place there; they had lots of good stores, a ball park. They 
had everything—lots of stuff going on for kids once in a while. 
They had parades, you know, carnivals. It was pretty good.59
 
Figure 4: Abandoned street, Pine Point, NWT, 2009. Photo by John Sandlos.
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Others mixed harsh criticism of the social, environmental, and economic 
impact of the mine while acknowledging the positive side of life and work 
at Pine Point. From K’atl’odeeche First Nation, Daniel Sonnefrere (speak-
ing through an interpreter), asserted: 
Some places look bad, some places look good, because it’s 
helped some people to work and there are still people working 
today. They learned a lot from there. But for us it was bad, be-
cause too much drinking . . . It was a good job, good work, you get 
good pay, you get to keep it. It’s too much drinking [and] we had 
a problem with that.60
Tommy Unka maintained a similar perspective on Fort Resolution’s ex-
perience of the mine: 
Well, like I said, it kinda brought the south to us, you know. 
So there’s that impact, you know. But it was also a lot of good 
stuff like at Christmas time we had a little more stuff because of 
Cominco mines, because the stores were there and shit like that, 
you know. So there’s the goods, you know, my family, my Dad had 
a little more rum and stuff like that. There’s a lot of parties, you 
know, and I was young, so you know, I enjoyed these little perks. 
But also of course there was always a down side to a good thing. 
And some of the down side was some of the social problems that 
happened as the highway came in.61
Gord Beaulieu summed up his perception of the mine by stating simply, 
“There’s a lot of good that came with it, but there’s a lot of bad too. A lot 
of negative. I was young back then, and I had a lot of fun. I had fun at Pine 
Point.”62 A mix of the good and the bad: this idea came through time and 
time again in the interviews and challenged our initial assumption that 
Aboriginal communities simply regarded Pine Point as a blot on their 
collective historical experience. 
Such an ambivalent view of Pine Point’s history has deeply influ-
enced local opinions on the recent plans of a smaller resource company, 
Tamerlane Ventures, to reopen the mine (but not the town) and remove 
the remaining economical deposits of lead and zinc. At environmental 
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assessment hearings in Fort Resolution in 2008 about the project, people 
raised concerns about the negative impacts of Pine Point, particularly 
ongoing environmental concerns and the fact that the community de-
rived little economic benefit from the mine.63 Our interviewees raised 
many of the same issues, with many opposed to or ambivalent about the 
idea of reopening the mine. Catherine Boucher proclaimed an oft-repeat-
ed concern for the environmental impacts of new mining activity: “For 
me, I don’t think it’d be good for our land. They’ve been taking things 
off our lands for so long; we don’t get nothing back.”64 Angus Beaulieu 
echoed the latter part of Boucher’s comments when he interpreted the 
lack of consultation prior to exploration work as a sign that history was 
repeating itself: “We’re hitting the table so it’s never going to happen to 
us again, and it happened again. These people come in and start drilling 
without even coming to Fort Res here.”65 Lloyd Cardinal was similarly 
critical that Tamerlane’s bulk sampling and test mining program had 
proceeded without an impact and benefit agreement, and many in Fort 
Resolution and at K’atl’odeeche were firm that development should only 
proceed if the communities received employment, assurances that the 
site would be remediated, and an IBA.66 Others juxtaposed environment-
al concerns with the pressing need for more employment and economic 
activity in the South Slave region. 
Some, however, wholeheartedly welcomed the return of mining at 
Pine Point. When asked what he thought about the mine opening up 
again, Garvin Lizotte replied, “Well I’m just waiting. I’m a truck driv-
er, eh. So I’m ready to go to work day one.”67 Gord Beaulieu felt that the 
community was more prepared than in the 1960s for a second Pine Point 
project: “So it’s not like, if they open up a mine and everybody has all this 
money, it’s not like this whole town is going to go back like it did again, 
like it did back in the ’60s and ’70s. We’re already used to it, so that part 
won’t change that much. But it will help the economy.”68 Lorraine Mckay 
claimed that if they did reopen the mine, she would move back and put 
up a house in the place where she was born.69 Whether one is a supporter 
or critic of Tamerlane’s Pine Point project, memories of the profound im-
pact of the original mine continue to shape local responses to industrial 
development in the South Slave region. 
5 |  “A M I X OF T H E G O OD A N D T H E BA D ”158
CONCLUSION
People’s life stories almost always proceed as a series of ups and downs. 
So why, then, is it important to suggest that Native people’s experience 
with industrial mining in the South Slave region was mixed? Part of the 
answer lies in the fact that the rich and complex oral history of Pine 
Point expands beyond the common (though understandable) emphasis 
in northern oral history projects on preserving traditional stories and 
accounts of the pre-industrial fur trade and trapping life. Indeed, the Pine 
Point oral histories offer a rare glimpse, not at long-ago stories passed from 
generation to generation or the hunting and trapping life that dominated 
in South Slave communities prior to World War II, but at the various 
ways that Aboriginal people in the region resisted, accommodated, and 
in some cases embraced post-war industrial development. Interviewees 
provided trenchant and perceptive critiques of historical approaches to 
northern development, but their comments also problematize previous 
studies suggesting that northern Aboriginal people received no benefit 
from the mine and associated developments. Personal histories of indi-
viduals suggest that the mine did not simply bypass Aboriginal people; 
nor were they purely the victims of an externally imposed development 
project. If the oral interviews confirm that, in general, Aboriginal com-
munities in the surrounding area realized very few social and economic 
benefits while having to live with a lasting legacy of environmental dam-
age in their proverbial backyard, they also suggest that many individuals 
responded creatively to the social and economic opportunities associated 
with the mine and the modern community that came with it. Some took 
advantage of available wage labour opportunities while never complete-
ly abandoning hunting and trapping as a potential economic safety net. 
Others translated their experience working in the mine into employment 
in other development projects, whether mines, mineral exploration, or 
work on the road crew. Still others embraced the social life and economic 
opportunities associated with a modern town. 
Acknowledging these stories should not be misinterpreted as an apo-
logia for a development project that largely failed to fulfill the promise 
of sustained economic development in the South Slave region. Nor is it 
an attempt to flatten the variety of human responses to Pine Point into 
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abstract social science concepts such as community resilience and adap-
tation. Instead, these oral histories should remind us that simple dualistic 
stories of traditional communities versus modern mines do not necessar-
ily accord with the complex individual experiences of people who shaped, 
and were shaped by, the massive social, environmental, and economic 
changes that came with developments like the Pine Point Mine. 
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The Revival of Québec’s Iron Ore 
Industry: Perspectives on Mining, 
Development, and History
Jean-Sébastien Boutet
Tes ancêtres t’ont conduit à moi pour me raconter les images 
de tes rêves.
—Joséphine Bacon1
These words, borrowed from a remarkable Innu poet, introduced the 
implementation strategy for Québec’s northern development plan—in-
itially labeled Plan Nord—for the first five-year period (2011–2016). One 
can emphatically question the pertinence of associating this expression 
with a technocratic agenda conceived to engineer social, economic, and 
ecological progress for Québec society. Yet it is possible to ascertain 
elements of continuity with previous generations of policy-makers who 
gazed northward and nurtured bold dreams of resource exploitation in 
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the subarctic hinterland.2 Through repeated invocations of the necessity 
for renewal in a changing and more competitive world, the provincial 
government hoped that “the scope of the Plan Nord will make it in the 
coming decades what the [hydroelectric] development of La Manicouagan 
and James Bay were to the 1960s and 1970s.”3 In the realm of northern 
development, innovative visions for the future thus meet the aspirations 
of yesteryear; for proponents of the resource industry, past megaprojects 
are always lurking, never fully erased or forgotten yet often simplified 
and reformatted to accommodate contemporary priorities.
Subarctic Québec is once again at the heart of a treasure hunt for the 
control of its “blooming iron ore scene.”4 Targets for the exploitation of 
major deposits in the Labrador Trough (Fig. 1),5 a geological region “set to 
transform into a major force in the iron ore sector” worldwide,6 point to 
the revival of a decisive episode in the history of large-scale resource de-
velopment in the province, a period that in fact predated the harnessing 
of Québec’s most powerful rivers. This new iron ore rush is stimulated, 
not unlike the first round of mineral activities of the postwar period, by 
the developing needs of emerging world powers. Known around the globe 
for their impressive size and good ore content, the vast iron formations of 
northern Québec on which China and India are hoping to “feast”7 could 
comprise the long-term strategic reserves that these countries need in 
order to meet increasing domestic demand for finished steel. As com-
petition for the control of iron deposits heightens globally, Québec pro-
poses, once again, to hand over its best mineral reserves in the North 
to interests located outside of the region. At the same time, government 
administrators aim to integrate—on paper, at least—the virtues of prof-
itable subsurface exploitation with improved environmental protection 
and substantial economic benefits for local indigenous communities and 
the province more generally.
This chapter argues that a retrospective synopsis of mineral activ-
ities in the Labrador Trough, at Schefferville in this particular case, can 
and should inform Québec’s present ambitions for industrial growth in 
the north. Plan Nord, the province’s latest twenty-five-year northern de-
velopment plan, was formulated without comprehensive citizen engage-
ment (and while bypassing the process of seeking approval from many in-
digenous communities) in a region that the government continues to treat 
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Figure 1: The Québec-Labrador peninsula, with the geological formation of the 
Labrador Iron Trough. Map by Charlie Conway.
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primarily as a “bank” of natural resources where few benefits are derived 
for the rural peripheries and their inhabitants.8 The first section adopts 
a state-corporate historical approach as it recounts the opening of the 
Ungava region to industrial interests through iron ore exploration (mid-
1930s) and the beginning of operations at the Schefferville mine (1954). 
In the second section, the story of the mine closure shifts the perspective 
toward Innu and Naskapi individuals, who remember how indigenous 
and mining worlds ceased to interact after 1982 at Schefferville. Finally, 
the third section explores the contemporary context and provides an 
overview of the development projects that currently define the renewed 
quest for iron ore extraction in the Québec-Labrador borderlands.
The diverse, multi-layered interpretations of the mining past (section 
2), understood in conjunction with the historical context that confirms 
the supremacy of state and corporate interests throughout the period 
(section 1), show the asymmetrical yet complex nature of the relation-
ship of indigenous groups living in the area with industrial modernity. 
This relationship continues to be marked, informed, and shaped by the 
region’s deeply contested mining history, a stark reminder for contem-
porary developers and policy-makers (section 3) that, despite mining’s 
instability and apparent ephemerality, the mining past of the region lives 
on. Amidst these unresolved legacies, this analysis suggests that mining 
proponents’ assertive guarantees of a durable, prosperous, and equitable 
industrial future for societies inhabiting the provincial north and the rest 
of Québec ought to be met with equal scrutiny and skepticism.
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THE FIR ST PHASE OF IRON MI NI NG  
I N THE LABR ADOR TROUGH
Les Américains possèdent les capitaux qui nous manquent. 
Ils mettent nos ressources naturelles en valeur, réveillent une 
richesse endormie.
—Robert Rumily9
During the late interwar years, Québec politicians sought to extract 
wealth from what they considered to be the subarctic hinterland’s dor-
mant mineral assets. In the Ungava region, the provincial administration 
subjected the geological formation known as the Labrador Trough to a 
certain preferential treatment, notably by granting exploration permits 
and large mining concessions to outside interests. However, this bold 
redefinition of geographical space in favour of foreign corporations col-
lided heavily with the indigenous populations’ prior occupation of their 
homelands.
In 1939, Québec conferred to McKay (Quebec) Explorers (MQEC) 
an impressive exploration concession of more than 10,000 square kilo-
metres located in the Whale River and Swampy Bay River watersheds. A 
few years previously, explorers and geologists, typically accompanied by 
knowledgeable indigenous guides, had identified ore bodies with potential 
commercial value. At the time, the first government of Québec premier 
Maurice Duplessis (1936–39) imposed on this concession a modest annual 
rent of $1,000 and $2,000, for the first two years respectively, which could 
be renewed at a slightly augmented rate in subsequent years.10 Following 
MQEC’s failure to develop the concession, Jules Timmins, a prosperous 
mining entrepreneur heading the Toronto-based Hollinger Consolidated 
Gold Mines, entered a partnership in December 1943 with the influential 
American steel magnate George Humphrey, who was at the helm of the 
Cleveland mining firm M. A. Hanna.11 Together these veritable “movers 
and shakers of mining empires”12 controlled the Hollinger North Shore 
and Exploration Company (HNSE) and secured their access to the great 
property located at the heart of the Ungava Peninsula.
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The recently formed HNSE venture received additional support from 
the Québec government via a special law passed in its favour three years 
later, in 1946.13 In the course of that year, the legislature introduced the 
Loi pour faciliter le développement minier et industriel du Nouveau-
Québec, which defined a “mining exploitation lease valid for eighty years 
and covering an area of 300 square miles” on the shores of Knob Lake, 
the future site of the mining town of Schefferville.14 When shareholders 
incorporated Iron Ore Company of Canada (IOC) in Delaware in 1949, in 
order to assemble the capital essential for kick-starting the Schefferville 
operations, HNSE subleased these mining rights to the newly formed 
American-led iron and steel conglomerate.15
In the world of corporate executives, the region that was traversed by 
numerous Aboriginal trading and transportation routes remained at the 
time completely cut off from the large industrial markets and freight net-
works so crucial to moving the ore riches out of Nouveau-Québec. Knob 
Lake deposits somehow had to be linked to the St. Lawrence navigational 
waters (later on, the St. Lawrence Seaway) and thereby to the great manu-
facturing towns of Baltimore, Detroit, Cleveland, or Philadelphia. The 
railway engineers’ answer to this technical challenge, 575 kilometres of 
steel rails and wooden ties to be laid over marshland, through mountains, 
and across forest, presented an enormous logistical and financial puzzle 
for IOC. Indeed, throughout the construction phase, the economic feas-
ibility of this project often hung in the balance, as the anticipated profits 
from the mine (projected from identified ore resources) were constantly 
re-evaluated against the growing upfront capital expended on the infra-
structure needed to transport the bulky, heavy, and relatively low-valued 
iron commodity to manufacturing markets.16
In order to support this major transportation program, in March 
1951, the provincial government proceeded not through leasing but by 
means of direct sale of a thin strip of land stretching from Sept-Îles (on 
the Gulf of St. Lawrence) to Knob Lake. This band of territory, extending 
hundreds of kilometres deep into the boreal forest and bisecting the Innu 
homeland, would host the railway to Schefferville, to be built and oper-
ated by Quebec North Shore and Labrador Railway Company (QNS&L), 
one of the several subsidiaries formed by IOC. In exchange for $4,000, 
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the railway company led by Jules Timmins became the “absolute owner” 
of this piece of land, free of any additional charges.17
In addition to guaranteeing the company woodcutting rights along 
the railroad right-of-way, Québec also conceded to QNS&L a shore lot 
near the coastal settlement of Sept-Îles for the establishment of a train 
terminal, a classification yard, and a modern seaport. Through one of 
its energy subsidiaries, Gulf Power Company, IOC gained control over 
sections of the Ste Marguerite River and the Menihek Lakes where it in-
stalled hydroelectric power plants destined to supply electricity to the 
terminal in Sept-Îles and the mine and townsite at Schefferville.
Several Innu labourers obtained casual work on these various con-
struction sites, and played an especially crucial role in the resupplying 
of railway work camps.18 This labour, if it remained very temporary and 
seasonal, nonetheless allowed a handful of families to confront the dif-
ficult conditions afflicting the trapping economy of the immediate post-
war period. In general, however, mining officials engaged in the radical 
transformation of human and natural landscapes without the explicit 
consent of local populations. The newly damned Ste Marguerite River, for 
example, had constituted for decades a vital transportation axis for hunt-
ing groups based on the coast of the St. Lawrence who wished to reach 
the interior of the territory during their long winter hunts. Yet for federal 
bureaucrats employed by the Indian Affairs agency in Sept-Îles, this land 
takeover was clearly a matter for optimism. According to the prevalent 
paternalistic dogma, the employment opportunities that were generated 
through the development and operation of the Schefferville mine would 
consecrate the local communities’ gradual retreat from the life on the 
land, thus encouraging a more sedentary lifestyle and the introduction 
of wage dependency. Going as far as threatening, in a few extreme cases, 
to suspend aid for families who refused to seek paid employment, the 
Canadian government urged the Innu residing near Sept-Îles—but in an 
even more decisive manner, the Naskapi of the Ungava region—to re-
locate to the town of Schefferville, a booming region that was tradition-
ally part of a number of families’ comprehensive harvesting activities and 
networks. There, federal bureaucrats promised, people would find “better 
housing, education, and so forth,”19 with job opportunities “that will last 
one hundred years.”20
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In Québec City, the provincial government of Maurice Duplessis 
argued that the new rail link from Schefferville to the coast “opens the 
Ungava region to commerce and civilization, as well as to the industry.”21 
For the premier, Québec’s natural resources had for many years remained 
“underutilized,” and this unfortunate state of affairs had engendered sub-
stantial losses for the province. By promoting portions of the hinterland 
to mining interests and welcoming the implementation of modern infra-
structure, the government hoped to profit in return from this “marvelous 
industrial development that will contribute powerfully, not only to the 
complete valuation of the Nouveau-Québec region, but also to the prog-
ress and prosperity of the province in general.”22
To what extent did the creation of public wealth from iron mines 
imagined by the Québec state in fact materialize? In general terms, the 
level of mining revenues flowing to the province—expressed as the per-
centage of government incomes drawn from the mining sector through 
taxes, royalties, mining rights and permits over the total value of mineral 
production—fell by roughly one-fifth during the second Duplessis man-
date (1944–59).23 Notwithstanding improvements of the taxation regime 
undertaken by the Liberal administration of Jean Lesage in 1965, which 
successfully increased returns on production to the public, revenues 
generated through mining rights, particularly in the iron ore sector, re-
mained weak.24 At the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, 
$2.4 million generated through mining rights in the iron ore sector ac-
crued to the Québec treasury every year; by comparison, the total value 
of iron production reached nearly $185 million, on average, during the 
same period, 1967 to 1972.25 This relatively marginal amount obtained 
from mining rights was proportionally lower than that registered in the 
Québec mining industry as a whole, with consequences for government 
finances given that iron ore was one of the most important mining sec-
tors in the province.26 Yet at the same time, Hollinger and Hanna Mining 
were cashing in on substantial revenues received through the transfer 
of their mining rights (originally granted by the Québec state) to IOC. 
These monies, according to Paquette, were “worth more than five times 
that which was drawn [via mining rights] by the owner of the mining 
domain”27—the provincial Crown.
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For Duplessis and his administration, engaged in the rhetoric of eco-
nomic autonomy for Québec, liberalism in mining policy represented 
a somewhat paradoxical situation closely tied to the evolution of inter-
national markets. During the Second World War, the United States be-
came aware of the impending exhaustion of its iron ore supplies located 
in the Mesabi Range (Minnesota). North American appetite for iron grew 
steadily as a consequence of the war—consumption increased two and a 
half times between 1935 and 194528—and its aftermath. But by 1953, as 
domestic demand grew due to Cold War (and Korean War) militarism 
and the rise of postwar consumer society, US production was on the de-
cline.29 Starting in the 1950s, American (but also European and Japanese) 
steelmakers restructured their commercial operations and sought con-
trol over strategic ore deposits worldwide.30 The American steelmaking 
industry gained access to some of the most attractive reserves by formal-
izing financial links with mining companies, thus ensuring a reliable ac-
cess to iron ore inputs at a cost that it could better regulate. By contrast to 
its European counterparts, who were “relying mainly on European iron 
ore producers,” American steelmakers were “procuring iron ore from 
their own captive mines.”31 
In this context, producers and investors saw in the Labrador Trough 
a good business opportunity, by virtue of the region’s advantageous geog-
raphy—a relative proximity to US steelmaking centres—which com-
plemented the presence of stable political institutions and a favourable 
fiscal and regulatory environment. Bethlehem Steel and National Steel, 
in conjunction with four other major American steelmakers, eventual-
ly took majority ownership of IOC on February 1, 1962. The beginning 
of the company’s operations, in 1954, had strongly helped to “reshape 
the Canadian iron ore industry,” since merely half of a decade later, 
Schefferville ore accounted for more than 60 per cent of iron production 
in the country.32 Notwithstanding the modest impact of such growth on 
direct and indirect labour opportunities—in 1966, the effect of economic 
expansion on employment in the iron ore sector was lower than for each 
of wood felling, the manufacture of women’s garments, and the fabrica-
tion of newspaper in the province as a whole33—the iron ore region, in 
Schefferville and elsewhere, never really experienced the development of 
a diversified, mature industrial economy. The narrow, external linkages 
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between the mining and steelmaking sectors (exemplified by the IOC 
venture) instead confined the region to an export-driven enclave of min-
imally processed iron ore.34 Located downstream of extractive activities, 
yet institutionally dissociated from the provincial mines, Québec manu-
factures could not capture the fiscal benefits typically associated with cor-
porate integration, nor were they in a position to secure primary inputs 
at a better cost.35 Ultimately, the exploitation of iron ore did not generate 
significant multiplier effects for the regional and provincial economies, 
despite the fact that mineral production underwent a veritable explo-
sion in the immediate postwar period, and even though the added value 
produced by this sector and the fabrication of primary steel in Québec 
jumped from $30 million to $188 million during the quarter century 
1944 to 1975 dominated by both Unionist and Liberal administrations.36
The birth of national steelmaker Sidbec-Normines was in fact engin-
eered to remedy some of the structural deficiencies that plagued the prov-
incial iron ore industry, notably by favouring domestic processing, but the 
launch of this partially state-owned entity in 1976 turned out to be poorly 
timed.37 A crisis was about to hit global steel markets: in the period 1974 
to 1977, worldwide production of steel fell by 5 per cent, and the stocks of 
iron ore began to accumulate (including in the Labrador Trough) as metal 
prices were depressed.38 Québec iron operations, incapable of competing 
with Venezuelan and Brazilian counterparts who exploited higher-grade 
iron deposits and incurred cheaper labour costs, inevitably felt the effects. 
In 1985, the subarctic municipality of Gagnon, “là où la chaleur humaine 
remplaçait l’astre du jour,”39 was bulldozed and effectively erased from 
the territory. The Schefferville mine, keenly recognized for the quality of 
its iron ore at the turn of the midcentury, also succumbed to the crisis. 
On November 2, 1982, IOC president Brian Mulroney announced to em-
ployees and authorities that the company would wind down operations,40 
an outcome that clearly showcased the precariousness of the commun-
ity’s reliance on a single export production. Despite their initial desire to 
shut down the municipality, provincial and federal authorities decided 
not to condemn Schefferville to the same fate that was about to descend 
upon Gagnon three years later.41 Between 1985 and 1998, town lots were 
in fact amalgamated to the Innu reserve of Matimekush through official 
Government of Canada purchases of Québec land register.42
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MEMOR IES AND MI NI NG  
LANDSCAPE AT SCHEFFERV ILLE
The mine closed in 1982. The company packed its bags and 
took off. Open pits, destruction everywhere; our animals driven 
away. We made the company rich. Where’s my share? Where’s 
my thank you? There was none of that.
—A Naskapi individual43
Throughout the operations of the Schefferville mine, between 1954 and 
1982, indigenous miners remained confined to very marginal positions 
within the company hierarchy. Relying on a variety of strategies, these 
labourers worked to adjust and maintain their own practices in order to 
combine the labour at the mine with their life on the land. Yet overall, 
Innu and Naskapi groups could not realize the vision of government 
agents and utilize their paid employment at the mine as a mechanism to 
“climb the ladder” of industrial society; nor were they in a position to lay 
the foundations of a multi-sectorial, diversified regional economy that 
would outlast the life of the mine and bring about growth and develop-
ment. This situation would have serious consequences for the viability of 
these two communities in the post-mining phase.
People’s memories of the abandonment phase reveal the shock and 
the traumatic nature of the mine closure at Schefferville. As the Innu 
and the Naskapi express their disapproval of government and company 
actions, which created “a lot of troubles” for them,44 they also recount, 
often with nostalgia, how people looked forward and continued to adapt 
and maintain their own life practices amidst the upheavals that charac-
terized the failure of the modernization project. In view of these diverse 
interpretations of the past—inextricably linked to the contingency, com-
plexity, and challenges of current everyday life—an intricate picture of 
local history, of indigenous homelands, and of the legacy of industrial 
development emerges. At Schefferville, local life stories generally reveal 
a deep sense of loss underlying Innu and Naskapi perspectives about the 
mine closure and the mining experience more generally, an experience 
which, in the final analysis, continues to defy any singular interpretation 
or meaning.
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Several Innu and Naskapi individuals remember the closure and 
deindustrialization period in terms of severe disruption and the aban-
donment of their community by IOC and the government. These au-
thorities, in their view, had operated illegitimately on a territory that did 
not belong to them in the first place. The sudden desertion by the min-
ing company was especially disconcerting, according to people whom I 
interviewed at Schefferville, considering the immense wealth extracted 
during the operations years:
We weren’t even told and we didn’t even know what they 
were using the ore for, why it was so precious to them. And years 
later, once they had distracted our way of life, we learned that 
the ore was in demand in foreign countries. They just came, took 
what they needed, and left.45
Back then the company took out much iron from here, a lot 
of iron, an enormous amount of iron, because for them it was like 
gold. It brought a lot of money, back then, it was very profitable.46
Since the late interwar years, industry proponents had strived to first re-
define and then exert control over the Québec-Labrador region in order 
to appropriate the riches of the subsurface. Now that the process was 
complete, Innu and Naskapi people were more or less left to pick up the 
pieces.
During the life of the mine, the somewhat marginal employment 
opportunities did provide, as some recall, non-negligible compensations 
for the local residents. This idea is articulated, for instance, by an Innu 
individual who explains that “according to my own knowledge, it did not 
bother the Innu to see the company dig holes in the ground and occupy 
our territory, because the company gave us work.”47 Yet as the company 
withdrew from Schefferville and wage labour was lost, it left few endur-
ing benefits for the local communities, other than a small pension for 
a handful of long-time employees. “We got a certain amount from the 
company,” a Naskapi elder recalls. “Certain people worked for so many 
years, and they received different amounts. But [the IOC managers] 
didn’t care, they just left. They didn’t care about us, and all the people, 
when they left from here. They didn’t give any benefits to the people, or 
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any other contributions.”48 People remember with some resentment that 
many indigenous workers were not in a position to even receive a pen-
sion after the company departed, because they were never employed—by 
choice or by constraint—as full-time labourers: “We got laid off and on, 
so some people like me didn’t get the full benefits that the company of-
fered after it left. There weren’t a lot of benefits from the IOC. No other 
benefits were given to the people and the communities; it was only them 
and their money.”49
Some indigenous people maintain particularly vivid memories of the 
material removal of municipal buildings and houses in the years that fol-
lowed that abandonment of the mine. As geographer John Bradbury de-
scribes, the relinquishment and destruction of infrastructure, considered 
by companies “as part of the production sector of the mine or mill,” was 
a common strategy that served to sever a corporation’s financial respons-
ibility from the mining town or municipality in the closing phase of large 
industrial projects.50 At Schefferville, IOC proceeded, in conjunction 
with the province, with a series of demolitions in order to dissolve its 
financial obligations (in addition to servicing all of Schefferville’s debt, 
the company still contributed up to 80 per cent of municipal taxes in 
the post-closure years of 1984 and 1985).51 The provincial government 
led by the Ministère des Affaires municipales was also eager to shed its 
Schefferville responsibilities and recommended a $6.5-million compen-
sation and demolition plan to shut down the municipality and remove 
a good portion of the infrastructure,52 including the local hospital, “for 
which Indians [were] by far the most frequent users.”53 This particularly 
dramatic event remains seared in the memory of many Innu and Naskapi 
individuals who have continued to reside in the vicinity of the once-cher-
ished health facility.
In addition to the loss of town services and infrastructure, as well 
as shrunken employment and economic development opportunities, 
the communities near Schefferville have had to live, and continue to 
live, amidst a deeply scarred landscape. For the Innu and the Naskapi, 
the post-mining environment acts as an incessant material reminder of 
three decades of intensive land and resource exploitation by a company 
that naturally prioritized shareholder dividends and the needs of the 
American economy during the Cold War period,54 but generated minimal 
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returns for the local population. As a consequence of development, their 
homeland became littered with tailings piles, industrial wastes, leftover 
equipment, and pollutants that were abandoned in the wake of the mine 
closure (Fig. 2), but only marginally remediated many years later, when 
the IOC undertook a modest clean-up operation in the early 2000s.
At least some people in Schefferville are particularly moved by the 
former mining pits, which extend hundreds of metres deep over several 
hundred square kilometres across the subarctic landscape.55 The removal 
of trees and other “overburden,” the blasting of hilltops, the digging of 
holes, the large tailing piles and debris, and the oxidizing iron-rich earth 
have contributed to create a red-coloured, cratered, barren, and danger-
ous landscape (Figs. 3 and 4), which one Innu resident metaphorically 
depicts as extraterrestrial scenery. Another hunter and former chief de-
scribes the major changes to the Innu territory that resulted from open-
pit mining, as he speaks of the unrecoverable beauty of the land near 
 
Figure 2: Abandoned mine with equipment near Schefferville. Photo by Jean-
Sébastien Boutet.
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Figure 3: Abandoned mine near Schefferville. Photo by Jean-Sébastien Boutet.
Schefferville: “We were already coming here before there was a mine. 
We came here to hunt. It was quite undulated here; there were beautiful 
mountains, beautiful rivers, beautiful lakes. It was nice here, before the 
mine.”56 In a similar vein, the same Innu who associates the mine with 
Martian landscape also emphasizes the profound changes to the territory 
compared with before industrialism, when people frequented the region 
for hunting and trapping activities. “When they came here ten years be-
fore [the mine], everything was pristine,” he suggests. “Ten years later 
they made large holes. It’s something to see the landscape where people 
hunted, and a decade later they see these big holes. It’s something to see 
all that.”57
For some individuals, then, the disfigured, deeply altered landscape 
evokes resentful memories of the company’s actions. When probed about 
the overall record of IOC and its long-term legacy for Schefferville and the 
region, a few residents simply point to the impressive, scattered mining 
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pits as a kind of self-explanatory evidence for the disruption, the aban-
donment, and the reckless attitude of the mining managers:
I would love to go up and show you over there in the moun-
tains, all the holes that are there. I would show you how they left 
it all like that, and then ran away. It’s still like that today.58
They left, and after that the pits were flooded and everything. 
They just left everything.59
By contrast, though not necessarily contradiction, other individuals at 
times emphasize their awe at this surreal landscape, and even their ap-
preciation of the physical and human immensity encapsulated by such 
scenes of emptiness (Fig. 5). Driving a truck with his grandson around 
the old mine, an elder repeatedly evoked his enjoyment of the landscape, 
 
Figure 4: Berms with warning sign bordering an abandoned mine near Schefferville.
Photo by Jean-Sébastien Boutet.
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whether we were passing by the rock waste and tailings, the open pits, 
or the surrounding lakes and rivers meandering through the abandoned 
sites.60 Initially, these comments can seriously challenge one’s own pre-
conceived notions of another people’s relationship with what is often 
denigrated as a kind of post-apocalyptic industrial wasteland. As an Innu 
from Matimekush seems to indicate, the mining landscape is indeed 
largely indicative of the ravage, squander, and unequal appropriation of 
resources by outside interests. But interestingly, these memories do not 
lead him to abandon or disdain the Innu territory around Schefferville. 
Rather, he makes use of powerful imagery and unusual metaphors in rela-
tion to the mining panorama to explain his own difficulty of living, as he 
understands it, “between two cultures”—or, of the struggle in sharing the 
land and livelihoods with strangers who, in the past, were mostly if not 
uniquely interested in reaping financial benefits from it.61 As he set up his 
white canvas tent in the middle of the mined-out and desolate barrens, 
he seeks by this occasion to reaffirm his own Innu identity and demon-
strate his people’s enduring presence on their homeland: “It makes me 
feel good, to hang out here on the barren mountain. It doesn’t discourage 
me. At least it tells me one thing: that even if I’m on a mountain with-
out vegetation, I am on my territory.”62 Even as some areas of Innu and 
Naskapi homeland were pretty much obliterated by the mining activities, 
it does not follow that the territory has become insignificant or worth-
less for the people who continue to inhabit it and who frequently visit it 
under various circumstances.63 Thus, reflecting and sharing stories about 
Schefferville, for this Innu man there is even a favourite time of the day 
to revisit the old mining sites. Right before sunset, the light reveals most 
effectively the scale of destruction and yet the strangely poetic beauty 
of this continuously modified, tirelessly engineered environment trans-
formed by mine workers over more than a quarter century.
The decrepit industrial landscape, the various townsites (some of 
them now entirely derelict), and the corresponding diversity of life stor-
ies that are shared and kept alive thus interact in complex ways with 
people’s present activities near and around Schefferville to create a fluid 
repository of interpretations of the longer past that include not only the 
closure but all phases of historical mining in the region. These place-
based understandings do not seem to be strictly reducible to stories of 
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appropriation, dispossession, destruction, and abandonment by an indif-
ferent, perhaps egotistical, cast of mining characters. Several indigenous 
residents who continue to move extensively over the degraded territory, 
for example, do speak regretfully of the hazards associated with winter 
travels across a territory that was mined out and left virtually unremedi-
ated. At the same time, these very individuals may also continue to make 
use of the old mining roads to access the family cabins for hunting, fish-
ing, or spending time on the land, while some also yearn—in the ardu-
ous context of a post-development economy—for the relatively plentiful 
jobs and active community life that the company once provided. If the 
dilapidation of the landscape and town continues to inflame people’s dis-
content as they reminisce about the IOC company today, and if feelings 
of bitterness associated with past exploitation clearly linger (the mining 
holes are, in many ways, the physical embodiment of the “hit-and-run” 
model of resource exploitation that struck Schefferville at midcentury), 
 
Figure 5: Abandoned mine near Schefferville. Photo by Jean-Sébastien Boutet.
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these attitudes also coexist with subtler affirmations of personal and col-
lective agency and, in some cases, of a vanished mining history that is in 
a sense still missed today.
The bare territory that typifies the former mine—repulsive, stun-
ning, majestic, or mysterious—as well as certain abandoned areas of the 
municipality in fact continue to evoke nostalgic sentiments of a more 
active or entertaining past. When people revisit or come across former 
workspaces (an old shed, a rotten wooden bridge, a water-filled pit, and 
an overgrown road) they sometimes are led to share memories of a time 
when Schefferville was teeming with people and bustling with noise and 
activities. Such evolving human-material relations, grounded in mem-
ories of the changing landscape, do not only refer back to the harsh and 
unjust working conditions at the mine, the complicated coexistence of 
mining labour and activities on the land, or the difficult and fluctuating 
ecological conditions that coincided, according to local perceptions, with 
a disappearing caribou herd and the overfishing of surrounding lakes by 
workers brought in from the south. They also speak to an employment 
period that enabled working families to support their relatives and be in-
volved in various ways with wage employment, and through which Innu 
and Naskapi employees sometimes nurtured close friendships with their 
fellow indigenous and even non-indigenous workers. One Innu evokes 
this sense of loss regarding the lively old days with friends that have either 
passed on or moved back to southern regions: “I knew many white people 
with whom I worked. I knew a whole bunch of them. Many of them have 
probably died. I also knew some bosses; at the end they were almost sixty-
five years old. They must be dead today. It’s troubling when I think about 
those I knew. They’re almost all dead now.”64
The abandonment of the town and some of the infrastructure near 
or on the reserves, as well as the emptiness of the sites that people of a 
younger generation formerly used for leisure activities, also call to mind 
sentiments of regret about a time when people actively participated in so-
cial and athletic activities. As he encounters the material leftovers dating 
back to the mining years, an Innu vividly reflects on his more youthful 
days when the company was in operation:
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When I think about the desolation here in the village, the 
desolation following the exploitation of the mine, when before 
the cultural and social life was so lively. It was lively here. My 
playground was everywhere, all the sidewalks that you see there; 
that was my playground. The hospital, for me, because it was as-
phalted, it was nice, there were some nice hills for someone who 
wanted to bicycle there. I could circulate freely when I lived in 
Matimekush.65
It is not uncommon for people in Schefferville, especially elders who used 
to work at the mine and befriended other workers, as well as adults who 
benefited from leisure and organized sport infrastructure in their youth, 
to remember elements of the social past with melancholy, given that many 
of these relationships and spaces died out soon after the IOC departure.
Overall, people’s interpretations of the closure phase point to the 
failure of modernization through industrial mining at Schefferville. They 
also reveal the importance of considering long-term perspectives on the 
history of resource exploitation and the uneven development that charac-
terized large-scale development in Québec’s iron belt. Several individuals 
who live in the area today recall with much offence and distress the mul-
tiple rounds of infrastructure removal and the gradual disappearance of 
significant social spaces. They remain especially puzzled by the fact that 
a great number of houses, the cultural centre, and even a hospital were 
torn down during a period when there were outstanding needs in the do-
mains of health, housing, infrastructure, social life, and youth support in 
Schefferville. As a former Naskapi leader explained to me, “they demol-
ished the hospital, at a time when people really needed essential services, 
like health services. . . . Us, the owners of this territory, we were asking the 
government for more housing while the company that made money was 
demolishing houses. That scene was not respectful. It was a destructive 
scene.”66 The people of Schefferville painfully reminisce about the re-
moval or abandonment of the swimming pool, the movie theatre, the 
bank, a few restaurants and bars, churches, the bowling alley, the town 
gymnasium, the ski hill infrastructure, and the asphalted roads and side-
walks (practically only the hockey arena was left standing). These mixed 
emotions of “anger, betrayal, resentment, exasperation and anxiety”67 are 
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quite a contrast with the official discourse that accompanied the closure 
of the mine, at the time largely justified to employees and the population 
at large in quite narrow technical and economic demonstrations.
For one Innu individual, the demolition exemplified the authorities’ 
familiar paternalism toward indigenous populations, in this case fuelled 
by the belief that Innu and Naskapi communities could not possibly 
maintain and administer the buildings and town services without the 
backing of IOC, the municipality of Schefferville, or other government 
bureaucracies.68 But he, as well as many others, believes that at a bare 
minimum, some of the installations could have been left for the local 
communities as compensation, and even new infrastructure might have 
been built for them upon IOC’s departure. In the demanding context of 
the reconstruction years, when local residents attempted to carry on with 
their lives independently of an industrial economy, many maintain that 
the company should have been compelled to implement a mitigation pro-
gram and leave behind some sort of positive legacy in order to offset the 
heavy social and environmental costs, perhaps in the form of roads to 
facilitate access to the territory and support hunting activities, financial 
donations to help out with the expensive airplane outings and especially 
the caribou hunt, or at the very least a proper rehabilitation and restora-
tion of the mining sites.
DISCUSSION
Et voilà que, trente ans plus tard, ces gens-là reviennent! 
C’est drôle, il y a seulement un an ou deux, ma communauté et 
moi n’existions pas dans le nord du Québec!
—Réal McKenzie69
In light of these perspectives on mining, development, and history per-
taining to the initial phase of extraction in the Labrador Trough, several 
concerns arise regarding the legitimacy and the soundness of the mode of 
industrial expansion favoured by Plan Nord and other such bureaucratic 
plans for the north. Nowadays, a new generation of miners actively look-
ing to revive the historical deposits and bank on new discoveries cannot 
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completely silence this problematic past,70 especially the unfortunate 
period that followed the closing of mining pits and the abandonment 
of villages and communities like Schefferville in the 1980s. This history 
is, in a very real, everyday sense, etched into the land, remembered in a 
manner that, as I have argued, is deeply textured. “Mines,” in the words of 
anthropologist Jamon Alex Halvaksz II, “are not merely extracting min-
erals, but are also marking time and space with their appearances.” They 
“transform the landscape, but these transformations remain subject to 
multiple interpretations.”71 But, ready as they may be to turn the page on 
this story, industrialists of today want to be reassuring about the future, 
confidently asserting that previous development errors will not be repro-
duced. As one mining executive explicitly defended, “we cannot under-
estimate this history, which belongs to the region. We certainly took it 
into account, to ensure that we do not repeat the same mistakes.”72
Much as was the case on the eve of the iron ore rush that took place at 
the midcentury, when federal bureaucrats encouraged Innu and Naskapi 
societies to adopt industrial livelihoods, nowadays mining-related em-
ployment is perceived and marketed—despite of all of its known histor-
ical shortcomings—as the device par excellence to engineer social, eco-
nomic, and ecological progress for the region. According to this view, a 
new “‘home grown’ generation of people who will regenerate the mining 
industry in Quebec” is about to emerge: indigenous peoples inhabiting 
the region “will now see a brighter future thanks to Plan Nord; especially 
the grade schoolers who will learn more and more about mining as they 
continue their education,” as well as “all Quebecois [who] will be given a 
chance to cash in on some of the province’s fortunes.”73 While affirming 
that “women, the Aboriginal peoples and young people living in the ter-
ritory that the Plan Nord covers are among the target populations to de-
velop qualified local workers who take their place in sectors that are often 
non-traditional or little known,”74 government planners nevertheless give 
little consideration as to how these communities’ involvement with other 
sectors of the economy referred to as “traditional”—typically outside of 
formal, monetized networks of production and exchange—will be en-
couraged and supported. This approach in effect disregards the historical 
strategies used by indigenous groups such as the Schefferville Innu and 
Naskapi who, as I have explained elsewhere, often adjusted their practices 
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to harmonize as best as possible their work at the mine with the crucially 
important life on the land.75
As for the contemporary mining industry, it generally sees “the de-
velopment of Plan Nord [as] a very proactive initiative at the right time,”76 
in particular because of the considerable government resources assigned 
to the implantation of modern transportation and power networks. In 
this regard, the province’s industrial expansion into the subarctic will be 
largely financed by Hydro-Québec and the public treasury ($60 billion 
is expected to be allocated to northern development in the next quarter 
century). With at least $1.2 billion reserved specifically for infrastructure 
upgrades and new construction during the initial five-year period (2011–
16), “the government will first invest in projects that afford access to 
areas with the greatest economic development potential” in the domain 
of mining and energy.77
Given that miners never exhausted its ore reserves, it is not surpris-
ing that the Labrador Trough still holds much potential provided the 
economic conditions are favourable. As the region stands on the cusp of 
becoming “the gateway to northeastern Quebec, helping to play a vital 
role in Plan Nord,”78 mining and steel conglomerates are knocking on 
the door, hoping to redeploy in the area with renewed intensity. Three 
large mining companies currently control roughly 40 per cent of the iron 
ore production worldwide and almost 80 per cent of the seaborne export 
trade; these statistics alone suffice to show the rapid consolidation of the 
sector, given that this triumvirate, Vale (headquartered in Rio de Janeiro), 
BHP Billiton (Melbourne–London), and Rio Tinto (London–Melbourne), 
was responsible for less than half of the seaborne trade in 1997.79 From 
this veritable iron cartel emanates a strict control over ore prices, which 
have surged ninefold since 2000.80 This phenomenon has created “major 
cost-inflation pressures”81 and is a source of irritation for governments 
and steelmakers, whose leverage dwindles with growing demand for base 
metals in China—a country that now produces nearly half of the global 
crude steel output.82
From the perspective of the steelmaking industry—never entirely 
powerless thanks to enormous capital resources, a high level of corporate 
concentration, and the fact that, in the final analysis, the dependency re-
lationship with the mining industry is reciprocal—a clever solution can 
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serve to counter this hegemony: the vertical integration of enterprises. 
For the Labrador Trough, this ownership of upstream supplier firms by 
downstream producers represents an interesting return to a bygone era, 
since the period that preceded the iron crisis of the 1980s in Nouveau-
Québec was in effect characterized, as the first section indicated, by the 
systematic acquisition of captive mining sites by large American steel in-
terests. As the mining and steel industries formalize their integration, a 
restructuring of the industry is clearly looming on the horizon (if in fact 
it hasn’t already begun, in particular among state-owned Chinese steel-
makers83). It cannot be ruled out that, as a result of these companies con-
solidating their hold on the territory and the ore reserves, the Labrador 
Trough may once again be closely tied to the progress of distant urbaniz-
ation and global consumer society.
Certainly the most prominent actors have changed over the course 
of sixty years. Bethlehem Steel and National Steel closed their doors at 
the turn of the twenty-first century and have been replaced by new multi-
national producers. The arrival of ArcelorMittal (Luxembourg), one of 
the leading steel-mining conglomerates in the world,84 in the region of 
Fermont is symptomatic of this evolution. Already in command of the 
largest mine in Québec, with operations set up at the historical deposits 
of Mont-Wright and Fire Lake, the company recently divulged a mas-
sive expansion program evaluated at more than $2 billion. Forecasting a 
“breakneck” pace of development, ArcelorMittal seeks to increase sub-
stantially the capacity of its processing plant and magnify by a factor 
of two its ability to move ore and waste, notably with the support of an 
impressive fleet of 400-ton Caterpillar 797 trucks, the largest available 
on the market.85 According to a company manager, “the commitment of 
the Quebec government” to the reindustrialization of Nouveau-Québec 
was a decisive factor in ArcelorMittal’s decision to allocate this capital to 
the Mont-Wright expansion, making it clear that without Plan Nord, “the 
money might have gone to the United States, Mexico, Brazil or any of a 
number of African and European operations.”86
At the earlier stages of both embryonic production and advanced ex-
ploration, Indian multinational Tata Steel (Mumbai) is a second poten-
tially important player on the Québec portion of the iron ore trough. This 
Asian steelmaker, which figures among the ten largest producers in the 
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world, is looking to secure “strategic captive iron ore” to supply its trans-
formation operations in Europe.87 In partnership with Calgary-based 
New Millennium Iron (NML), Tata Steel owns 80 per cent of a direct 
shipping ore project already in production near Schefferville,88 a develop-
ment that proposes to reactivate existing historical deposits, notably in 
the Timmins area which straddles both sides of the Québec–Labrador 
border.89 Pursuing a long tradition of appropriating Innu and Naskapi 
territory in the name of corporate interests, NML recently renamed the 
geological formation stretching over more than two hundred kilometres 
west of Schefferville the Millennium Iron Range, “a huge iron ore district” 
over which the company now claims “control.”90 Tata is also studying 
the possibility of formalizing other investment partnerships with NML, 
with the goal of exploiting the much more imposing taconite deposits—
these veritable company builders that rank among the largest iron de-
posits in the world, according to NML91—of Lac Harris (KéMag) and 
Howells River (LabMag). Pending the outcome of the ongoing feasibility 
study, the two partners hope to make use of the same railway installa-
tions constructed by QNS&L in the early 1950s, in addition to envisaging 
the laying of a 600- to 700-kilometre-long slurry “ferroduct” designed to 
transport fine grained concentrate to the port of Sept-Îles.92 Necessary 
upgrades intended to transform the port installations into state-of-the-
art shipping facilities are expected to be financed by a public-private 
partnership (several companies, including NML and Tata, are involved 
as part of an investment consortium) supported by the recently launched 
Atlantic Gateway and Trade Corridor Strategy, a federal initiative meant 
to “provide a quick, reliable, and secure transportation network between 
North American markets and markets in Europe, the Caribbean, Latin 
America, and Asia.”93
A third steel giant is presently deploying its operations in the region. 
Already active as a minority partner on the Newfoundland side of the 
southern Labrador Trough, at the Bloom Lake mine and concentrator, 
WISCO International Resources Development & Investment (WISCO), a 
subsidiary of Chinese steelmaker Wuhan Iron & Steel Corporation, is at 
the helm of a longer-term, more ambitious project, also at the advanced 
exploration stage, which “centres on a huge iron deposit.”94 With the ob-
jective of exploiting the Lac Otelnuk formation 170 kilometres north of 
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Schefferville, the steelmaker entered a joint venture with Toronto-based 
junior miner Adriana Resources, and together they expect “to make the 
Otelnuk project nothing less than the biggest mine in Canadian hist-
ory.”95 To justify the enormous investments required, Adriana’s president 
and chief economic officer has suggested that “if we’re right in our es-
timates, the mine life will be in excess of 100 years,”96 an expectation 
echoed by the Québec government.97
Alerted by these clear echoes of past mining discourses in the re-
gion, obvious questions come to mind: To what extent have things ef-
fectively changed? Are observers and local communities confident that 
similar development mistakes will not be repeated? After all, Québec’s 
Plan Nord assures that, in contrast with the previous phase of north-
ern development, benefits will materialize “for all Quebecers” this time 
around, thanks in part to the creation of many new employment oppor-
tunities, particularly for indigenous labourers.98 In order to fill these pos-
itions locally, “the objective is to ensure that the workers are ready to 
work when the projects are launched,” which means that “Aboriginal and 
local communities [must] participate rapidly in the process that leads to 
the acquisition of the desired skills.”99 This government strategy mirrors 
the approach favoured by mining companies, who strive not only to hire 
Aboriginal individuals already settled near industrial sites, since this al-
lows them to save “a lot of money”; but also, in light of the unfolding 
“cultural revolution” of corporate responsibility that is taking place in 
the industry, to secure a social licence to develop and operate mines in 
the region.100 As to distant Asian and European steelmakers, they find 
themselves in need of “Canadian management” and administrators who 
“are used to dealing with Aboriginals, [who are] used to working in the 
north,”101 in order to help them navigate the complexities inherent to the 
establishment of a mine in remote and isolated indigenous territories.
Apart from technical accounting discussions regarding modest alter-
ations to royalty regimes, public officials, industry representatives, and 
Québec civil society have generally not engaged, however, in a fundamen-
tal rethinking of the business model—the common “dig-and-sell” para-
digm102—that has guided, and continues to guide, mining development 
in the provincial north. If the means to carry out this overhaul remain 
to be invented and implemented, some industry observers, authors, and 
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critics have theorized and in some cases empirically examined possible 
alternatives.103 In economic terms, they have proposed:
•	 the creation of a resource rent tax and an associated 
sovereign wealth fund;
•	 revenue sharing with First Nations, Métis, and Inuit groups 
on whose land mineral development is occurring;
•	 regional economic diversification, in particular through the 
establishment and support of a balanced industrial base and 
smaller scale, revenue-generating ventures;
•	 the development of local and/or state-owned manufacture 
industries;
•	 a more careful examination and potential veto over foreign 
mergers and takeovers;
•	 government and/or Aboriginal control over the number, 
size, and scale of concurrent mining projects, and the 
staggering of operations over longer time horizons;
•	 transparency and systematic publishing of statistical 
information pertaining to industrial mining operations, 
including financial agreements and corporate taxes paid;
•	 support and development of the land-based and social 
economies of the north.
In the environmental realm, analysts have argued for:
•	 supervision of the weakly regulated mineral exploration 
industry and in particular, replacement of the free entry 
licensing system;
•	 stricter environmental permitting and the implementation 
of cumulative impact assessments and follow-up 
monitoring;
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•	 close evaluation of rehabilitation and restoration plans, 
posting of steeper financial assurances, and more stringent 
auditing and certification processes related to mine closure; 
•	 greater government oversight over land permits, 
implementation of integrated land management, and 
creation of zones of exclusion from development;
•	 comprehensive recycling, energy efficiency, and 
consumption reduction programs, including the fight 
against planned obsolescence.
Finally, in the social and political domains, experts have highlighted the 
potential for adapted work and training programs such as job-sharing 
arrangements for indigenous workers and, perhaps most importantly, 
active and meaningful participation of communities not only at the noti-
fication and assessment stages but also through the prospection, explor-
ation, design, construction, implementation, monitoring, follow-up, and 
remediation, and also the partial ownership of industrial projects that 
have secured local support. These policy proposals have not really gar-
nered serious considerations from regulatory authorities or the industry, 
which are generally intent on exploiting the region as rapidly and effi-
ciently as possible so long as the social licence has been obtained.
CONCLUSION
By the mid-twentieth century, the “exploration” and gradual abrogation 
of indigenous homelands situated north of the forty-ninth parallel was 
already a long-standing phenomenon in the Québec-Labrador peninsula. 
These territories were travelled as early as 1578 by European crews look-
ing for the Northwest Passage, before being visited, between the seven-
teenth and nineteenth century, by a series of missionaries, English and 
French traders, and, toward the end of that period, exploration parties 
assigned to diverse scientific and geological duties. As we have seen, the 
colonial process accelerated through the mining boom of the postwar 
period, when powerful American mining and steel interests formed 
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corporate alliances, under the auspices of a generally proactive, inter-
ventionist state, to lay their hands onto the strategic iron ore reserves 
in the Labrador Trough. The end result turned out to be deleterious for 
the regional economy at large and for the well-being of local indigenous 
populations.
The initial search for valuable iron deposits in the interwar years led 
to the opening of the Ungava region to intensive mineral development, in 
part thanks to the provincial government’s espousal of a liberal econom-
ic program that limited the ability or willingness of the state to sustain 
an endogenous manufacturing sector linked to primary extractive activ-
ities.104 But, contradicting their own laissez-faire principles, government 
administrators adopted a hands-on approach to produce a mineral policy 
largely favourable to corporate interests. This state-sanctioned support 
of industry facilitated the incursion of massive foreign capital into the 
North, with the launching of modern infrastructure projects, notably in 
the domains of energy, mechanical transportation, and urban planning, 
and the consequent appropriation of indigenous homelands.
In the early 1980s, the development of the resource-dependent, ma-
ture mining municipality of Schefferville, located at the heart of the 
Labrador Trough, went tumbling to a sudden yet brutal crash. Despite the 
challenges thrown at the local communities to survive the death of their 
unique industry, many people, including most members of Schefferville’s 
two indigenous groups, resolved to pursue their lives in this economically 
frail region. As authorities worked rather ineptly to promote alternatives 
to mineral production that could rescue the regional economy, Innu and 
Naskapi residents were forced to reorganize their livelihoods through the 
region’s deindustrialization phase.
The post-closure phase did not come without immense obstacles and 
uncertainties, as one of the main sources of employment for the Innu 
and the Naskapi in Schefferville vanished virtually overnight. Indigenous 
residents remember with particular bitterness the difficulties associat-
ed with mine closure, holding both IOC and government authorities re-
sponsible for the failure to deliver on their promises of long-term pros-
perity for their communities. Notwithstanding their very real grievances 
and misfortunes, the dismantling of a wage economy at Schefferville im-
plied that people had to find, much as during the preceding development 
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and production years, alternate ways to make a living—only this time 
around, literally outside of an evanescent mining world that, for better 
or for worse, stopped exerting its overwhelming influence on the local 
people, their economies, and their environments.
In this chapter, I suggest that the mine’s influence never fully dis-
appeared from the memories, the imagination, and even the lived ex-
periences of Innu and Naskapi residents. At Schefferville the past is cer-
tainly made, as Halvaksz illustrates in a different context, of the more 
constructive “aesthetic qualities of mineral extraction (the attractive 
constructions of town life, mining equipment, roads, etc.).”105 Yet the 
mine also exhibits, to borrow an evocative metaphor from Sandlos and 
Keeling, a zombie-like character, where the industrial sites “continue to 
exert some sort of malevolent effect during their afterlife.”106 I contend 
that the undead nature of the mine is a powerful legacy of industrial ex-
traction in the region.
Indeed, the past figured prominently in the minds of the Innu indi-
viduals who erected mine and rail barricades in Schefferville in the sum-
mer of 2010, contesting the redevelopment of the nearby iron deposits. 
For Innu leader Réal McKenzie, the lessons and details of this history 
were a central motivation to this action, as people engaged in the pro-
test asserted that they did not “want to live the IOC story again.”107 In 
addition to physical blockades, the Innu communities of Matimekush–
Lac John (Schefferville) and Uashat mak Mani-utenam (Sept-Îles) have 
launched a $900 million lawsuit against IOC/Rio Tinto to seek finan-
cial compensation for historical and ongoing damages resulting from the 
“colonization and dispossession” of their ancestral territories.108 Through 
this judicial action, the Innu are hoping to recoup some of the profits 
earned by the IOC since 1954, thanks in part to company infrastructure 
such as the QNS&L railway, which, according to the Innu groups who 
filed the proceedings, continue to “violate their ancestral rights.”109 This 
prosecution should serve as an unambiguous reminder that, at the dawn 
of a new mining cycle and amidst the resource boom, these past mining 
developments continue to represent a deep historical wound for some so-
cieties that are about to experience the revival of the iron ore industry in 
Québec. In contrast with the dominant optimism that has seized the re-
gion, one Innu from Schefferville anticipates the future in his community 
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in rather cautious terms, guided by his long experience with mining ac-
tivities: “What do I see in twenty-five years? . . . I see the closure of this 
mine that is opening today. Then we will live through a second closure. 
They will say: ‘Schefferville, goodbye.’”110 By failing to engage the public 
and indigenous communities in a comprehensive consultation process 
and mineral policy overhaul, it is precisely this multifarious story (of col-
onization and dispossession) that public officials and corporate execu-
tives have not heard while planning to reindustrialize subarctic Québec.
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Indigenous Battles for Environmental 
Protection and Economic Benefits 
during the Commercialization of the 
Alberta Oil Sands, 1967–1986 
Hereward Longley
I NTRODUCTION
Since the late 1990s, the Alberta oil sands industry has become an eco-
nomic powerhouse that employs thousands of indigenous and non-in-
digenous people, generates billions of dollars of economic activity, and 
produces over two million barrels of oil per day. However, it has also 
become the source of controversy and disputes over environmental im-
pacts that include large-scale landscape disturbance and wildlife habitat 
destruction due primarily to open pit mining, atmospheric pollution, 
carbon dioxide emissions, and watershed pollution that may be related to 
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high cancer rates in downstream communities.1 Many indigenous people 
in the region have viewed government regulators as negligent in con-
sidering the impact of oil sands development on their traditional lands, 
treaty rights, and lives.2 Though there is a substantial historical litera-
ture on hydrocarbon development in Alberta, there remains a shortage 
of research into social and environmental impacts and conflicts and the 
consequences of the initial development phase of the oil sands industry 
for indigenous communities.3 This chapter demonstrates that while the 
environmental impacts of oil sands activities on indigenous communities 
are often understood to be recent controversies, they are contemporary 
manifestations of issues that first emerged during the initial commer-
cial development phase of the oil sands industry from the late-1960s to 
mid-1980s.
The early impacts of the Great Canadian Oil Sands Ltd. (Suncor) and 
Syncrude oil sands operations were most acutely felt in the closest com-
munity, Fort McKay, located approximately twenty kilometres down-
stream on the west bank of the Athabasca River. Strip mining, atmo-
spheric emissions, watershed contamination, and population increases 
from incoming workers and the industries that support large-scale syn-
thetic oil production caused an array of adverse impacts on proximate 
ecosystems and undermined the capacity of the Fort McKay commun-
ity to continue their hunting, trapping, and food gathering practices. In 
addition to these impacts on resources, Fort McKay was also left out of 
the employment opportunities and other economic benefits of industrial-
ization. The Alberta government and the oil sands industry had minimal 
regard for indigenous peoples in the 1970s and 1980s, focused as they 
were on the rapid production of oil and dismissive of indigenous con-
cerns as a federal responsibility. By the 1980s, the Fort McKay commun-
ity was forced to respond to the environmental issues associated with oil 
sands development and their economic exclusion from the new industrial 
economy. To assess these issues, I use an approach drawn from several 
works on the history of resource development and indigenous people in 
Northern Canada, particularly those which call for a critical examination 
of the agency of indigenous peoples to shape and influence the coloniz-
ing forces of industrialization and the encroachments of western insti-
tutions.4 As with many northern indigenous communities, Fort McKay 
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representatives attempted to respond to the impacts of the oil sands in-
dustry in the 1960s to the 1980s through the various legal and political 
channels that were available to them. In spite of extensive efforts, how-
ever, the community was unable to extend any influence over develop-
ers or regulators to better protect their environment. Yet in forming the 
Athabasca Tribal Council (ATC) with other First Nations governments 
in the region, the community was ultimately able to make progress in 
the areas of employment and participation that increased the economic 
benefits of oil sands development for indigenous communities in north-
ern Alberta.
DEV ELOPMENT AND  
EN V IRON MENTAL IMPACTS
The development of the oil sands industry emerged as part of a larger 
twentieth-century process of industrialization in Northern Canada that 
exploited indigenous lands for resources and economic gain.5 Change in 
northeastern Alberta began with the establishment of Fort McMurray as a 
major transport site during the 1930s and World War II. By the 1960s, the 
Lake Athabasca region had been affected by the uranium-mining boom 
at Uranium City, Saskatchewan, the construction of the Bennett Dam on 
the Peace River in British Columbia (which affected the Peace–Athabasca 
Delta in Alberta), and the establishment of commercial fisheries on Lake 
Athabasca.6 Wider developments also prompted the commercialization 
of the Athabasca oil sands industry, including events in the oil-producing 
countries of the Middle East and the increasing volatility of the Cold War 
between the mid-1950s and the 1960s. In 1956, in response to the Suez 
crisis, the Sun Oil Company of Philadelphia took a majority position in 
Great Canadian Oil Sands Ltd. (GCOS). In 1966, Cities Service, Imperial 
Oil, Royalite, and Atlantic-Richfield formed the Syncrude consortium.7 
In 1967, GCOS opened as the first commercial synthetic oil production 
operation, followed by the Syncrude project in 1978.8 
In the 1970s, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) imposed supply restrictions, and subsequently, the price of oil in-
creased, creating an energy crisis in Canada and throughout the Western 
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world. The supply crunch impelled the Alberta and federal governments 
to expand synthetic oil production irrespective of environmental con-
sequences. In response to a federal report on the deficiencies of the 
1973 Syncrude environmental impact assessment, Alberta Environment 
Minister William J. Yurko wrote to federal Environment Minister Jeanne 
Sauvé stating that a secure oil supply outweighed environmental risks: 
We know that major information gaps exist in respect to the 
baseline environmental data in the entire area. Nevertheless, in 
light of Canada’s critical energy balance, it did not and does not 
appear prudent to delay oil sands development until all needed 
information is available.9
Energy security concerns prompted the federal, Alberta, and Ontario 
governments to take a combined 30 per cent equity in the Syncrude pro-
ject following the withdrawal of Atlantic Richfield Canada (ARCAN) in 
December 1974.10 With the price of oil and inflation rising through the 
1970s and the early 1980s, the successful development of the oil sands 
industry was a top priority for the federal and Alberta governments until 
the collapse of oil prices in 1982. 
The rush toward development caused dramatic environment-
al change in communities such as Fort McKay. By the 1980s, the Fort 
McKay community reported that they were seeing far fewer birds, squir-
rels, muskrats, and moose that had once been abundant and important 
sources of food and fur.11 The community also reported that the influx of 
people to the region was compounding pressures on wildlife due to rec-
reational hunting, particularly of moose populations.12 They also noted a 
huge increase in waste dumping and garbage. The most significant and 
controversial impacts of oil sands development, however, stemmed from 
the pollution of the Athabasca River by tailings pond effluent and oil 
spills, and from atmospheric emissions from the upgrading process.13
The complex and energy-intensive process of removing surface soils 
and vegetation and extracting and processing bitumen produced huge 
quantities of toxic liquid tailings containing significant concentrations 
of ammonia and heavy metals, including copper, nickel, chromium, and 
zinc, as well as unextracted hydrocarbons that had to be stored.14 From 
the mid-1960s, one of the most significant polluters of the Athabasca 
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River was the Great Canadian Oil Sands Ltd. tailings pond. Designed in 
1964 as temporary storage on Tar Island pending the availability of an 
inland mined-out area for a permanent site, the GCOS tailings dyke, con-
structed of compacted earth, was initially twelve metres tall.15 Because of 
unanticipated processing difficulties, more tailings storage was required 
than initially anticipated, and by 1974 the dyke grew to over 67 metres tall 
and 3.5 kilometres long. By 1976, effluent seeped from the tailings dyke 
into the Athabasca River at a rate between 1.5 and 1.6 million litres per 
day.16 However, scientists from the Alberta Department of Environment 
thought that this seepage accounted for only 55 to 70 per cent of total 
seepage because of unknown quantities of groundwater contamination.17 
The Alberta government had no regulatory framework in place to control 
the effluent seepage from the GCOS tailings dyke. The company’s 1973 
Clean Water Act licence regulated effluents entering the tailings ponds 
but did not address seepage rates or quality.18
In the late 1970s, Dr. W. C. Mackay of Alberta Environment con-
cluded that tailings pond water seeping from the tailings dyke was more 
toxic in composition than the organic carbon that naturally leached from 
exposed bitumen deposits.19 Bioassay testing of the toxicity of tailings 
pond water conducted in 1974 found the heavy metal content to be lethal 
to rainbow trout.20 The Athabasca River tended to dilute effluent flows 
by as much as 400 times in winter and 1,200 times in summer, one mile 
downstream of the dyke.21 While this amount of dilution reduced the 
toxicity of contaminants to a non-lethal level for fish, Mackay main-
tained that sub-lethal concentrations of tailings water toxicants would 
impair various body functions and cause significant health problems in 
fish.22 However, D. N. Gallup from Alberta Environment asserted that 
existing research had not yet assessed the long-term fish and human 
health implications of diluted chemical and organic contaminants in the 
Athabasca River.23 The Athabasca River was also contaminated by bio-
logical pathogens from sewage produced by the rapidly expanding town 
of Fort McMurray.24 
In addition to water problems, oil sands activities produced local air 
pollution affecting Fort McKay and the surrounding environment, as 
atmospheric emissions from the two operations are naturally funnelled 
northward along the Athabasca River.25 In 1986, Fort McKay officials 
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commissioned an environmental impact assessment (EIA) that conclud-
ed, “There has been a definite and statistically significant deterioration in 
long-term air quality of the region.”26 The Syncrude stack produced par-
ticulate emissions at a rate of 3,060 kilograms per day. Syncrude’s analy-
sis of these emissions revealed twenty-six toxic trace elements and metals 
emitted at seventy kilograms per day.27 Of the trace element emissions, 
95 per cent consisted of sodium, vanadium, magnesium, titanium, and 
manganese. The 1986 EIA report pointed out that vanadium, a transition 
metal emitted at three kilograms per day, was not monitored but had 
potential to cause deleterious effects on the human respiratory system.28 
The remaining 2,090 kg/day of emissions consisted of sulphur dioxide 
(a well-documented cause of acid rain, damage to vegetation, and res-
piratory issues among vulnerable individuals) and significant amounts 
of hydrocarbon particulates (a possible explanation for the presence of 
oily residue in water melted from snow in Fort McKay). The particulate 
emissions from oil sands operations could have adverse and long-term 
effects on terrestrial environments, including altering the mineral nutri-
ent cycle in the region. Recent research has found that major increases in 
the atmospheric deposition of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) 
and dibenzothiophenes from oil sands operations over the last fifty years 
have had significant impacts on the surrounding watershed, causing oil 
sands lake ecosystems to enter “new ecological states completely distinct 
from those of previous centuries.” These ecological changes may in turn 
be related to public health and environmental problems downstream 
from the oil sands industry.29
Biological and chemical atmospheric and water-borne pollution in-
creased through the 1970s and had profound consequences for the Fort 
McKay community. Fort McKay had dealt with water quality issues since 
the late 1960s, when the community began to notice that drinking water 
from the Athabasca River induced nausea and vomiting and other ill-
nesses, possibly due to industrial effluent or municipal sewage from Fort 
McMurray.30 Between 1967 and 1975, the Alberta Department of Health 
warned the people of Fort McKay to stop drinking water from the river.31 
Two water storage tanks were installed at either end of the town. The 
tanks were meant to eliminate the problem of water supply, but were not 
cleaned as they should have been by government officials and quickly 
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became contaminated. During the winter, the tanks had to be constant-
ly heated by propane burners to prevent them from freezing.32 By 1980, 
residents of Fort McKay reported that they could no longer wash clothes 
with river water because they would stink and cause skin irritation and 
rashes.
Before the Athabasca River became polluted, fishing was a signifi-
cant food source for Fort McKay. Each family would catch over 2,000 fish 
each fall to dry and store for winter months. Members of the community 
reported that pike and pickerel caught from the Athabasca River tast-
ed bad and induced vomiting. By the early 1980s, dead fish were regu-
larly seen floating in the Athabasca River; fish from the Muskeg River 
began to taste like oil and were subsequently abandoned as a food source 
by the community.33 In 1985, an EIA of Fort McKay, commissioned by 
the Energy Resources Conservation Board (ERCB), found that everyone 
in the community relied on the river, ice, snow, and rain for water, but 
that all of these sources were contaminated. The community reported 
that rainwater developed a “yellow scum” when collected and allowed 
to settle.34 Fort McKay residents associated atmospheric emissions from 
oil sands operations with a decline in the health of regional vegetation.35 
They reported that the tops of birch trees were dying, and that those that 
were still alive had yellowing leaves and were unhealthy. All trees had 
generally declined in health and produced less foliage. They reported 
that Jack-pine needles were dying and falling off and that all coniferous 
trees were producing fewer cones and nuts, which had been a significant 
food supplement for Fort McKay. Soon after the GCOS plant began oper-
ations, Fort McKay residents observed that berries had become less abun-
dant. Edible plants, herbs, and medicinal plants became more difficult to 
harvest, and the community trusted the safety of what could be collected 
less and less.36
The Fort McKay community participated in the regulatory pro-
cess and opposed the environmental impacts of the oil sands industry 
through whatever channels they could. The community’s intervention at 
the Energy Resources Conservation Board hearing on the expansion of 
GCOS operations in January 1979 highlighted the massive environment-
al, social, and economic effects that GCOS had had on the community:
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Before 1960, Fort McKay was a relatively isolated settlement 
having little contact with the “outside world.” The building of 
the Great Canadian Oil Sands plant in the 1960s marked the 
beginning of the encroachment of major resource development 
upon the settlement. The plant was constructed on the summer 
residence for many families from Fort McKay. The construction 
of the plant provided the first major conflict between the tradi-
tional lifestyle of the community and an industrialized way of 
life. In such a conflict, the “old way” can not win [sic]. A giant 
like the GCOS has not changed its way because of Fort McKay. 
But certainly our community has had to turn “upside down” for 
GCOS and other specific resource developments.37
Additional research suggested that the GCOS plant on Tar Island de-
stroyed a prime hunting area, including important summer camps and 
traplines. These sudden changes compromised the community’s ability to 
subsist from hunting and trapping.38 The community’s intervention also 
expressed concerns about water quality in the Athabasca River, which 
residents perceived had “deteriorated significantly since the construction 
of the GCOS plant.”39 
In spite of the environmental and health concerns raised by Fort 
McKay, GCOS was granted approval to expand by Minister of Renewable 
Resources F. W. MacDougall on March 8, 1979.40 In 1978, GCOS merged 
with Sun Oil, becoming Suncor shortly after the approval of the expan-
sion project in 1979. In 1980, Suncor claimed $259 million in profit and 
continued to pollute the Athabasca River Valley on an even bigger scale.41 
Within two years, Suncor was responsible for another significant pollu-
tion spill in the Athabasca River. December 1981 was an unusually cold 
winter, affecting equipment throughout the region. In Fort McKay, the 
propane heater on the south water tank malfunctioned, and the entire 
structure burned down. The heater on the north tank failed and the tank 
froze, turning the remainder of the town’s water into ice, which cracked 
and destroyed the tank as it expanded. The failure of the water system 
caused a crisis, and residents were forced to take water from the con-
taminated river. At the Suncor plant, cold temperatures caused signifi-
cant equipment failures in late December 1981, which were compounded 
215Hereward Longley
by fires in January 1982, causing major spills of oil, grease, and phenols 
into the Athabasca River that continued until the end of February. In the 
course of a few days, more than forty tons of toxic waste and chemicals 
were spilled into the river.42 Suncor did not inform Fort McKay that a 
spill had occurred until February 23, despite having been told to do so by 
Alberta Environment on January 26. As news of the Suncor spill became 
widely known, an emergency water delivery system was established that 
was used into the mid-1980s.43
Environment Minister John Cookson told Fort McMurray Today 
that there would be an investigation into the spill: “Both the ERCB and 
my department are concerned [about] why this happened. The company 
has to tell us why machines failed, what staff was on duty to manage, 
and submit recommendations.”44 Fort McKay Chief Dorothy MacDonald 
was furious about the spill and how the situation was being handled. In 
March, she wondered in a press conference, “Where the hell was the gov-
ernment when all this was going on? Why didn’t the Department of the 
Environment tell us what was going on and why didn’t they conduct test-
ing themselves? How foolish can you be to allow a company like Suncor 
to conduct its own monitoring? Do bank robbers turn themselves in af-
ter they’ve done the job?”45 Commenting on Cookson’s announcement 
of the investigation, Member of the Legislative Assembly Grant Notley 
told Fort McMurray Today, “It’s a whitewash when they don’t include an 
investigation of the department’s performance. I think one thing that 
now is quite common throughout the province is we’ve got a Department 
of the Environment that is badly managed and incompetently led.”46 He 
drew attention to the Alberta Department of Environment pollution con-
trol division’s “Summary of Suncor Inc. Wastewater Treatment System 
Performance, June 1978 to Date,” which stated that Suncor had exceeded 
its water pollution limits in thirty-six of the preceding forty-three months. 
The minister for Workers’ Health, Safety and Compensation reported 
that testing of Suncor effluents revealed an abundance of polychlorinated 
biphenyls (PCBs), which are toxic aromatic compounds.47 The following 
week, Fort McMurray Today reported that samples of pickerel taken from 
Lake Athabasca near Fort Chipewyan had an oily taste and that the lake 
had high levels of PCBs. The government warned people downstream of 
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Fort McMurray not to eat fish from the lake or the river and delayed the 
opening of the commercial fishing season to June pending test results.48
In 1983, Suncor was charged with seven violations of the federal 
Fisheries Act and two violations of the Alberta Clean Water Act.49 The 
initial trial was on the Clean Water Act violations, to which Suncor plead 
not guilty. The court found that the company had exercised due diligence 
in attempting to prevent the flow of oil into the Athabasca River, and 
Suncor was acquitted. The Crown then simultaneously appealed the 
judgment and pursued new charges of unlawful deposit of a deleterious 
substance in water frequented by fish under section 33(2) of the Fisheries 
Act.50 The court ruled that the Crown had drawn a defective case that 
was further weakened by an unconventional appeal process and by the 
repetition of evidence that resulted from the Crown charging Suncor sep-
arately for each set of violations. The Alberta Court of Appeal acquitted 
Suncor and dismissed the appeals. For the residents of Fort McKay and 
Fort Chipewyan who suffered every day from the widely observed con-
tamination of drinking water and the declining quality and quantity of 
fish, the Crown’s failure to secure a conviction was a failure of justice for 
indigenous peoples in the Athabasca region. In spite of the collection of 
evidence from the trial of this case, no regional study of the potential im-
pacts of industrial effluents on water quality and fisheries was conducted 
in the region such as had been previously conducted on the Mackenzie 
River below Norman Wells by Fisheries and Oceans Canada.51
Concurrent to the expansion of Suncor, Fort MacKay fought hard 
to be involved in the planning and development of the proposed $14 bil-
lion Alsands project on the east side of the Athabasca River near Fort 
McKay.52 The community filed an intervention at the ERCB hearing call-
ing for direct consultation and hearings in Fort McKay, but their con-
cerns were largely disregarded. ERCB chairman Vern Millard wrote to 
Chief MacDonald stating that Fort McKay’s claims did not justify further 
hearings, asserting that “the alleged long-term environmental and health 
impacts from oil sands development are, in the board’s view, not sub-
stantiated. If they should be proven, the board and Alberta Environment 
would undoubtedly take the appropriate action.” He stated that re-
search into the ability of the new plant to deal with possible chemical 
and oil spills would not “serve any useful purpose.” He also wrote off 
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compensation and housing issues as not part of the ERCB’s jurisdiction.53 
Chief MacDonald told Fort McMurray Today that “the response of the 
board is an absolute outrage.” She criticized the review process, stating:
The board says it won’t act until there is evidence but it refus-
es to re-open the hearings to hear the evidence. They never con-
sidered health impacts at the hearings in 1979. It’s fairly obvious 
that the ERCB is just a political body with absolutely no interest 
in human health.54
She continued, “the only acceptable evidence to them is if we rolled in 
with a wheel barrow with someone dead in it. The province is so intent on 
resource development that they don’t care what impact it has on people. 
They just don’t care what the public health cost is.”55 On June 5, 1979, 
Alberta Energy Minister Mervin Leitch announced that there would be 
no public ERCB hearings in Fort McKay, and that he was unaware of 
any significant local concerns about the plant.56 He stated that the ma-
jor consideration in building the Alsands project was economic viability. 
Other than the opportunity to intervene at the ERCB hearings, the Fort 
McKay community was largely excluded from the environmental review 
of the Alsands project. Under the “one window concept” introduced by 
Environment Minister William Yurko in 1973, environmental assess-
ment was done by the company or the Department of Environment and 
was factored in as a component of the ERCB approval process but was 
not a separate decision-making criteria.57 A review of the Alsands EIA by 
the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development stated, “It 
appears no effort has been taken to include or obtain the oral history of 
Indian elders in the area. It also appears that the Indian Association of 
Alberta and the individual Indian Bands were not consulted.”58 Though 
the community took significant steps to participate in the planning and 
regulation of the oil sands industry, Fort McKay never achieved the power 
to influence government or industry in a meaningful way.  
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EMPLOY MENT OPPORTU NITIES  
OR EXCLUSION?
While indigenous communities suffered from the crippling impacts of 
environmental degradation in the 1970s and 1980s, they were also largely 
excluded from the economic benefits of employment and participation. 
Indeed, the federal and provincial governments took only tentative steps 
to ensure indigenous employment in the oil sands industry.59 The Alberta 
Conservation and Utilization Committee’s 1972 “Tar Sands Development 
Strategy” advocated, for example, that the Alberta government create a 
“multi-purpose public awareness program which would emphasize the 
prospective developments and condition of the local population, and 
place special attention on the native people in order to encourage assimi-
lation into the work force and overcome alienation.”60 Peter Lougheed, 
speaking in the legislature in 1973, suggested that this process would be 
slow:
We have to keep in mind in this area that we, as a provincial 
government, cannot interfere, unless there are ways in which we 
are asked to, with the treaty rights of our Native people. We are 
all well aware that trapping and fishing is a phasing-out situa-
tion to some extent, and we are faced with skilled jobs in areas 
such as tar sands plants—and there is great transition going to 
be required in that, considerable patience and not too much false 
expectation. The progress will be slow and let no one pretend 
otherwise.61
In keeping with these comments, the Alberta government remained only 
minimally concerned with issues of indigenous employment.62 When the 
federal government, Syncrude, and the Indian Association of Alberta 
(IAA) reached an agreement on the hiring of indigenous people in 1976, 
the provincial government refused to sign. The agreement contained 
plans for recruiting indigenous workers, establishing training programs, 
and forming institutional alliances to better the employment potential 
of indigenous peoples.63 Even though the Syncrude agreement therefore 
focused mostly on training rather than setting definite quotas for in-
digenous employment, the Alberta government continued to maintain a 
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hands-off approach to the issue. Indeed, a policy paper from the federal 
Department of Energy, Mines and Resources written in September 1980 
stated that Alberta had “generally taken the position that special pro-
grams which operate in favour of status Indians (as proposed by the fed-
eral government) discriminate against non-status Indians and Métis.”64
Despite such a weak commitment to indigenous employment, many 
within the provincial government publicly trumpeted the so-called tri-
umph of indigenous employment in the oil sands. Local people and the 
federal government recognized that plans to hire indigenous peoples had 
more or less failed, but MLAs in the Alberta government argued as late 
as the 1980s that indigenous hiring had been a success. Norm Weiss, 
MLA for Lac La Biche–McMurray, championed the efforts of the private 
sector, stating that “the employment of natives by Syncrude and Great 
Canadian Oil Sands has shown a dedication to equality and human rights 
that our government can be proud of.”65 In response to a question from 
NDP MLA Grant Notley about the Alberta government’s inadequate 
indigenous hiring policy in 1981, Dr. Don McCrimmon, Conservative 
Minister without portfolio responsible for native affairs, replied that “the 
history of Syncrude disproves what the Hon. Member is saying. When 
these megaprojects go ahead, I think the companies have been pretty 
conscientious and pretty good about trying to get the native people work-
ing in them as much as possible.”66 
In 1979, two consultants for the Cold Lake band, Roger Justus and 
Joanne Simonetta, produced a report that painted a very different pic-
ture of indigenous employment in the oil sands industry in the 1970s. 
Only thirty indigenous people in total, including twenty-four from Fort 
McKay, had ever been employed in the oil sands, and of these only sev-
en people were still employed. Of those no longer employed, 33.3 per 
cent had been laid off, 16.7 per cent had left to go trapping, and 16.7 per 
cent had left because of illness. In terms of duration, 41.7 per cent had 
worked for less than six months, and only 23.6 per cent had worked for 
more than eighteen months. The majority of jobs were in menial labour. 
Respondents reported that there were only minimal salary increases, and 
only 13.3 per cent of respondents ever received a promotion.67 The re-
port further suggested that the Syncrude hiring agreement had meant 
that “Syncrude has made some effort to employ Indian people in all job 
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categories. However, the number of Indian employees, particularly from 
the immediate local area, has remained relatively low.”68 The consultants 
also took a dim view of the pilot training program: 
The Syncrude Agreement represents a well-intentioned at-
tempt by all parties to ensure Indian participation in employment 
training and business opportunities in the oil sands area. How-
ever, exploratory research in the communities and an analysis of 
the available documentation reveals a gap between the original 
intents of the Agreement and the results of implementation ef-
forts, by all parties, to date.69
If the environmental impacts of this early period of development were 
justified in part through the promise of enhanced local wage labour 
opportunities, this pledge proved hollow for the people of Fort McKay.
Indigenous people were unable to find work in the oil sands indus-
try for numerous reasons. Most of the jobs were in skilled labour and 
required training and education that most indigenous people in the 
region lacked. Another problem was that employment infrastructure 
was planned around work camps and busing workers in and out of Fort 
McMurray. Work was often not advertised in indigenous communities, 
and there were no indigenous-specific hiring and training programs. 
Also, full-time employment was incompatible with the hunting and trap-
ping lifestyle of indigenous people. It was difficult to work a full-time, 
year-round schedule and pursue seasonal hunting and trapping oppor-
tunities. As was the case with other case studies in this volume (with 
Rankin Inlet being the notable exception), the unwillingness of many in-
digenous employees to commit to full-time employment was not accept-
able in the oil sands industry.70
Nonetheless, the failure to employ significant numbers of Fort McKay 
residents in the oil sands was not an indication of local people’s antipathy 
toward wage labour. The Justus-Simonetta report found, for example, 
that 60.5 per cent of the indigenous people surveyed, and 74 per cent of 
Fort McKay respondents, expected to get jobs in the oil sands industry. 
Indeed, over 76 per cent of respondents highly desired jobs and had ap-
plied for them despite most people not hearing of potential jobs before 
construction.71 While Chief MacDonald primarily sought environmental 
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protection in the construction of the Alsands project, the young secre-
tary-treasurer of the band council, Jim Boucher, focused on the provision 
of local jobs. Age twenty-three in 1979, Boucher represented the gener-
ation that had grown up in a settled community and had been educated 
in residential schools. Though members of his generation continued to 
be highly dependent on the land for subsistence, they also had a greater 
connection to the industrial world. In an interview with the Edmonton 
Journal, Boucher stated that resource development in the area had made 
it impossible for community members to maintain a traditional way of 
life, and that within less than two decades the once-isolated community 
had been completely upset.72 From Boucher’s perspective, there was no 
choice but to work with government and industry to seek participation in 
the oil sands. He told the Edmonton Journal that Fort McKay supported 
the Alsands project and the proposal to build a new town. Boucher de-
spised handouts, and sought autonomy, a guarantee of the town’s sur-
vival, infrastructure improvements, land tenure, reduced pollution, and 
affirmative action hiring programs.73
As a further response to the disappointing hiring situation, the 
five indigenous communities of the Athabasca oil sands region, Fort 
McMurray First Nation, Chipewyan Prairie First Nation, Mikisew Cree 
First Nation, Fort McKay First Nation, and Athabasca Chipewyan First 
Nation, formed the Athabasca Tribal Council (ATC) to unify their voice 
on oil sands industry matters, especially employment and participa-
tion. As intervenors in the Alsands ERCB hearings, the ATC sought the 
implementation of an affirmative action hiring program as a condition 
of approval for the Alsands project.74 The program would have legally 
bound Alsands to hiring indigenous workers. The ERCB concluded that 
it did not have power under section 43 of the Oil and Gas Conservation 
Act to mandate such a program.75 The ATC appealed the decision to the 
Alberta Court of Appeal, which dismissed the case, ruling that the af-
firmative action program was out of the ERCB’s jurisdiction, and that 
such a program might, as a form of reverse discrimination, be in breach 
of the Individual Rights Protection Act. The Supreme Court of Canada 
dismissed a further appeal, but ruled that affirmative action programs 
did not breach the Individual Rights Protection Act.76 The ruling was a 
disappointment for the ATC, but the case established an important legal 
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precedent that developers could not cite the Individual Rights Protection 
Act to prevent the tabling of future affirmative action programs.77
In 1980, both the ATC and the Indian Association of Alberta ap-
pealed to the highest levels of the federal government to seek improved 
participation in the oil sands industry. Joe Dion, president of the IAA, 
wrote to Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau:
Development of Canada’s resources has not been in partner-
ship with Canada’s Native people. Rather, it has occurred to the 
detriment of the traditional economies and lifestyles of Indian 
peoples. Being isolated from participation has caused no sig-
nificant rise in income of Indian communities, and, as a result, 
Indian people do not have the capacity to finance their future 
developments. It is fundamental in our view, that the need for 
aid should eventually subside and this can only be accomplished 
with the growth in the capacity of Indians to help themselves.78
Dion advocated affirmative action and equity participation in the Alsands 
project. ATC Chairman Lawrence Courteorielle wrote to Marc Lalonde, 
Lloyd Axworthy, John Munro, and Jean Chrétien seeking greater partici-
pation in the Alsands project, specifically the establishment of affirma-
tive action hiring programs, infrastructure spending, housing, and great-
er efforts to minimize the social impacts of industrialization.79 The IAA 
and the ATC were finally able to influence the federal government to aid 
their interests by helping to encourage affirmative action programs. The 
National Energy Program explicitly required that Alsands implement a 
preferential hiring program for indigenous people as a condition of pref-
erential oil pricing.80
Following the collapse of global oil prices in 1982, the Alsands project 
was cancelled and the people of Fort McKay were spared from further en-
vironmental destruction from a third oil sands plant designed to produce 
125,000 barrels per day. But they also lost employment opportunities. In 
1985, Fort McKay reported that the oil sands industry still had not deliv-
ered jobs. For example, Alsands had promised that during construction 
of the bridge, all who sought work could have it, but only one man was 
hired.81 Although the Alsands project failed, the efforts of the IAA and 
the ATC were not a complete loss. In 1986, the Fort McKay First Nation 
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established the Fort McKay Group of Companies, which provided basic 
services to the oil industry and evolved into a major business enterprise 
valued in the hundreds of millions of dollars.82 In response to the efforts 
of indigenous communities, the oil sands industry, especially Syncrude, 
began to include communities in development planning and econom-
ic opportunities. In 1986 and 1987, Syncrude formed the Syncrude 
Application Review Group (SARG) and the Syncrude Expansion Review 
Group (SERG) to bring together communities, industry, and government 
in an alternative dispute resolution process to examine development and 
expansion issues.83 Under the tenure of Eric Newell as CEO and chair-
man from 1989 to 2003, Syncrude became a more proactive employer of 
indigenous peoples. In a 2012 interview, Newell told the Calgary Herald, 
regarding the hiring of indigenous peoples in the 1980s, that Syncrude
made every mistake in the book . . . We thought we were in 
a hiring program, but as fast as we could hire young aboriginal 
workers, we would let them go. We realized that taking some per-
son from a little community of 250 people and throwing them 
into an industrial complex like Syncrude was not a formula for 
success.
Syncrude pursued indigenous education and development programs that 
eventually led the company to become a significant Canadian employer 
of indigenous peoples. Newell was later made an Officer of the Order of 
Canada for his indigenous employment initiatives, and has received the 
Award for Excellence in Aboriginal Relations from the Canadian Council 
For Aboriginal Business.84 Although the efforts of indigenous people to 
challenge the environmental impacts of the oil sands industry in the 
1980s failed, their efforts to gain increased participation represented the 
slow and painful beginning of what would, three decades after the first 
period of oil sands expansion, become a success story.85
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CONCLUSION
The commercial development of the oil sands industry from the 1960s 
to 1980s, combined with the postwar industrialization of northeastern 
Alberta, radically transformed the environmental and economic land-
scapes of the Athabasca region. The environmental impacts of oil sands 
operations on nearby Fort McKay undermined the community’s trad-
itional economy, while mostly excluding Fort McKay residents from the 
jobs and economic benefits associated with industrialization. Although 
politicians and developers intended that economic benefits to indigenous 
people would offset the impacts of development, the oil sands industry 
in effect socialized the environmental costs of development by allowing 
adverse impacts, rather than the benefits of participation, to accrue to 
indigenous communities. 
In the face of their new industrial neighbours’ encroachments, in-
digenous peoples in the Athabasca region fought for environmental jus-
tice and participation by making interventions at ERCB hearings, voicing 
their concerns to politicians, contributing to published reports, and tak-
ing legal action. Despite extensive efforts, the indigenous organizations 
were unable to make industry or government take any meaningful ac-
tion to protect their environment. In spite of the repeatedly document-
ed and widely observed adverse environmental impacts reported by the 
Fort McKay community, neither industry nor government acknowledged 
the severity of or acted upon these environmental concerns. Perhaps 
indicative of a weakness of environmental rights in the Canadian legal 
system, government and industry disregard for indigenous peoples’ en-
vironmental concerns has continued during recent booms in oil sands 
development.86 
Indigenous peoples suffered from underemployment and inadequate 
economic participation in the oil sands industry from the 1960s to 1980s, 
but the principle of indigenous employment was eventually acknow-
ledged by government and industry. Although the 1976 Syncrude hiring 
agreement was objectively an almost complete failure, it represented an 
intention by industry and government to include indigenous people in the 
benefits of the new industrial economy. By forming the Athabasca Tribal 
Council, indigenous communities demonstrated a powerful capacity to 
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act independently and effectively within the Canadian legal and polit-
ical systems. Efforts of the ATC to secure an affirmative action program 
were defeated in the Supreme Court but were successful in persuading 
the federal government to make indigenous hiring a requirement for the 
Alsands project in exchange for international preferential oil pricing. In 
spite of the inaction of the Alberta government, the ATC’s hiring agree-
ment with the federal government for the Alsands project and the earli-
er Syncrude agreement, alongside the efforts of progressive leaders like 
Dorothy MacDonald and Jim Boucher, were important early steps toward 
the economic development of First Nations communities in the oil sands 
region. 
For indigenous communities like Fort McKay, environmental protec-
tion and economic development have never been mutually exclusive ob-
jectives.87 While indigenous-owned businesses in the oil sands industry 
have thrived, major questions about the adverse environmental impacts of 
bitumen extraction remain unresolved and are seen as being inadequate-
ly addressed by the Alberta government. In the past year, the Fort McKay 
First Nation, the Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation, the Mikisew Cree 
First Nation, and the Fort McMurray First Nation have all abandoned 
Alberta’s new Joint Oil Sands Monitoring Program, and have boycotted 
the new consultation policy, which they view as co-opting initiatives that 
were developed without indigenous input.88 Communities including Fort 
McKay and the Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation are now funding their 
own health studies to investigate abnormal cancer rates that they believe 
are caused by the expanding oil sands industry, as the Alberta govern-
ment has refused to do so.89 Indigenous communities needed regional 
unification in the ATC, extensive advocacy, and legal action in order to 
secure employment and economic benefits in the 1980s. For indigen-
ous communities seeking meaningful environmental regulation of the 
oil sands industry, regional indigenous unification, advocacy, and legal 
action may be the only path forward. 
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Uranium, Inuit Rights,  
and Emergent Neoliberalism  
in Labrador, 1956–2012
Andrea Procter
The struggle for Aboriginal rights in Canada is closely connected with re-
source conflicts. The threat of mining projects, hydroelectric dams, pipe-
line construction, and other industrial developments has often pushed 
Aboriginal groups to mobilize in order to reclaim control over trad-
itional lands. As a number of chapters in this book demonstrate, many 
Aboriginal peoples have fought to prevent mining developments or have 
struggled against the harmful effects of mines on their lives and lands. 
The mining industry and nation-states have dispossessed Aboriginal 
groups of their territories and sovereignty on so many occasions that 
scholars often automatically situate the relationship between Aboriginal 
peoples and mining as a conflict. Yet increasingly, some Aboriginal gov-
ernments are choosing to negotiate with mining companies and are en-
tering into impact and benefit agreements and development proposals. 
Some analysts have connected the shift from protest to negotiation with 
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Figure 1: Labrador, showing territory of Nunatsiavut in shaded areas and key 
settlements and locations mentioned in the chapter. Map by Charlie Conway.
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hegemonic neoliberal values and practices (see Levitan and Cameron in 
this volume).1 The current global economy encourages states to facili-
tate the unimpeded exploitation of resources, and neoliberal govern-
ance tends to prioritize decentralization, a sense of responsibility for 
self-improvement, and decreased dependency on the state.2 As Gabrielle 
Slowey argues, within this context, Aboriginal “self-determination is 
consistent with normative and neoliberal goals of economic, political, 
and cultural self-reliance.”3 How does the willingness of Aboriginal gov-
ernments to negotiate with mining interests, therefore, correlate with 
Aboriginal goals of self-determination? What are the implications of this 
engagement with neoliberal projects? 
This chapter explores these questions by examining how Inuit in 
Nunatsiavut, Labrador, have dealt with the prospect of a uranium mine 
on their territory since the 1950s, and how the relationship between 
neoliberal and Inuit goals has become complex and entangled. Based 
on a year of ethnographic fieldwork in Labrador in 2007–8, as well as 
on archival and media analysis, this chapter examines the historical ar-
ticulation between changing and contradictory ideas about Aboriginal 
rights, economic development, and regional autonomy. By attending to 
the diverse perspectives of individuals and organizations, I illustrate the 
lived experience of regional and global processes such as modernization, 
Aboriginal self-government, and emerging neoliberalism, and explore 
how Inuit self-government and mining have become interconnected in 
unexpected ways. Over a sixty-year timeframe, Labrador Inuit, state au-
thorities, and industry have come to align Inuit sovereignty, resource de-
velopment, and regional self-sufficiency in order to further their own pol-
itical and economic ambitions. As Charles Hale and others have argued, 
the neoliberal combination of autonomy and constraint can offer some 
space for Aboriginal rights claims, but, as I demonstrate here, a neolib-
eral framework can also limit economic and conceptual possibilities and 
can exacerbate and obscure inequalities.4
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UR ANIUM, MODER NIZATION, AND  
I NUIT R ELOCATIONS I N THE 1950s
When uranium was found in northern Labrador in 1954, the discovery 
set off a string of events that profoundly transformed the political, social, 
and economic circumstances of the region. In the 1950s, the majority of 
Inuit in Labrador lived in dispersed settlements, homesteads, and camps 
on the northern coast and in central regions. In the winter months, many 
chose to stay in the villages established in the late 1700s by Moravian 
missionaries, in order to trade with the mission store and to attend 
church events. Most Inuit relied on a combination of commercial fishing 
for cod and char, fur trapping, and subsistence harvesting for their liveli-
hood. Since World War II and the arrival of the American and Canadian 
militaries in the region, some also worked on the construction of various 
military sites, including those near Hopedale and Goose Bay.5 
In provincial affairs at the time, Labrador was an afterthought. The 
region only gained political representation in 1946, and responsibil-
ity for education and health care had largely been left to the churches 
and the privately funded International Grenfell Association.6 The prov-
incial government in St. John’s viewed Labrador as predominantly a 
place for Newfoundlanders to fish and, more recently, to find employ-
ment at military bases. Labrador was both a source of resources and a 
burden; its people were of little consequence to the government. In fact, 
Newfoundland had tried to sell Labrador to Quebec in 1925 and again 
in 1933 in order to deal with its financial difficulties.7 Aboriginal people 
in the province, including Inuit, Innu, and those of mixed ancestry in 
Labrador, were “pencilled out” of the Terms of Union agreement when 
Newfoundland joined Canada in 1949, as Premier Smallwood argued 
that there were only Canadians in the province.8 
It is within this context of political and economic marginalization 
that the uranium story begins. In 1953, the Newfoundland govern-
ment leased vast resource rights over much of Labrador to the British 
Investment Company (or “Brinco”), for very little in return.9 The one-
sided Brinco concession was an example of the government’s approach to 
economic development at the time: natural resources were the property 
of the Crown and were to be developed for the public good; no special 
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rights to lands or resources based on Aboriginal rights or historical 
ownership existed.10 Brinco prospectors found some uranium deposits 
near Makkovik and Postville in 1954 and even more in 1956. Although the 
company tried to keep the discovery secret until the timing better suited 
it, Premier Smallwood leaked the news during the Labrador Conference 
of 1956, which had been convened by the provincial government in order 
to discuss future plans for Labrador and its people.11 
One major theme at the conference was the social and economic 
future of the Labrador Inuit. Conference participants from the govern-
ment, the Moravian mission, and the International Grenfell Association 
discussed their problems with administering health and social services to 
such a dispersed Inuit population and their concerns about the Inuit har-
vesting economy, which some felt should be replaced by wage labour. One 
option that was considered, in the absence of any Inuit participants, was 
relocating Inuit in the northernmost communities of Nutak and Hebron 
to places farther south, where they might find paid employment. In the 
midst of these discussions, and much to the dismay of Brinco officials, 
Smallwood announced to the press, “It is quite likely that mining of ur-
anium ore and processing of uranium concentrates could commence in 
1957.”12 The possibility of a mine near Makkovik created great optimism 
in government circles about development potential, especially given the 
bleak economic and health conditions on the coast that the conference 
participants had described. 
 Propelled in part by the possibility of wage labour opportunities, 
authorities decided to relocate more than four hundred Inuit from Nutak 
and Hebron to more southern communities in 1956 and 1959, and almost 
two hundred went to Makkovik. The main rationale was the provision 
of improved and more efficient services in centralized locations, but the 
discovery of uranium near Makkovik and the potential for jobs for the 
relocated Inuit did play a role in the decision.13 The prospect of a uranium 
mine influenced the idea of Makkovik as a “growth centre” and therefore 
as a suitable location for the relocatees. Officials at the time generally as-
sumed that Inuit could adapt easily, both to wage labour jobs and to new 
environments. Some Inuit who were relocated recount promises made 
to their families about jobs at the potential mine. One woman recalled, 
“They said that we’re moving to a place where there is lots of things, lots 
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of seals everywhere, lots of animals and fish. That’s what they said. That 
there were jobs available also. We had to go to Makkovik because they 
said Makkovik had everything.”14 Another said, “We were told on July 12 
that we had to leave Okak and we left on July 25. My father was told there 
would be lots of work with Brinex. They took dad away from his fishing 
in Silutalik. My father could not get work so he ended up fishing there.”15
The Inuit themselves were not consulted about the relocations, and 
they expressed their opposition to the plans, but paternalistic govern-
ment authorities argued that the transition to an industrial, modern econ-
omy would be beneficial for them. Wage labour jobs would keep Inuit in 
settlements where they could also be provided with education and health 
services, and would encourage them to move away from what authorities 
felt were non-modern harvesting practices. “Both the Eskimos and the 
Indians [sic] have been encouraged and assisted in hunting and fishing,” 
wrote the minister of public welfare in 1959, “but we regard these ac-
tivities as ‘holding operations’ until the economy in the area becomes 
more diversified. However, with the development of the mineral resour-
ces of Labrador, there is hope that some progress in this direction will be 
possible.”16 Modernization would provide the government with the dual 
benefits of creating “productive” and sedentary citizens, as well as remov-
ing people from the land, thus making it available for development.17
Despite the promises of houses and jobs, the almost two hundred 
Inuit from Nutak and Hebron arrived in Makkovik to find nothing of the 
sort. Most spent many cold months living in tents before houses were 
eventually built on the outskirts of town in an area called “Hebron vil-
lage.” The relocatees were therefore spatially segregated from the rest of 
Makkovik and were also socially segregated by the original residents, 
who, although mainly of Inuit ancestry, considered themselves to be 
“Settlers,” and not Inuit. The ethnic tensions and sometimes outright ra-
cism between the two groups added considerably to the already stressful 
and disruptive relocation.18 Rose Pamack-Jeddore of Nain describes the 
relocations from an Inuit perspective:
Resettlement is one of the gems of Confederation. Hebron 
and Nutak became non-existent in the rush for centralization. 
The rationale for resettlement was improvement of services. To 
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the Inuit, resettlement meant living in tents while waiting for 
accommodation, leaving behind personal belongings, adjusting 
to a different hunting environment, the inconvenience of return-
ing to fishing grounds in open boats and living in tents in the 
summer, and it led to an increase in community conflicts. The 
ensuing insecurity of relocation and the futility of attempting to 
adjust to depleted hunting, fishing, and wooding grounds drove 
the Inuit to the escape mechanism of drunkenness. Their pow-
erlessness and insignificance in the dominant society had been 
made all too clear to them.19
The Hebron and Nutak relocations caused widespread social upheaval in 
Labrador, and the ongoing social devastation and inequalities caused by 
the resettlement policy are still evident today.20
The enthusiasm caused by the discovery of uranium near Makkovik 
was relatively short-lived. By 1958, Brinco’s subsidiary exploration com-
pany Brinex had built tunnels and developed plans for a mine at the Kitts 
site, but by the end of 1959, uranium prices dropped, and the company 
realized that the mine would be too late to qualify for Atomic Energy of 
Canada contracts. Brinex exploration stopped soon afterwards. No jobs 
materialized for the almost two hundred relocated Inuit in Makkovik, 
who were now far from home and without a meaningful or sufficient 
livelihood. 
NEW LI V ELIHOODS: BR I NEX I N THE 1970S
Brinex’s interest in uranium surfaced again in the early 1970s with the 
international energy crisis and an improved uranium market. Company 
employees returned to the Kitts-Michelin site and built a camp fif-
teen kilometres from the communities of Postville and Makkovik. 
Labradorians viewed the company’s renewed interest in the region with 
some skepticism. Other Smallwood-initiated developments in the prov-
ince had failed to create many local or provincial benefits, and people 
were beginning to call for more local participation in development deci-
sion making.21 
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The company’s resurgence also coincided with the rise of the 
Aboriginal rights movement in Labrador. Influenced by social movements 
in the United States—and driven by the controversy over the 1969 White 
Paper22 and large-scale developments such as the Mackenzie Valley pipe-
line and the James Bay hydroelectric dam—Aboriginal peoples across 
Canada increasingly challenged state incursions into their lives and lands. 
In Labrador, the injustice of the 1950s northern relocations prompted 
many Inuit to voice their grievances and to call for restitution. After the 
federal government announced in 1973 that it would agree to negotiate 
comprehensive land claims with Aboriginal groups who had never signed 
treaties, Inuit in Nain23 formed the Labrador Inuit Association (LIA). The 
LIA granted full membership to Kablunângajuit (the Inuttitut word for 
those of mixed Inuit-settler ancestry) in 1975 and filed a Labrador Inuit 
land claim in 1977.24
The Brinex project proposals of 1976 and 1979 were some of the first 
development issues tackled by the LIA. Within the context of the global 
anti-nuclear movement, the uranium development in Labrador was 
controversial in itself, and the LIA connected environmental and eth-
ical concerns with calls for the recognition of Inuit authority over their 
homeland. Because they framed their opposition to the project in terms 
of Inuit rights, identity, and culture, however, the LIA leaders faced some 
difficulty in finding widespread support for their claims among those 
who lived closest to the mine site. Many Settler/Kablunângajuit residents 
from Makkovik and Postville did not self-identify as Inuit at that point, 
and they expressed some ambivalence toward political claims based on 
Inuit cultural difference.25 The Labrador Inuit Association tried to use 
the sense of crisis created by the Brinex project to convince its potential 
members to recognize their shared interests and to foster a sense of Inuit 
identity and solidarity: “Development from big multi-national companies 
threaten[s] our traditional way of life, not to mention our resources and 
our land and waters . . . LIA encourages its members to unite and have 
one voice speaking for the rights of all its members. Let’s begin seriously 
discussing our future and get the most of LIA’s land claim for the good of 
all northern Labrador.”26 
Many residents of Makkovik, especially, framed their opposition to 
the project and their concerns about the dangers of uranium mining in 
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terms of the government’s obligation to protect “a way of life that is vi-
brant and strong and where the traditional lifestyle makes for a fiercely 
independent people.”27 Residents stressed the importance of their “way 
of life,” which encompassed shared values, activities, self-sufficiency, 
and circumstances,28 but few labelled it as “Inuit.” Evelyn Plaice and 
Lawrence Dunn have argued elsewhere29 that this focus on “lifestyle” 
or “way of life” was an approach that North Coast residents and the 
Labrador Inuit Association used to avoid issues concerning ancestry.30 In 
the 1970s, ethnic tensions and differentiation between Inuit and Settlers/
Kablunângajuit were prominent features of social life in the region; the 
northern relocations had created persistent social and economic inequal-
ities among groups in the communities.31 
In the 1970s, the provincial government was receptive to the “way of 
life” argument, but it firmly denied any possibility of Aboriginal rights. It 
issued an official development policy for Labrador in 1979 that suggested 
local lifestyles should be taken into consideration, but only to the extent 
that these lifestyles were deemed desirable. Premier Brian Peckford ex-
panded on how this approach would affect Labrador: 
The special relationship of the people to the land must be 
accounted for. The traditional lifestyle of Labrador, based on the 
harvesting of renewable resources, fishing, hunting, trapping, 
etc., requires a sensitive and symbiotic relationship between man 
and his delicate northern environment. That relationship perme-
ates almost every aspect of the society and culture of Labrador 
and has to be accounted for in future development. However, we 
must also recognize the challenges, opportunities, and rewards 
of new lifestyles which can be ours through a rational program of 
resource development.32 
Although government policy statements allowed that the way of life 
“must be accounted for,” it was framed as something that could (and 
ideally should) be changed into “rewarding new lifestyles,” and not as 
something that was inherently valuable or vital. Aboriginal rights, on the 
other hand, as championed by the LIA, had a fundamentally political and 
anticolonial basis that was much less malleable, more challenging, and 
therefore less appealing for the government.
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Brinex’s official response to calls for the recognition of Aboriginal 
rights was to defer to the provincial government’s handling of the mat-
ter. In practice, however, the company criticized and denied such claims, 
especially in 1979, when public support for the recognition of Aboriginal 
rights was increasing,33 and the issue became prominent in discussions 
about the potential mining development. In response to this pressure, 
Brinex worked to minimize the effect of Aboriginal rights on the project, 
first by arguing that the mine site would not interfere with any current 
Inuit land use. “I believe the project in question does not directly involve 
the LIA,” argued Brinex’s vice president of mining. “I would think they 
cannot be considered to be residents of the land in the project area south 
of Kappokok Bay [sic].”34 The company also responded to local concerns 
by arguing that the mine could be designed on a very local scale and 
in isolation from places and people who did not wish to be “involved.” 
A Brinex official stated, “The communities of Postville, Makkovik and 
North West River have special concerns relating to impacts such as life-
styles. I am confident that we can work closely with these communities 
to resolve concerns and design our systems to have them participate only 
to the extent they wish.”35 At a public meeting in 1976, when residents 
commented that local people would likely only get the lowest-paid jobs, 
Brinex’s Murray Poloski replied that they “have to start somewhere—
have to choose a lifestyle . . .The communities can choose their amount 
of involvement.”36
Brinex thus acknowledged the “special concerns” of residents by 
appropriating the claim for local rights through isolating the residents 
geographically, socially, and economically from any development. Any 
economic benefit that may accrue to local people from the mine would 
be a result of their own choice to “change their lifestyle”—they would 
not be forced to participate. The company thus attempted to defuse and 
neutralize the residents’ claims of local rights by conflating “local” with 
“isolated,” and by relying on the liberal championing of the individual 
right to choose.
Despite the fierce denial by industry and government of local argu-
ments against the Brinex proposal, moral and political support for the 
Inuit claims grew. In 1980, the Environmental Assessment Board for 
the Kitts-Michelin uranium project concluded that the Brinex mining 
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proposal did not prove that the project was environmentally, socially, 
and economically acceptable, and that serious concerns about Aboriginal 
rights must be addressed.37 By the time of the board’s report, however, 
internal company politics and poor global markets for uranium after the 
Three Mile Island accident in 1979 had prompted the company to shelve 
the project for the final time.
NEOLIBER AL CONTEXTS: NU NATSIAV UT  
I N THE TW ENTY-FIR ST CENTURY
In the years following the Brinex proposals, Inuit land claims negoti-
ations between the Labrador Inuit Association and the provincial and 
federal governments were often stalled.38 In 1980, the provincial govern-
ment reluctantly acknowledged Aboriginal rights, but it limited its defin-
ition of Aboriginal rights to culture, heritage, and the traditional use of 
renewable resources, and refused to consider any rights to subsurface or 
“non-traditional” resources.39 In the 1980s and early 1990s, the province 
framed its approach to the land claims negotiations as affirmative action 
for a disadvantaged minority, who, once lifted to the economic status 
of others in the province, would presumably then become socially in-
discernible.40 This perspective on Inuit concerns contrasted greatly with 
the LIA’s position that the Inuit were a political community with inherent 
rights to resources and autonomy. 
Even in 1989, when LIA President William Andersen III articulated a 
possible alignment between Inuit and provincial goals, the Newfoundland 
and Labrador government was slow in following the LIA’s lead. Andersen 
argued that Labrador Inuit must be “guaranteed their own lands and re-
sources in sufficient quantities to be as self-sufficient a people as possible 
. . . Of fundamental importance to us, as Labrador Inuit, is our future as a 
distinct and viable people. We are looking to the next 200 years—not the 
next 20.”41 The LIA’s approach changed slightly from demanding recog-
nition of Inuit rights to demanding the means by which Inuit could sus-
tain themselves in a self-contained territory. Inuit were looking to land 
claims to help create political and economic independence, he argued: 
“To us, land claims is not a threat to non-aboriginal people, it’s a way 
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to self-sufficiency.”42 By situating the Labrador Inuit as a political com-
munity in search of self-sufficiency, the LIA framed its claim in the dom-
inant society’s terms by appropriating concepts from the state’s neolib-
eral project of producing self-reliant subjects.43 Given the government’s 
insistence on limiting Inuit rights to those based on an image of Inuit 
as self-sustaining subsistence harvesters, aligning the goals of self-suf-
ficiency and resource development offered some middle ground to the 
provincial government.
Yet it was only when a massive nickel deposit was found in 1994 at 
Voisey’s Bay, south of Nain, that land claims negotiations heated up. With 
the increasingly mobile nature of capital markets, investors jumped at 
the prospect of a mining development, but they were also increasingly 
sensitive to uncertainties about land tenure, and the provincial govern-
ment felt new pressure to settle Aboriginal land claims in Labrador. Its 
first step was to take the Voisey’s Bay area completely off the negotia-
tion table, but the government also fast-tracked the Labrador Inuit land 
claim talks. An agreement in principle was signed in 1999, and the final 
agreement was signed in 2004, at which point the provincial government 
also issued a formal apology and financial compensation for its role in 
the 1950s relocations. The Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement cre-
ated the Labrador Inuit Settlement Area, a region administered by the 
Nunatsiavut Government.
Within the Settlement Area, the Nunatsiavut Government has en-
hanced authority over a proportion of land (15,799 square kilometres of 
the total 72,520 square kilometres of land) specifically selected by Inuit 
and designated as Labrador Inuit Lands.44
Shortly after its creation, the Nunatsiavut Government (NG) faced 
one of its first major crises. Uranium prospects had improved in the 
early 2000s, due to uncertain global geopolitics concerning oil resour-
ces and renewed interest in nuclear power as a possible response to cli-
mate change. Accordingly, the price of uranium had risen from US$7/lb 
in 2001 to US$136/lb in 2007.45 Exploration companies returned in full 
force to Labrador, and Nunatsiavut beneficiaries were embroiled in an 
intense debate about how to approach the renewed possibility of uranium 
mining on their lands near Makkovik and Postville.
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The Kitts-Michelin site, now under lease to Aurora Energy Resources 
Ltd., was called “the largest undeveloped uranium deposit in Canada,” 
and Aurora spokespeople claimed that a mine would be many times 
the size of the nearby Voisey’s Bay nickel mine.46 However, this project 
would mine uranium—a substance that was much more controversial 
than nickel. The global anti-nuclear movement had quieted significantly 
since the Brinex proposals, due in no small part to the post-Chernobyl 
decline of the nuclear power industry, but uranium remained a conten-
tious topic. The jurisdiction over the land and the allocation of potential 
economic benefits had, however, significantly changed since the 1970s. 
The Michelin deposit is on Labrador Inuit Land, which means that NG 
has jurisdiction over surface access and would receive a 25 per cent share 
in any provincial royalties of a future development.
In August 2007, Aurora notified the Nunatsiavut Government of 
its intention to register its project for an environmental assessment by 
the end of the year. NG had not yet developed a regional land use plan 
or legislation on environmental assessment, and so the NG minister of 
lands and environment tabled a motion in the Nunatsiavut Assembly 
to ban uranium development on Labrador Inuit Lands for three years.47 
Debate about “the moratorium,” as it was called, was fierce and endured 
for many months until the Nunatsiavut Assembly voted to pass the bill 
in April 2008.
For those who supported the moratorium, the idea that the Inuit 
government was actively protecting its land and people from poten-
tially harmful developments was a source of pride based in ideas about 
post-colonial control, environmentalism, and Inuit culture. Given the 
history of frustrated efforts to defend their lands from industrial incur-
sions, many Inuit took great comfort in knowing that the NG has, in the 
words of one man, “complete sovereignty” over the land and is willing 
to exercise that authority.48 The lengthy land claims negotiations had re-
sulted in some concrete authority over land governance, and some people 
expressed their relief that the NG was not simply going to “give the land 
away” for quick economic gain, or capitulate to industrial and economic 
pressures.49
Some who supported the ban described aspects of the Nunatsiavut 
Government’s approach as characteristically Inuit: “When people are 
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hasty to encourage economic development for the sake of accessing jobs 
and revenues, important details get overlooked. Nunatsiavut Government 
does need time to be able to stand on solid ground before taking part in 
an environmental assessment for a proposed uranium development on 
Labrador Inuit Lands. One common virtue that Inuit culture is based 
on is patience. We are an Inuit Government.”50 Unlike the situation in 
the past, the Inuit now had the ability to control development within 
Nunatsiavut, and many argued that it should do so carefully, at its own 
pace, and based on its own priorities.
To many Inuit, the connection between the land and the well-being 
of future generations was fundamental and must be protected. As in the 
1970s, the issue of people’s “way of life” was prominent in the debate, but 
this phrase took on various meanings. For some, protecting the “way of 
life” entailed protecting the integrity of the land for future generations 
by prohibiting mining. For others, protecting the “way of life” entailed 
protecting the viability of living in Nunatsiavut by developing resources 
in order to support Inuit jobs, housing, and infrastructure. 
Some argued that the potentially disastrous environmental effects 
of uranium tailings could destroy the land, water, and wildlife in the 
vicinity of the development, and could pose a health risk. Many felt that 
this potential harm was not worth the short-term economic benefits of a 
mine: “The employment benefits are not going to be there forever, so it’s 
really not worth the environmental and the health (risks) and the loss of 
our traditional hunting areas,” argued Terry Rice of Makkovik.51 Others 
felt that the use of land for the sustenance of future generations did not 
preclude resource development, as long as the environment is not ruined: 
We’re not against development—we see development as 
providing economic opportunities for beneficiaries that’s great-
ly needed and we see need in communities for infrastructure, 
for housing, for other projects and maybe revenue from mining 
can allow us to deliver these programs. But if our environment 
is contaminated then these things don’t really matter. You know, 
we need to ensure that, first and foremost our land is protected 
for future generations and the onus is on the Assembly to ensure 
that we do this.52
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On the other hand, some Inuit argued that mining could “help to pro-
tect our people” by allowing them to remain in their home communities 
and “learn their culture by living near the land instead of moving away 
for work.”53 Many people on the coast were worried that young people 
would have to leave the community in order to make a living elsewhere 
if mining were not permitted. One woman connected this out-migration 
with the loss of culture, as young people would not have the opportunity 
to experience and learn their culture by living in Nunatsiavut and being 
taught by elders: 
It’s a sin if our children have to move away because they can’t 
get anything here. They’re not going to work at the fish plant if 
there’s something better somewhere else . . . If all the young peo-
ple have to leave the communities for work, there’ll be nothing 
left to govern. Everything will just die out! Yes, there will be land, 
but there will be nobody there.54
The idea of “protecting our people” included providing the means by 
which they can remain in Nunatsiavut. According to this perspective, 
people in Nunatsiavut should be “using the land to its fullest” and using 
Nunatsiavut’s resources to “sustain ourselves in perpetuity.”55 
Some Inuit also argued that people should adopt a stronger sense of 
individual responsibility so that they gain the education and develop the 
skills needed to take advantage of potential mining jobs. “There’s more to 
life than 420 hours of work to get EI. The young people need to get edu-
cated, and then come home to get work in the mine, if it goes ahead. We 
need to take control of our lives.”56 In some ways reminiscent of Brinex’s 
claim that people could “choose their own level of participation” in the 
mine, these comments illustrate how some people have now internal-
ized the desire for “self-improvement,” and how modernization themes 
are reappearing as hegemonic neoliberal values. Arguments for increased 
responsibility over one’s future were echoed by government and industry 
campaigns encouraging people to train for jobs and to seize mining-re-
lated opportunities. Although these perspectives were quite widespread 
among both Inuit and industry representatives, other Inuit countered 
these arguments by stating that the role of the Nunatsiavut Government 
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should be to provide compensation or jobs to those who might be hurt by 
a moratorium.57
Neoliberal calls for individual responsibility and self-improvement 
are also evident at the governmental level. The land claim agreement’s 
fiscal structures strongly encourage the Nunatsiavut Government to 
sustain itself and its programs through revenues that it raises itself. In 
general terms, the agreement states that the Nunatsiavut Government 
would gain a 25 per cent share of provincial royalties from development 
on Labrador Inuit Lands, while it would only see a 5 per cent share of roy-
alties from development on other lands in the settlement area.58 Because 
the Michelin site is on Labrador Inuit Lands, the prospect of a 25 per cent 
share of royalties from a mine was a serious consideration for many, es-
pecially given the huge financial pressure of funding a new government. 
The land claim agreement therefore puts Inuit in a new relationship 
with the land, one that is determined by formal economic agreements. 
Inuit no longer stand in direct opposition to industry or to a govern-
ment intent on facilitating resource development; as the “landlord,” the 
Nunatsiavut Government now has a vested interest in development, as 
well as the responsibility of protecting Nunatsiavut beneficiaries.59 The 
pressure on the NG to develop its resources is therefore quite high, and 
the decision to prevent any uranium mining for three years was made 
by some members of the Assembly only for administrative reasons—not 
because they opposed the development of a uranium mine in the future.60 
One politician described the pressure on the government to finance itself 
in this way: “We need economic development and in a government where 
we’re all aware that the finances are not that great and we will be facing 
some hard times in the next few years, to delay any process that may give 
us a light at the end of the tunnel could be extremely detrimental to our 
success as a government.”61 
As a product of the alignment between Inuit goals of self-determin-
ation and neoliberal state goals of increased regional self-sufficiency, 
the land claim agreement promotes particular ways of conceptualizing 
Nunatsiavut land and resources.62 One candidate for the position of NG 
president in 2008 illustrated the framing of resources as commodities: 
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As our North Coast tax base is significantly smaller than 
what we need to run our self-government, the Nunatsiavut gov-
ernment will be dependent on extracting its natural resources 
in order to have the funds necessary to sustain our communi-
ties and the running of our government. The generation of own 
source revenue is essential, and right now, mining seems to be the 
short-term answer. So, even though I am not a mining advocate, 
I still have to consider it strategically as an income source for 
government, a source of employment and opportunity for Bene-
ficiaries, and a way to utilize one of our most important assets.63
The Nunatsiavut Government should therefore keep this new economic 
relationship in mind, he continued, as “there is no sense in negatively 
affecting the reputation of our potential business partner [i.e., the explor-
ation company] or the value of our asset” by establishing a moratorium.64 
Government and corporate interests are aligned, in this perspective, and 
actions that have a negative impact on industry will likewise have a nega-
tive impact on Nunatsiavut. 
When the Nunatsiavut Assembly voted to ban temporarily uranium 
development in 2008, this prediction proved correct, at least initially. As 
uranium exploration company stocks plummeted in the days after the 
vote, many Inuit watched with either trepidation or quiet cynicism about 
industry’s flair for melodrama. As one woman told me, “They’re just riling 
people up and getting them to support mining. Give them a year or two 
years and they’ll be back with more support—just before the three years 
is up.”65 For its part, Aurora Energy Ltd. offered a measured response, 
intended to quell environmental concerns about uranium mining and 
to minimize the perceived distance between the company and the Inuit 
communities: “Aurora shares the goal of careful stewardship of the land 
that Labrador Inuit have been a part of for over 5,000 years . . . In light of 
a growing world demand for clean, safe energy, Aurora is looking to the 
future benefits of moving forward in the spirit of co-operation with the 
people of North Coast Labrador.”66
The political, economic, and social ramifications of Aboriginal 
self-government within a neoliberal context are thus multiple and often 
contradictory. While the provincial government has an increasing 
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appetite for regional self-sufficiency and, therefore, the settlement of Inuit 
land claims, the lands and resources on which the Inuit are expected to 
subsist are extremely limited. In the midst of this debate, mining and ex-
ploration companies offer consistently positive information and images 
about the solution that uranium mining offers to individuals, families, 
and governments, and the role that Inuit can play in decision making. 
The consistent focus of industry, government, and many individuals 
is on the ability of the Nunatsiavut Government and Labrador Inuit to 
control the outcome of the uranium issue. In this view, Inuit are now 
“empowered” to engage in decision-making processes and to decide what 
their own futures will hold. Yet, as Shore and Wright argue, this focus on 
new-found “empowerment” can obscure many underlying issues that the 
new governance structures have not resolved.67 The ideal neoliberal cit-
izen—self-managing, self-governing, and self-sufficient—is empowered 
to work as a partner in management and to take responsibility for his or 
her own success. In this “project of self-improvement . . . any discussion 
of poverty as inequality or disadvantage has been erased from the dis-
course.”68 Larger issues such as the lingering inequalities created by the 
1950s relocations of Hebron and Nutak, for instance, are overshadowed 
by talk of individual choice and self-governance, responsibility to im-
prove oneself, and job training. 
While many embrace the opportunity to engage in “self-improve-
ment” and development projects, many others feel further alienated by 
this emphasis on empowerment, as a woman from Nain told me: 
Most [Inuit] live in too much depression to really do any-
thing, can’t understand English most of the time and do not ben-
efit from programs and services. It’s sickening . . . The Inuit pop-
ulation always seems as though [they] are always in the position 
of a high price chip: worth a lot but never really benefiting from 
all what is happening. People say they want the money instead 
[of programs], they say the leaders don’t listen and they only take 
care of their own family and many don’t like it, including me.69 
The forced relocations from Hebron and Nutak in the 1950s, as well as 
the more general social and economic impacts of centuries of colonial-
ism, have caused lasting social divisions and inequalities among Inuit in 
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Nunatsiavut. Some have benefited from the land claims settlement and 
new economic opportunities, but others have felt further marginalized.
THE POW ER OF THE PROSPECT
The relationship between uranium and Inuit self-government is still 
evolving. In 2011, Aurora Energy Ltd. was purchased by the giant 
Australian uranium producer Paladin Energy Ltd., and in March 2012, 
the Nunatsiavut Government lifted its moratorium on uranium mining, 
but the development of a mine in Labrador has not progressed to formal 
deliberation. As the global market for uranium continues to fluctuate at 
the time of writing (early 2013) with the impact of the 2011 Fukushima 
disaster, the development of a uranium mine in Nunatsiavut remains un-
certain, and the ultimate influence of the deposit is yet to be known.
For over fifty years, the prospect of a uranium mine in Nunatsiavut 
has highlighted the complex and often contradictory correlation between 
Inuit self-governance and mining development. Speculation about the 
uranium deposit has fuelled many of the advances in Inuit self-govern-
ment, but the relationship has not been straightforward. Over the years, 
the Inuit and provincial authorities have used the crises surrounding ur-
anium both as a catalyst to solidify their political goals and as an oppor-
tunity to launch a different future. In many ways, however, the anticipa-
tion of a mine has also deepened social inequalities and constrained the 
range of economic possibilities.
The history of the debate about uranium in Labrador illustrates the 
entwined connections between Inuit and global dynamics. In the 1950s, 
following the worldwide propensity for modernization schemes, govern-
mental authorities assumed that the Inuit harvesting economy should be 
converted into a wage-earning economy, and that Inuit would adapt to 
enforced (yet inevitable) social and economic transformation. The po-
tential for jobs at a mine was therefore one of the justifications used for 
the massive relocation and dispossession of northern Inuit from their 
lands, an event that has caused pervasive social trauma and inequality in 
the region. In the 1970s, the Brinex proposal was a catalyst for Inuit and 
Kablunângajuit to join forces and to fight for their rights as Aboriginal 
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people, as national and international debates about local and Aboriginal 
participation in resource governance were challenging state domination. 
The Brinex experience also illustrates the emerging influence of neo-
liberalism in community-industry relationships, both in the autonomy 
that Brinex granted individual citizens to “participate only to the extent 
they wish,” and in the increasing autonomy that the new political context 
granted to local voices such as the Labrador Inuit Association to express 
their own concerns.
In the early twenty-first century, uranium plays a central role in 
highlighting the contradictory neoliberal engagement with Aboriginal 
self-governance. With the creation of Nunatsiavut, Inuit are now “em-
powered” to control their own government and region, but as such, as 
Linda Tuhiwai Smith says about another indigenous situation, the Inuit 
are perhaps “made responsible for their own oppression and freedom.”70 
They have taken advantage of the space offered by neoliberal policies to 
advance their claims, and now have extraordinary authority over some 
aspects of governance in Nunatsiavut, including the freedom to make 
many of their own decisions about issues such as uranium mining. But 
hand in hand with this authority comes pressure to achieve economic 
self-sufficiency. The limited Inuit land base, diminished through historic-
al dispossessions, relocations, policies that discounted the significance of 
the harvesting economy, and, finally, the land claims negotiations, must 
now support the needs of the Nunatsiavut Government and its benefici-
aries. Inuit may therefore have the authority to ban uranium mining, but, 
within the neoliberal framework of the land claim agreement, they face 
significant pressure to develop their limited resources.
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Privatizing Consent?  
Impact and Benefit Agreements  
and the Neoliberalization of Mineral 
Development in the Canadian North
Tyler Levitan and Emilie Cameron
This chapter considers the extent to which impact and benefit agreements 
(IBAs)—agreements between indigenous communities and mining com-
panies that seek to extract resources from their traditional territories—
relate to broader processes of neoliberalization in Northern Canada.1 
Although IBAs have been a focus of scholarly inquiry for some time, 
scholars have not yet explicitly theorized IBAs in relation to the broader 
political-economic context within which they unfold, or in relation to 
the neoliberalization of resource and indigenous governance in Canada.2 
Drawing on interviews and participant observation in the Northwest 
Territories (NWT), analysis of federal and territorial policy, and a critical 
review of various academic literatures, we consider the ways in which 
IBAs relate to these broader formations.3
|  chapter 9
9 |  PR I VAT I Z I NG C ON S E N T ? 260
We begin with a brief overview of IBAs and the history of their de-
velopment in the Canadian North. Next, we discuss key insights into pro-
cesses of neoliberalization in Canada, with an emphasis on the ways in 
which relations between indigenous peoples, corporations, and the state 
are being reconfigured. With these insights in mind, and drawing on our 
research in the NWT, we outline some of the ways in which IBAs might 
relate to processes of neoliberalization, including their role in removing 
barriers to accumulation of capital, privatizing the federal duty to consult 
and to accommodate indigenous peoples in regard to development on 
their lands, and naturalizing market-based solutions to social suffering. 
We conclude with some thoughts on the implications and limitations of 
these findings. 
IBAs: OV ERV IEW
IBAs are a relatively new component of the northern resource govern-
ance regime, having emerged only in the late 1980s and early 1990s.4 
Since then, IBAs have become a standard component of mineral de-
velopment in the Canadian North; they are a de facto requirement for 
corporations interested in developing mines within the traditional terri-
tories of northern indigenous groups and have been negotiated in relation 
to every major mine proposed or developed since the late 1990s.5 For 
indigenous communities, IBAs typically include provisions for employ-
ment quotas, skills training and other educational benefits, contracting 
and joint venture opportunities, financial compensation, environmental 
mitigation-related measures, and even culture-related benefits.6 Industry 
proponents, for their part, secure good working relations with indigen-
ous communities and enhance their “social licence to operate”—but they 
also, it should be noted, frequently negotiate clauses prohibiting public 
critique of the company and any form of protest against the mine on the 
part of indigenous community members, as well as other measures to 
secure ongoing consent.7 It is typically industry proponents, moreover, 
that insist on the confidentiality of IBAs, although indigenous signator-
ies have also advocated for and defended the confidentiality of IBAs. As 
such, the details of the range of impact-benefit agreements signed in the 
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North are not in the public domain, and are sometimes not made public 
even to members of signatory communities, and thus much of the litera-
ture on IBAs comments on the agreements in general terms. 
Indeed, what distinguishes IBAs from other components of resource 
governance in the North (such as mining codes, Crown land regulations, 
environmental impact assessment processes, comprehensive land claim 
agreements, various forms of licensing, and so on) is their bilateral and 
private nature: they are typically signed between an industrial proponent 
and an indigenous government, with no direct involvement by federal or 
territorial government representatives or agencies, and no public policy 
framework guiding their negotiation, terms of reference, or implemen-
tation. The first IBAs signed in the North, as part of the development of 
the Ekati diamond mine in the NWT, remain the first and only IBAs in 
which government8 played a formal role, insofar as Indian and Northern 
Affairs (INAC9) mandated that “satisfactory progress”10 be made in ne-
gotiations regarding the realization of benefits and the mitigation of im-
pacts for indigenous communities affected by the Ekati mine within a 
sixty-day period in 1996. INAC itself did not participate in the negoti-
ations. Since then, despite numerous calls for a comprehensive federal 
policy to guide IBAs in the region, INAC (now Aboriginal Affairs and 
Northern Development Canada, or AANDC) has issued no such guide-
lines, and appears not to be actively pursuing the matter.
There is a relatively robust literature on IBAs, some of which em-
phasizes the practical benefits of IBAs for Aboriginal communities11 and 
some of which raises concerns about the broader power relations shaping 
IBA negotiation and implementation.12 Caine and Krogman argue, for ex-
ample, that IBA researchers have thus far been insufficiently attentive to 
the ways in which power infuses not only the negotiation and implemen-
tation of IBAs, but also the broader social, political, and institutional con-
text within which they have come to make sense. Their findings echo and 
extend concerns articulated in the late 1990s, when scholars first began 
to comment on IBAs after the federal government mandated the nego-
tiation of IBAs for the Ekati diamond mine.13 Since then, as IBAs have 
become an established part of the northern resource governance regime, 
research has tended to focus more on the extent to which IBAs enhance 
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the equitability, sustainability, and benefits of mining than on critiques 
of the political-economic conditions under which they have emerged.14 
Perhaps because IBAs do not formally and directly involve any gov-
ernment ministries, the role of the state in the development and imple-
mentation of IBAs has not been a primary focus of the literature. IBAs 
are frequently referred to as “supraregulatory,”15 for example, and their 
role in northern resource extraction is primarily considered as a supple-
ment or alternative to state regulations, policies, and practices. While 
Isaac and Knox16 note that, ultimately, IBAs are subject to contract law 
and may well be tested by the judicial system, in general it is the absence 
of the state from IBA negotiation and implementation that tends to be 
noted by scholars. The implications of that absence have been probed by 
a number of authors. Prno and Slocombe understand IBAs as evidence of 
the emergence of “local communities” as “particularly important govern-
ance actors” in northern resource extraction, arguing that “conventional 
approaches to mineral development no longer suffice for these commun-
ities, who have demanded a greater share of benefits and increased in-
volvement in decision making.”17 In such formulations, less state is good 
for local communities, insofar as the state has been understood as a bar-
rier to community involvement in governing extractive activity. Others 
have been much more critical of the lack of active state involvement in 
this dimension of resource governance, both in relation to the imposed 
sixty-day timeline with respect to the Ekati IBAs and more broadly 
around the question of federal fiduciary responsibilities.18 
In the wake of the government’s ad hoc position with respect to Ekati, 
for example, a comprehensive discussion paper was prepared by Steven 
Kennett for the Mineral and Resources Directorate of the Department of 
Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND) outlining a range 
of policy options that might clarify the government’s position in relation 
to IBAs.19 The report found that IBAs were already seen “as a de facto 
regulatory requirement” in the North because of DIAND’s role in the 
Ekati process, but also because DIAND provided informal advice to 
mining companies and funding to indigenous organizations that were 
negotiating IBAs. But, because the negotiation and implementation of 
IBAs “lacks the procedural and substantive parameters normally asso-
ciated with regulation,” Kennett argued, “the roles of mining companies, 
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aboriginal organizations and government are not properly defined and 
some inappropriate off-loading of responsibilities by government is oc-
curring.” Kennett also noted issues with identifying communities that 
were eligible to negotiate IBAs and the emergence of “marked inequal-
ities” and “tensions” between communities who secure varying benefits 
under bilateral, confidential negotiations. He urged DIAND to develop a 
more comprehensive, reasoned policy on IBAs, a recommendation that, 
almost fifteen years later, has yet to be taken up.
Although it has not been studied in-depth, there is a distinction 
made in the literature between IBAs signed by communities with settled 
land claims and those whose territorial claims remain unresolved. Many 
comprehensive land claim agreements (CLCAs) include language around 
IBAs, and all CLCAs formally clarify surface and subsurface land rights 
within a given territory. To varying extents, CLCAs also clarify and estab-
lish the broader regulatory regime through which mineral development 
will be assessed. In regions where land claims have been settled, IBAs 
are thus often framed as one among several mechanisms whereby an in-
digenous community can obtain benefits from extraction. In commun-
ities without settled claims, however, IBAs may be one of the only means 
through which an affected community can realize limited benefits from 
extraction on their lands. Thus, Galbraith notes that respondents in her 
study “cynically” argued that “IBAs are like historical treaties between 
aboriginal groups and the federal government . . . these agreements stem 
from government and developers’ interest in clarifying the legal rights of 
aboriginal people and aim to limit these rights with respect to the dia-
mond mine development.”20 But while IBAs may act as a kind of substi-
tute for treaties and land claims in regions where CLCAs have yet to be 
finalized, the conditions under which indigenous communities negotiate 
IBAs are vastly different than the conditions under which comprehensive 
land claims are negotiated. Because the federal government has provided 
“no principled basis for determining eligibility to negotiate IBAs in areas 
of unsettled land claims or where project impacts cross settlement area 
boundaries,” and because development projects can proceed whether or 
not an IBA has been signed, mining companies are to some extent free to 
decide which communities they will negotiate with, and can threaten to 
terminate negotiations at any time.21 Although it is part of the Akaitcho 
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Dene Nation (which has not yet signed a CLCA), for example, Deninu 
Kue (Fort Resolution, NWT) was left out of the IBA process for the Snap 
Lake mine despite arguing that their traditional territory would be great-
ly impacted, even while other Akaitcho communities were consulted.22 
To the extent that the discovery of promising mineral deposits on 
indigenous lands has historically motivated governments to settle com-
prehensive land claims, moreover, IBAs may actually slow progress on 
CLCA negotiations, insofar as corporate and state interests in secur-
ing indigenous consent for specific developments are satisfied by IBAs. 
Indeed, Gogal et al. advise developers negotiating IBAs with Aboriginal 
groups who have not signed comprehensive land claim agreements to 
include “a covenant to the effect that the Aboriginal group will not ad-
vance any land claim that will negatively impact or impede the project.”23 
In such cases, IBAs would seem to function not merely as temporary 
measures to ensure consent to a proposed development while CLCAs are 
under negotiation, but rather as explicit deterrents to the pursuit of com-
prehensive claims. 
O’Faircheallaigh has made the important observation that while 
IBAs can offer clear and substantial benefits for participating indigenous 
communities, “they also have implications beyond the contractual rela-
tionship they create between a developer and a community that must be 
addressed if their contribution to community development is to be maxi-
mized.”24 IBAs, he argues, effectively curtail the “two powerful weapons” 
indigenous groups have historically used to intervene in the assessment 
and development of extractive projects on their lands: a) formal engage-
ment in various legal and regulatory processes (such as environmental 
impact assessment hearings, court challenges, and so on) and/or direct 
action aimed at halting a project; and b) “the ability to embarrass govern-
ment politically by using the media to appeal to its constituents.”25 Both 
“weapons” are contractually limited or prohibited by various clauses typ-
ical of IBAs. 
In sum, the literature on IBAs has thus far established that the lack of 
federal policy and regulation with respect to the negotiation and imple-
mentation of IBAs has a range of repercussions for indigenous commun-
ities, that IBAs are functioning as a kind of substitute for the discharge 
of duties that have typically been the responsibility of the federal Crown 
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(and, in many cases, remain Crown responsibilities), and that IBAs con-
tain clauses that are themselves changing the relationship between in-
digenous peoples and the state. Thus far these shifts have been noted 
and critiqued by IBA scholars but have not yet been theorized in relation 
to broader shifts in resource and indigenous governance in Northern 
Canada, and particularly in relation to processes of neoliberalization.
NEOLIBER ALISM AND I NDIGENOUS  
PEOPLES I N CANADA
Although neoliberalization is commonly understood to involve a re-
trenchment of the welfare state, deregulation, and privatization, and its 
proponents frequently appeal to the notion of an excessive and over-
extended state to rationalize the rollback of various programs and servi-
ces, it is crucial to note that such shifts do not represent the disappear-
ance of the state so much as its restructuring.26 Thus, “neoliberalization” 
typically involves the “rolling back” of traditional state functions and the 
subsequent “rolling out” of different state functions, policies, and practi-
ces that serve to deepen institutional linkages with globalized capital. As 
Peck observes, through the “rolling back” of the state, the state per se is 
not being hollowed out; what is being hollowed out is “a historically and 
geographically specific institutionalization of the state, which in turn is 
being replaced, not by fresh air and free markets, but by a reorganized 
state apparatus.”27 
The “rolling out” of the state, Peck argues, is characterized, in part, 
by non-governmental entities or third parties taking on some of the 
responsibilities and assets previously held by the state. In practice, neo-
liberal adjustments tend to “purge the system of obstacles to the func-
tioning of ‘free markets’; restrain public expenditure and any form of 
collective initiative; celebrate the virtues of individualism, competitive-
ness, and economic self-sufficiency; abolish or weaken social transfer 
programs while actively fostering the ‘inclusion’ of the poor and mar-
ginalized into the labour market, on the market’s terms.”28 Over the last 
several decades, such adjustments have been documented in a number 
of jurisdictions, including Canada where, according to Albo, although 
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identifiable much earlier, neoliberal ideology and policies came to dom-
inate by the 1990s, regardless of the party in power.29 We pay particular 
attention here to the commentary on how processes of neoliberalization 
have reshaped indigenous governance in Canada. 
If there is any realm where a reorganization of state practices and 
functions might be welcomed in Canada, including by many indigenous 
leaders and communities, it is in the realm of indigenous–state relations. 
For indigenous peoples across Canada, the welfare state has been associ-
ated with some of the most egregious and illegitimate interventions into 
their lives, including residential schooling, the apprehension of indigen-
ous children through child welfare systems, the promotion of Band gov-
ernments over traditional forms of governance, the exertion of various 
forms of control over wildlife, hunting, health, education, and justice, 
ongoing amendments to the Indian Act, extraction of natural resour-
ces from indigenous lands, and other colonial policies and practices.30 
Opposition to the state, and identification of the colonial dimensions 
of state intervention into the lives of indigenous peoples, has thus been 
central to anticolonial and self-determination movements over the past 
several decades.31 It should come as no surprise, then, that the devolu-
tion or dismantling of certain state functions and policies has been wel-
comed by some indigenous communities, who see rejection of the col-
onial state and the assertion of indigenous sovereignty as a cornerstone 
of self-determination. 
Perhaps because of the resonance between indigenous challenges 
to state jurisdiction over their lands and lives and neoliberal rhetor-
ic about the merits of “less state” and freedom from state intervention, 
several authors have identified a kind of convergence between neoliberal 
ideologies and indigenous self-determination movements. Thus, Slowey 
and MacDonald argue that neoliberal and indigenous critiques of the 
Canadian welfare state share the same disdain for the paternalism that 
both claim are endemic to the welfare state and the ways in which ex-
cessive state oversight impedes autonomy and self-determination.32 The 
devolution of federal and provincial authority over indigenous education 
and child welfare to indigenous governments in various jurisdictions in 
Canada, for example, can be understood as both an off-loading of state 
responsibilities and a form of redress for colonial dimensions of state 
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control over indigenous children and families.33 While Slowey acknow-
ledges that “the assumptions guiding federal policy and activity may not 
reflect First Nations concepts of self-determination,” federal interest in 
devolving responsibilities to indigenous governments, she argues, “still 
facilitates the realization of First Nation’s goals of economic self-reliance 
and jurisdictional autonomy.” 34
We are skeptical of this apparent convergence of interests, and follow 
scholars who insist that indigenous and state interests in neoliberal times 
are informed by distinctly different histories, material circumstances, 
and political commitments. Although the notion that there should be 
“less state” meets the objectives of some indigenous communities under 
some circumstances, indigenous communities, organizations, leaders, 
scholars, and activists across the country (including Northern Canada) 
consistently argue that the state’s failure to meet its obligations and com-
mitments undermines their well-being. The Idle No More movement 
that arose, in part, in response to federal omnibus bills aiming to weak-
en environmental legislation and “streamline” government, citizen, in-
digenous, and corporate involvement in various dimensions of resource 
governance, called for the implementation and enforcement of treaty 
and non-treaty relationships, and aimed to hold the federal government 
to account for its failure to meet its constitutional, fiduciary, treaty, and 
land claims obligations.35 The movement explicitly rejected the notion 
that “less state,” or the retreat of the state, responds to the demands of 
indigenous peoples in Canada. 
Furthermore, while understandings of indigenous self-determination 
vary across and within the diverse indigenous communities impacted by 
resource development in Canada, the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples not only delineates a range of indigenous 
rights (including the right to self-determination; the right to free, prior, 
and informed consent about any activities that might impact indigenous 
territories; and the right to determine land and resource use), it also em-
phasizes the role of the state in ensuring such rights are upheld and re-
spected.36 Asserting and enacting self-determination, in other words, can 
include holding the state accountable for its activities and obligations. 
There is an important distinction to be made between reorganizing the 
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state to meet these obligations and reorganizing the state to further the 
interests of mining corporations.
Indeed, a number of scholars have expressed skepticism about the 
potential for neoliberal policies and practices to support indigenous 
self-determination and indigenous rights. Dempsey et al. argue, for ex-
ample, that the neoliberal push to expand private property rights on First 
Nations reserves is based on a shallow idea of “equality” that assumes 
that equality with white settler society can only be experienced when 
Western notions of property are institutionalized, a notion that “is made 
possible only by a complete bracketing of historical geographies of dis-
possession.”37 The language of self-reliance and responsibility “hijacks” 
notions of self-determination, they argue, leaving First Nations with the 
opportunity to “self-determine within the narrow confines that are stipu-
lated by the white capitalist elite.”38 Papillon points to the contradictory 
effects of neoliberalization in indigenous communities, arguing that it 
represents a new form of cultural and economic colonization insofar as 
it promotes resource extraction in indigenous territories and restricts 
the sovereign control of communities over affected lands.39 MacDonald 
similarly observes that “[n]eoliberal manifestations of indigenous auton-
omy or self-government are . . . vulnerable to criticisms launched against 
practices of privatization. These practices include a variety of policies 
that promote shifting contentious issues out of the public sphere, there-
by limiting public debate and collective—that is, state—responsibility.”40 
Finally, Kuokkanen challenges Slowey’s contention that neoliberal shifts 
in indigenous–state relations reduce dependency. In the case of the 
Mikisew First Nation, she argues that while the nation’s dependency on 
“the government might have decreased to some extent, it has only created 
a new dependency on corporations exploiting the natural resources in 
the Mikisew territory.”41 As Kuokkanen makes clear, the retreat of the 
state is often accompanied by an intensification and acceleration of cor-
porate involvement in indigenous lands and governance. 
It is by no means certain, then, that indigenous peoples are better 
placed to advance their interests through the forms of privatization, mar-
ketization, and individualization that underpin processes of neoliberaliz-
ation in Canada, even while the retreat of the state from certain dimen-
sions of indigenous peoples’ lives has been welcomed by some. Howlett et 
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al. thus call for research that engages the “not-so-positive implications for 
Indigenous peoples” of neoliberal reforms in order to develop a more com-
prehensive picture of the ways that neoliberalization exacerbates “the in-
equalities that already exist for Indigenous peoples.”42 But just as there is 
a danger of overemphasizing the benefits of neoliberal reforms, we share 
Feit’s concern about simplistic analyses that cast indigenous peoples as 
either naive victims of neoliberalization or active opponents, and echo 
his emphasis on the importance of nuanced, contextualized accounts of 
contemporary shifts in indigenous, state, and corporate relations.43
IBAs AND THE NEOLIBER ALIZATION OF 
R ESOURCE AND I NDIGENOUS GOV ER NANCE
How might we understand IBAs, then, in relation to processes of neolib-
eralization in Canada? As noted, IBAs have not been explicitly theorized 
in relation to neoliberalism in Canada, although scholars have identified 
a number of issues associated with IBAs that might productively be read 
as manifestations of neoliberal processes and policies.44 We consider, 
here, the ways in which IBAs relate to neoliberal processes of marketiza-
tion, privatization, and individualization in the Canadian North, and to 
broader state interests in ensuring that large-scale, industrial resource 
extraction proceeds in the region. Drawing on interviews conducted with 
indigenous leaders, government representatives, consultants, and lawyers 
involved in the negotiation, implementation, and regulation of IBAs in 
the Northwest Territories, as well as on a review of key documents that 
have shaped the evolution (or lack thereof) of federal policy on IBAs over 
the past ten to fifteen years, we argue that the emergence of IBAs as a 
key dimension of resource governance in the North since the late 1990s 
has advanced neoliberal objectives in the region, which we understand 
to include the removal of barriers to accumulating capital; the privatiz-
ation of state assets, functions, and services; and the promotion of mar-
ket-based solutions for various social, economic, environmental, and pol-
itical struggles.45 These shifts are made to make sense through neoliberal 
discourses emphasizing entrepreneurial, individualized understandings 
of citizenship and social life. 
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Although it is possible to identify processes of neoliberalization 
operative both within and beyond the Canadian North, we follow Hayter 
and Barnes in refusing to assume “neoliberalism’s hegemony” in this 
study.46 We do not begin with the assumption that the Canadian North 
is wholly shaped by processes of neoliberalization, nor do we argue that 
IBAs are themselves a primarily neoliberal phenomena. To make such 
claims would require much more attention to the specific geographies of 
neoliberalization in the region, and a more thorough study of the ways 
in which IBAs articulate with other institutional, historical, and political 
processes. Our analysis is both more preliminary and more schematic. 
We aim here to bring understandings of neoliberalism to bear on the 
study of IBAs in order to sharpen our analysis of precisely what IBAs do, 
and draw attention to the ways in which IBAs are both emblematic of 
and contribute to shifting relations between indigenous peoples, mining 
corporations, and the state. 
Removal of barriers
If, in the 1970s and 1980s, northern indigenous peoples were understood 
by government and industry to be formidable and effective “barriers” 
to the development of industrial resource extraction in the region, to 
what extent do IBAs assist in the removal of such barriers? As discussed, 
IBAs contain features that act as explicit deterrents to community-level 
resistance, such as non-compliance provisions. Indeed, from an indus-
try perspective, part of the purpose of IBAs is to ensure that there will 
be no interruptions to the project, and that there is certainty that the 
community (or at least its leadership) has consented to the development 
and will allow it to go forward without any hindrances. Non-compliance 
provisions—contained within a legally binding IBA—serve as what Caine 
and Krogman refer to as a “gag order,”47 whereby indigenous groups can-
not voice concerns in light of new information as the project proceeds. 
Along with confidentiality clauses that limit a community’s capacity to 
seek allies by releasing details of the agreement that may assist in creat-
ing campaigns of public support and political pressure, non-compliance 
provisions are tools used by industry to mitigate the risk of indigen-
ous resistance, which has historically been a significant barrier to the 
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accumulation of capital through the extraction of natural resources in 
Canada.48
Securing indigenous consent for a given project through an IBA, 
whether or not it is accompanied by non-compliance and confidentiality 
clauses, and whether or not that consent is meaningful, informed, and 
legally binding,49 is also an enormously efficient, cost-effective, and rapid 
means of addressing the single largest threat indigenous peoples have 
historically posed to resource development in Canada: their capacity to 
assert unceded claims to a given piece of land. Negotiations of compre-
hensive land claims, which themselves aim (from the federal perspective) 
to clarify surface and subsurface land rights, are vastly more expensive50 
and time consuming, and do not directly secure a developer’s legal or 
social licence to develop a given project. As we detail in the following 
section, moreover, to the extent that IBAs are viewed as de facto (if not 
de jure) satisfaction of the Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate in-
digenous peoples with respect to actual or potential infringement of their 
rights to a given territory, they act as particularly potent removals of bar-
riers to capital accumulation in the region. In Nunavut, efforts to chal-
lenge the development of a proposed uranium mine have been thwart-
ed, in part, by assertions that the land claims corporation (Nunavut 
Tunngavik Incorporated) has contractual obligations to proceed with its 
approval of the project, regardless of dissent among beneficiaries and the 
fact that environmental assessment processes are ongoing.51 Here, the 
lack of clarity around what constitutes adequate, legitimate, and appro-
priate consultation for proposed resource development is acutely felt, and 
raises the question of whether bilateral agreements between developers 
and indigenous organizations can undermine public review and assess-
ment processes.
Privatization
The privatization of state assets, functions, and services is considered 
a hallmark of neoliberal ideology and practice. IBAs, we argue, can be 
understood as a means by which the Crown’s duty to consult and accom-
modate indigenous peoples is privatized. The duty to consult and accom-
modate rests solely with the Crown; as established through Haida Nation 
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vs. British Columbia,52 the Crown is required to consult and accommo-
date indigenous peoples in Canada whenever their traditional rights may 
be infringed upon by resource development. From a legal standpoint, 
the Crown can delegate procedural aspects of this duty—third parties, 
for example, can work to determine real or potential infringement of 
Aboriginal rights and title with respect to a particular mineral develop-
ment project.53 Third parties are under no legal obligation to consult with 
and accommodate Aboriginal peoples, however, as that obligation is as-
sumed entirely by the Crown. But as Fidler and Hitch observe, in prac-
tice, governments increasingly operate as though the Crown’s duties have 
been effectively relieved through IBAs, insofar as a signed IBA is taken as 
evidence that the indigenous nation or community in question has been 
both consulted and accommodated in relation to a proposed resource 
extraction project.54 This observation is widely shared by government, 
legal, and indigenous sources interviewed as part of this research, and 
corroborated by corporate sources.55 As a consultant working in the in-
digenous governance sector put it, the Crown’s approach is:
instead of being active, being more passive but watching and 
monitoring. I think they hold their nose over what IBAs are, but 
also part of them likes the fact that they’re being done because it 
sort of gets them off the hook for taking care of their consulta-
tion and accommodation responsibilities. The company’s going 
to do it and get the First Nation to sign; then really the Crown can 
sort of wash its hands and say “consultation and accommodation 
accomplished. Problem solved. We don’t have to get involved. 
Someone else has solved it for us.”56
Indeed, the process of consulting and accommodating indigenous gov-
ernments for every potential infringement of Aboriginal rights and title 
is extremely cumbersome for the state, and there is certainly a financial 
incentive for the state to delegate this duty to the private sector. A lawyer 
who has been involved with IBA negotiations in British Columbia and in 
the North observed, moreover, that “savvy” mining companies endeav-
our to include language in their IBAs that specifically characterizes the 
IBA as satisfying the Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate.57 Such 
language would not likely hold up in court,58 but it demonstrates the 
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extent to which a historically defined relationship between the state and 
indigenous peoples has been delegated to the private sector. Similarly, 
Gogal et al. advise developers pursuing IBAs to keep the Crown informed 
“of the substance of the negotiations” and ensure the Crown “is satisfied 
with the level of consultation, and, if possible, signs off on the IBA” to 
protect against future challenges to the legitimacy of the IBA as satis-
fying the Crown’s duty.59 The Crown and the courts have justified the 
delegation of procedural aspects of consultation and accommodation 
to industrial proponents partly because the proponent is most familiar 
with the details of a proposed development project and is in a “financial 
position to offer mitigation and other benefits.”60 But as a high-ranking 
AANDC employee rightly observed, “if we want this to be an effective 
part of our duty—the Crown’s duty to consult—then we need to know 
what’s in them,”61 and confidentiality provisions precisely delimit such 
knowledge. 
The de facto satisfaction of the Crown’s duty to consult and accom-
modate has been rationalized, in part, through neoliberal discourses of 
efficiency and enhanced individual agency. Crown–indigenous relations 
that have historically (and constitutionally) been framed in terms of 
rights and responsibilities are being shifted to the private sector in the 
name of cost effectiveness, timeliness, efficiency, and the enhancement of 
local or indigenous agency. Indeed, AANDC not only appears to see itself 
as appropriately absent from IBA negotiations, but when asked about the 
unequal playing field within which IBAs are negotiated, a high-ranking 
AANDC employee responded:
You can’t say to a company “you will have less lawyers than 
these guys. You will look out for their interests.” This is a natu-
rally evolving equilibrium here. It’s a free economy. Like I said, if 
you were living in Russia or China or in a communist system—
there has to be some sort of a free market that the system itself 
establishes its rule.62
Here, neoliberal discourses of a “free market” economy are invoked to 
justify the negotiation of agreements between multinational corpora-
tions and indigenous communities, “stakeholders” with vastly different 
legal and consulting resources at their disposal. Cognizant of the risks of 
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IBA negotiations being (or appearing to be) one-sided, Gogal et al. advise 
developers to include provisions indicating that the negotiations have not 
been coerced, and even to provide funding to an indigenous group to 
assist with securing independent counsel and consulting assistance. The 
authors go on to suggest that, faced with both the practical requirement 
to negotiate IBAs and the lack of certainty about whether IBAs can se-
cure legally enforceable, ongoing access to a given territory (what they 
term “a problem that has no clear answer”), “building meaningful busi-
ness partnerships” with indigenous groups “may be the best solution.”63 
Here, business partnerships are not just ideologically sensible but also a 
profoundly practical and efficient solution to the “problem” of unresolved 
indigenous territorial claims. 
Although AANDC sources frame IBA negotiations as appropriately 
regulated by a “free economy,” not all stakeholders are satisfied with the 
government’s lack of involvement in this dimension of resource govern-
ance in the North. As an indigenous negotiator in the BHP-Ekati IBA 
negotiations pointed out: 
Government shouldn’t just wash their hands. They have a 
fiduciary obligation which clearly states that when Aboriginal 
peoples are in a situation that requires certain resources, to en-
sure that there’s a fair treatment of their citizens in their own 
territory, and that they’re there to ensure that things are done 
properly and that industry isn’t just ramrodding whatever they 
want through with Aboriginal people in their own homeland. So 
it’s a concern.64
Here, the ongoing failure of the federal government to develop a policy 
on IBAs becomes particularly significant. When asked in an interview 
whether he was aware of any follow-up to his 1999 report, Steven Kennett 
commented that he “handed it off to them; they thanked me very much. I 
think there were a few comments from people, but when I stopped track-
ing this issue a long time ago, there was no indication they would do any-
thing.”65 A broad review of northern regulatory systems commissioned 
by DIAND in 2008 specifically recommended that the “federal govern-
ment should give priority to developing an official policy on the purpose, 
scope and nature of Impact Benefit Agreements in the North,”66 but this, 
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too, appears not to have resulted in meaningful action. Interviews with 
both Government of the Northwest Territories (GNWT) and AANDC 
employees confirm that there has been no apparent movement on the 
IBA file.67 Meanwhile, as Gogal et al. observe, although “once seen as 
the Crown’s fiduciary obligation, the duty to consult has now shifted to 
the developer,”68 even if in legal terms it remains wholly and clearly the 
responsibility of the Crown.
Market-based solutions to social problems
The past decade has seen a marked rise in discourses of indigenous entre-
preneurialism and market-based understandings of indigenous–state re-
lations and indigenous economic, social, and cultural well-being. From 
treatises (and, more recently, proposed federal legislation) advocating the 
privatization of reserve lands to celebrations of indigenous–corporate 
joint ventures and indigenous-run corporations, it has become increas-
ingly common to associate the aims of increased well-being, independ-
ence, autonomy, and self-determination with involvement in capitalist 
labour, property, and investment markets.69 As a number of scholars have 
made clear, these shifts are highly affiliated with neoliberalism.70
IBAs, we would argue, are consistent with such shifts. Not only do 
they promote market-based solutions to various social, economic, and 
political problems, but in a time of reduced federal spending on social 
transfer programs, as well as a lack of spending on infrastructure need-
ed in northern, predominately indigenous communities, the benefits re-
sulting from contracts with mining companies have in many ways re-
placed the traditional role of the state in providing for these vital services 
and infrastructural needs.71 While the state continues to provide sub-
sidies to the private sector,72 private industry is becoming the primary 
point of contact for some indigenous communities regarding the impacts 
and benefits of extraction. Industry is increasingly involved in the pro-
vision of social, environmental, and cultural services and benefits in the 
North, as well as in the development of roads, airports, and other physical 
infrastructure, and in monitoring and assessment processes. 
Indeed, as a number of scholars have observed, indigenous signator-
ies aim to use IBAs to extract benefits that they have repeatedly failed to 
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secure from federal and territorial governments.73 But while government 
is often—and rightly—blamed for creating many of the conditions under 
which northern indigenous peoples experience social, economic, cultur-
al, and political suffering,74 and while less government intrusion into the 
lives of indigenous peoples is often demanded by indigenous commun-
ities, the obligation of the state to redress colonial policies and practices, 
to honour historical treaties and contemporary claims, and to provide 
adequate health, educational, judicial, and other services is also empha-
sized by northerners. To the extent that IBAs act as market-based prox-
ies for satisfying obligations that would otherwise be the responsibility 
of the state, they are in line with a broader neoliberalization of indigen-
ous–state relations in Canada, and they fortify the notion that jobs and 
cash will resolve the structural, systemic, historically informed struggles 
faced by northern indigenous peoples. 
Consider, for example, the preponderance of employment quotas, 
job-training programs, and other educational and employment bene-
fits in IBAs. The federal government has aimed to integrate northern 
indigenous peoples into the wage labour market for decades,75 but thus 
far the educational system has not been intimately tied to particular 
industrial requirements. IBAs act as a mechanism for integrating pub-
lic education with the employment needs of mining companies, which 
in communities with severely restricted employment and educational 
opportunities can significantly shape available options. Concerns have 
been raised by northerners that the explicit reorientation of education-
al and training programs to support industry needs will further restrict 
the development of a professional class in northern communities, and 
entrench the racialized division of labour already documented at north-
ern mine sites, where indigenous peoples predominantly work as labour-
ers, and non-indigenous, transient workers occupy professional, skilled 
managerial roles.76 But within market-based assessments of indigenous 
well-being, an increase in waged work of any kind is seen as a measure 
of success, even though mine work is linked to increased rates of sexual-
ly transmitted infections (STIs), substance abuse, and family violence, 
and even though mines themselves pose risks to land-based economies.77 
Indeed, when asked about the role of IBAs in the contemporary North, 
a former NWT politician characterized IBAs as “business agreement[s] 
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between one company and another”78 and emphasized the capacity for 
IBAs to provide “tools” to facilitate the integration of indigenous peoples 
into the labour market. Here, the historical lack of indigenous involve-
ment in waged work is framed as a matter of missed opportunity and lack 
of capacity, not as a conscious choice to engage in land-based and mixed 
economies, and not as a function of colonial histories of education and 
employment in the North. 
Unlike Crown obligations to indigenous peoples, which predate the 
formation of the Canadian state and are grounded in a larger nation-to-na-
tion framework (as well as being reaffirmed in the Constitution and clari-
fied in case law), the obligations of developers are reduced to their de-
lineation in the IBA itself and are ultimately subject to contract law. This 
distinction is most acutely felt in regard to designating responsibility for 
ongoing, unplanned, or significant impacts. In discussing the ways in 
which IBAs intersect with environmental assessment processes, Gogal et 
al. note that environmental assessment “deals with mitigation of planned 
or known environmental effects,” not long-term, unforeseen, or other-
wise complex impacts. While IBAs “often include mitigation or remedial 
measures over and above those commitments made during the environ-
mental assessment process,” the authors warn that “Aboriginal groups 
will often want to negotiate through an IBA additional compensation 
for unplanned events or effects that are more significant than planned. 
Negotiation of such provisions should be approached with caution so as 
to avoid a ‘bottomless pit’ of compensation.”79 If, in fact, developers are 
securing measures to ensure they are not liable for a “bottomless pit” of 
compensation, and if the Crown is functioning as though IBAs satisfy 
their duty to consult and accommodate, it remains unclear who will ad-
dress these more complex dimensions of extraction. As an indigenous 
IBA negotiator observed, although he is satisfied with the IBAs that he 
has been involved in, “IBAs [are] a quick fix. It’s not going to solve our 
problems. I think it’s going to make more problems for us in the future.”80 
These “future problems,” he noted, will arise when mines close and the 
retreat of government from key services and programs—justified, in part, 
because of IBAs—will be most acutely felt.
Finally, while the services, quotas, training programs, contracting, 
partnerships, and joint venture opportunities negotiated through IBAs 
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are frequently framed as novel opportunities that enable a kind of latent 
entrepreneurialism to flourish in indigenous communities, and while 
the federal government has explicitly supported such developments,81 
it would seem that such “flourishing” also becomes a justification for 
government clawbacks. According to an indigenous leader from the 
Northwest Territories, the federal and territorial governments have en-
couraged the proliferation of IBAs in order to reduce their spending in 
indigenous communities:
There’s no doubt that [the government] encourage[s IBAs] 
because it lessens the pressures on their social purse strings . . . If 
you totally just go on the social purse, which is what all govern-
ments look at—it’s to ensure you have the basic requirements of 
survival—but IBAs are a little bit different because it becomes a 
benefit. Governments will try to claw back on those benefits any 
time, every chance they get.82
Indeed, following the signing of IBAs regarding the Ekati mine, the 
GNWT began clawing back income support payments to welfare recipi-
ents from communities that were signatories to these agreements.83 After 
nearly ten years of protest, the territorial government finally decided to 
allow up to $1,200 in IBA-related “gifts” to be received without affecting 
income support payments.84 The clawbacks themselves resulted in min-
imal cost-saving for the GNWT, and it would seem that they were as 
much about reframing the terms of indigenous–government relations as 
about the savings themselves. According to O’Faircheallaigh, fear of gov-
ernment clawbacks motivates some indigenous signatories to keep the 
content of IBAs confidential.85
In sum, viewed through the lens of neoliberalism, several dimen-
sions of IBA policy, negotiation, and implementation can be theorized 
in terms of broader political-economic shifts in indigenous and resource 
governance in the North. IBAs contribute to the removal of barriers to 
accumulation in the region, effectively privatize the federal duty to con-
sult and accommodate indigenous peoples, and both facilitate and valid-
ate the development of market-based solutions to the historically-rooted, 
structural, and systemic challenges that confront northern indigenous 
peoples. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Studies of neoliberalism have been subject to several important critiques. 
As some critics observe, the term “neoliberalism” has come to be as-
sociated with any and all shifts in social, economic, political, and en-
vironmental relations. According to Barnett, neoliberalism has become a 
catch-all term, a “consolation” for the Left, which actually “compound[s] 
rather than aid[s] in the task of figuring out how the world works and how 
it changes.”86 Indeed, just as it has become standard to invoke processes 
of neoliberalization in a wide range of studies of social, political, and eco-
nomic restructuring, it has also become standard to acknowledge that 
the term itself can lack both conceptual clarity and analytical purchase. 
Furthermore, as Feit argues, many studies of neoliberalism provide sim-
plistic analyses that cast indigenous peoples as either naive victims or 
active opponents rather than as empowered subjects facing complex 
choices.87 
We are sympathetic to these critiques, and are reluctant to attribute 
the historically and geographically specific shifts in resource governance 
and indigenous–state relations in the North entirely to processes of neo-
liberalization. We note, for example, that far from being passive victims 
of a retreating, neoliberalizing state, some northern indigenous leaders 
and governments have in many ways pushed the federal government out 
of various dimensions of resource governance, insisting that that the 
state has no jurisdiction over resource development on indigenous lands. 
The responsibility to negotiate impacts and benefits related to resource 
development has not so much been downloaded onto indigenous com-
munities by the federal government, these leaders insist, but rather in-
digenous peoples have asserted jurisdiction over what was always their 
responsibility, and in this sense, IBAs must be understood as a hallmark 
of self-determination.88 While some of the benefits, services, and infra-
structure northern indigenous peoples are securing through IBAs have 
previously been provided by the state, moreover, many have not; the most 
successful and comprehensive IBAs are celebrated for their capacity to 
bring meaningful benefits to northerners, benefits that governments 
have repeatedly failed to provide. 
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Furthermore, the historic timeline taken up in so many studies of 
neoliberalization, in which neoliberal ideologies begin to emerge in the 
1970s in the United States and United Kingdom, and come to flourish by 
the 1990s in these and other jurisdictions, is an awkward fit in Northern 
Canada. Although one can certainly identify forms of state retrenchment 
in Northern Canada over the last several decades, lack of federal involve-
ment in the region is anything but novel. The rapid expansion of state 
services in the North in the post–WWII era was an historical anomaly, 
insofar as previous governments had aimed to minimize federal involve-
ment in the lives of indigenous northerners and ensure that they main-
tained land-based livelihoods (except, of course, in areas where the state 
aimed to extract natural resources). Indeed, as indigenous northerners 
are keenly aware, the state has quite happily engaged in both “laissez 
faire” and “aidez faire” policies for centuries, from the days of the fur 
trade (when a corporation, the Hudson’s Bay Company, was permitted 
to govern Rupert’s Land as it saw fit, so as to maximize fur trade profit) 
through to the granting of oil, gas, and mineral leases to corporations 
without regard to indigenous rights and claims. A state that promotes 
the interests of capital, seeks to limit its involvement in the lives of its 
citizens, and works to enrol its citizens in market-based, individualized, 
and privatized forms of life is nothing new to indigenous northerners. 
What is new, we suggest, is the ways in which a neoliberal reorganiz-
ation of the state is being framed as consistent with northern indigenous 
self-determination, and the alleged consensus that “less state” represents 
a win-win-win situation for indigenous communities, corporations, and 
the state. According to such framings, it is precisely around the notion of 
“less state” that indigenous peoples, mineral developers, and neoliberal 
governments find agreement. But as Peck and others have made clear, 
neoliberalization involves not so much less state as a different state, one 
organized to more fully accommodate the needs of capital, and one that 
relies upon its citizens to enact entrepreneurial, individualized forms of 
self-governance and self-regulation. Although framed as a morally and 
politically appropriate shift away from paternalism, the neoliberalization 
of indigenous–state relations and state involvement in northern resource 
extraction risks ushering in new forms of dependency, even while it is 
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rightly celebrated by indigenous northerners as a rejection of long-stand-
ing, deeply colonial relations. As Kuokkanen observes: 
In attempts to break the cycles of dependency, poverty 
and dire socioeconomic circumstances in their communities, 
many indigenous groups and institutions have, as a part of their 
self-governance efforts, embarked on the path of neoliberal eco-
nomic development which has often meant further exploitation 
of the natural resources in their territories, now in the form of 
joint ventures and in partnerships with corporations. What is 
surprising in these contemporary political efforts is that very lit-
tle attention has been paid to the economic processes that played 
a significant role in creating dependency historically or linking 
the historical dependency creation to the contemporary forms 
of dependency on corporations and their conditions for partner-
ships which may include restructuring key institutions in indig-
enous communities.89
Indeed, while a rejection of state paternalism and an assertion of juris-
diction over land and livelihoods underpins many northern indigenous 
peoples’ support for resource governance mechanisms like IBAs, it is 
far from clear that these mechanisms will result in precisely what they 
aim at: meaningful, long-term, effective control over development on in-
digenous lands.
Our intention in raising questions about IBAs and their affiliation 
with processes of neoliberalization, then, is not to condemn IBAs as 
components of northern resource governance. Indigenous signatories are 
acutely aware of the vulnerabilities of their communities to the whims 
of capital, and many framed their negotiation and signing of IBAs not as 
a panacea, but as an effort to secure needed (if limited) benefits and to 
assert control over a portion of resource development. Many indigenous 
groups redirect IBA monies toward community initiatives in an effort to 
ensure that IBAs do not simply work to “get you into the wage economy, 
and turn you from an Indian to a Canadian,” but also help to “maintain 
your identity, your language, your culture.”90 We concur with Feit that in-
sufficient attention has been paid to the diversity of relations between in-
digenous peoples and various neoliberal practices and shifts; identifying 
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the neoliberal dimensions of IBAs does not imply that indigenous signa-
tories have uniform relations, experiences, or interests in these agree-
ments.91 Our concern, here, has been with the broader political-economic 
work that IBAs perform, and their role in both facilitating and naturalizing 
significant shifts in indigenous–state relations and resource governance 
in the Canadian North. To the extent that IBAs remove barriers to cap-
ital accumulation; privatize federal duties and responsibilities; naturalize 
market-based solutions to social, political, economic, cultural, and en-
vironmental struggles; and delimit the capacities for members of signatory 
communities to assess proposed developments or to express concern and 
dissent, the framing of IBAs as expressions of convergence between in-
digenous, corporate, and state interests must be challenged. 
In conclusion, then, the neoliberalization of northern resource govern-
ance and indigenous–state relations, as manifested in IBAs, gives us reason 
to echo Caine and Krogman’s “healthy suspicion” that IBAs do what they 
claim to do, and that they are, in fact, the best available tool for ensur-
ing that indigenous northerners secure benefits and minimize the impacts 
of extraction on their lands, particularly in regions without settled com-
prehensive claims.92 When compared to past practices, where indigenous 
peoples gained almost no benefits from extraction on their lands, IBAs 
surely represent an improvement. But this improvement must be weighed 
against concerns that IBAs are merely a “quick fix”93 whose primary func-
tion is to secure consent for projects with significant long-term effects and 
that IBAs absolve the Crown of its responsibility to consult and accommo-
date indigenous peoples, silence potential critics of mining development, 
delay resolution of comprehensive land claims, and naturalize individual-
ized and entrepreneurial forms of citizenship and community. Viewed in 
this light, Caine and Krogman’s healthy suspicion is thoroughly warranted. 
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Affairs and Northern Development) and “state” to refer to the broader polit-
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Contesting Closure: Science, Politics, 
and Community Responses to Closing 
the Nanisivik Mine, Nunavut
Scott Midgley
Hit by a decline in the price of zinc and with a looming deadline to pay 
millions of dollars for an annual order of sealift supplies, the Nanisivik 
lead-zinc mine on north Baffin Island closed in 2002 after twenty-six 
years of successful operation. News of Nanisivik’s closure was delivered 
by Nunavut’s territorial newspaper Nunatsiaq News with the morose 
headline “Nanisivik Mine to Die Four Years Early.”1 Similarly, some com-
munity members viewed Nanisivik as a deceased entity, eulogizing the 
personified Nanisivik during public meetings:
In some ways, it’s sad for me because it was a town for a long 
time, and we were working there, and we were friends with the 
people that I worked with, and Inuit from our communities were 
there too. And when you, one of your family members dies, it 
looks like you’re losing some of your family members even the 
|  chapter 10
10 |  C ON T E ST I NG C L O S U R E294
non-Inuit there were — they too were your friends .  .  . It was 
emotional for me that I could still feel the life in that building.2
These statements mirrored classic narratives of mine closure that often 
consider ruination and dereliction as inevitable, in what some scholars 
call the “mining imaginary”: the idea that mining is a linear process that 
must naturally terminate in ecological destruction and economic dev-
astation.3 In its productive phase, the Nanisivik mine extracted ores as 
well as economic value. Once the mine’s operation halted, it seemed, the 
mine had died. The mine was no longer productive; the ore deposit was 
no longer valuable. 
While acknowledging that ore deposits are finite resources and mines 
must inevitably close, this chapter encourages a different reading of 
Nanisivik’s closure that moves away from the “mining imaginary.” Rather 
than suggesting that the Nanisivik mine became an unproductive, life-
less, and valueless site after its closure, this chapter builds on arguments 
developed by geographers and historians such as Ben Marsh, William 
Wyckoff, and David Robertson who suggest that mining communities, 
memories, and legacies persist long after mining activity formally ends.4 
While analyses of industrial development and resource exploitation by 
scholars in fields such as resource geography often investigate how nat-
ural resources are culturally produced within particular socio-technical 
arrangements and historical-geographical circumstances,5 these litera-
tures focus on resource production rather than post-production when 
these arrangements and circumstances shift. Yet focusing on the process 
of closure itself reveals ways in which former sites of commodity produc-
tion—their communities, economies, and environments—continue to be 
negotiated and transformed by numerous actors and reclamation practi-
ces in ways that upset the mining imaginary. Mine closure is a time when 
the history of a mine resurfaces, and the landscape, already transformed 
by mining, is remade again by closure and reclamation activities. 
This chapter examines the ways in which Nanisivik’s closed mining 
landscape became an object of experimentation, subjected to scientific 
activities that extracted environmental data from the mine site, produced 
scientific knowledge, and valued the cost of reclamation amid attempts 
to offset the environmental impacts of mining. Through an analysis of 
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historic and contemporary documentary evidence relating to Nanisivik’s 
opening and closure, this chapter first briefly introduces the history of 
mine development at Nanisivik and describes some of the impacts of min-
ing on the nearby community of Arctic Bay. In a critique of the mining 
imaginary, the next section explains how the mine company CanZinco 
attempted to cast the closed Nanisivik townsite as a valuable and useful 
site. The final section examines how the cost of reclamation was valued 
and contested by various parties during the reclamation of the tailings 
at Nanisivik. In particular, this final section argues that these debates 
involved generating objective, authoritative, and neutral knowledge to 
legitimize different claims about the environment and verify contesting 
valuations of the cost of reclamation. Far from an unproductive, value-
less, or lifeless space after closure, this chapter outlines the ongoing but 
different ways Nanisivik continued to be productive after the mine’s 
operations ceased.     
NANISI V IK’S DEV ELOPMENT AND 
COMMU NITY R ESPONSES TO CLOSUR E
Located 750 kilometres north of the Arctic Circle, the Nanisivik lead-
zinc mine opened by Mineral Resources International (MRI) was the first 
mine north of the Arctic Circle and the northernmost mine in Canada at 
the time of its establishment in 1976. The Nanisivik site was comprised 
of a purpose-built town with a school, church, post office, recreational 
centre, dining hall, nearby airstrip, and dock constructed on Strathcona 
Sound, approximately twenty-five kilometres from the Inuit community 
of Arctic Bay. Nanisivik’s infrastructure was partially financed by the 
federal government in the hope that this experimental project would test 
the feasibility of operating in the High Arctic and pave the way for ex-
panded mining across Canada’s northern resource frontier. As the vice 
president of CanZinco Ltd. (then-current owner of the Nanisivik prop-
erty) explained in one public hearing:
. . . one of the visions was that this would be a pilot project. 
It may not be successful, but if it was, what a wonderful way to 
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find out if we could do natural resource exploitation in the north. 
In 2007, there was $1-and-a-half billion that came through the 
north in mining, and Nanisivik was the first one north of the 
Arctic Circle and a pioneer breaking the way for all those others 
that have followed.6
As this quote suggests, government support of the Nanisivik venture 
was not driven by profitability alone, but also various social and political 
objectives. In particular, the government “saw benefit in the [Nanisivik] 
project as a ‘pioneer project’ that without setting precedents might en-
able large scale experimentation in Arctic mining techniques and trans-
portation.”7 Like previous Inuit employment projects at the Rankin Inlet 
nickel mine (see Keeling and Boulter, this volume) and at DEW (Distant 
Early Warning) line stations, the government hoped that Nanisivik would 
introduce some Inuit residents in the Baffin region to wage labour in an 
industrial setting. 
To ensure the success of Nanisivik, the federal government entered 
into the Strathcona Agreement with MRI in 1974, signed by the minis-
ter of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, the president of MRI, 
and a local witness by the name of I. Attagutsiak.8 Under the agreement, 
the government invested $18.3 million into townsite, dock, and airstrip 
development in return for an 18 per cent stake in the company and 
representation on the company’s board of directors.9 For its part, MRI 
pledged compliance with the government’s social, environmental, and 
economic objectives for the North. One key objective of the Strathcona 
Agreement was ensuring that Inuit workers comprised 60 per cent of 
the workforce at Nanisivik. The agreement also sought to minimize the 
environmental impacts of mining through environmental studies and 
reclamation activities.10 Other conditions of the Strathcona Agreement 
included:
Provisions of vocational training for northern residents, 
comprehensive environmental studies and planning, preference 
for the use of Canadian material and equipment and Canadian 
shipping, company exploration programs to increase ore re-
serves and possible further processing of mine concentrates in 
Canada.11
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Deemed a progressive and unprecedented approach to northern resource 
development, the agreement clearly sought to enact the government’s 
commitment to the well-being of northerners and “optimize experience 
and benefits obtainable from this pilot Arctic mining venture.”12 
This experiment proved successful from the point of view of the 
government and mine company: the Nanisivik mine operated profitably 
for twenty-six years until its closure in 2002 and typically employed a 
workforce of two hundred people. In line with the mining imagin-
ary, CanZinco’s Vice President of Environment and Sustainability Bob 
Carreau presented closure as an inevitable stage in the life course of the 
mine, albeit with a notably positive spin:
Unlike many businesses where closure often means failure, 
closure of a mine is, in fact, a measure of success. It means that 
you have gone through all the stages of a mine, and you have 
reached closure and reclamation, at least a plan in closure and 
reclamation. If you didn’t do that, you would be doing abandon-
ment, and that’s not the case with Nanisivik. We have reached this 
final stage, closure and reclamation, it is a measure of success . . . 
Now, as we enter the final stage of the project, we culminate the 
success with the closure of the mine and the townsite. Closing a 
mine is never a happy event. And in the case of Nanisivik where 
this means the community will cease to exist, it is that much 
harder. However, as stated at the outset of this introduction, the 
closure of the mine is inevitable, and planned reclamation, it is 
the final milestone of that achievement.13
In spite of these proclamations that Nanisivik had succeeded as a pi-
lot project, the mine failed to achieve its target of a 60 per cent Inuit 
workforce. Instead, typically only 20 to 25 per cent of the workforce was 
Inuit, a figure that dropped to 9 per cent in the final years of the mine’s 
operation.14 The failure to employ higher levels of Inuit labour led con-
sultants Hickling-Partners to conclude in one report that “the mine has 
not succeeded in the role for which it was intended—as an experimental 
prototype.”15
For the community of Arctic Bay, the mine’s closure left behind many 
uncertainties: no one knew whether other economic activities could be 
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undertaken at Nanisivik, and concerns grew over the environmental im-
pacts of mining (such as soil and water contamination and the disposal 
of tailings waste). In public meetings, community members expressed 
concern about the destiny of the Nanisivik townsite, the level of com-
munity involvement in reclamation activities, and the impacts of mining 
on local wildlife and the land upon which the Inuit depended for hunting. 
Kunuk Oyukuluk explained in one public hearing how wildlife had been 
impacted by mining at Nanisivik:
In early spring, when it was still March or May, when there 
is still ice, they would break the ice. And because it is our wild-
life area—and so my concern is that seals, we rely on the seal 
meat; and they have a breeding ground on the ice, that the ship 
went through the breeding ground of the seals. And in July when 
Arctic Bay residents were out Norwhale [narwhal] hunting, the 
ship also went through the hunting ground, the hunting area. 
And during the Norwhale hunting, Norwhales would be scat-
tered away by the ship. So every year they did that through the 
ice . . . So I need more help so that our generation— next genera-
tion, that they will have to have food to eat. And because we were 
brought up from the country food, so—and they are best food 
and makes you stronger, and we will be weaker population on 
other kinds of food.16
In a similar narrative, Moses Akumalik described how this environment-
al change impacted traditional lifestyles:
I’m not trying to look big but we were living off the land when 
we were young. Now children when they grow up will lean more 
towards the civilized life as opposed to the nomadic life. In 1978, 
the ships would come in to load concentrate and they break the 
ice. Hunters lost their machines that were on the ice. That’s why 
I’m asking for compensation because there have been impacts . . . 
They should thank the community for supporting their mining 
activity for all those years. A public apology with a thank you in 
money would be good. More than 20 skidoos were lost and all of 
their hunting equipment.17
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As this quote suggests, some community members raised concerns re-
garding the cultural and environmental impacts of mining and requested 
an apology from the mine company. Additionally Mucktar Akumalik 
described how, despite co-operating with the mine, the community had 
been detrimentally affected by it, and he called for the community of 
Arctic Bay to be compensated:
I want some kind of an apology, I guess, from the company 
because they did—they did their own activity without consider-
ing what the Arctic Bay community wants. And, you know, they 
didn’t even ask the community how they feel about their activi-
ty, whether to, you know—Arctic Bay residents were concerned 
that—they were anxious for an apology, I guess, and they all just 
leave the area without apologizing to us.18
While some community members requested monetary compensation, 
others called for compensation in the form of old furnishings and equip-
ment from the Nanisivik townsite or employment in future reclamation 
activities. In whatever form, these requests embodied appeals for justice: 
justice for harming the land, justice for impacting hunting activities, and 
justice for failing to reach Inuit employment targets. 
NEGOTIATI NG CLOSUR E AND 
R ECLAMATION AT NANISI V IK
Community appeals for justice, inclusion, and empowerment during 
the closure of the Nanisivik mine reflected, in part at least, a dramatic 
change in the political context between the founding and closure of the 
mine. With the creation of “the new territory of Nunavut and, with it, the 
expectation that Inuit would become the managers of their own destiny,” 
Inuit awareness of what power they could exercise increased significantly 
in the period leading to the closure of the mine.19 In addition, the newly 
formed Government of Nunavut was cognizant that many mining com-
panies had, in the past, abandoned northern mining projects without 
dealing with the environmental impacts of these activities, and was con-
scious that the livelihoods of Aboriginal northerners had been severely 
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affected by changes to the environments on which they depend. As such, 
the “Mine Site Reclamation Policy for Nunavut” attempted to empower 
northern communities and provide “the Inuit a ‘clean slate’ to develop the 
kind of resource management regime they want to take with them into 
the new millennium.”20
Whereas the costs associated with environmental degradation had 
been largely externalized by mine companies and paid by the govern-
ment in the past, the “Mine  Site Reclamation Policy” applied the “pollut-
er pays” principle, enforceable through security bond arrangements writ-
ten into water licences, land leases, and other regulatory instruments. At 
Nanisivik, this meant that a water licence administered by the Nunavut 
Water Board (NWB) set the terms of reclamation, and the board as-
sumed the primary responsibility for regulating and enforcing reclam-
ation efforts. As part of the security bond arrangements, CanZinco, the 
NWB, and other intervening parties present at public hearings had to 
agree on the value of the bond, based on the projected costs of reclama-
tion. In addition, as part of their commitment to forge a positive legacy 
for this Arctic experiment, CanZinco and the Government of Nunavut 
worked with the community of Arctic Bay to produce the “Closure and 
Reclamation Plan” for Nanisivik.
Newspaper stories documenting this process reveal something in-
triguing about Nanisivik’s closure: while the mine had closed and its 
production had stopped, Nanisivik continued to be valued, but these 
valuations were contested by CanZinco, the government, and the com-
munity.21 These valuations were estimates of the cost of reclamation, spe-
cifically, the amount that would be held in a security bond to ensure that 
CanZinco completed Nanisivik’s reclamation in line with the “Mine Site 
Reclamation Policy for Nunavut.” Huge valuations were suggested (and 
contested) by each party: initially, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 
(INAC) suggested that reclamation would cost $27,536,028, while 
CanZinco’s consultants estimated reclamation would cost $9,224,608, a 
figure almost three times lower than the INAC estimate.22
Two interesting features of this valuation process unsettle the notion 
that mining landscapes are devalued after their closure. First, as payee of 
the cost of reclamation, CanZinco attempted to inscribe the Nanisivik 
townsite with value. The importance of the Nanisivik townsite—as 
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a potential cost to CanZinco if it had to be destroyed due to contam-
ination—was evident through CanZinco’s attempts to attribute a high 
economic value to the site in order to offset the costs of reclamation. 
CanZinco commissioned an engineering firm in Toronto that esti-
mated that it would cost more than $100 million to rebuild Nanisivik.23 
Declaring that “we have long taken and continue to take the view that 
it would be a tragedy if this facility were destroyed as part of the rec-
lamation exercise,”24 CanZinco worked hard to find future uses for the 
infrastructure, and undertook negotiations with companies interested in 
Nanisivik’s production assets. CanZinco believed that given the “sheer 
number of companies currently exploring for diamonds within the im-
mediate vicinity of Nanisivik .  .  . it would be foolhardy to destroy the 
existing industrial complex .  .  . when such a complex may serve as an 
inducement to one or more of these companies to establish a base at 
Nanisivik.”25 CanZinco eventually sold the mill, concentrate storage fa-
cility, power generation installation, conveyors, and ship-loading equip-
ment to Wolfden Resources (owners of a property in Nunavut), who, in 
return, performed environmental cleanup in the area of the mill and 
storage facilities.26 CanZinco’s efforts to recoup monetary value from 
the closed townsite and mine illustrates how some of Nanisivik’s infra-
structure continued to possess both use-value and exchange-value after 
the mine’s closure. 
A second key feature of the closure process is the way that scientific 
knowledge was produced and mobilized to legitimate particular valua-
tions of the cost of reclamation. A proliferation of studies undertaken 
by government scientists—and more frequently scientists, engineers, 
and technical consultants working for private environmental consulting 
firms—sought to provide an authoritative basis for resolving the dispute 
over the cost of reclamation. For CanZinco, this scientific knowledge 
was important in determining the amount of money the company would 
have to pay for reclamation. Consequently, both the government and 
CanZinco hired their own scientific experts to ensure that the knowledge 
produced was accurate and rigorous. These studies examined the extent 
of soil contamination, tested the stability and impact of tailings, contrib-
uted to various environmental site assessments and the Human Health 
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and Ecological Risk Assessment (HHERA), and measured the level of 
contamination of the townsite infrastructure.27
Studies on soil contamination were among some of the most im-
portant in determining the cost of reclamation, as well as some of the 
most contentious, because establishing the level of contamination was 
decisive in determining whether the townsite would be destroyed. In one 
study, the Government of Nunavut hired consultants EBA Engineering 
to conduct a soil-sampling program to determine the extent of con-
tamination at Nanisivik—research that cost over $49,000.28 Because of 
the high costs involved in destroying a townsite due to contamination, 
CanZinco also hired privately owned environmental consulting firm 
Lorax Environmental Services. Lorax observed the work of EBA, and 
represented CanZinco’s interests through collecting duplicate samples 
following the same methodology as EBA.29 The economic importance of 
these study results is evident in a letter written by CanZinco disputing 
reports that surface soils at the Nanisivik townsite were “toxic.”30 In this 
letter to the NWB, CanZinco asserted:
The parties realized that there would have to be some amount 
of clean up performed at the Nanisivik townsite before the trans-
fer of infrastructure assets from CanZinco to the GN [Govern-
ment of Nunavut] could be completed. It is hoped, though, that 
the introduction of the word “toxicity” (by all accounts an inac-
curate inference) has not derailed those discussions and caused 
irreparable harm and considerable expense to CanZinco Ltd. It 
is also hoped that the use of the word can be put in its proper 
context and that before becoming unduly alarmed the Ecological 
and Human Health Risk Assessment (which the group correctly 
points out was proposed by CanZinco Ltd.) is allowed to serve its 
designed purpose—to provide concrete information from which 
to act in a reasonable manner.31
In this letter, branding soil at Nanisivik as toxic represented a “con-
siderable expense to CanZinco” because it raised reclamation costs 
while threatening to devalue the townsite, worth up to $100 million in 
CanZinco’s eyes. Producing and legitimizing scientific evidence, then, 
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was critical for CanZinco to finalize the cost of reclamation and the value 
of its property at the site.
Together, these two features illustrate how CanZinco mobilized a 
counter-discourse to the “mining imaginary.” Although Nanisivik was no 
longer a site for the production of valuable ores (and in fact, the site was 
a financial liability for the mine company), CanZinco cast Nanisivik as a 
useful and valuable site while subduing claims regarding the severity of 
contamination of the town. Furthermore, the Nanisivik minescape had 
become a space of intensive scientific investigation as soil samples were 
collected, water quality monitoring stations were established, and vari-
ous field projects were initiated in order to legitimize different valuations 
of the cost of reclamation. However, as the next section will argue, these 
valuations were contested by the community of Arctic Bay and other 
intervenors, and the authority of scientific knowledge itself came under 
scrutiny. 
THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF 
NANISI V IK’S TA ILI NGS COV ER
The depth of an engineered tailings cover was perhaps the most conten-
tious issue during Nanisivik’s reclamation, and an issue that demonstrates 
how the scientific knowledge-making central to determining the cost of 
reclamation at Nanisivik was contested. The tailings at Nanisivik were 
the material by-product from the extraction and transformation of ores 
into lead-zinc concentrates. Within these tailings, Thiobacillus bacteria 
catalyzed the transformation of reactive sulphide minerals to generate 
outflows of acidic water containing high concentrations of heavy metals, 
in a process known as acid mine drainage. Even long after mining, these 
tailings continued to produce acid mine drainage—described as “poison 
water”32 by the community—that the community and the government 
viewed as harmful to the surrounding environment. For instance, Elder 
Leah Oqallak commented in two public hearings, “So snow bunting, little 
bird landed on the tailings and it died right away, and it got—I got scared 
that I saw the bird die, so that’s why it is my big concern.”33
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As part of progressive reclamation efforts undertaken during 
Nanisivik’s operation, a field-monitoring program from 1990 investi-
gated how acid mine drainage could be mitigated. Research conducted on 
behalf of Nanisivik mines indicated that Thiobacillus bacteria catalyzed 
the production of metals at a slower rate at lower temperatures.34 The 
field-monitoring program sought to test the optimum conditions under 
which freeze-up of the tailings would occur using “test cell” covers.35 
Shale covers were constructed of varying levels of compaction and satura-
tion, with thermocouples and frost gauges used to monitor temperatures. 
It was hoped that constructing a cover over the tailings at Nanisivik 
would thermally insulate the exposed tailings and promote freeze-up.36 
Once incorporated into the permafrost regime, these freezing conditions 
would reduce oxygen diffusion to make contaminants inert, preventing 
the contamination of surface water.37 The extreme Arctic climate thus 
offered a “natural” method by which acid mine drainage could be pre-
vented; in the words of CanZinco, this “reclamation work [was] focused 
on utilising the natural conditions to provide for the secure, long-term 
closure of the mine.”38
Data from this field monitoring program, in combination with other 
studies conducted during the closure of the mine, were critical to in-
forming the design of the engineered cover that would limit acid mine 
drainage. Data collected by CanZinco indicated that test cell 1, con-
structed from shale without compaction or saturation, had an average 
thaw depth of 0.92 metres.39 To ensure that the tailings would remain 
frozen even under worst-case climate warming scenarios, geothermal 
models predicted thaw of 1.0 metres in a one-year period in the event 
of an extreme weather scenario (1-in-100 year warm event) and thaw 
of 1.22 metres at the end of one hundred years under a global warm-
ing scenario.40 Whereas worst-case climate scenarios predicted by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the Panel on 
Energy Research and Development (PERD) estimated warming of 3.5°C 
to 4.5°C respectively, CanZinco’s modelling assumed a change of 5.5°C 
in order to mitigate against thaw.41 Based on the test cover results and 
geothermal models, CanZinco asserted in its 2002 “Mine Closure and 
Reclamation Plan” that a 1.25-metre cover depth was sufficient, compris-
ing 1.0 metres of shale and 0.25 metres of armour surfacing.
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Throughout the closure and reclamation process, however, much de-
bate surrounded the depth—and thus cost—of the engineered tailings 
cover proposed by CanZinco. Some Arctic Bay residents asserted that 
the cover should have been 10 metres deep at the dock area and 5 metres 
deep at the industrial site, areas (correctly) perceived as the most con-
taminated.42 Though the rationale behind these estimates is unclear from 
the archival record, public hearing transcripts reveal that the Hamlet of 
Arctic Bay regarded the tailings depth as an important issue and the com-
munity asserted its disappointment with the lack of information they had 
received regarding the tailings. In one hearing, the mayor of Arctic Bay, 
Joanasie Akumalik, explained:
In the past we know that there was monitoring happening 
of the water and the tailings pond and even the air. We have also 
been aware of tailings monitoring devices that have not worked 
for long periods of time. We have not received the results from 
these activities. It is important that the local people in Arctic Bay 
become fully involved in this long term monitoring work and be 
trained to undertake this activity. It is important that the local 
people trust the results of these activities.43
This quote suggests some residents felt excluded from these scientific ac-
tivities during Nanisivik’s closure, in similar ways to how the community 
had felt marginalized during the mine’s operation. To rectify this, some 
residents hoped that the community could observe the reclamation work 
undertaken at Nanisivik. An elder commented that:
There should be someone observing when you are burying 
the tailing so that they can share their story and the information 
that they observe. Back in 1959 I was working for the Bay store. 
We used to hide things from the Manager before they came to the 
store so that the Manager would know it was a good store. I want 
someone there to observe the burying of tailings. If you tell me 
straight [it] will not contaminate the people and environment, I 
will believe I won’t mind if you cover it. It is a concern without 
someone telling me that it won’t have impact on my life. I want 
someone to observe. There will be work for Arctic Bay residents 
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to work on the clean-up but when you are covering the tailings I 
want someone too. I want to see the picture of the tailings on the 
side of it. I’m serious here. People are serious here. We should ask 
all kinds of questions here.44
Rigorous monitoring was important for many residents to trust that the 
impacts of mining on their health and livelihoods had been offset. As well, 
these recommendations positioned community members as independent 
observers who could fill employment positions during reclamation and 
confirm whether work was being conducted correctly.45
While the cover depth issue was important for the health and 
well-being of the residents of Arctic Bay, it was equally important for 
CanZinco in determining the total amount of the security bond—a fig-
ure disputed by CanZinco and the Nunavut Water Board. On behalf of 
INAC, Brodie Consulting initially estimated that a cover depth of 1.75 
metres was required, based on the fact that one of the test cells had ex-
perienced thawing to a depth of 1.59 metres.46 Brodie later suggested that 
a 1.5-metre cover depth was required, still costing $1.25 million more 
than CanZinco’s estimate of 1.25 metres. These cover depth estimations 
were of utmost importance to CanZinco, as they represented significant 
sums of money needed to pay for the surface covering—at the very least, 
$1.25 million was at stake.
CanZinco asserted the legitimacy of its estimate by presenting its 
cover depth as a “scientifically sound” estimate. CanZinco stressed that 
a depth of 1.25 metres was sufficient to keep the tailings frozen by high-
lighting that the data input into the geothermal model was more conserv-
ative than the estimates used by world-renowned scientific panels such 
as the IPCC. Emphasizing the authority of its scientific facts, CanZinco 
declared:
We have calculated with the warming effect, so that’s calcu-
lated in there. Global warming, as you mentioned, is a concern, 
and so we had, as I mentioned, included modelling that takes the 
worst-case scenario that Environment Canada offers you now 
over the years, we include that in the mine. And like any engi-
neering we do, that’s the best you can do, it has to be based on 
some scientific data, and that is based on sound scientific data.47 
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As this quote suggests, the scientific method not only produced know-
ledge about the environment, but this method in itself was presented as 
an authoritative and reliable source for the production of knowledge. 
Indeed, CanZinco heavily relied on arguments based in notions of 
scientific expertise to validate its estimate and protest the valuations 
made by Brodie Consulting and the community. Throughout the closure 
and reclamation period at Nanisivik, CanZinco had urged the interven-
ing parties to use “good science to come up with the best answers.”48 In 
public hearings, CanZinco introduced scientific and technical consult-
ants as “independent and outside professionals,”49 neutral parties external 
to the politics of reclamation and without bias. This is not to say that one 
estimate was more accurate than another, but rather CanZinco sought 
to present its rationale as “scientifically sound” in order to legitimize its 
estimate of the cost of the cover depth. For instance, CanZinco wrote in 
one letter to the NWB that:
The intervening parties who are saying 1.25m is insufficient 
are not supporting this with any concrete information. They are 
simply and quite arbitrarily saying that they intuitively assume 
that 1.25 metres is not enough, and more cover should be added. 
If the intervening parties are able to take their rationale for ad-
ditional coverage, at the very least a meaningful technical debate 
could ensue, and CanZinco is confident that it would prevail. 
CanZinco is currently at a disadvantage, though, where it pres-
ents scientifically defensible information and the only rebuttal is 
“we want more.”50
In this quote, non-scientific estimates are cast as “arbitrary” and “intui-
tive,” whereas scientific expertise is “meaningful” and “rational.” Again, 
this is not to argue that the science behind each estimate was correct (or 
incorrect), but rather that this discourse inscribed science with the power 
to adjudicate and validate competing claims over reclamation, in such a 
way that at times it delegitimized the non-scientific estimates suggested 
by the community. Indeed, some residents were disappointed that sug-
gestions they made in public hearings were not acted upon.51 In this way, 
CanZinco-sponsored research not only produced an economic valuation 
(of the cost of reclamation), but necessarily reproduced the authority of 
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science: an explicit example of the way that the closed Nanisivik mine 
was a site for the production of contested valuations (of the cost of rec-
lamation) and the scientific knowledge that legitimized these valuations.
CONCLUSION
After many meetings and much technical debate between the intervening 
parties, it was agreed that a 1.25-metre cover depth would be appropriate. 
The security bond was finally set at $17.6 million, and CanZinco’s closure 
and reclamation plan was approved in 2004. It had become increasingly 
clear that the Nanisivik townsite and infrastructure would have to be 
demolished, as efforts to find alternate uses for the site were unsuccess-
ful and contamination proved a costly problem. Many buildings had 
exceeded their lifespan, and those still in usable condition required as 
much as $50 million over four years for renovation.52 After reclamation 
was completed in 2008, the security bond was reduced to $2 million to 
cover a five-year post-closure monitoring period. CanZinco estimated in 
a 2009 public hearing that the company had spent $17 million and that 
Wolfden had spent $12 million on reclamation at the site.53
Now, Nanisivik’s mining infrastructure, housing, and support facili-
ties are all but gone from the site. This was not an inevitable outcome 
of Nanisivik’s life cycle, however. Some of Nanisivik’s mining infra-
structure continued to embody value: it was dismantled and reconfig-
ured at other mine sites in Northern Canada. Furthermore, CanZinco 
mobilized a counter-discourse to the mining imaginary—the finality 
of mine closure—by casting the Nanisivik minescape as a valuable (and 
uncontaminated) space. In fact, after the closure of the mine, Nanisivik 
became a landscape of data production and economic valuation: scientific 
and technical consultants were hired from several external engineering 
firms, and technological infrastructures were erected in order to mine 
data from the environment. The closed Nanisivik minescape had become 
a hive of new activity that produced scientific knowledge and informed 
valuations of the cost of reclamation, which were disputed by CanZinco 
(as payee of the reclamation) and the Government of Nunavut (as regula-
tor of the reclamation). The most fascinating aspect about this scientific 
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production process is that this knowledge making embodied scientific 
authority and neutrality that was used to assert the cost of reclamation 
by these different parties. These efforts not only generated scientific 
knowledge about the environment at Nanisivik, but the intervening par-
ties cast this knowledge as being neutral, external, and unbiased—the 
most reliable knowledge for determining the cost of reclamation. Efforts 
to legitimize scientific knowledge concurrently legitimized valuations of 
the cost of reclamation. Thus, despite appearing to be an economically 
worthless post-productive space—as popularly imagined of closed mines 
under the mining imaginary—Nanisivik was a site of the production of 
both scientific knowledge and valuations of the cost of reclamation.
As such, this chapter favours a reading of Nanisivik’s closure as 
an important historical-geographical event in the life of the mine, set 
amidst Nunavut’s transforming political and regulatory context, and 
thereby negotiated and navigated by various actors (such as community 
members, government officials, and mine company representatives) with 
different, and at times, conflicting interests in the mine’s closure and rec-
lamation. Far from an unproductive, valueless, or lifeless space, the town-
site continued to be valued in different (and contested) ways after the 
mine’s closure and during reclamation. The case of Nanisivik prompts 
a reconsideration of the political-economic function and character of 
“post-productive” landscapes to account for the ongoing, and often con-
tested, historical-geographical reconfiguration of such landscapes after 
resource extractive activities have formally ended.
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“There Is No Memory of It Here”: 
Closure and Memory of the Polaris 
Mine in Resolute Bay, 1973–2012
Heather Green
Industrial closure is about much more than decreased market value, cap-
ital loss, commodity decline, and economic disruption. It is also about 
individuals and communities. Though deindustrialization is a broad 
process that occurs worldwide, those impacted by closure experience an 
intimate and local connection to this process. In single industry towns 
especially, closure frequently starts a chain of unemployment, out-migra-
tion, population decline, and abandoned infrastructure. It is also com-
mon for post-industrial communities to suffer negative environmental 
impacts. Previous scholarship has studied the socio-economic, cultural, 
and environmental legacies of mine closure and deindustrialization in 
both Rust Belt zones and single industry towns in Southern Canada and 
the United States.1 Mining and mine closures have also been prevalent in 
the Canadian North since the 1950s, and historians have recently begun 
paying attention to the impacts of closure in the North, as this volume 
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attests. Each case of closure is unique, though scholars have identified 
key trends in southern industrial closures, including their economic, 
cultural, and social impacts, which have also been repeated in cases of 
northern deindustrialization.2 
One of the more recent topics in this literature is the connection be-
tween collective memory and closure.3 Much scholarly work currently 
available about mining and collective memory is concerned with how 
communities react to closure and decline, and how in this reaction com-
munities form a group/collective memory or a mining heritage. This 
literature provides case studies of mine closure and collective memory 
formation around the globe. What is striking about these cases, which 
examine different types of mining, different demographics of mine work-
ers, and different geographic spaces, are the similarities they share in 
terms of both the economic and social importance of mining and the 
collective memories these local communities develop in retaining their 
mining heritage. What is further striking for my research concerning the 
Polaris mine in Resolute was how much the Polaris mine and the com-
munity of Resolute diverge from this post-closure narrative. Throughout 
this chapter I will attempt to provide an explanation for this divergence.
Studying coal-mining heritage in Britain, Rosemary Power explains 
that mining heritage is defined in a community in terms of “what has 
been lost, what needs to be retained, and what needs to be preserved 
to benefit future generations.”4 She says mining heritage includes local 
community organizations that gather written records, and abandoned 
equipment and artifacts that are set within the community as symbols of 
honour. Mining heritage involves both physical artifacts and “commun-
ity spirit.”5 Finally, to be considered as having mining heritage, a com-
munity must identify as a mining or former mining community (even in 
cases where the mine has been closed for a period of time).6 Such desire 
to commemorate mining heritage comes from the social and econom-
ic factors these single industries brought to local communities. In most 
cases, these towns revolved around mining, and the secondary economic 
development was based on providing services and products for mining. 
Further, Power argues that tight-knit social communities came from the 
structure of mining lifestyles, particularly in terms of gender roles and 
class consciousness.7 
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Scholars have also argued that the formation and retention of a col-
lective mining memory has served political purposes. For example, in 
their work, Mellor and Stephenson outline the attempts of Durham min-
ing communities to maintain their mining heritage through continuing 
the Durham Miners’ Gala. The authors argue that the gala represented 
a political platform for the community to defend itself from the mar-
ginalization faced by post-industrial single industry towns.8 In his work, 
Ben Marsh also provides an understanding of power struggles and power 
structures that commonly existed in such small towns industrialized 
from an outside force.9 The inhabitants and workers in the small anthra-
cite mining towns he discusses came from other continents in the ear-
ly twentieth century. Though these places were created by companies, 
the workers felt these places were “theirs,” and they claimed a sense of 
place on their own terms. This is important to understanding the de-
velopment of community strength and loyalty to place.10 Forming a col-
lectively shared memory for the community helps in claiming legitimacy 
for future political issues, such as demands for economic development or 
government support for the deindustrialized area. 
As this literature suggests, the memories that communities form 
about industry after closure are largely influenced by the degree to which 
a community participated in the industrial activity and the extent of its 
impacts, both positive and negative. In the Canadian North, these mem-
ories also include the experiences of Aboriginal communities, impacts 
on traditional land use, and the penetration of outside mining companies 
into the region. There has been less scholarly attention to mine closures 
and heritage in the North and, more specifically, in Aboriginal commu-
nities, though this area of scholarship is growing. Tara Cater and Arn 
Keeling study the ongoing influence the North Rankin Nickel Mine has in 
the community’s built environment and cultural landscape since closure 
in 1962. They argue that the community of Rankin Inlet is “(re)staking its 
claims to its industrial past, as part of contemporary efforts to manage 
the costs and benefits of new mineral development in the region.”11 Once 
again, the case of the Polaris mine and Resolute Bay community widely 
differs from Rankin Inlet. The town of Rankin Inlet was created because 
of the mine. Community members not only worked at the mine, but it 
was the town’s sole source of income. Finally, in Rankin, the former mine 
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Figure 1: Nunavut, showing study area location (detail in figure 2). Map by  
Michael Fisher.
site has become an attraction for the community; it is a landscape to base 
mining heritage and memory around. 
This chapter will explore the connections between memory and clos-
ure of the Polaris lead-zinc mine (in operation from 1982 to 2002) in the 
community of Resolute Bay (Qausuittuq),12 located about one hundred 
kilometres from the mine (Fig. 1). Because of the deeply personal nature 
of the connection between closure and memory (both individual and 
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Figure 2: Cornwallis Island and Little Cornwallis Island indicating Resolute Bay and 
the Polaris mine site. Map by Michael Fisher.
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collective), it is impossible to fully study mining memory without speak-
ing with those who were affected by industry. Oral history interviews 
conducted with former Inuit Polaris workers and Resolute community 
members form the basis of this analysis. Interviewees spoke about their 
memories of the Polaris mine, from the time of its announcement to its 
closure. However, this research also found that, without asking directly 
about the mine, one would never guess there had been a mine nearby, 
even though Polaris closed only eleven years before this study. Due to the 
geographic isolation of the mine site from the town (Fig. 2), there are no 
physical remnants of industry in the town. There is no heritage site, no 
photographs in public buildings, and the youth are largely unaware that 
there had been a mine nearby. A collective memory of Polaris is absent in 
the hamlet.13 
It may seem contradictory to state that Resolute lacks community 
memory of the Polaris operation and then proceed to discuss residents’ 
memories of the mine. In Oral History and Public Memories, Hamilton 
and Shopes argue that the relationship between the individuals who do 
the remembering (which is the central concern in oral history) and the 
memory of a group has not yet been resolved nor analyzed in-depth. When 
I began this research project, I was initially interested in exploring the 
community memory of mining in Resolute Bay. However, as I began 
talking to more people and exploring the area, it became clear that the 
community did not have a specific mining memory, or a collective memo-
ry specific to a mining past. It is important to note that those interviewed 
were a select few from the total population of Resolute (9 interviewees 
from a population of 240), and those interviewed spoke of their individ-
ual memories and experiences with Cominco, the mining company that 
owned Polaris, and the Polaris mine, while indicating that a collective or 
community memory of the mine remains absent in Resolute.14 Individual 
memories were quite strong, and each interviewee brought his or her 
own unique experiences, opinions, and memories to the narrative of the 
Polaris story. While many individuals shared similar personal memories, 
as I will expand upon below, these memories were not publicly codified in 
memorials, monuments, or events associated with mine work.
Previous scholarship reveals that community memory is often 
preserved within the deindustrialized landscape.15 An overwhelming 
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presence of industrial heritage (whether abandoned infrastructure or en-
vironmental legacies) tends to force people to remember and, sometimes, 
to engage with the industrial past. By contrast, the residents of Resolute 
do not face such physical reminders (in part because of their distance 
from the actual mine site), which has contributed to the lack of mining 
memory in the town. Even if individuals mostly enjoyed their experience 
at the mine, those interviewed were in agreement that Cominco let the 
community down in not living up to its pre-development promises of 
employment and community benefits.
It is not enough to note the presence or absence of a collective mining 
memory; understanding why this is the case and what factors influence 
the formation of collective memory is critical to this story. Collectively, 
the stories from Resolute Bay suggest that the lack of involvement of 
Resolute Inuit in the Polaris development, from consultation to operation 
to closure, strongly affected the way that residents remember deindus-
trialization and their mining past. Cominco began planning and devel-
oping Polaris in 1973, opening the mine in 1982. The mine site was locat-
ed in an area traditionally used by Resolute Inuit, which raised concerns 
about environmental impacts from the community in the planning phase. 
However, environmental concerns largely dissipated in the operational 
stage as Resolute residents became discontented over the lack of Inuit 
employed at Polaris. The Inuit employment rate, both in general and from 
Resolute specifically, remained low throughout operation. Some Resolute 
residents remain bitter about this, and many contend that their margin-
alization and lack of involvement in the Polaris mine explain the lack of 
socio-economic benefits the town received from mine development. It 
is clear that the absence of collective community memory of Polaris is 
rooted in the exclusion of Resolute Inuit throughout the lifespan of the 
mine, even though the Polaris operation was developed and operating at 
a time when Inuit political activism was becoming more recognized by 
the federal government and the mining industry.
****
Northern mining development has always been pursued by forces from 
outside the region. Since the 1950s, the Canadian state has promoted the 
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mineral industry as part of its agenda of northern modernization.16 David 
Trigger, using an Australian example similar to Canada in the 1950s to 
1970s, highlights the prevalent historical belief that mining was moral 
progress, bringing “value” to the land and allowing people to “maintain a 
standard of living” through industrial opportunities.17 As a result, min-
ing companies often ignored the value of the land to Aboriginal peoples 
and rarely accounted for the consequences industry may bring to north-
ern Aboriginal peoples specifically. By the 1970s, this attitude began to 
shift in Northern Canada as political activist groups, such as the Indian 
Eskimo Association (IEA), developed among southerners concerned 
about the plight of Inuit. Inuit-initiated political activism such as the 
Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (ITC) and the Committee for Original People’s 
Entitlement (COPE) occurred parallel to new mine developments.18 
Geologist Robert McPherson has linked the changing political climate 
and growing Inuit political activism in the 1970s to resource issues, as 
Inuit asserted their rights to be active participants in northern econom-
ic development, to have their concerns and opinions considered and 
respected, and to become owners of their land. Inuit activism achieved 
some success, especially when political agitation led to the Nunavut land 
claims negotiations throughout the 1970s and the 1990s, culminating in 
the creation of Nunavut as its own territory in 1999.19 However, during 
the 1970s and 1980s, at the same time that land claims were negotiated 
between the federal and territorial governments and Inuit organizations, 
companies such as Cominco continued to overlook Inuit concerns about 
mineral development in the development decision-making process.
The development of Polaris began when Bankeno Mines originally 
discovered mineralization on Little Cornwallis Island in 1960 and staked 
the first claim.20 Cominco Ltd., one of the largest Canadian natural re-
source companies at the time, bought these claims in 1964 and, upon 
further exploration, discovered the Polaris lead-zinc ore body in 1971.21 
Unlike previous mine developments in the North, the company included 
community consultation in its planning process. In 1973, Cominco sent 
consultant J. E. Barrett to some Inuit communities to interview residents 
about their potential interest in working at Polaris.22 In the planning 
stage, Cominco directed most of its attention (however marginal) to 
Resolute, the community nearest to the Polaris operation, holding two 
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community meetings (both in May 1980) before opening the site. The 
company promised the Resolute Inuit employment opportunities and de-
scribed other economic benefits that the town would gain from having a 
mine nearby.23 Interviews with Resolute residents suggest that Resolute 
expected Cominco would draw an Inuit labour force from the commun-
ity and that the town would gain services and economic growth from the 
mine. According to interviewees, Cominco said the mine would help the 
town accumulate capital, and “it would be easier [to] build up a little bit 
of the community.”24 They agreed that Resolute residents were optimistic 
about the arrival of industry.
Though Cominco took consultation further than any previous oper-
ation had, it is important to point out that this consultation took the 
form of information sessions, rather than co-planning or negotiation. 
There were no legal requirements to provide communities with deci-
sion-making power, and throughout planning, Cominco did not exceed 
its obligations under an informal “Socioeconomic Action Plan” signed 
between the company and the Government of the Northwest Territories 
(GNWT), which simply required the company stay in contact with com-
munities.25 In 1976, Barrett and some company officials returned to seven 
communities from which Cominco believed it would likely draw Inuit 
employees.26 After his second visit to Resolute in 1976, Barrett reported, 
“It seemed to the Consultant that at the meeting [in Resolute] Inuit were 
feeling a little threatened by the thought of the mine development. It was 
coming closer and becoming more of a reality.”27 This concern persisted 
as the mine opening drew closer, and was evident at a further commun-
ity meeting on May 23, 1980. One remark made at this meeting was that 
Resolute people felt like “Cominco is rushing the Inuit.”28 Resolute Inuit 
wanted more communication so that they could be better informed and 
make certain that their concerns would be addressed. This poor consul-
tation process reflected the mining industry at this time, which exhibited 
ignorance of and apathy to Inuit needs and desires.29 
Among the biggest concerns Resolute residents had in the planning 
stages were the environmental impacts of the mine. Some residents 
also expressed concerns about the impacts of the mine on the subsist-
ence economy, migration patterns, and animal populations on Little 
Cornwallis Island. Resolute Inuit traditionally hunted in that area as they 
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crossed between Resolute and Bathurst Island.30 The Inuit consulted made 
clear that they wanted to continue hunting and trapping while working 
at the mine, and they wanted to continue hunting in the area around the 
mine.31 Residents were concerned that the white-whale wintering colony 
along the shore near the mine site and the sea bird population might be 
scared away by the noise and shipping.32 They also expressed concern 
about disposing solid waste and sewage in the sea. 
At the public community meeting on May 23, 1980, Resolute Inuit ex-
pressed their concern about Cominco’s tailings disposal plan. Originally, 
Cominco had planned to dispose of mine tailings in Crozier Strait;33 
however, a feasibility study commissioned in 1974 advised against mar-
ine disposal of tailings from the Polaris Mine.34 Instead, the consult-
ants recommended Garrow Lake, a permafrost-bound, hypersaline lake 
two miles away from the mine, as an alternative disposal site (Fig. 2).35 
Further reports confirmed that the bottom of Garrow Lake was concen-
trated salt water, that there was no plant or fish life in the lake, and that 
the hydrogen sulphide in the water would precipitate any soluble heavy 
metals deposited in the lake.36 However, local residents still worried 
about the possibility that Garrow Lake could overflow and carry tailings, 
consisting of mine waste and lead and zinc ion concentrates, into the 
surrounding marine environment.37 They also believed that, because the 
lake was saline, it must have an underground channel from the sea, and 
this concerned them. Cominco assured residents that the tailings would 
not leave Garrow Lake.38 
Resolute residents were not the only group concerned about the 
Polaris development. A Northwest Territories Water Board public hear-
ing held in Resolute on May 22, 1980, provided a venue for the Canadian 
Arctic Resources Committee (CARC) and Inuit Tapirisat of Canada to 
voice their opposition to the Polaris development. Founded in 1971 and 
operating out of offices in Yellowknife and Ottawa, CARC was a pub-
lic interest group comprised mainly of southern academics dedicated 
to the environmental and social well-being of Northern Canada and 
its peoples. The organization emerged as part of the Mackenzie Valley 
Pipeline Inquiry and presented alternative opinions about industry and 
resource development projects; through criticizing the problems posed 
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by resource development, CARC sought to bring public attention to 
issues that impacted the people and environment of the north.39
During the Polaris development process, CARC criticized Cominco’s 
actions in the pre-development stage. CARC’s concerns about the Polaris 
project were largely environmental in nature, but it also presented so-
cial and economic concerns while working closely with ITC.40 CARC 
demanded that the development undergo a federal Environmental 
Assessment and Review Process (EARP).41 Cominco never did undergo 
the EARP process, but instead conducted its own environmental assess-
ments.42 In 1975, Cominco commissioned BC Research to conduct an en-
vironmental study of the mine. BC Research acknowledged that possible 
and probable environmental effects included direct destruction of vege-
tation and animal habitat, habitat avoidance due to human activity, and 
chemical pollutants including sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxide com-
pounds.43 Like Resolute residents, CARC was also concerned about the 
Garrow Lake tailings disposal plan and criticized Cominco for not con-
sidering the possible impact on marine environments.44 In spite of these 
concerns, the NWT Water Board granted Cominco a water licence for 
the mine’s water supply and tailings disposal effective November 1981.45 
CARC also criticized Cominco for avoiding any discussion of compen-
sating the Inuit for environmental damage caused by the mine or loss of 
income due to reduced resource base.46
ITC supported CARC’s environmental criticisms, but the Inuit or-
ganization was principally concerned with the economic and political as-
pects of the Polaris project. The transcript of the May 23 public hearing 
reveals that ITC was not consulted or involved in the discussion and plan-
ning process, despite its efforts to foster contact with Jake Epp, minister 
of Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND). 
ITC was critical of Cominco’s dismissal of land claims negotiations and 
the action plan signed between government and Cominco. Largely initi-
ated by the GNWT, the “Socioeconomic Action Plan” primarily focused 
on employment and training assistance programs for Inuit workers, as 
well as the dissemination of information, consultation with communities 
and governments, and maximization of business opportunities for north-
erners. Though ITC did not go into specific detail in a letter it submitted 
for reading at the NWT Water Board hearing, it declared the action plan 
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an overall failure, and was particularly dissatisfied with an absence of 
Cominco Inuit training or hiring programs.47
The cooperation of these two groups in opposing the mining indus-
try exemplifies the growing importance that both southern and northern 
political activists attributed to Inuit rights in the 1970s. Cominco’s ex-
clusion of ITC from Polaris discussions was typical of the industry’s atti-
tude at this time. Though CARC and ITC shared some anxieties with the 
people of Resolute Bay, specifically in terms of possible environmental 
impacts, their attitudes differed from local concerns about mine develop-
ment. CARC and ITC acted in what they thought were the best inter-
ests of the northern environment and people in their criticisms, but their 
opinions overshadowed the concerns and opinions of those most dir-
ectly affected by development—the people of Resolute Bay. For example, 
CARC claimed that the people of Resolute stood in outright opposition 
to the mine development.48 While Resolute residents did have concerns 
about development, as outlined above, they mostly supported it.
During planning, Cominco told the community it planned to hire 
local people, but unlike the Nanisivik mine, which opened near the com-
munity of Arctic Bay in 1976, Cominco did not commit to a formal Inuit 
employment agreement with the government. Nanisivik was one of the 
first mines in Canada to have an agreement with the government speci-
fying a quota for Aboriginal workers (the company pledged that 60 per 
cent of its workforce of 219 would be Inuit within the first three years).49 
According to Robert McPherson, by the time Polaris was developing, the 
government realized that Nanisivik’s agreement was unrealistic and had 
given up on imposing employment quotas.50 Instead, Cominco signed 
informal memorandums of understanding with DIAND in 1980 and 
1981 that did not include specific employment targets for Native hiring. 
Dan McKinnon of DIAND’s Northern Resource and Economic Planning 
branch stated that Polaris would not require any formal agreement with 
the government, largely because of the lack of state financial support and 
involvement in the Polaris project.51 Cominco committed only that it 
would advertise jobs in the Northwest Territories first and that “when-
ever possible preference will be given to NWT residents.”52 
It is difficult to know whether Resolute residents were aware that 
there was no hiring agreement. Interviewees were knowledgeable about 
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the Nanisivik mine and may have assumed that Polaris would be similar 
in terms of Inuit employment. Most of the correspondence consulted re-
garding employment was private between the state and the company. The 
public meeting transcripts do not necessarily suggest that Resolute had 
concerns or anxiety about employment possibilities; for the most part, 
according to interviewees, Resolute residents took Cominco at its word 
that it intended to hire locals. Overall, the hamlet looked forward to the 
employment opportunities they believed the operation would bring to 
the community. Once Polaris began operation in 1982, however, Resolute 
soon realized that significant employment had not materialized.
Once the mine began operation (Fig. 3), previous environmental con-
cerns dissipated when Inuit workers saw little damage to the surrounding 
area, though one interviewee remembered that dust and chemical ash 
coming from the mill in the summer months covered the surrounding 
land.53 Another interviewee reported that, as he was handling ore in the 
mill, he noticed ore concentrates going into the ocean while ships were 
being loaded.54 Furthermore, interviewees reported that animal popula-
tions decreased during operation, though they did note that populations 
returned after closure.55
Employment rather than the environment remained the major point 
of contention for Resolute during the operational stage. Inuit comprised 
fewer than thirty (of 250) Polaris employees at peak employment per-
iods, making up less than 10 per cent of the mine’s total workforce.56 
Interviewees could recall only ten people from Resolute employed at 
Polaris over the twenty years it was in operation.57 Former workers from 
Resolute stated that the majority of mine workers came from Southern 
Canada, including a large number from Springdale, Newfoundland, and 
many from Alberta and Manitoba. They also remembered non-local 
Aboriginal people working at the mine, including Dene from Dettah (near 
Yellowknife) and Inuit from other areas in the Northwest Territories.58 
Interviewees commented on the difficulty of getting the better jobs, 
which tended to be filled by non-Natives because there was no train-
ing offered to Inuit for positions requiring skilled labour.59 Those from 
Resolute did a variety of jobs. Most were general labourers (all started 
out in this position, with the exception of one person who was hired as a 
guide in the development stage), mill workers (reported as the worst job 
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because of the dust and ash from the mill), surface crew, heavy equip-
ment operators, and polar bear monitors. Female employees worked as 
housekeepers in the accommodation facilities, although one moved up to 
become a heavy machine operator after one year.60
The low number of employees from the community helps to explain 
why Resolute residents felt ignored by Cominco. It also adds to our under-
standing about the lack of collective mining memory in Resolute; so few 
people from the town were employed at the mine that working there did 
not become a significant part of the community identity. Interviewees 
agreed that they would not consider Resolute a mining community either 
then or now. Furthermore, because of the nature of their positions, the 
Inuit employees did not form individual identities as miners or mine 
workers. Many described working at Polaris, though they enjoyed the 
work, as “just [another] job.”61 
The lack of benefits to the community from the operation also re-
inforced the town’s disconnection from the mine. Before the mine 
 
Figure 3: The Polaris Mine. NWT Archives/Northwest Territories Dept. of Public 
Works and Services fonds/G-1995-001: 1525
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opened, residents believed that the mine would bring spinoff industries 
to the town. However, such spinoffs failed to materialize, and some inter-
viewees stated that residents were left feeling fooled and betrayed.62 In 
their study of post-closure Polaris, Bowes-Lyon et al. suggested residents 
realized some minor short-term economic benefits from mining oper-
ations, but they identified very few long-term benefits.63 Short-term bene-
fits included increased income for those individuals employed at the mine, 
more frequent and less expensive jet services in and out of Resolute, and 
cheaper grocery prices due to the frequency of air traffic coming into the 
community. When asked if there were any major changes to the com-
munity as a result of the mine, all interviewees said the mine had “no 
real impact” or benefits for the community, other than for the individuals 
who worked there. Some residents had hoped that Polaris’ fly-in/fly-out 
structure would stimulate extra spending in the community co-op store 
and the hotels while incoming workers waited for the company charter to 
fly them to the mine for their rotation. However, these workers stayed at 
a company hotel next to the airport and very rarely came into the town.64 
****
Polaris closed in 2002 because of declining ore grades and profitability. 
Interviewees noted that they knew well in advance that the operation 
would cease. In fact, the Nunatsiaq News reported that Cominco initially 
intended to close in 2001, but managed to get another year out of the 
mine.65 At closure, out of 225 employees, only twenty from the North and 
only one from Resolute Bay were still working at the mine.66 Naturally, 
that one individual was disappointed to lose his job, but interviews clari-
fied that, collectively, Resolute residents felt no sense of loss when they 
discovered the mine would cease operation. Economically, since there 
had been little spinoff business as a result of the mine, there was no sig-
nificant service sector loss or economic disruption upon closure. The big-
gest impact on the community was the loss of jet services, as Resolute lost 
all service from Canadian North airlines. First Air is now the only airline 
with service to Resolute Bay.67  
Those interviewed expressed mixed feelings about the closure of 
Polaris. Some reported they were glad to see the mine close because of 
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“less pollution” on Little Cornwallis Island and an increase in animal 
populations. Some former workers reported that working at the mine was 
the best time of their lives. One stated, “I am still homesick for that place,” 
and another reported that when the company was closing it up and de-
molishing the buildings he did not want to see it happen so he chartered 
a plane to leave early. When interviewees spoke of their personal experi-
ences and memories of the mine, their stories usually related to social 
events or work. For the most part, although there were some negative 
memories, individuals generally emphasized the positive aspects of their 
mining experiences. They all spoke of how much fun they had working at 
Polaris, and recalled the activities available to them during their time off 
such as swimming, karate demonstrations, and passing time at the gym. 
One interviewee recalled, “there was always something to do . . . but lots 
of work too.” Another remembered the baseball games when the Polaris 
team played the Nanisivik team, as well as teams from the airport and 
from the hamlet of Resolute. “It had a big impact on me, that mine,” one 
interviewee reflected, and saying if he had the chance he would love to 
work in a mine again. 
In contrast to these strong personal memories, the exclusion and 
marginalization of Resolute itself left the community with no strong ties 
to Polaris. Cominco largely ignored residents’ concerns about environ-
mental impacts and failed to conduct any further environmental assess-
ments. Some community members were critical of the lack of communi-
cation and involvement in the planning stages: 
It was good but it would have been better if we talked to them 
more and worked with them more by communicating [with] each 
other. But we leave them alone; we were so Inuk that . . . Inuit way 
is leave things alone. Live down here, let the people live up there, 
on top of you. Don’t harass and ask around. If they ask you then, 
“Ok, thank you.”68
This particular interviewee also suggested that the biggest disappoint-
ment that she, personally, had with the company and with northern min-
ing was the lack of employment opportunities. If Inuit had been more 
involved in the planning process, she believes, they would have received 
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more benefits locally from the mine, and many more people from Resolute 
would have been hired at Polaris.69
Together, the lack of involvement in both planning and employment 
at the mine, the marginalization of Resolute Inuit concerns about develop-
ment, and the limited benefit (and loss) created by operation (and closure) 
suggest why Resolute does not retain heritage or collective mining mem-
ory in the town. In addition, Resolute Bay’s distance from the mine—be-
ing one hundred kilometres away from the mine site and physically sep-
arated by water—has kept its physical legacies hidden. The structure of its 
fly-in/fly-out rotation schedule meant that often the only people who ever 
spent significant amounts of time in and around the mine were those who 
worked there. One interviewee stated, “If you’d never gone to that mine, 
you’d never know who’s working there.”70 The only time Resolute Inuit 
would have occasion to see the mine infrastructure was during freeze-up 
when they made their way across Little Cornwallis Island on the sea ice 
to hunt on Bathurst Island, and even then they usually only saw Polaris as 
a light in the distance directing them west. 
Unlike many former mining communities in the North and in the 
South, Polaris left few industrial ruins on the landscape that might pro-
vide reminders of the region’s industrial past. Residents do not walk past 
the old mine site every day. They do not see it in the distance from their 
front porch or their window. At the site itself, the landing strip is the only 
relic of the former mine that remains in the area. Decommissioning and 
reclamation of the site began immediately after closure and was complet-
ed in 2004. This process consisted of removing buildings and the dock, 
disposing of metal-contaminated soil, and decommissioning the tailings 
dam. Infrastructure such as the mill, mill equipment, and mining fleet 
were buried underground.71
Furthermore, there is a general absence of visible ecological changes 
left on the land. At most abandoned mines, one is likely to find tailings 
piles, pollutants, industrial waste, open pits, abandoned infrastructure, 
destroyed migration zones, and (potentially) adverse human health ef-
fects.72 Analyzing Schefferville, Jean Sébastien Boutet argues, “For the 
Innu and Naskapi, the post-industrial environment acts as an incessant 
material reminder of three decades of intensive land exploitation.”73 At 
Polaris, aside from twenty million tonnes of mining tailings that have 
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been dumped into the Garrow Lake, there is little evidence of environ-
mental degradation around the mine site. In Resolute, in the absence of 
any persistent or urgent environmental impacts, there are few lingering 
anxieties about the old mine site, aside from some ongoing concern about 
Garrow Lake. Teck Cominco’s environmental monitoring ended in 2012, 
and, when the author was in Resolute, one interviewee was hopeful that 
the company would update them on the condition of the tailings. Though 
there has been no reported or suspected damage, the concern is still 
present, especially when hunting in the area. He stated, “I’d like to know. 
I just want to be safe.”74
In Resolute, the town did not think it critical to preserve a public, 
collective memory of the mine. There is no plaque or memorial to the 
mine. Every now and then, when hunting in the area, some notice that 
the buildings are no longer there. As one interviewee stated, “It’s gone 
now, there is no memory of it here in the community.”75 The youth in the 
community are largely unaware that there had been a mine near Resolute 
(unless a parent or relative had worked there).76 Those interviewed with-
out exception reported that working at the mine was just a job. None of 
the former workers I interviewed identified themselves as mine workers; 
rather, they self-identified as hunters. I heard repeatedly (sometimes in 
laughter) that Resolute is certainly not a mining town today, and it was 
not during the operational phase either.77 The absence of commemora-
tion means that the youth (and outsiders) fail to learn about that aspect 
of the community’s past.
The absence of commemoration speaks to the marginalization that 
Resolute Inuit, like communities before them, felt at a time when it was 
expected and normal for an outside force to make decisions that would 
affect a community, without including the community in the process. 
Just as commemoration can tell us much about what a community wants 
to remember, the absence of commemoration can teach us about what a 
community may choose to forget. The lack of commemoration suggests 
that the Polaris mine was not deemed an important site to the commun-
ity for good reason. The formation of a collective mining memory served 
no purpose for the residents of Resolute Bay. Unlike southern mining 
towns (and other northern mining towns such as Rankin Inlet), Polaris 
lacked a strong labour force from within the local community; Resolute 
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Bay existed before the mine came, and the town did not rely on the mine 
for its major income. Finally, a collective memory served no political, eco-
nomic, or social purpose for the town. Arguably, the Polaris mine oper-
ation itself was not a part of Resolute’s history as a community. It is a 
part of individual persons’ histories, for those who worked there or those 
who were actively engaged in the planning phase. Aside from private, 
individual reminiscence, Resolute residents largely do not engage with 
memories of a process in which they were largely slighted, excluded, and 
marginalized.
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Liability, Legacy, and Perpetual 
Care: Government Ownership and 
Management of the Giant Mine, 
1999–2015
Kevin O’Reilly
I NTRODUCTION
Yellowknife is a place of contrasts and transition.1 The oldest rocks on 
earth were found about three hundred kilometres north of Yellowknife 
on the Canadian Shield, and the rock around Yellowknife itself is about 
2.6 billion years old.2 Geographically, it is on the edge of the tenth largest 
freshwater lake on the planet, Great Slave Lake. Near the northern edge 
of the Canadian Subarctic, the tree line is only about two hundred kilo-
metres north of Yellowknife. The Yellowknives Dene and their ancestors 
have lived in the area for at least 7,000 years; their name comes from 
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their use of native copper in making tools. The fur trade for the area was 
mostly handled out of Fort Rae, about one hundred kilometres northwest 
of Yellowknife, until a small outpost opened at Dettah near the present 
city of Yellowknife in 1920. Prospectors were drawn to the area as early as 
the Klondike gold rush in the 1890s, when traces of gold were found near 
Yellowknife. Full-blown prospecting and a producing mine waited until 
the 1930s. There was a lull in gold mining during the Second World War 
when labourers were drawn away from the industry, but a full-scale boom 
followed shortly afterwards.3 
The population of Yellowknife grew from a few hundred in the 1930s 
to almost a thousand in 1940 and 3,200 by 1961. In 1967 Yellowknife 
became the first capital of the Northwest Territories, and many federal 
workers moved north with their families to work for the new territorial 
government. By 1981 the population had grown to about 9,500, and today 
almost 20,000 people live in the city. Until the 1990s, Yellowknife was 
still known primarily as a gold-mining centre, but with the closure of 
the gold mines, the economy has transitioned to diamond mining and 
services.4 
An uneasy relationship long existed between the non-Aboriginal 
and Aboriginal populations. From the beginning of the mining era, few 
jobs were available to members of the Yellowknives Dene First Nation, 
and they received no revenues from the gold mines in their tradition-
al territory. In the 1950s, federal Indian Affairs officials convinced the 
Yellowknives to move from scattered camps to centralized settlements 
around the trading post at Dettah and on part of Latham Island in the Old 
Town. The Yellowknives, as part of the Akaitcho Territory Government, 
are still negotiating their broader rights to lands and resources in the 
region with the federal and territorial governments. The lack of local con-
trol over land and resources also created feelings of marginalization on 
the part of many non-Aboriginal northerners, as the federal government 
has maintained authority over natural resources from the early twentieth 
century to the present, with a devolution agreement completed in 2014.5 
The long-standing issue of arsenic pollution from the Giant 
Yellowknife Gold Mine provides one of the worst examples where ex-
ternal pressure to develop northern resources, and a corresponding fail-
ure to meaningfully involve local people in decision making, produced 
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disastrous short- and long-term consequences for the environment and 
human health. The mine operated from 1948 to 1999, when its owner, 
Royal Oak Mines, went into receivership (see Table 1 for some key dates 
regarding the Giant Mine). Underground production continued until 
2004 (with the ore being processed at the nearby Con Mine), when it 
finally shut down and became a huge public liability. The gold ore at 
Giant was found in arsenopyrite rock, which was heated or “roasted” to 
drive off sulphur and arsenic. The arsenic was released as arsenic triox-
ide, which takes the form of a gas when heated, but dust at normal room 
temperature. As part of the ore processing, 237,000 tonnes of arsenic tri-
oxide were blown underground into old mine workings and some pur-
pose-built chambers. The thirteen chambers are approximately equiva-
lent to the volume of seven ten-storey buildings. Arsenic trioxide is a 
proven non-threshold carcinogen and dissolves easily in water. Currently, 
the chambers are leaking arsenic into the mine water, which is then 
 
Figure 1: Aerial view of the Giant Mine complex, Yellowknife, NWT, 2009. Photo by 
Kevin O’Reilly.
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treated before it eventually reaches Yellowknife Bay. There are ninety-five 
hectares of contaminated mine tailings on the surface, the equivalent of 
about three hundred football fields, ten to fifteen metres deep. Eight open 
pits and a roaster complex on the surface contain another 4,900 cubic 
metres of arsenic trioxide and other waste.6 
Gold mining in Yellowknife, particularly the histories of the three 
mines closest to the city (Giant, Con, and Negus Mines), is often por-
trayed in a positive light as part of the Northwest Territories’ “found-
ing” story (see Table 1). But beginning in the 1950s, water and airborne 
arsenic pollution from all these mines (with Giant contributing the vast 
majority) had very severe health and environmental consequences, par-
ticularly for the nearby Yellowknives Dene First Nation communities.7 
The Yellowknives Dene First Nation citizens have described the area of 
the mine site as a previously very productive valley full of blueberries and 
fish, an important gathering area that the mining operation completely 
destroyed. The Yellowknives Dene also suffered disproportionate risks 
from arsenic due to extensive contamination of snow and water used for 
drinking. At least one First Nation child died from drinking meltwater 
made from snow in 1951, and several other community members became 
sick. The mine owner paid the family $750 in compensation for the death 
of their child.8 
Ironically, it was the pollution control equipment installed in 
October 1951 in response to air pollution issues that created the under-
ground storage problem, as ton after ton of captured toxic arsenic triox-
ide dust had to be deposited somewhere on the mine site. Up until the 
1980s, the theory was that permafrost would contain the arsenic stored 
underground permanently. The mine owners and the government were 
of the view that underground storage of the arsenic trioxide produced by 
the roasting operation would be safe. An engineer working at the mine, 
W. M. Gilchrist, warned that this method might not work, writing that 
“the advantage of underground storage in the area considered over surface 
storage is not marked enough to warrant it, when the possible effects of 
operations in the area and the lack of control over the material once it is 
place in an underground chamber are considered.”9 The available records 
suggest, however, that few, if any, other government and mine officials 
said “stop” or “maybe we should think this through.” Careful monitoring 
345Kevin O’Reilly
Table 2:  Chronology of Key Events for Giant Mine
Date Event
1935 Original mining claims staked
1948  Giant Mine goes into production, tailings initially dumped 
directly into Great Slave Lake
1949 Gold roasting operations begin at Giant Mine
February 1951 Giant Mine tailings begin to be dumped directly into smaller 
lakes near the site
October 1951 Air pollution control equipment installed, captured arsenic 
trioxide dust blown underground into mined out areas
1957 Treatment of tailings and water discharges begins at Giant 
Mine
December 1977  Canadian Public Health Association Task Force reports on 
Giant Mine
1978 First water licence issued for Giant Mine
1999 Giant Mine owner Royal Oak Mines goes into receivership
July 2004 All mining at Giant Mine stops
March 15, 2005 Cooperation Agreement signed between federal and 
territorial governments for Giant Mine
June 15, 2005 Subsurface rights under Giant Mine are withdrawn by federal 
Order in Council SI/2005-55
December 31, 2005 Water Licence for Giant Mine expires
October 7, 2007  Giant Mine Remediation Plan water licence application 
submitted
February 21, 2008                                 Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board completes a 
preliminary screening of the Giant Mine water licence and 
sends it forward without an environmental assessment
March 31, 2008 Giant Mine water licence application referred for an 
environmental assessment by the City of Yellowknife
July 22-23, 2008 Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board holds 
scoping hearing
October 2010 DIAND and GNWT submit Developer’s Assessment Report 
as part of the environmental assessment of the Giant Mine 
Remediation Project
September 10-14, 2012 Public Hearings held as part of the Environmental 
Assessment of the Giant Mine Remediation Project
June 20, 2013                        Review Board issues its Report of Environmental Assessment 
and Reasons for Decision on the Giant Mine Remediation 
Project
12 |  L I A BI L I T Y,  L E GAC Y, A N D PE R PET UA L C A R E346
of the underground storage process was recommended by the Canadian 
Public Health Association special task force that examined the arsenic 
issue in Yellowknife in the 1970s, advice that obviously was not followed.10 
Canadian taxpayers have spent over $160 million to look after the 
Giant Mine site since 1999.11 The government’s remediation plan will 
cost $903 million and will require perpetual care at an estimated cost of 
$2 million a year—forever.12 A 2002 study by government officials esti-
mated that seven million ounces of gold were produced from Giant Mine 
with a value of about $2.7 billion.13 The owners made $867 million in 
profit, while the government only collected $454 million ($360 million 
from workers as income tax, $78 million as corporate taxes, and only 
$16 million in royalties, while providing direct subsidies of $47 million). 
Canadians should seriously question whether this was a wise investment 
and who really benefited from a resource development that has become 
one of the worst toxic liabilities in the country.14 Canadians should also 
question how the federal government has handled the remediation of the 
mine, particularly the proposal to freeze the underground arsenic and 
create a perpetual care scenario with unknown risks and potential lia-
bilities that extend for an unimaginable amount of time into the future. 
As one means of contributing to this debate, this chapter will provide a 
history and critical review of the period of government ownership and 
management of the Giant Mine from  1999 to 2015, including the de-
velopment of the remediation plan, the environmental assessment of the 
proposed frozen block method of arsenic containment and the negotia-
tion of a legally-binding environmental agreement to set up an independ-
ent oversight body.
PR ELUDE TO R ECEI V ER SHIP, 1991–1998
Pollution controversies at Giant predate the closure of the mine. They 
are worth briefly recounting because they reveal a lax federal regulatory 
regime for air and water pollution in the Northwest Territories in the 
decades leading up to closure of Giant Mine and Royal Oak’s tendency to 
resist stubbornly the strict regulation of contaminants. Moreover, in the 
few years before Giant Mine went into receivership, the noose started to 
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tighten in terms of increased public pressure for some form of improved 
pollution control, particularly for sulphur dioxide and arsenic emissions. 
These pollution controversies provided forums for the expression of in-
creasing public and official concern over the underground arsenic issue. 
In April 1991, two Yellowknife citizens (Chris O’Brien and the au-
thor), pressed for an investigation into the impact of air emissions from 
Giant on the environment and human health. The request proceeded 
under the newly minted NWT Environmental Rights Act, passed as a 
private member’s bill by the NWT Legislative Assembly in 1990.15 The 
initial response from the territorial government was to ask for more evi-
dence of arsenic emissions, so the requesters sent relevant documents, 
including a report generated by the government itself. More than two 
years after the request for an investigation, the territorial government 
released a report confirming that trees were being damaged by sulphur 
dioxide.16 The federal Department of Health and Welfare conducted a hu-
man health assessment and concluded that sulphur dioxide levels posed 
no health hazards to Yellowknifers other than mild and reversible im-
pacts among those with respiratory issues such as asthma. For arsenic, 
however, the report emphasized that no safe threshold level could be im-
posed: “Canadian and international regulatory agencies have classified 
arsenic as a known human carcinogen. For this reason alone, exposure to 
arsenic should be reduced to the lowest possible level.”17
At that time, estimates suggested that twenty-six kilograms of arsen-
ic trioxide per day were still going up the stack at Giant Mine. There was 
no clearly enforceable air quality legislation or regulations covering the 
Northwest Territories, due in part to the fact that air quality legislation 
is being left to provincial authorities in Southern Canada and so some 
confusion over jurisdiction occurred.18 The territorial government was 
also reluctant to take on new responsibilities and related monitoring and 
enforcement costs. Both governments were also extremely reluctant to 
regulate Giant Mine as the primary point source for airborne arsenic in 
the Yellowknife area. By the early 1990s, pollution concerns had been 
pushed to the sidelines as the horrendous labour dispute at the Giant 
Mine—during which nine replacement workers were killed—thrust 
Giant Mine into the national media spotlight. Even here, remarkably, the 
federal government was reluctant to intervene in Royal Oak’s internal 
12 |  L I A BI L I T Y,  L E GAC Y, A N D PE R PET UA L C A R E348
affairs, ensuring that there was little action on both the environmental 
and labour fronts through the early 1990s.19
In 1994 the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA) iden-
tified inorganic arsenic compounds, including the arsenic trioxide as 
found at the Giant Mine, as a priority toxic substance that required an 
action plan to reduce exposure. In May 1995 the Standing Committee on 
the Environment and Sustainable Development travelled to Yellowknife, 
but nothing had happened.20 In June, the Committee recommended that 
Environment Canada identify what action it would take on arsenic by 
December 1995.21 The Committee was particularly concerned about per-
ceptions of arsenic contamination among the Yellowknives Dene, sug-
gesting that public consultations had revealed “the elders’ resulting loss 
of confidence in the government’s ability to protect their environment 
and health. Nowhere was this loss of trust more apparent than on the 
issues of arsenic pollution.”22
In response to growing pressure from the public and municipal au-
thorities, the territorial government adopted an unenforceable ambient 
air quality guideline for maximum levels of sulphur dioxide on June 
24, 1994, that was identical to the federal guideline. In August 1995, 
Yellowknife City Council adopted a motion calling on the federal and ter-
ritorial governments to “take immediate steps to introduce enforceable, 
binding regulations dealing with sulphur dioxide and arsenic.”23 That 
same month, the federal and territorial governments set up a task force 
that included officials from federal and territorial departments respon-
sible for health, environment, and mining.24 Following a series of reports 
and consultations, the task force held a final workshop in July 1997 that 
recommended negotiating an agreement with the owners of Giant Mine 
to impose arsenic emission reductions over a fixed period of time with 
penalties for non-compliance.25 Amid the task force deliberations on ar-
senic, the territorial government released draft Gold Roasting Discharge 
Control Regulations (in May 1996) that would have required the owners 
of Giant Mine to monitor and reduce sulphur dioxide by 90 per cent 
within ten years (i.e., toward the end of the then predicted mine life). 
The owner, Royal Oak Mines, openly threatened to shut down the mine 
if the government introduced air-quality regulations.26 Nothing further 
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happened with the proposed sulphur dioxide or arsenic regulations, and 
the ultimate solution was to wait for the mine to shut down.
Local concerns about arsenic and water pollution in Yellowknife Bay 
and Back Bay also persisted into the 1990s despite the fact the intake for 
potable water was moved upstream of Giant Mine in 1969.27 Giant Mine’s 
use of water, including any pollution of local waterways, was first regu-
lated in 1975 through a water licence issued by the newly created NWT 
Water Board. Renewals of the water licence took place (roughly every five 
to six years), and transcripts of the hearings reveal persistent and ongoing 
concerns about the impact of arsenic issuing from tailings ponds into 
Baker Creek, and then draining out into Back Bay. In February 1975 the 
federal government fined the company $2,000 under the federal Fisheries 
Act for a tailings spill the previous April in Back Bay, where the heavy 
loading of cyanide and arsenic proved toxic to fish.28 By 1993 ammonia 
emissions (a by-product of heavy explosive use in mining) were also regu-
lated for the first time under the water licence due to this substance’s 
acute toxicity to aquatic life. The company could not meet the ammonia 
limits due to increased sewage from the camp as replacement workers 
were being housed at the mine during the strike, but Royal Oak success-
fully petitioned for an emergency amendment to raise the limits from 2 
parts per million (ppm) to 15 ppm, and then a longer term increase to 
19.5 ppm in May 1994.29 
Amid all the various pollution controversies and the evolving regu-
latory regime surrounding Giant Mine in the early 1990s, federal and 
territorial regulators began to express at least some concern about sta-
bility and long-term liabilities associated with Giant Mine’s underground 
arsenic. The renewal of the water licence issued in May 1993 contained a 
few new provisions about the underground storage of arsenic and ultim-
ate closure and reclamation of the site. An investigation and evaluation 
of the underground arsenic storage vaults, including rock mechanics, 
geohydrology, geochemistry, permafrost, and risk assessment, as part of 
abandonment and reclamation were required, with a terms of reference 
to be submitted for approval to the NWT Water Board by June 1993. The 
final report on this work was due in 1997 but not completed. A letter 
from the company indicated that Royal Oak was now pursuing remov-
al, refining, and export of pure arsenic to the United States for use in 
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manufacturing wood preservatives. The company suggested that leaving 
the arsenic underground would produce a perpetual care scenario, some-
thing that regulators and the general public would find unacceptable. The 
company proposed a new date of May 1, 2000, for a detailed proposal for 
removing and reprocessing the underground arsenic.30
At the same time, the federal Department of Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development (DIAND) began its own study of the under-
ground arsenic storage, fearful that it would likely inherit the site be-
cause Royal Oak would not or could not carry out a proper reclamation 
program. On October 6, 1997, DIAND released a report that examined 
options for the underground arsenic with costs ranging from $10 million 
to $1.7 billion (see Table 2).31 
Company, federal, territorial, and City of Yellowknife officials held a 
technical workshop on the issue in October 1997, but no representatives 
were invited from the Yellowknives Dene First Nation or non-govern-
mental organizations. Workshop participants made no firm decisions but 
Table 3: DIAND’s proposed options for remediating underground arsenic at Giant 
Mine in 1997 study 
METHOD DESCRIPTION ESTIMATED COST
Secure Landfilling removal and storage in an engineered 
landfill 
$205-225 million
Offsite Treatment removal and shipment by truck to another 
facility 
$425-445 million
Off-site Incineration removal and shipment by truck to another 
facility 
$347-368 million
Bioremediation use of biological agents for treatment, not 
proven
$1.542 billion
Cement Stabilization removal and mixing with cement for 
deposition into an engineered landfill 
$25-31 million
Phytoremediation use of plants for treatment, not proven $10-180 million
Conversion to Ferric 
Arsenate  
use of a pressure oxidation unit to convert 
the arsenic into a less toxic form 
$1.684 billion
Conversion to Arsenic 
Sulphide 
conversion to a less toxic form of arsenic $725 million
Marketing reprocessing or arsenic for other uses 
such as pesticides or wood preservative 
$10-30 million in 
profits from sales
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did complete a preliminary evaluation of options that rated continued 
storage underground as the least expensive option.32
To partially fulfill previous requirements of its water licence, Royal 
Oak Mines submitted a rough proposal in December 1997 to the NWT 
Water Board for above-ground storage of any newly generated arsenic 
trioxide from continued gold-roasting operations, and re-mining and re-
processing the underground arsenic trioxide for commercial resale.33 The 
Water Board issued another water licence renewal for five years beginning 
in June 1998. This new licence required an arsenic trioxide management 
plan be submitted to the board by October 1, 1999, with quarterly prog-
ress reports beginning on October 1, 1998. Financial security (funds the 
mining company provided to offset the costs of remediation) remained 
the same under this licence ($400,000), but this low amount would be 
gradually increased to $7 million at the end of the term of the licence. The 
company filed its first quarterly report on the arsenic trioxide manage-
ment plan in February 1999, reporting that they had made little head-
way on its plan to remove the underground arsenic. The company also 
indicated that it had submitted a proposal to the federal Department of 
Indian Affairs and Northern Development for a grant to fund the work, 
hoping to complete the plan by March 31, 2000.34 
Despite the very serious environmental issues posed by the under-
ground arsenic, governments at all levels seemed more intent on prop-
ping up the failing finances of Royal Oak and squeezing just a few more 
years out of a mine that was clearly in decline rather than addressing 
the issue of who would pay the potentially massive costs of remediation 
after closure. In the fall of 1998, the price of gold had fallen to $280 an 
ounce from about $440 an ounce, and Royal Oak was seeking subsidies 
to remain in operation. The territorial government developed a sev-
en-year program to subsidize further exploration and development for 
gold mines by making a per capita contribution for each employee. An 
annual grant was to be provided up to $1.5 million, based on $5,000 per 
employee, repayable if the price of gold moved above $365 an ounce for 
more than nine months.35 Senior levels of government placed political 
pressure on the City of Yellowknife to participate in the subsidy program, 
and it agreed to contribute $150,000 per year on a matching basis to the 
GNWT funds using the same criteria for the two gold mines operating 
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within city limits (Giant and Con Mines).36 The city’s subsidies actual-
ly flowed through the territorial government rather than directly to the 
mining companies, as it was illegal to make a direct financial contribu-
tion to private interests under the territorial legislation governing muni-
cipal governments.37
In the prelude to the closure of the Giant Mine in 1999, it is very 
clear that governments at all levels, even those responsible for regulating 
the mine, were not prepared to press the owners for any significant or 
substantive changes to reduce air or water pollution, or even to require 
better reclamation planning. The attitude of the Department of Indian 
Affairs and Northern Development, the main regulator, was summarized 
by one commentator as, “We try to work with a company to find solutions 
because frequent court actions don’t give you the solution you want.”38 
The company used the deteriorating gold market as a pretext for inaction 
on planning or implementing remediation measure for underground ar-
senic. As Larry Connell, Royal Oak’s manager of environmental services, 
explained to the NWT Water Board in 1999, “in reality little progress 
was made during the fourth quarter of 1998 on advancing proposals for 
the extraction and recovery of the baghouse material from the existing 
underground storage vaults . . . The current low gold and copper prices 
have created a severe cash flow and liquidity problem at Royal Oak.”39 In 
the years immediately prior to the closure, the public interest in address-
ing the difficult remediation issues at Giant Mine was always subservient 
to the economic interests at play.
R ECEI V ER SHIP AND GOV ER N MENT 
MANAGEMENT, 1999–20 07
In addition to falling gold prices, the root cause of Giant Mine going into 
receivership on April 16, 1999, was a rapidly expanding mining com-
pany that could not adequately finance all of its ongoing operations. The 
company had devoted huge amounts of finance capital to opening the 
large Kemess Mine in northern British Columbia, investing $470 million 
but ending in 1997 with a $135 million loss, even after closing a couple 
of other mines in its portfolio.40 Minutes after Royal Oak was put into 
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receivership, the company’s entire board of directors (including the con-
troversial Peggy Witte, also known as Margaret Kent) resigned. Price 
Waterhouse Coopers was appointed as interim receiver to try to arrange 
sale of the assets to pay some of the creditors.41 The City of Yellowknife 
was owed $737,000 in property taxes at the end of 1998 from Giant Mine, 
and began to withhold further subsidies to the operation as previously 
negotiated with the territorial government.42 By May 1999, Royal Oak 
owed over $14 million to local creditors, including the City of Yellowknife 
($1.078 million for property and school taxes), Government of the NWT 
($1.088 million) and the NWT Power Corporation ($1.585 million).43
Two major developments came out of the bankruptcy and closure of 
Giant Mine. First, DIAND arranged for the sale of the Giant property for 
only $10 to Miramar Mining Corporation, which operated the Con Mine 
on the south side of the city. Second, all levels of government continued 
to provide subsidies and concessions to keep the mine operating. As part 
of a deal that was reached December 14, 1999, Miramar agreed to operate 
the mine with trucking of the ore across town to its processing facilities 
at the Con Mine.44 A reduced work force of about fifty employees would 
be needed to operate Giant. Miramar also agreed to place a small levy 
on gold production into a Reclamation Security Trust, with the ability to 
write off various operating and management costs. It is unclear wheth-
er Miramar actually made any contributions to the trust.45 Miramar set 
up a new shell company to operate the mine, and regulators granted the 
newly branded Miramar Giant complete and total indemnification from 
all environmental liabilities related to the previous operations at the site. 
Though absolved of responsibility for long-term environmental issues 
at the Giant site, Miramar Giant did agree to keep the property in com-
pliance with environmental regulations. The company’s highest expense 
was the approximately $2 million a year required to pump water from 
the mine, a procedure needed to continue mining and to keep the under-
ground arsenic from being dissolved. Responsibility for the longer-term 
issues associated with underground arsenic issue had now passed from 
private to public hands. The federal and territorial governments would 
pay for development of the arsenic trioxide management plan and subse-
quent reclamation activities at the site. On December 14, 2001, Miramar 
Giant exercised its right to terminate the agreement with government, 
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and so the costs of maintaining the entire property became a permanent 
public liability. The federal government even agreed to assume immedi-
ately the company’s expenses for pumping water and all environmental 
compliance costs, approximately $300,000 a month by this point, despite 
the fact the agreement required six months’ notice prior to the govern-
ment taking on maintenance costs of the site.46
FURTHER SUBSIDIES AND CONCESSIONS 
FOR GIANT MI NE
Remarkably, even as the gold mines near Yellowknife became increasing-
ly marginal operations, DIAND and GNWT agreed to provide matching 
funds up to $500,000 per year for exploration at the Giant and Con Mine 
properties. Miramar and the federal and territorial governments agreed 
among themselves that there should also be concessions from the City 
of Yellowknife: the company could take a two-year tax holiday and forgo 
tax arrears now totalling about $1.7 million.47 Yellowknife Mayor David 
Lovell suggested that “they essentially came to an agreement that suited 
their needs and then threw the ball in our court for final approval,” and 
further, “the City and the Education Districts are being asked to make 
the biggest relative sacrifices and we are, by far, the smallest players.” The 
annual loss to the city and school boards amounted to about $700,000. A 
deal was eventually reached where: 
•	 the city agreed to “buy” a portion of the surface lease 
covering the Giant Mine site where there was a townsite 
and a potential boat launch area, for a portion of the value 
of the property taxes ($233,000 in 2000 and $177,000 in 
2001);
•	 a cap on property taxes for Giant Mine was imposed; 
•	 the city received a release from GNWT and DIAND for any 
existing environmental contamination in the area; 
•	 the federal and territorial governments agreed to remediate 
the area as part of the overall program for the property.48 
355Kevin O’Reilly
Initially the city attempted to secure an indemnification for the lands to 
be leased by the city, similar to what had already been secured by Miramar 
for its use of Giant Mine, but both the federal and territorial governments 
refused to offer the same deal to Yellowknife. The city also sought to have 
the surface remediation of the area completed to a mutually agreeable 
standard but dropped this after receiving verbal assurances. The deal 
for the leased area and the release agreement was finally formalized in 
October 2000.49 Less than a year later, the federal and territorial govern-
ments reneged on the understanding that city’s leased area would be re-
mediated to a standard agreeable to the city. When the city attempted to 
develop a boat launch in the area, the federal and territorial governments 
informed the city that they would only remediate areas within the leased 
lands to an “industrial” standard and that any other desired use would be 
Yellowknife’s responsibility.50 
DEV ELOPMENT OF AN AR SENIC 
TR IOXIDE MANAGEMENT PLAN AND THE 
R EMEDIATION PLAN
Once it became clear that the owners of the Giant Mine had little or no 
intention of developing a plan for the underground arsenic, the federal 
government began to conduct its own research, perhaps in anticipation of 
the site becoming a public liability. This work began in 1997, as discussed 
above, and there was a workshop on the subject that did not include par-
ties outside of government and the company. DIAND hired a technical 
adviser in 1999 to provide advice on how to manage the underground ar-
senic. There was a series of successive workshops run as consultation ses-
sions where the federal government and its consultants presented find-
ings and options but with very little public input in-between and little or 
no involvement in the development of evaluation criteria and selection of 
preferred alternatives. Materials were often not provided ahead of time, 
no participant funding was provided to help parties obtain independ-
ent technical advice, and there was very little flexibility shown by the 
government in fully assessing new or preferred alternatives as expressed 
by workshop participants. In no way could this process be compared to 
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principles of free, prior, and informed consent or consultation and ac-
commodation in terms of the federal government’s fiduciary obligations 
to Aboriginal peoples.51
The City of Yellowknife outlined its principles for the remediation of 
underground arsenic trioxide in an October 2001 letter to the minister of 
Indian Affairs and Northern Development as follows:
•	 DIAND’s proposed in-situ option [freezing] be considered 
only as an interim measure;
•	 DIAND should commit to fund ongoing research and 
development to identify a solution and regularly review new 
advances in technology for a permanent solution;
•	 A community trust should be established and funded by the 
federal government to manage cleanup and containment 
and conduct research and development into a long-term, 
permanent solution;
•	 DIAND should consider all options available with 
preference given to methods that offer a long-term 
permanent solution with the lowest possible risks;
•	 The public should be consulted for input and that it be in 
the best interests of the citizens of Yellowknife;
•	 Timelines for completion of interim and permanent 
solutions should be established and adhered to;
•	 Local employment should be maximized; and
•	 All costs should remain the responsibility of the federal 
government.52 
DIAND seems to have had some difficulty finding the funds to carry out 
initial assessment and planning work on the underground arsenic.53 In 
early January 2003, DIAND advertised that funding up to $2,000 was 
available for Yellowknife-based organizations to make presentations at 
a workshop held that month and at other community consultations.54 
The funding could not be used to support additional technical review, 
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critique of the DIAND’s final report on arsenic trioxide, or for travel. 
DIAND made funding available only for internal consultations and for 
preparing a written and oral presentation at the workshop (maximum 
of ten minutes). Given the narrow scope of eligibility, no organizations 
secured any of this limited funding. The only organization to formally 
present at the May 2003 workshop was a group of Yellowknife MLAs, 
who generally supported the freezing option after a private meeting with 
DIAND and GNWT staff.55 Following the final workshop held in June 
2003, the federal government decided to proceed with the freezing op-
tion for the underground arsenic. 
THE COOPER ATION AGR EEMENT
Mining ceased for good at Giant in July 2004 and the mine was scheduled 
to be returned to DIAND from Miramar in January 2005 (extended to 
July 2005 to allow the federal government to arrange a contract for care 
and maintenance). DIAND’s consultants prepared a draft remediation 
plan in January 2005. Given the uncertainty over the respective costs and 
responsibilities of federal and territorial governments, an agreement of 
some sort had to be worked out before much in the way of substantive 
remediation could begin. The two governments signed a Cooperation 
Agreement in March 2005. In exchange for limiting its liability to $23 
million, the territorial government agreed that the site would only be re-
mediated to an “industrial” standard for arsenic and hydrocarbon spills 
and that the underground arsenic would be frozen in place forever. The 
two governments also agreed to become co-proponents in any environ-
mental assessment and regulatory proceedings, and agreed to establish 
an “oversight committee” to coordinate their activities and to finalize a 
remediation plan. The agreement stipulated that the parties had to dis-
cuss with the City of Yellowknife the care and maintenance and remedi-
ation of the area under lease, municipal services to be provided to the 
mine site, and any other developments in the remediation.56
The day before the agreement was signed, territorial and federal of-
ficials met with city council members on what was about to be signed 
and indicated that the Yellowknives Dene First Nation Chiefs had been 
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briefed three days earlier.57 City council expressed its disappointment 
with the lack of consultation and nominal role afforded the city in the 
agreement. The city was also concerned because it had entered into a 
lease of the townsite and marina area for “municipal” and “recreational” 
purposes with the understanding that this area would be remediated to 
permit such uses, but the other orders of government now would only 
remediate to an “industrial” standard.58 
EN V IRON MENTAL ASSESSMENT OF THE 
GIANT MI NE R EMEDIATION PLAN
At the end of the limited consultative process in 2003, DIAND’s tech-
nical adviser suggested that their recommendation for freezing the 
underground arsenic be subject to an environmental assessment.59 The 
federal government ignored this advice, attempting to leapfrog ahead to 
the regulatory process without final designs in hand, despite significant 
public concern about an approach that was perceived to be “freeze it and 
forget it.” The government and the regulators refused to automatically 
refer to environmental assessment a remediation that proposed to main-
tain in situ a massive amount of toxic material immediately adjacent to a 
community of 20,000 people. The federal government’s hand was forced 
only when the City of Yellowknife made a mandatory referral under the 
Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act.60 The city government 
took this action based on a request from the author, representations from 
a Yellowknives Dene First Nation Chief, and petitions from the local 
MLA of the NWT. This request for an environmental assessment repre-
sented an extraordinary convergence of interests and resistance from 
organizations and individuals that had not worked together effectively 
in the past. Ironically, these interests acted together in part because of 
their marginalization from the decision-making process surrounding the 
remediation of Giant Mine. Although the public’s exclusion from mean-
ingful consultation about Giant Mine might have continued indefinitely, 
concerned groups found a powerful ally in the city government, one that 
held the power to trigger a mandatory referral in face of indifference by 
the federal and territorial governments. 
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The federal and territorial governments resisted the environment-
al assessment, showing disregard for the process from the beginning 
and managing to drag it out for longer than five years. For example, 
Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada (AANDC, for-
merly DIAND) requested extensions or produced delays thirteen times 
during the process for a total of more than 1.6 years.61 During the scop-
ing hearing, the federal government promised to consider proposals for 
participant funding on a case-by-case basis. But when the Yellowknives 
Dene First Nation, the City of Yellowknife, and a private citizen (the au-
thor) submitted a proposal for $40,000 to study independent oversight in 
October 2009, AANDC rejected it eleven months later because the work 
was to be done by the government.62 When the government’s submission 
was filed with the review board more than a year later, there was nothing 
in it regarding independent oversight. The Oversight Working Group was 
established outside of the process to attempt to reach some consensus on 
a legally binding environmental agreement containing provisions for an 
independent oversight body, much like the arrangements already in place 
for three northern diamond mines. After twelve meetings, six drafts of 
a discussion paper, and eight drafts of an environmental agreement, the 
most the governments could do was to say to the review board that they 
generally agreed with the concept of oversight but wanted to discuss 
it further.63 Documents obtained under federal access-to-information 
legislation indicate that AANDC secretly developed a “Site Stabilization 
Plan” to move forward with remediation outside of the environmental 
assessment in November 2011.64 Finally, AANDC officials provided mis-
leading cost figures for the overall project in August 2012 and at the pub-
lic hearing, stating that implementation of the remediation plan would 
total $449 million.65 This claim was made despite the fact that the federal 
Treasury Board approved a revised cost estimate for the project in March 
2012 for $903 million based on a submission from AANDC. The fact that 
AANDC’s projection of a near doubling in remediation costs for Giant 
Mine was only revealed through an access-to-information request by the 
author suggests, perhaps more than any other incident, the department’s 
indifference to the public consultation requirements of the environment-
al assessment.66 
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Figure 2: Pipes constructed to freeze one of the underground arsenic chambers as 
part of a Freeze Optimization Study begun in 2009. Photo by Kevin O’Reilly.
Even at the public hearings stage of the environmental assessment, the 
federal and territorial governments also did not engage fully with the 
process. On the first day of public hearings held by the Mackenzie Valley 
Environmental Impact Review Board in September 2012, the chair had 
to urge the government representatives several times to answer the ques-
tions being put to them.67 Federal government officials stated, on more 
than one occasion, that the focus of their work was on stabilizing the site; 
thus the big picture issues such as perpetual care and oversight had not 
been addressed very well. The government made vague commitments on 
oversight and perpetual care at the very last possible moment, and filed 
presentations just before the public hearings began.68 
In contrast, any doubt that public concern with the government’s re-
mediation plan existed was removed by over twenty presentations made 
by private citizens during the hearings. Over fifty people waited during a 
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power outage one evening before the lights came on again to make many 
of these submissions directly to the review board. Public participants 
raised many key issues through the many days of hearings, including: 
•	 Lack of perpetual care planning and independent oversight 
for the project; 
•	 The current plan for the Giant Mine is really a “stabilization 
plan” and not a “remediation plan” that truly reflects the 
views and needs of the community; 
•	 As the proposed plan requires perpetual care and is not 
a real solution, strategic investment for ongoing research 
and development into a more sustainable and permanent 
outcome is required;
•	 There is still an opportunity to work together, but a written, 
legally binding agreement is needed to firm up the vague 
commitments made by the governments; 
•	 Proper management of the project will cost a lot more 
money, and community leaders will need to work together 
with the project team to convince decision makers and 
funders that this is the case; 
•	 There is more than enough evidence for the review board 
to conclude that there is significant public concern with 
the remediation plan and that there is the potential for 
significant adverse environmental impacts. These two 
findings are necessary to establish the legal basis for the 
board to recommend binding measures before the project 
can proceed.
In its final submission to the review board in October 2012, the govern-
ment continued to conclude that the project “poses no significant risks 
of adverse environmental effects” and “is not the source of long standing 
concerns.”69 The government concluded that the legacy of the site is the 
source of public concern and not the incomplete stabilization proposals 
in its remediation plan. The government actually stated in this letter that 
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“during the hearings, there was wide support for the ground freezing ap-
proach”—this despite not one person offering support for the plan during 
the public hearing. The letter denies the concerns expressed and appears 
to be motivated foremost by the desire to “get on with it.” The government 
responded to public concern in its closing comments to the review board 
by stating that it was committed to “continuing and even increasing our 
engagement efforts so that concerned individuals, groups and the public 
can feel confident, as we do, that the proposed Remediation Plan pre-
sents the best available approach.”70 But more of the same consultation 
without consideration of the approach is simply not going to work. The 
government needs to devote a lot more resources to the development of a 
real remediation plan that is based on a foundation of trust and working 
together. The government also should heed calls for a public apology and 
compensation to the Yellowknives Dene First Nation for the suffering they 
experienced to due arsenic contamination and the permanent damage 
that Giant Mine has caused to their traditional territory. Furthermore, at 
this point in the process frequent calls for a real commitment to develop 
a comprehensive perpetual care plan and a legally binding environmental 
agreement (one that contains provisions for access to information, in-
dependent oversight, investment in strategic ongoing research, and de-
velopment of a more permanent solution) all fell on deaf ears. 
Nevertheless, the federal government began a formal process to ex-
empt or split out from the ongoing environmental assessment the demo-
lition of the most highly contaminated buildings on the site, the roaster 
complex, intending to start this work in June 2013.71 This is the most con-
taminated mine feature above ground and contains about 4,000 tonnes 
of toxic arsenic trioxide and other contaminants. Initially there were no 
plans for air monitoring of arsenic stirred up by the demolition, and no 
clear limits for ambient airborne arsenic to protect the health of workers 
or those using the Ingraham Trail, a popular public highway running 
right through the Giant Mine site.72 The work on the roaster demolition 
was completed in 2014. Despite the fact that the work was not contracted 
using the federal government’s emergency authority, the federal and ter-
ritorial governments wanted the regulators to consider it an “emergency” 
situation so it could be exempted from the scrutiny and protections that 
will come from the environmental assessment. 
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The review board released its Report of Environmental Assessment 
and Reasons for Decision on the Giant Mine Remediation Project on June 
20, 2013. The board found that there is significant public concern with 
the project and the potential for significant adverse environmental im-
pacts. This was a crucial finding that then gave the board the authority to 
recommend binding measures to reduce or eliminate these concerns and 
impacts. The board recommended an unprecedented twenty-six binding 
measures that would have to be adopted by anyone carrying out the pro-
ject and incorporated as terms and conditions on any licences or permits 
issued by the federal and territorial governments.  There are a further 
sixteen suggestions in a variety of areas. It would be fair to say that the 
board listened very carefully to what the communities had to say and 
made every effort to clearly reflect the concerns and issues they heard. 
Virtually all of the recommendations from the Yellowknives Dene First 
Nation and civil society were adopted in various ways.73
One of the most significant recommendations from the board was 
that the project should only proceed as a reversible “interim solution” for a 
maximum of one hundred years, rather than the perpetual care approach 
of the government. This shifts the onus to come up with a permanent 
solution onto this and a few subsequent generations. This is reinforced 
with a mandatory twenty-year comprehensive and independent review 
of the entire project, with the involvement of the communities. The gov-
ernment was also required to create a multi-stakeholder research agency 
(as part of a legally binding environmental agreement) to facilitate active 
research on a permanent solution. There was also a requirement for a 
legally binding environmental agreement that would pick up where nego-
tiations left off in 2012 and would create a community-based independ-
ent oversight body with provisions for dispute resolution.74 
Further measures recommended an independent quantitative risk 
assessment and an improved human health assessment and human 
health-monitoring program focused on arsenic. The review board also 
recommended that the government investigate long-term funding op-
tions, including an independent, self-sustaining trust, to support the 
long-term management of the site. The government is required to consid-
er the results of the human health risk assessment and consult with the 
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Yellowknives and City of Yellowknife in determining suitable end uses of 
the mine site.
Once the report was received by the federal (Aboriginal Affairs and 
Northern Development, Fisheries and Oceans, and Environment) and 
territorial (Environment and Natural Resources), government ministers 
they had to decide on one of the following courses of action:
1. Accept the recommendation that the project can proceed 
with the recommended measures, which means that the 
measures then become binding on regulators and those that 
carry out the work; or
2. Refer the recommendation that the project can proceed 
with the recommended measures back to the review board 
for further consideration; or
3. Reject the recommendation that the project can proceed 
with the recommended measures, and send the project 
for a higher level of assessment (an impact review, by the 
same board, where alternatives and other factors must be 
considered); or
4. Invoke a murky process called “consult-to-modify” where 
the ministers write the review board and proved a rationale 
to change (and/or weaken) the measures to make them 
“acceptable.” The role, if any, for the public is not clear. 
A period of intense lobbying took place in the summer and fall of 2013 
encouraging the relevant federal and territorial ministers to accept the 
review board report.75 Meanwhile, the Giant Mine Remediation Project 
staff released their own critique of the review board that basically advised 
rejection of key recommendations because of perceived delays they may 
cause, additional costs and threats to the accountability and authority 
over the project.76 Despite these objections, the responsible ministers 
entered into a “consult-to-modify” process with the review board on 
December 23, 2013 that actually resulted in strengthened legally binding 
measures when the ministers finally accepted the measures on August 
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11, 2014.77 Among the measures was a requirement for a legally binding 
environmental agreement to set up an independent oversight body for the 
Giant Mine Remediation Project that would also have responsibility for 
research and development of a permanent solution to the underground 
arsenic.  After seven negotiating sessions from September 2014 to April 
2015, an agreement was reached and signed in the summer of 2015.78  In 
a bold and unusual move, Alternatives North was recognized as a full 
party with roles and responsibilities the same as the Yellowknives Dene 
First Nation and the City of Yellowknife. The Giant Mine Oversight Body 
is expected to be operational in the fall of 2015. 
CONCLUSIONS
What have we learned from the Giant Mine story? Unfortunately, it seems 
very little. The governments who manage environmental issues in the 
Northwest Territories apparently still feel they are more in the business 
of promoting northern development than protecting the public interest. 
There is nothing in federal or territorial law that would prevent another 
Giant Mine: no regulations on air quality in the NWT, no mandatory 
financial security for mines, and no mandatory requirement for closure 
plans for mines.79 Only through the actions of individual citizens (includ-
ing the author) and a few regular MLAs was the territorial government 
embarrassed into amending its land management legislation to require 
mandatory financial security for industrial and commercial surface leas-
es over the small pockets of land it controls, beginning in February 2011 
through revisions to the Commissioner’s Lands Act.80 
If Giant Mine is symbolic of what other communities facing remedi-
ation of orphan sites might face, here are a few findings and suggestions:
•	 There needs to be an acknowledgement of failure and an 
apology for wrongdoing (not necessarily blame), to provide a 
basis for reconciliation and moving forward;
•	 Governments are driven by cost avoidance and will usually 
gravitate toward least expensive options;
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•	 Governments will often attempt to manufacture consensus 
and avoid public scrutiny;
•	 Short-term technical fixes will often be proposed and 
prevail without organized resistance;
•	 Governments have infinite confidence in their internal 
capacity, commitment, and longevity and will portray 
perpetual care as manageable and sustainable; 
•	 Communities need to organize and seek independent 
technical assistance; 
•	 Marginalization in decision making often provides 
opportunities for new alliances and convergence of 
interests.
With the current federal government dismantling decades of work to es-
tablish environmental assessment to prevent impacts to human health 
and the environment, and the dramatic weakening of the most important 
federal environmental protection legislation, namely the Fisheries Act, 
we are likely to see more Giant Mines. The Government of the Northwest 
Territories acted as a silent accomplice throughout much of the Giant 
Mine tragedy. This does not bode well for the much-vaunted devolution 
of authority over resource development to the territorial government.
An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. As a nation, a so-
ciety, and a species, we do not seem capable of limiting ourselves. It will 
take individual citizens and civil society to hold governments account-
able. We still have a chance to get it right with what is left at Giant Mine, 
to build a true partnership based on trust, learning from our mistakes, 
and communicating to future generations what we have done. On the 
bright side, the report from the Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact 
Review Board sets the standard for how the remediation should be car-
ried out and is a rare example of environmental assessment working and 
responding to Aboriginal interests, citizens, and civil society. It is still 
unclear why the responsible ministers went against the advice of their 
own staff on the Giant Mine Remediation Project and accepted the re-
view board’s measures. Perhaps it was the remarkable convergence of 
367Kevin O’Reilly
public opinion and the common interests of the affected First Nation, 
municipal and non-governmental organizations that finally overcame 
resistance. Significant progress has been made since the environmental 
assessment, largely reflecting a change in project management staff and 
attitude. Time will tell whether the Giant Mine Oversight Body is able to 
fulfill its mandate as an effective environmental watchdog and manager 
of ongoing research into a long-term solution. For northern residents, 
one lesson is to never give up and never downplay the ability of a small 
group of committed citizens to create change. 
NOTES
 1 Portions of this chapter appeared as Kevin O’Reilly, “Giant Mine, Giant Lega-
cy,” Northern Public Affairs 1, no. 2 (2012): 50–53.
 2 For an excellent natural history of the Yellowknife area, see Jamie Bastedo, 
Shield Country: The Life and Times of the Oldest Piece of the Planet, Komatik 
Series 4 (Calgary: Arctic Institute of North America, 1994).
 3 For an overview, see Morris Zaslow, The Northward Expansion of Canada, 
1914–1967 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1988). 
 4 For a general overview, see Jerald Sabin and Frances Abele, State and Society 
in a Northern Capital: Yellowknife’s Social Economy in Hard Times (Ottawa: 
Carleton Centre for Community Innovation, 2010).
 5 A “Northwest Territories Lands and Resources Devolution Agreement” was 
reached on June 25, 2013 and came into effect on April 1, 2014, but left out the 
Akaitcho Territory and Dehcho First Nations governments, see http://devolu-
tion.gov.nt.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Final-Devolution-Agreement.pdf 
accessed August 10, 2015.
 6 Further details on the proposals to remediate Giant Mine are found in Indian 
and Northern Affairs Canada and Government of the Northwest Territories, 
“Giant Mine Remediation Project Developers’ Assessment Report,” October 
2010, accessed February 11, 2013, http://www.reviewboard.ca/upload/proj-
ect_document/EA0809-001_Giant_DAR_1328896950.PDF.
 7 For a very helpful historical overview of Giant Mine, see John Sandlos and 
Arn Keeling, “Giant Mine: Historical Summary, Report submitted to the 
Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board,” August 12, 2012, 
accessed February 11, 2013, http://www.reviewboard.ca/upload/project_doc-
ument/EA0809-001_Giant_Mine__History_Summary.PDF.
12 |  L I A BI L I T Y,  L E GAC Y, A N D PE R PET UA L C A R E368
 8 A. K. Muir, General Manager, Giant Yellowknife Gold Mines, Ltd. to G.E.B. 
Sinclair, Director, Northern Administration and Lands Branch, Department 
of Resources and Development, no date. RG 85, vol. 40, file 139-7, pt. 1, Li-
brary and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC).
 9 W. M. Gilchrist [Mining Engineer and Mine Superintendent] to A. K. Muir, 
General Manager, Giant Mine, Giant Yellowknife Gold Mines, November 22, 
1950. Author’s collection as provided by Ben Nordahn, Aboriginal Affairs and 
Northern Development Canada on February 24, 2011. 
 10 Canadian Public Health Association, “Final Report,” Yellowknife, NWT: Ca-
nadian Public Health Association Task Force on Arsenic, 1977. See especially 
pages 63–64 where the task force makes a number of assumptions and rec-
ommendations regarding continued disposal of arsenic trioxide underground.
 11 Joanna Ankersmit, Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, 
Opening Remarks at the Giant Mine Remediation Project Environmental 
Assessment Public Hearing, Hearing Transcript for September 10, 2012, 
25, accessed February 11, 2013, http://www.reviewboard.ca/upload/proj-
ect_document/EA0809-001_Giant_Mine_hearing_transcripts_-_Septem-
ber_10__2012.PDF.
 12 AANDC reported the cost for the remediation plan as $479 million in the 
2010 Developer’s Assessment Report. In August 2012, AANDC reported the 
cost to implement the remediation plan at $449 million. Alternatives North 
obtained documents under Access to Information that show the cost to the 
federal government for developing and implementing all remediation mea-
sures at Giant Mine will be $903 million. See Appendices 1 and 2 in http://
www.reviewboard.ca/upload/project_document/EA0809-001_Letter_from_
Alternatives_North_on_2013_IR_on_Water_Treatment.PDF, as accessed 
March 29, 2013.
 13 These and the following figures are taken from the paper by Warwick Bullen 
(A/Senior Mining Advisor, Department of Resources, Wildlife and Econom-
ic Development, Government of the NWT) and Malcolm Robb (Manager, 
Mineral Development Division, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs), 
“Socio-Economic Impact of Gold Mining in the Yellowknife Mining Dis-
trict,” 2002, accessed February 11, 2013, http://www.miningnorth.com/docs/
Socio-Economic%20Impacts%20of%20Gold%20Mining%20in%20Yellow-
knife%202002.pdf.
 14 Office of the Auditor General, “2002 Report of the Commissioner of the Envi-
ronment and Sustainable Development,” Chapter 3, Abandoned Mines in the 
North, accessed March 10, 2013, http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/
parl_cesd_200210_03_e_12409.html, and Office of the Auditor General, 
“Spring 2012 Report of the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustain-
able Development,” Chapter 3, Federal Contaminated Sites and Their Impact, 
369Kevin O’Reilly
84-85, accessed March 10, 2013, http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/docs/
parl_cesd_201205_03_e.pdf.
 15 C. O’Brien and K. O’Reilly to Hon. Titus Alloloo, Minister of Renewable Re-
sources, Government of the Northwest Territories, April 22, 1991. Author’s 
collection. 
 16 Government of the Northwest Territories, “An Investigation of Atmospheric 
Emissions from the Royal Oak Giant Yellowknife Mine,” Department of Re-
newable Resources, June 1993.
 17 J. R. Hickman, Director General, Environmental Health Directorate, Health 
and Welfare Canada, to Dr. Ian Gilchrist, Medical Director, Northwest Terri-
tories Health, Government of the NWT, July 6, 1993. Author’s collection.
 18 Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development, “Evi-
dence of Meeting #123,” May 11, 1995, accessed January 27, 2013, http://www.
parl.gc.ca/content/hoc/archives/committee/351/sust/evidence/123_95-05-11/
sust-123-cover-e.html.
 19 The author was engaged as an activist on Giant Mine issues during this peri-
od, and these observations represent his own recollections of this period. 
 20 Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development, 
“Evidence of Meetings #122 and 123,” May 11, 1995, accessed January 27, 
2013, http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/hoc/archives/committee/351/sust/
evidence/122_95-05-11/sust-122-cover-e.html and http://www.parl.gc.ca/
content/hoc/archives/committee/351/sust/evidence/123_95-05-11/sust-123-
cover-e.html.
 21 “It’s About Our Health! Towards Pollution Prevention, CEPA Revisited,” Re-
port of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Environment and 
Sustainable Development, June 1995.
 22 Ibid., 196.
 23 Minutes of Yellowknife City Council, August 28, 1995, Motion #0417-95. Au-
thor’s collection.
 24 Resource Futures International, “Socio-Economic Analysis of Three Manage-
ment Options to Reduce Atmospheric Emissions of Arsenic from Gold Roast-
ing,” September 9, 1996. Author’s collection.
 25 Environment Canada, “Workshop on Controlling Arsenic Releases into the 
Environment in the Northwest Territories, Final Workshop Report,” October 
1997. Author’s collection.
 26 Sadek E. El-Afy, Vice President of Operations, Royal Oak Mines to Mayor 
Dave Lovell, City of Yellowknife, October 4, 1995. Author’s collection.
 27 Canadian Public Health Association, “Final Report.” See especially pages 
49–51 where the municipal water supply for Yellowknife is discussed.
12 |  L I A BI L I T Y,  L E GAC Y, A N D PE R PET UA L C A R E370
 28 Ron Verzuh, “Giant Mine Fined $2,000 for Arsenic Pollution in Back Bay Last 
April,” News of the North, February 26, 1975, 1–2.
 29 The author gave a deposition to the NWT Water Board on the ammonia issue 
during these hearings. 
 30 Ed Szol, Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer, Royal Oak 
Mines, to Gordon Wray, Chair, NWT Water Board, August 18, 1997. NWT 
Water Board Public Registry.
 31 Dillon Consulting Limited, “Arsenic Trioxide Management Feasibility Study,” 
prepared for Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, October 6, 1997. Author’s 
collection.
 32 Dillon Consulting Limited, “Giant Mine Arsenic Trioxide Management Tech-
nical Meeting Proceedings,” prepared for Department of Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development, October 1997, 28–30.
 33 Royal Oak Mines and EBA Engineering Limited, “Arsenic Trioxide Surface 
Storage and Handling Project Scoping Document,” December 1997. Author’s 
collection.
 34 Larry Connell, Manager of Environmental Services, Royal Oak Mines Inc. to 
Gordon Wray, Chairman, NWT Water Board and Bob Overvold, Regional Di-
rector General, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, February 5, 1999. NWT 
Water Board Public Registry N1L2-1563.
 35 “Royal Oak Receives Subsidy, GNWT Approves $1.5 Million, City Gives Ad-
ditional Dollars,” Yellowknifer, October 2, 1998, A9.
 36 “Royal Oak Losses, Company in the Red in Third Quarter,” Yellowknifer, Janu-
ary 13, 1999.
 37 Hon. Manitok Thompson, Minister of Municipal and Community Affairs, 
Government of the Northwest Territories to Dave Lovell, Mayor, City of Yel-
lowknife, November 23, 1998. Author’s collection.
 38 Ian MacKinnon, “Royal Oak May Leave Taxpayers on Hook: Cleanup at NWT 
Mines Likely to Top $256 Million,” National Post, March 9, 1999, C1.
 39 Larry Connell, Manager of Environmental Services, Royal Oak Mines Inc., to 
Gordon Wray, Chairman, NWT Water Board, and Bob Overvold, Regional 
Director General, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, February 5, 1999. 
NWT Water Board Public Registry N1L2-1563.
 40 Allan Robinson, “Losses Mount at Royal Oak. Mine Closings, Writedowns 
and Currency, Commodity Dealings Lead to $135-Million Shortfall,” Globe 
and Mail, April 1, 1998, B1.
 41 Allan Robinson, “Royal Oak Board Quits, Firm in Receivership, Witte and 
Directors Resign as Debt Cripples Company; Miner Unable to Fine Rescue 
Plan,” Globe and Mail, April 17, 1999.
371Kevin O’Reilly
 42 City of Yellowknife press release, “City Receives Status Report on Royal Oak 
Mines,” April 7, 1999.
 43 Dane Gibson, “Cashless Mine Owes Big, Royal Oak Yellowknife Creditors 
Holding Their Breath on Getting What’s Owed,” Yellowknifer, May 7, 1999, 
A9.
 44 Some details on the deal are found in a news release (99–15) put out by Mi-
ramar Mining Corporation on December 14, 1999, “Miramar Acquires Giant 
Mine Assets, Boosts Production and Lowers Costs.”
 45 Terriplan Consultants, “Giant Mine Underground Arsenic Trioxide Manage-
ment Alternatives. Draft Workshop Summary Report, January 14–15, 2003,” 
prepared for the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 
March 2003. See page 12 where the author attempted to secure information 
about the payments by Miramar into the Reclamation Security Trust. Robert 
Lauer, an official with the Department, later stated that no funds were added 
to the trust by Miramar as a result of its operation of the Giant Mine.
 46 Miramar Mining Corporation, “Miramar and DIAND Finalize Amendment 
to Existing Giant Mine Agreement,” November 13, 2001. Author’s collection.
 47 City of Yellowknife, “News Release,” November 18, 1999.
 48 Memorandum to Council, City of Yellowknife, November 26, 1999. Author’s 
collection.
 49 Release Agreement between Government of the NWT and City of Yellow-
knife, October 1, 2000, and Giant Mine Leasehold Purchase and Sale Agree-
ment between Miramar Giant Mine Ltd. and City of Yellowknife, October 1, 
2000. Author’s collection.
 50 Emery Paquin, Director, Environmental Protection Services, Government 
of the NWT, to Gary Craig, Director of Public Works and Engineering, City 
of Yellowknife, July 10, 2001, and D. E. Nutter, Senior Advisor, Giant Mine 
Project, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, to Gary Craig, Director of 
Public Works and Engineering, City of Yellowknife, July 13, 2001. Author’s 
collection.
 51 The author participated in the process, and these statements represent per-
sonal recollections. 
 52 Gordon Van Tighem, Mayor, City of Yellowknife, to Hon. Robert Nault, Min-
ister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, October 22, 2001. Author’s 
collection.
 53 Richard Gleeson, “Cleanup Dollars in Short Supply, $3 Million to Cover this 
Year’s Work at Both Giant and Colomac Mines,” News/North, June 26, 2000, 
A5.
 54 Bill Mitchell, “Giant Mine Remediation Project,” to various recipients (e-mail) 
and attachment “Presenter Funding,” January 4, 2003. Author’s collection.
12 |  L I A BI L I T Y,  L E GAC Y, A N D PE R PET UA L C A R E372
 55 Terriplan Consultants, “Giant Mine Underground Arsenic Trioxide Manage-
ment Alternatives, Moving Forward: Selecting a Management Alternative, 
Draft Summary Workshop Report,” May 26–27, 2003, prepared for the De-
partment of Indian Affairs and Northern Development.
 56 “Cooperation Agreement Respecting the Giant Mine Remediation Project,” 
Between Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada as Represented by the 
Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and the Government 
of the Northwest Territories as Represented by the Minister of Resources, 
Wildlife and Economic Development, March 15, 2005, accessed February 10, 
2013, http://db.maca.gov.nt.ca/resources/Cooperation_Agreement_Giant-
mine_remediation.pdf.
 57 Priorities, Policies, and Budget Committee Agenda, City of Yellowknife, 
March 14, 2005, and author’s notes of the meeting.
 58 Gordon Van Tighem, Mayor, City of Yellowknife, to Hon. Andy Scott, Minis-
ter of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, May 11, 2005, and Gordon 
Van Tighem, Mayor, City of Yellowknife, to Hon. Michael Miltenberger, Min-
ister of Environment and Natural Resources, Government of the NWT, May 
11, 2005. Author’s collection.
 59 See Developer’s Assessment Report, page 6–10, where the technical adviser 
made the following recommendation: “The in situ alternative recommend-
ed by the Technical Advisor, namely Alternative B3 – Ground Freezing as 
a Frozen Block, should be adopted as the preferred approach for managing 
the arsenic trioxide dust stored underground at Giant Mine. Elements of the 
alternative should be modified to take into account suggestions made by the 
general public, the Yellowknives Dene, and the GNWT. The modified alter-
native should be described within a Project Description that presents a com-
plete plan for final closure and reclamation of the Giant Mine site, including 
surface works. The Project Description should then be submitted for formal 
environmental review, licensing and subsequent implementation.” Emphasis 
added.
 60 Gordon Van Tighem, Mayor, City of Yellowknife, to Gabrielle Macken-
zie-Scott, Chair, Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board, 
March 31, 2008, accessed February 11, 2013, http://www.reviewboard.ca/
upload/project_document/EA0809-001_Letter_of_Referral_from_the_City_
of_Yellowknife_1328900441.pdf.
 61 Alternatives North, Record of Giant Mine Environmental Assessment Delays 
(Requests and Notices), August 27, 2012, accessed February 11, 2013, http://
www.reviewboard.ca/upload/project_document/EA0809-001_Giant_Mine_
EA_Schedule_Delays.PDF. An additional one-week delay took place in March 
2013, as shown by http://www.reviewboard.ca/upload/project_document/
373Kevin O’Reilly
EA0809-001_Board_letter_granting_extension.PDF (accessed March 29, 
2013).
 62 See correspondence filed with the Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact 
Review Board, accessed February 11, 2013, http://www.reviewboard.ca/up-
load/project_document/EA0809-001_E-mail_from_Kevin_O_Reilly_Regard-
ing_Funding_Requests_for_Independent_Oversight_1328898680.PDF; and 
Hon. Chuck Strahl, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 
to Bob Bromley, Member of the Legislative Assembly for Weledeh, Govern-
ment of the NWT, January 28, 2010, accessed February 11, 2013, http://www.
reviewboard.ca/upload/project_document/EA0809-001_Reply_from_INAC_
to_Bob_Bromley__MLA_1328896942.PDF.
 63 See the letter from Adrian Paradis, A/Manager, Giant Mine Remediation 
Project, Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, and Ray 
Case, Assistant Deputy Minister, Environment and Natural Resources, Gov-
ernment of the NWT, to Richard Edjericon, Chair, Mackenzie Valley Environ-
mental Impact Review Board, August 31, 2012, accessed February 11, 2013, 
http://www.reviewboard.ca/upload/project_document/EA0809-001_Let-
ter_from_develoepr_re__Oversight.PDF.
 64 See the Alternatives North, “Technical Report Giant Mine Remediation 
Project,” submitted to the Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review 
Board, July 2012, accessed February 11, 2013, http://www.reviewboard.ca/up-
load/project_document/EA0809-001_AN_Giant_Mine_EA_Technical_Re-
port__Final_.PDF. See especially page 9 and appendix B. Aboriginal Affairs 
and Northern Development Canada finally filed the “Site Stabilization Plan” 
on August 10, 2012, with heavy redactions throughout, as seen at http://www.
reviewboard.ca/upload/project_document/EA0809-001_Site_Stabilization_
Plan_for_the_Giant_Mine_Remediation_Project.PDF (accessed February 11, 
2013).
 65 Adrian Paradis, A/Manager, Giant Mine Remediation Project, Aboriginal 
Affairs and Northern Development Canada, and Ray Case, Assistant Deputy 
Minister, Environment and Natural Resources, Government of the NWT, to 
Richard Edjericon, Chair, Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review 
Board, August 10, 2012, accessed March 10, 2013, http://www.reviewboard.
ca/upload/project_document/EA0809-001_Cover_Letter_for_Giant_Mine_
Responses_to_Parties__Recommendations.PDF; and Giant Mine Remedia-
tion Project Environmental Assessment Public Hearing Transcripts, Septem-
ber 14, 2012, 165–167, accessed March 10, 2013, http://www.reviewboard.ca/
upload/project_document/EA0809-001_Giant_Mine_public_hearing_tran-
script_-_September_14__2012.PDF. 
 66 See Appendices 1 and 2, accessed March 29, 2013, http://
www.reviewboard.ca/upload/project_document/
12 |  L I A BI L I T Y,  L E GAC Y, A N D PE R PET UA L C A R E374
EA0809-001_Letter_from_Alternatives_North_on_2013_IR_on_Water_
Treatment.PDF.
 67 See the transcripts of the public hearing held on September 10, 2012, espe-
cially pages 50–71, accessed February 11, 2012, http://www.reviewboard.ca/
upload/project_document/EA0809-001_Giant_Mine_hearing_transcripts_-_
September_10__2012.PDF.
 68 See public hearing transcript, September 13, pages 107, 116, 151, accessed 
February 11, 2012, http://www.reviewboard.ca/upload/project_document/
EA0809-001_Giant_Mine_public_hearing_transcript_-_Sept_13__2012.PDF; 
and public hearing transcript, September 14, pages 138–39, accessed Febru-
ary 11, 2012, http://www.reviewboard.ca/upload/project_document/EA0809-
001_Giant_Mine_public_hearing_transcript_-_September_14__2012.PDF.
 69 Joanna Ankersmit, Director, Contaminated Sites Program, Aboriginal Affairs 
and Northern Development Canada, and Ray Case, Assistant Deputy Minis-
ter, Environment and Natural Resources, Government of the NWT, October 
12, 2012, accessed February 11, 2013, http://www.reviewboard.ca/upload/
project_document/EA0809-001_Closing_comments-_Developer.PDF.
 70 Giant Mine Remediation Closing Comments, Giant Mine Remediation Proj-
ect Environmental Assessment, accessed August 5, 2013, http://reviewboard.
ca/upload/project_document/EA0809-001_Closing_comments-_Developer.
PDF.
 71 See the application for a water licence for “Giant Mine Roaster Com-
plex Deconstruction and Underground Stabilization Work” as filed 
with the Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board on December 19, 
2012, as found at http://mvlwb.ca/Boards/mv/Registry/Forms/Folder-
View.aspx?RootFolder=%2FBoards%2Fmv%2FRegistry%2F2012%2FM-
V2012L8-0010&FolderCTID=0x012000E7E47FF72F0B4D43A5BB2A7B-
7616D923&View={757F78CE-B22D-4021-9A5A-EA094ABF5B0B} (accessed 
February 11, 2013).
 72 See http://www.mvlwb.ca/Boards/mv/Registry/2012/MV2012L8-0010/
MV2012L8-0010%20-%20AANDC%20-%20CARD%20-%20Giant%20
Mine%20site%20-%20Comment%20on%20Roaster%20Complex%20-%20Al-
ternates%20North%20-%20Feb15-13.pdf (accessed March 29, 2013).
 73 Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board, “Report of Environ-
mental Assessment and Reasons for Decision on Giant Mine Remediation 
Project EA0809-0001,” June 20, 2013, accessed July 1, 2013, http://www.re-
viewboard.ca/upload/project_document/EA0809-001_Giant_Report_of_En-
vironmental_Assessment_June_20_2013.PDF.
375Kevin O’Reilly
 74 Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board, “Report of Environ-
mental Assessment and Reasons for Decision on Giant Mine Remediation 
Project EA0809-0001.” 
 75  See the letters sent by the Yellowknives Dene First Nation on September 
13, 2013http://www.reviewboard.ca/upload/project_document/EA0809-
001_YKDFN_letter_re_Giant_Report_of_EA.PDF; City of Yellowknife letter 
of August 6, 2013 http://www.reviewboard.ca/upload/project_document/
EA0809-001_City_of_YK_letter_to_Responsible_Ministers.PDF; letter from 
three Yellowknife Members of the Legislative Assembly on August 7, 2013 
http://www.reviewboard.ca/upload/project_document/EA0809-001_Let-
ter_from_3_NWT_MLA_to_responsible_Ministers.PDF; and letter from the 
Western Arctic Member of Parliament dated October 7, 2013   http://www.
reviewboard.ca/upload/project_document/EA0809-001_Bevington_Letter_
of_Support_on_Giant_Mine_EA_Report.PDF accessed August 10, 2015. 
 76  Joanna Ankersmit, Director, Contaminated Sites Program, Aboriginal Affairs 
and Northern Development Canada, and Ray Case, Assistant Deputy Minis-
ter, Environment and Natural Resources, Government of the NWT, Novem-
ber 1, 2013, http://www.reviewboard.ca/upload/project_document/EA0809-
001_Giant_Team_comments_on_REA.PDF accessed August 10, 2015, 
 77  Letter from Hon. Bernard Valcourt, Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and 
Northern Development to Richard Edjericon, Chairperson, Mackenzie Valley 
Environmental Impact Review Board dated December 23, 2013 HYPERLINK 
“http://www.reviewboard.ca/upload/project_document/EA0809-001_AAN-
DC_Minister_letter_-_consultation_to_modify_measures.PDFaccessed 
August 10” http://www.reviewboard.ca/upload/project_document/EA0809-
001_AANDC_Minister_letter_-_consultation_to_modify_measures.PDF 
accessed August 10, 2015; and letter from Hon. Bernard Valcourt, Minister of 
Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development to JoAnne Deneron, Chairper-
son, Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board dated August 14, 
2014 HYPERLINK “http://www.reviewboard.ca/upload/project_document/
EA0809-001_Letter_from_AANDC_Minister_to_MVRB_Chairperson.PD-
Faccessed August 10” http://www.reviewboard.ca/upload/project_document/
EA0809-001_Letter_from_AANDC_Minister_to_MVRB_Chairperson.PDF 
accessed August 10, 2015.
 78  For a full copy of the Giant Mine Environmental Agreement, see http://
www.alternativesnorth.ca/Portals/0/Documents/Mining%20Oil%20and%20
Gas/Giant%20Mine/Giant%20Mine%20Environmental%20Agreement%20
%28Signed%29%20June%202015.pdf accessed August 10, 2015 and the news 
release issued by Alternatives North on June 16, 2015, http://www.alter-
nativesnorth.ca/Portals/0/AN%20News%20Release%20on%20Giant%20
12 |  L I A BI L I T Y,  L E GAC Y, A N D PE R PET UA L C A R E376
Mine%20Environmental%20Agreement%20%28final%29%20.pdf accessed 
August 10, 2015.
 79 For a detailed critique of the Northwest Territories mining reclamation re-
gime, see Michael Wenig and Kevin O’Reilly, The Mining Reclamation Regime 
in the Northwest Territories: A Comparison with Selected Canadian and U.S. 
Jurisdictions, Canadian Institute of Resources Law and Canadian Arctic Re-
sources Committee, January 2005, accessed February 11, 2013, http://carc.
org/pdfs/mining49_nwtminingreclam_final_21jan05.pdf. Another recent re-
port on federal government management of financial security and inspections 
found that the existing system is completely inadequate, see Office of the Au-
ditor General, “Fall 2012 Report of the Commissioner of the Environment and 
Sustainable Development, Chapter 2 Financial Assurances for Environmental 
Risk,” 10-12, accessed February 11, 2013, http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/
docs/parl_cesd_201212_02_e.pdf.
 80 See s. 3.1 of the Commissioner’s Lands Act brought into force on February 15, 
2011, accessed March 29, 2013, http://www.justice.gov.nt.ca/PDF/ACTS/Com-
missioners%20Land.pdf.
377
Conclusion
Arn Keeling and John Sandlos
Mining controversies are not new. The noted late-medieval scholar 
Georgius Agricola opened his classic text, De Re Metallica (1556), with an 
extensive defence of mining against critics who cited its environmental 
impact, hazardous work conditions, and economic instability. But he also 
suggested that opinions on mining had long been divergent: “There has 
always been the greatest disagreement amongst men concerning metals 
and mining, some praising, others utterly condemning them.”1 In a per-
iod when large-scale mining was just beginning to exploit the riches be-
neath indigenous lands in the New World, there remained no consensus 
on the relative value of minerals when weighed against the social and 
environmental costs of development.
The issues Agricola discussed nearly half a millennium ago continue 
to resonate throughout the world’s mining regions. In Canada, there has 
always been a particular intensity and longevity to debates about min-
eral development, perhaps matched only by environmental battles over 
clear-cut logging in British Columbia in the 1980s and 1990s. Conflicts 
over mining past and present are often uniquely polarized, with miners 
derided as profiteers and despoilers of the earth, while mining critics are 
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branded as “anti-development” types who would “lock up” resources in 
the name of environmental protection. Like all caricatures, there are un-
comfortable elements of truth in these accusations, and presumably one 
can find extreme examples of each in the historical record (not to men-
tion the daily news).
The case histories of mineral development presented in this volume 
prompt a more reflective examination of these positions, in light of the 
complex historical experience of communities adjacent to, or founded by, 
mining activities in the North. The Abandoned Mines project began as 
an attempt to understand the role of mineral development in the indus-
trialization of Northern Canada, the impacts of mining in hitherto large-
ly undisturbed northern environments, and the social and cultural chan-
ges experienced by local communities, particularly Aboriginal people, 
in the wake of these developments. What the many contributors to this 
volume discovered, however, was more than a simple tale of despoliation 
and decline rooted in the “bad old days” of lax regulation and industrial 
disregard for people and nature. Certainly the economic instability, com-
munity collapse, and environmental impacts associated with northern 
mining suggests the industry delivered far less in terms of social and 
economic development than the boosters of northern development in 
government and business promised time and time again. For some com-
munities, however, mining presented an important economic stopgap 
against price shocks and resource declines in other sectors of the north-
ern Aboriginal economy, especially hunting and trapping. Perhaps the 
most remarkable of our collective findings is the ability of many northern 
Aboriginal communities and individuals to accommodate and assimilate 
mine work, culture, and communities, while simultaneously engaging in 
a profound critique of mineral-intensive development strategies. Stories 
of northern mining encompass widely varying historical experiences of 
economic dislocation and opportunity, community development and col-
lapse, memories that continue to shape widely divergent local attitudes to 
northern mineral development in the present day. 
But even as the authors in this book reflect on the complexity of indi-
vidual and local experiences, they by no means reject a critical examina-
tion of the industry and its social, environmental, and economic impacts. 
While never a historical source of violent conflict in Northern Canada 
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(as it has been elsewhere in the world), mineral development has often re-
inforced the inequities associated with settler colonialism in the region. 
The injustices experienced by Aboriginal northerners associated with 
mineral development documented in these chapters range from territor-
ial dispossession and social and economic marginalization to toxic con-
tamination and degradation of important local environments. These in-
justices are best understood in connection with the broader suite of fed-
eral government neocolonial policies aimed at “modernizing” Aboriginal 
people and territories in the region in the twentieth century. There is 
also a strong link between these past experiences and the deep suspicion 
felt today by many toward the industry (and its promoters in federal and 
territorial governments). Signs of the physical changes wrought by min-
ing, from open pits to toxic sites to industrial ruins on the landscape, 
remain potent material reminders of the mining experience, legacies that 
continue to haunt both the memories and the biophysical environments 
of local communities. These experiences, memories, and material condi-
tions continue to inform present debates about the costs and benefits of 
mineral development today, as mining is touted as the economic salva-
tion of supposedly dependent northern communities. Contemporary de-
velopments in the vicinity of abandoned mines may threaten to reawaken 
or reproduce the injustices associated with past developments, regardless 
of the goodwill of companies or the improvement of regulatory oversight. 
As several of the chapters also show, attending to the history of mining 
can raise uncomfortable questions about the persistence of colonial leg-
acies and institutions in the region, even in this era of land claims, impact 
and benefit agreements, and corporate social responsibility.
Ultimately, we think that a better understanding of the scope and im-
pacts of historical mineral development in the North, as well as its many 
ongoing legacies, can contribute to wider debates about resources and 
sustainability in Canada, and beyond. Historically, the goal of mining has 
only been tangentially (and at times only rhetorically) about the modern-
ization and development of northern communities. Rather, the main aim 
of mining companies and their government promoters has been to fulfill 
the insatiable demand for minerals (and profits) in Southern Canada and 
for export markets. Thus, the story of mining in Northern Canada is one 
that connects all Canadians, whether consumers of mineral products or 
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holders of mining stocks in investment portfolios, to the remote, often 
poorly understood northern places, people, and environments affected 
by mining. As seen in debates around bitumen development in north-
ern Alberta, southern Canadians (and urbanites in particular) have often 
been willing to ignore the environmental and public health burdens 
associated with our material- and energy-intensive lifestyles. Perhaps a 
better understanding of the historical and contemporary impacts of min-
ing can help lead to a better reckoning of the how the costs and benefits 
of resource extraction have been distributed among local communities, 
highly mobile capital, and distant consumers. Certainly the ephemeral 
local benefits that stem from northern mining— the historical boom and 
bust cycle that is emblematic of the industry—force Canadians to face 
the difficult question of what a sustainable economy might look like in 
the North and in the country as whole. 
These histories also highlight the problem of who bears the long-
term financial consequences of abandoned mines—in Canada, typically 
taxpayers have been left on the hook for billions in environmental lia-
bilities associated with cleaning up past industrial developments. These 
long-term environmental legacies and financial liabilities—the “zombies” 
that stalk northern mine sites and communities—illustrate the funda-
mentally unsustainable nature of extractive industries such as mining. 
Based as they are on finite resources, extractive sites like mines must 
ultimately decline as deposits are exhausted or, more likely, as the costs 
of extraction begin to exceed the market value of the product. There is no 
renewable “resource cycle” associated with minerals, though technologic-
al change and market conditions can lead to the revaluation of former-
ly closed sites or unworked deposits. But as many of the chapters show, 
the cessation of extractive activity does not necessarily end the costs 
and controversies associated with mineral development. Toxic contam-
inants, ecological changes, and the collapse of local resource-dependent 
economies may resonate for decades or longer after the end of mining, 
scarring the landscape and displacing communities. Even in cases where 
some remediation has been undertaken, many of the financial costs asso-
ciated with these impacts are borne not by the industry, but by the public, 
individually and collectively. Under new forms of environmental regula-
tion, companies are often required to post financial security during the 
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life of a mine to cover closure and clean-up costs, though time will tell 
if today’s estimates match the actual cost of cleanup. What cannot be 
recovered from industry, however, is the massive cost of historic aban-
doned mines. Despite frequent calls from industry and recent calls from 
the Canadian government to cut regulatory red tape to speed the pace of 
northern resource development, the environmental liabilities associated 
with historic abandoned mines provide a potent reminder of the need for 
strict environmental assessment, public oversight, and regulation of new 
northern mineral projects in all phases of their operation.
In broader historical terms, there can be little doubt that mining 
was one of the most important drivers of social, cultural, and econom-
ic change in Northern Canada. This book has attempted to reckon with 
the precise meaning of these changes, and how they intersected with 
the broader suite of social, cultural, and economic changes sweeping the 
region in the twentieth century. In doing so we discovered histories of 
resource projects that were too often focused narrowly on mineral ex-
traction to the exclusion of social development and environmental issues 
in adjacent Aboriginal (and in a few cases non-Aboriginal) communities. 
In some cases these communities responded creatively to the sudden 
social, economic, and environmental changes associated with northern 
mineral development. At other times the adjustments to new patterns of 
work, settlement, and economic exchange proved painful, as did environ-
mental changes that brought toxic exposure, sickness, and sometimes 
death. As we enter a new era of promises and unbridled optimism about 
northern development based on minerals and offshore oil, all Canadians 
would do well to reflect on the opportunities and challenges these types 
of megaprojects have presented to northern communities in the past, and 
what kind of issues they might raise for them in the future. 
NOTE
 1 Georgius Agricola, De Re Metallica, trans. Herbert Clark Hoover and Lou 
Henry Hoover (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1950 [1556]), 4.
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Fort McKay, Alberta
environmental impacts on, 210–13, 
214–16
excluded from Alsands project hearings, 
216–17
at GCOS expansion hearings, 213–14
and oil sands development, 208–9
in the oil sands workforce, 219–22
partnership with Syncrude, 223
Fort McKay First Nation, 221, 225
Fort McMurray, Alberta, 209, 211, 212
Fort McMurray First Nation, 221, 225
Fort Resolution, Northwest Territories
compared to Pine Point, 150–51
concerns about Pine Point Mine, 141–48
excluded from economic benefits, 139, 
145–46, 154
mine reopening assessment hearings, 157
mixed feelings about Pine Point Mine, 
140–41, 156
quality of life changes, 152–53
social changes, 149
Foster, Terrence W., 50
Fox, Bonnie, 118
Francaviglia, Richard V., 9
Frederiksen, Tomas, 37–38
G
Gagnon, Quebec, 178
Galbraith, Lindsay, 263
Garrow Lake tailings disposal, 324, 325, 332
GCOS. See Great Canadian Oil Sands Ltd. 
(GCOS); Suncor
generational differences in views, 80–81, 
112–13
Geological Survey of Canada, 66
Giant Mine, 12
arsenic byproducts, 342–44
arsenic storage proposals, 350–51, 352, 
360
environmental assessments, 347
environmental issues, 8
Nanisivik, 297–99
Pine Point Mine, 141–44, 146–48
Polaris Mine, 321, 323–24, 327, 329–30
Port Radium, 63, 64–65
understanding through oral histories, 13
environmental legislation
Alberta Clean Water Act, 211, 216
apparent weaknesses, 224
attempts to create, 346–48
Giant Mine negotiations, 349, 351, 358
in Nanisivik reclamation, 300
Polaris development, 324–25
environmental monitoring
advice ignored, 344, 346
demands for participation in, 305–6, 332
Joint Oil Sands Monitoring Program, 225
Environmental Rights Act (NWT), 347
ERCB. See Energy Resources Conservation 
Board (ERCB)
exploration
Keno Hill, 88, 104
Labrador Trough, 173, 196
Pine Point seismic, 144–45
Port Radium area, 66–67
F
Fabian, Roy, 146
Fabien, Kevin, 144
Fafard (Father), 44
family lifestyles and company policies, 120, 
123–24
Faro (Yukon), 2, 8
Feit, Harvey, 269, 279
ferroducts, 193
Fidler, Courtney, 272
financial independence for women, 120, 121, 
126, 127, 128–29
First Air, 329
fish and fishing
impacts on, 64, 103, 146, 211, 213, 215, 
216, 349
overfishing, 187
food. See also land-based living
importance of country food, 298
purchasing, 152–53
foreign control of resources, 173–74, 197
foreign workers, 128
431Index
Hay River Reserve. See K’atl’odeeche First 
Nation
health impacts
Alberta oil sands pollution, 211–13, 
214–15, 215–17, 225
demolition of hospitals, 181, 188–89
from mine development, 8–9
from mining work, 99–100, 110–11
Pine Point Mine, 146–48
Port Radium, 64–65, 71–72
Yellowknife gold mines, 344, 347
Hebron, Newfoundland and Labrador, 238, 
250
Hickling-Partners Inc., 297
Hills of Silver (Aho), 96
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exclusions from historical accounts, 
74–76
mine impacts on, 60, 64–65
narratives of Port Radium origin, 69–74
reciprocity and exchange ethic, 77–79
on remediation efforts, 65, 79–81
St. Paul, Charles, 67–68
Sandlos, John
biography, 386
chapter by, 19, 137–65, 377–81
Saskatchewan mines, 4, 17
Sawmill Bay, Northwest Territories, 59, 79
Sayine, Robert, 142
Schefferville, Quebec
after mine closure, 181, 188–89, 197–98
barricades at, 198
community resilience, 10
quality of life in, 187–88
relocations to, 175
Schefferville Mine, 180–81, 182, 183, 184, 
186
closure, 178, 179–81
development, 4, 174–75
economic value, 177–78
landscape impacts, 181–84
as zombie mine, 12, 198
scientific expertise, as authoritative and 
reliable, 307–8
scientific methods in reclamations
modelling for tailings cover, 306
using evidence for cost valuation, 301–3
Searle, John R., 60
security bonds
adequacy of, 380–81
Giant Mine remediation, 351, 353
Nanisivik reclamation project, 300–303
Seddon, Vicky, 118
segregation policies, 42–44, 46–47, 98
Sept-Îles, Quebec, 175, 193, 198
settlement
Makkovik, 238–39
Na-Cho Nyäk Dun, 89
Rankin Inuit experiences, 42–44, 43
Yellowknives Dene First Nation, 342
M I N I NG A N D C OM M U N I T I E S I N NORT H E R N C A NA DA440
toxins and pollutants. See also tailings and 
tailings ponds
Fort McKay area, 210–12
Giant Mine, 342–44, 347, 348, 362
as loaded terminology, 302
mentions in oral history accounts, 138
permafrost as containment of, 304, 344
Pine Point Mine, 146–48
Port Radium, 64–65
traditional lifeways. See land-based living
Trigger, David S., 322
trust and distrust
on protection of environment, 305–6, 348
in remediation process, 80, 362, 366
Tudlik, Thomas, 41, 42, 45
Twardy, Stanley, 47
U
Uashat mak Mani-utenam (Sept-Îles), 198
UKHM. See United Keno Hill Mines Ltd. 
(UKHM)
unemployment insurance, 49
Ungava region, 172, 173–78. See also 
Labrador Trough
Union Miniére (Belgium), 63
union participation in education programs, 
127
United Keno Hill Mines Ltd. (UKHM), 90, 
98, 102
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, 267
United States
iron and steel industry, 177, 196–97
uranium oxide demand, 63–64
Unka, Bernadette, 143–44
Unka, Tommy, 149, 156
uranium
Brinex mining proposal, 240
discovery in Labrador, 236–37
industry and markets, 63–64, 239, 243, 
244, 249, 251
Uranium City, Saskatchewan, 8, 10, 209
Stephenson, C., 317
Stern, Pamela, 51
Stewart River, 89, 96
stories. See narratives
Strathcona Agreement, 296–97
Strathcona Sound dock
contaminants at, 305, 327
investment in, 295, 296
subsidies
infrastructure investments, 7–8, 138, 
295, 296
Northwest Territories to Miramar, 353
Northwest Territories to Royal Oak 
Mines, 351–52
subsistence living. See land-based living
sulphur dioxide emissions at Giant Mine, 
347
Suncor. See also Great Canadian Oil Sands 
Ltd. (GCOS)
pollution spill (1981), 214–16
Syncrude
employment of indigenous people, 218, 
219–20, 223
environmental impact assessments, 210
founding of, 209
particulate emissions, 212
partnership with communities, 223
T
tailings and tailings ponds
cover for Nanisivik, 303–8
definitions, xiii
GCOS, 211
Giant Mine, 344, 349
Pine Point Mine, 142, 143, 148
Polaris Mine (Garrow Lake), 324, 325, 
331–32
uranium in, 63
Tamerlane Ventures Pine Point Mine 
project, 156–57
Tata Steel (Mumbai), 192–93
temporary foreign workers, 128
Thiobacillus bacteria in tailings, 303, 304
Timmins, Jules, 173, 175
tourism development, 104
Towtoongie, John, 41, 46, 49
441Index
models for studying, 118
push for opportunities, 126–27, 128–29, 
130
social attitudes about, 121–22, 124–26
Women’s Centre (Labrador City), 126
workers compensation, 100
working mothers, 124–25
workplace culture
Carol Lake Mine, 129, 130
North Rankin Nickel Mine, 36, 37, 45
Schefferville Mine, 187
Wright, Susan, 250
Wyckoff, William, 294
Y
Yellowknife, Northwest Territories
air quality concerns, 347
area history, 2, 341–42
community today, 9–10, 59
concessions and subsidies, 351–52, 353, 
354–55
disappointment with remediation 
planning, 357–58
principles for remediation plan, 356
push for pollution regulations, 348
push for review process, 358–59
recommendations accepted, 363
water pollution concerns, 349
Yellowknives Dene First Nation
excluded from workshops, 350
government briefing of, 357–58
health impacts from gold mines, 344
lands and settlement, 341–42
loss of trust in government, 348
push for review process, 358–59
recommendations accepted, 363
youth
disconnected from the land, 78
employment in mining towns, 127, 128
Yukon
agreements with First Nations, 103
economic development, 104
employment, 96
Z
“zombie” mines, 11, 12, 198
V
values
conveyed in community debates, 80–81, 
109–10, 111–13, 245–51, 252
conveyed in narratives, 60–61, 81
of minerals versus development costs, 
377–81
on reciprocity and exchange, 78–79
regarding hard work, 51
regarding land protection, 111–13
Villeneuve, Greg, 145
Voisey’s Bay nickel deposit, 244
volunteer work, 128
W
wage labour
attitudes towards, 51
as economy modernization, 39–40, 138, 
175, 237–38, 276–77, 296
indigenous experiences with, 10, 44, 45, 50
waste rock, 140
definition, xiii
water quality
Athabasca River, 213–14
Fort McKay area, 211, 212–13, 214–16
Keno Hill, 103
Pine Point Mine, 142–43, 146–48
Port Radium, 63, 64
Yellowknife, 344, 349
Weber, W.W., 40–41
welfare payments, 49, 278
Wernecke Mountains, 110
Whatmough, Ken, 40
Williamson, Robert G., 46, 50
Wilson, Shawn, 93
Winton, Alexandra
biography, 386
chapter by, 18–19, 87–116
WISCO International Resources 
Development & Investment 
(WISCO), 193–94
Wiseman, Alison, 124
Wolfden Resources, Nanisivik, 301, 308
women in mining
labour divisions, 119–21
mine worker relations, 122–23

For indigenous communities around the globe, mining has been a historical 
forerunner of colonialism, introducing new and often disruptive settlement 
patterns and economic arrangements. Although some communities may 
benefit from and adapt to the wage labour and training opportunities provided 
by new mining operations, they are also often left to navigate the complicated 
process of remediating the long-term ecological changes associated with 
industrial mining. Thus the mining often inscribes colonialism as a broad set 
of physical and ecological changes to indigenous lands. 
Mining and Communities in Northern Canada: History, Politics, and Memory 
examines historical and contemporary social, economic, and environmental 
impacts of mining on Aboriginal communities in northern Canada. Com-
bining oral history research with intensive archival study, the contributors 
juxtapose the perspectives of government and industry with those of local 
communities. The oral history and ethnographic material provides an ex-
tremely significant record of local Aboriginal perspectives on histories of 
mining and development in their regions.
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“The book situates itself at the intersection of two of the signal developments 
shaping Canada’s political landscape today: the renewed boom in natural 
resource extraction and the mobilization of First Nations communities 
around territorial stewardship and self-determination. The book brings 
a much-needed historical perspective on this juncture, and its editors are 
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